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WORLD·WAR ISSUES·AND IDEALS

SPEARE·AND·NORRIS

1. [illegible], 1914 — Addresses, sermons, etc.

2. Essays (American) — [illegible]

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2. Essays (American) — [illegible]

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

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INTRODUCTION

Every generation needs to be addressed in its own language. — Bosanquet

For youth whose education begins upon a momentous day in history, when vast and cataclysmic political changes must needs influence educational methods as well, this book of essays, sketches, addresses, and state papers has been framed. Time-worn ideals and policies of every nation which had become permanent parts of their people's character and established tenets of their constitutional life have been lifted by a great historical crisis into the foreground. They are being subjected to a searching examination by a majority of humanity to prove that they are worth the millions of lives and the billions of wealth that have been spent in their defense. It is especially necessary for American youth, the ideals of whose nation have been suddenly proposed for framing the basic principles of a world democracy, that they understand what is the best modern interpretation of those ideals, and what are the ideals of those nations whom we are to-day influencing and with whom we have been allied. A new program for a cosmopolitan education must be hereafter adopted. We must henceforth cultivate — to use President Butler's admirable phrase — the quality of "international-mindedness."

Experience of some years in instructing college youth, and at present young men in the United States Naval Academy, where, since the beginning of the World War, considerable attention has been given to the study of the underlying causes and the issues of that war, has bred confidence in the belief that in a book of the character here presented may be found the most expedient means and the most effective method of furnishing, in a brief space of time and without the need of elaborate study, a comprehensive and well-rounded survey of those profound ideas whose significance now engages the attention of the entire thinking world. A further result of that experience has bred the conviction that to latter-day youth, in these

times, ideals and issues become living realities only in direct proportion to the respect which is awakened in them for the influence and the character of the writer or the speaker whose works they study. If a man has proved in the present his ability to influence events, if his discussions upon matters of national import show his ability to rephrase old traditions in terms of contemporary life, that man — rewarded with influence and recognized with leadership — is most likely to quicken and invigorate his youthful reader; far more so, indeed, than is the other writer or speaker who, while living a generation before and enunciating principles which have since become classic examples of conduct, has not himself reached the fringe of this vital present day when the whole world has been battling for an Ideal.

In emphasizing the need of making ideas living realities to American youth, the editors feel themselves in accord with certain pedagogical principles which have, in recent years, exerted a considerable influence upon introductory courses in our colleges and universities. Not the least important example of this influence is to be found in the program of the War Issues Course fashioned by the Committee on Education and Special Training for the purposes of the War Department. "The purpose of the War Issues Course," says that Committee, "is to enhance the morale of the members of the Corps by giving them an understanding of what the war is about and the supreme importance to civilization of the cause for which we are fighting." It was intended to make this War of Ideas a living reality to each man. The Committee therefore desired that, so far as the limited time of the course allowed, opportunity should be made for a discussion of the various points of view, the attitudes of life and of society, the philosophy which we have been called upon to defend, and the ideas against which we have fought. The student possessing a knowledge of the issues and the ideals at stake in the international situation and giving some reflection to the various national characteristics and to the conflicts in the points of view — as these are expressed in the literature and the history of the various states — would then realize the full purpose and the international character of the War Issues Course. When one now considers the almost immeasurable

influence which the events of the last several years will have upon our education hereafter, and recalls also the particular influence which the Committee on Education and Special Training has had upon the college and university life in more recent days, one may well predict that however temporary may be the physical place of this particular group of educators, its intellectual influence will be obvious for many years to come.

Altogether in sympathy with this influence, and in order to present the issues and the ideals which have been so significant in these momentous historical times in a form that is compact as well as unqualifiedly authoritative, the editors have made this survey of national and international motives. It has been a peculiar privilege to be able to gather this collection of essays, speeches, and sketches from so many distinguished sources and from the writings of so various a group of statesmen and of men of letters. In spite of the variety of material, it is hoped that the arrangement here will suggest some sense of unity. The editors have sought, first, through the most distinguished spokesmen of the major warring nations, to present the conflicting issues of the war, the spirit which has guided their youth and their citizenry, and the ideals underlying the philosophy and the history of their respective governments. Then, the gains from the war as these are now possible to approximate, the relation of force to peace in a democracy, the conditions which may hereafter make for a permanent peace, the vision of the new Europe which shall henceforth arise — all these it has been thought desirable to reflect not alone from President Wilson's state papers but also from the writings of distinguished educators and scholars. To youthful readers, furthermore, and to nonparticipants generally, no great crisis of a political or social nature can be made a reality by an appeal to the intellect alone. Some reflection of the atmosphere of the war, presenting in its narrative and descriptive sketches a challenge to the imagination and the senses of the reader, has, therefore, also been thought worth including. Finally, since this book of selections is intended primarily for American youth, a reflection more or less comprehensive is necessary to remind the student of certain permanent aims and ideas underlying American character and American politics.

For that reason a handful of recent interpretations concerned with American domestic matters and with American foreign policy has been included. These, showing America from within and from without, will lead the thoughtful person to gather for himself some conclusions with respect to those tendencies in our life which have brought the nation to its present consecration to the cause of democracy and international justice.

In times like these, when all public matters are painted before the national consciousness in huge brush-strokes, there is offered to the college instructor and to the teacher generally a fortunate opportunity to combine the study of great ideals and momentous acts with the work of composition. How significant the use of the vigorous writing of these stirring days is for the service of English-composition courses may be seen not only in the adoption of the practice by many schools and colleges but also from the recommendation of its value by educators now directly serving the government. One need scarcely reassert — what these educators have already so well emphasized — the supreme value of classroom discussions, arguments, reports, speeches, and written exercises in which there is evidence of the student's own reflection upon matters debated in the classroom, and proof that he has grasped the intent of the various ideals and ideas which this war of contrasts presents. It is for these objects that any effective introductory course must be planned. It is the hope of the editors that teachers of English may find within this large variety of material — the vigorous writing of distinguished men who almost invariably express themselves with force and with character — not only ideas but also those models of literary style and facility of expression without which no course in English composition can be taught constructively. Among the many models here of undoubted literary excellence are speeches, essays, after-dinner addresses, orations, persuasive expositions, sketches, personal narratives, and magazine articles, written for different occasions and for a large variety of objects, a very large number of which — in the opinion of competent critics — must remain, both for the forcefulness of their ideas and for their intrinsic literary excellence, permanent models of prose composition.

Bearing in mind the compressed character which introductory courses must necessarily have, and the consequent need of selections that can be mastered in not more than one or two assignments, the editors have purposely avoided abstruse ideas and the use of the extended selections so frequently found in books of this nature. In adapting, therefore, the various articles for present requirements, they have found it necessary, much as they would have desired not to do so, to omit parts of many articles. The larger gaps in these articles have been indicated, but in every case the author's ideas and his methods of presentation have been scrupulously preserved. To indicate every omission of material would have made the selections appear fragmentary, and lacking in that very unity which the editors feel each article still possesses.

It is but a commonplace to observe that a book of selective readings must serve, at best, as a mere introduction to that major study of those historical backgrounds, philosophies, and literatures which together constitute the true and permanent material for an understanding of the ideals and the national characteristics of peoples represented. With the requirements of effective teaching in mind, and the importance of opportunity for choice by the individual teacher before them, the editors have tried to present, within the space of a single volume, as large a variety of ideas and from as many points of view as possible. Life in a national institution during a period of great historical importance offers a unique opportunity for studying the most expedient way to meet the needs and requirements of young men who must be trained quickly but efficiently for public service. The editors entertain the hope that this compendious reflection of ideas affords at least one practical solution to the problem which such an exigency presents. The purpose in gathering this group of essays, sketches, and state papers will be completely fulfilled, however, only when the articles in this collection shall prove of such significant value that the student, either of his own accord or through the stimulus of his instructors, shall be led to investigate the larger and more important works of the writers. When, by so doing, the American youth becomes awakened into a reflective, vigorous, and useful American citizen, may we then hope that the master

spirits of the present will furnish him with the inspiration for a study of the master spirits of the past. The editors have, for this reason, indicated in the biographical sketches the names of many of the better-known works of the various writers. In the references for collateral reading, to be found in the back of the book, are noted, furthermore, short but comprehensive articles by writers and speakers of distinction, furnishing additional light upon the subjects discussed in this volume. These articles, as well as the standard reference books which quickly define terms not mentioned in the notes, can be found in any fair library.

To the various authors and to the publishers, without whose sympathy and interest in the purpose of this book its creation would have been impossible, the editors desire to express their profound gratitude. For generous information in regard to the War Issues Course and the new conditions now existing in colleges and universities, the editors would express their indebtedness to Professor Frank Aydelotte, the Director of the War Issues Course, and to those coöperating with him.

M. E. S.
W. B. N.

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WORLD WAR ISSUES AND IDEALS

I

THE ISSUES OF THE WORLD WAR

A WAR FOR DEMOCRACY

(Message to Congress, April 2, 1917)

WOODROW WILSON

[Woodrow Wilson (1856–), President of the United States since 1913, was educated at Princeton, the University of Virginia, and at Johns Hopkins, and later taught history and political science at Bryn Mawr, Wesleyan, and Princeton. From 1902 to 1910 he served as President of Princeton University. He was then elected Governor of New Jersey. His most important writings are "Congressional Government" (1885), "The State" (1889), "History of the American People" (1902), and a life of Washington. The best examples of his essays are "Ideals of America" (*Atlantic Monthly* for December, 1902) and "When a Man Comes to Himself" (1915). The present selection is from his Message to Congress on April 2, 1917, in which he recommended the declaration of war against Germany. Its sentence, "The world must be made safe for democracy," has become the rallying cry of all the nations fighting Germany, and best expresses the causes and underlying aims of American participation in the World War.]

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS:

I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making.

On the third of February last I officially laid before you the extraordinary announcement of the Imperial German Government that on and after the first day of February it was its purpose to put aside all restraints of law or of humanity and use its submarines to sink every vessel that sought to approach either the ports of Great Britain and Ireland or the western coasts of Europe or any of the ports controlled by

the enemies of Germany within the Mediterranean. That had seemed to be the object of the German submarine warfare earlier in the war, but since April of last year the Imperial Government had somewhat restrained the commanders of its undersea craft in conformity with its promise then given to us that passenger boats should not be sunk and that due warning would be given to all other vessels which its submarines might seek to destroy, when no resistance was offered or escape attempted, and care taken that their crews were given at least a fair chance to save their lives in their open boats. The precautions taken were meager and haphazard enough, as was proyed in distressing instance after instance in the progress of the cruel and unmanly business, but a certain degree of restraint was observed. The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents. Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe conduct through the proscribed areas by the German Government itself and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of identity, have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle.

I was for a little while unable to believe that such things would in fact be done by any government that had hitherto subscribed to the humane practices of civilized nations. International law had its origin in the attempt to set up some law which would be respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had right of dominion and where lay the free highways of the world. By painful stage after stage has that law been built up, with meager enough results, indeed, after all was accomplished that could be accomplished, but always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of mankind demanded. This minimum of right

the German Government has swept aside under the plea of retaliation and necessity and because it had no weapons which it could use at sea except these, which it is impossible to employ as it is employing them without throwing to the winds all scruples of humanity or of respect for the understandings that were supposed to underlie the intercourse of the world. I am not now thinking of the loss of property involved, immense and serious as that is, but only of the wanton and wholesale destruction of the lives of non-combatants, men, women, and children, engaged in pursuits which have always, even in the darkest periods of modern history, been deemed innocent and legitimate. Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and innocent people cannot be. The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind.

It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgment befitting our character and our motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.

When I addressed the Congress on the twenty-sixth of February last I thought that it would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence. But armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable. Because submarines are in effect outlaws when used as the German submarines have been used against merchant shipping, it is impossible to defend ships against their

attacks as the law of nations has assumed that merchantmen would defend themselves against privateers or cruisers, visible craft giving chase upon the open sea. It is common prudence in such circumstances, grim necessity indeed, to endeavor to destroy them before they have shown their own intention. They must be dealt with upon sight, if dealt with at all. The German Government denies the right of neutrals to use arms at all within the areas of the sea which it has proscribed, even in the defense of rights which no modern publicist has ever before questioned their right to defend. The intimation is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed on our merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of law and subject to be dealt with as pirates would be. Armed neutrality is ineffectual enough at best; in such circumstances and in the face of such pretensions it is worse than ineffectual: it is likely only to produce what it was meant to prevent; it is practically certain to draw us into the war without either the rights or the effectiveness of belligerents. There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life.

With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war. . . .

While we do these things, these deeply momentous things, let us be very clear, and make very clear to all the world, what our motives and our objects are. My own thought has not been driven from its habitual and normal course by the unhappy events of the last two months, and I do not believe that the thought of the nation has been altered or clouded by them. I have exactly the same things in mind now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the twenty-second of January last; the same that I had in mind when I addressed the Congress on the third of February and on the twenty-sixth of February. Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances. We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states.

We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools. Self-governed nations

do not fill their neighbor states with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs can be successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the right to ask questions. Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may be, from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs.

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.

One of the things that has served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not and could never be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies, and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce. Indeed it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began; and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture but a fact proved in our courts of justice that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal direction of official agents of the Imperial Government

accredited to the Government of the United States. Even in checking these things and trying to extirpate them we have sought to put the most generous interpretation possible upon them because we knew that their source lay, not in any hostile feeling or purpose of the German people towards us (who were, no doubt, as ignorant of them as we ourselves were), but only in the selfish designs of a government that did what it pleased and told its people nothing. But they have played their part in serving to convince us at last that that government entertains no real friendship for us and means to act against our peace and security at its convenience. That it means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors the intercepted note to the German Minister at Mexico City is eloquent evidence.

We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world. We are now about to accept gage of battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included; for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them.

Just because we fight without rancor and without selfish object, seeking nothing for ourselves but what we shall wish to share with all free peoples, we shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents without passion and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and of fair play we profess to be fighting for.

It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in a high spirit of right and fairness because we act without animus, not in enmity towards a people or with the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible government which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of right and is running amuck. We are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the German people, and shall desire nothing so much as the early reëstablishment of intimate relations of mutual advantage between us, — however hard it may be for them, for the time being, to believe that this is spoken from our hearts. We have borne with their present government through all these bitter months because of that friendship, exercising a patience and forbearance which would otherwise have been impossible. We shall, happily, still have an opportunity to prove that friendship in our daily attitude and actions towards the millions of men and women of German birth and native sympathy who live amongst us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it towards all who are in fact loyal to their neighbors and to the Government in the hour of test. They are, most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and purpose. If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression; but, if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here and there and without countenance except from a lawless and malignant few.

It is a distressing and oppressive duty, Gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you.

There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts, — for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.

THE MENACE OF AUTOCRACY[1]

ELIHU ROOT

[Elihu Root (1845–) was educated at Hamilton College, and is one of the foremost American statesmen of to-day. His chief public services have been as Secretary of War under Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt, Secretary of State under President Roosevelt, and Senator from New York from 1909 to 1915. He was a member of the Hague Tribunal in 1910 and has rendered important services to the settlement of international problems. In 1912 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The present selection is the larger part of his Presidential Address at the Eleventh Meeting of the American Society of International Law in Washington, April 26, 1917. As an exposition of the phrase "The world must be made safe for democracy" and a justification of the entrance of the United States into the World War it stands second only to the April 2d Message.]

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The greatest change in the conditions of national life during the past century has been in the advance and spread of democratic government, and the correlative decrease in the extent and power of autocratic and dynastic governments. It is impossible to regard the advance of democracy as being merely local or temporary. It has been the result of long-continued and persistent progress, varying in different countries according to the character of the people and the nature of the obstacles to be overcome, but, in its nature, essentially the same in all countries.

England, in her steady-going, undemonstrative way, has moved along from government by a king claiming divine right to a Commons representing popular right through the revolution of 1688, which established the nation's right to

[1] From "The Effect of Democracy on International Law," *International Conciliation*, August, 1917. Reprinted by permission.

choose its king, through that civil war over the rights of British subjects known as the American Revolution, through chartism and Catholic emancipation, the Reform Bill of 1832, the franchise extension of 1867, the abandonment of the king's veto power, and the establishment of the Commons' right to pass bills over the rejection of the House of Lords.

France, in her own different way, with much action and reaction, traveled towards the same goal through the States General and the Constituent Assembly, through the Reign of Terror, and her amazing defense of the first Republic against all Europe, through the heroic surgery of Napoleon's career, the Bourbon restoration, the assertion of her right to choose her own king in 1830, and the assertion of her right to dispense with a king in 1848, the plebiscite and the second Empire, the Commune and the third Republic, which has grown in stability and capacity for popular government until the steadiness and self-control and noble devotion of the French people under suffering and sacrifice have come to be one of the amazing revelations of these terrible years.

Italy, struggling out of the control of a multitude of petty tyrants sustained by foreign influence, established her newly won unity and independence upon the basis of representative parliamentary government.

Spain has regained and strengthened the constitution of which Ferdinand VII and the Holy Alliance deprived her.

Throughout the greater part of the world constitutions have become the order of the day. Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, Portugal, all Scandinavia, all Latin-America, have established their governments upon constitutional bases. Japan, emerging from her military feudalism, makes her entry into the community of civilized nations under a constitutional government. China, throwing off the domination of the Manchu, is striving to accustom her long-suffering and submissive millions to the idea of constitutional right. The great self-governing British Dominions, bound to the Mother Country only by ties of tradition and sentiment, have shown

that free democracies can respond to moral forces with a splendid power of loyalty that no coercion could inspire. And now, Russia, extirpating the government which has been for modern times the typical illustration of autocracy, is engaged in establishing the new self-control of that vast Empire upon the basis of universal suffrage and republican institutions.

The political conception of control from above by monarchs exercising divine right is not merely disputed by philosophers and reformers; it has faded and grown dim in the minds of the millions of men in the civilized nations, and in its place has spread throughout the world the political conception of constitutional government exercising control by authority of the peoples who are governed.

The persistence and extent of this change in the political and social conditions of national life forbid the idea that it is the child of individual minds or local provocations or temporary causes, and distinguish it as one of those great and fundamental movements of the human mind which no power can control, and which run their course inevitably to the end in an unknown future. The existence and assured continuance of this process of development of democracy is the great fact forecasting the future conditions under which the effort to reinstate the law of nations is to be made.

What is to be the effect of this change in conditions upon the possibility of making international law relatively permanent? In considering this question, some facts can be clearly perceived.

The substitution of a democratic for an autocratic régime removes the chief force which in the past has led nations to break over and destroy the limitations of law; that is, the prosecution of dynastic policies. Such policies in general have in view the increase of territory, of dominion, of power, for the ruler and the military class or aristocracy which surrounds the ruler and supports his throne. The benefit of the people who are ruled is only incidentally — if at all —

involved. If we turn back to the causes which destroyed the peace of the world under the dispositions made by the Treaty of Westphalia, the mind naturally rests on the War of the Spanish Succession, which drenched Europe in blood through the first decade of the eighteenth century, and ended in the Treaty of Utrecht only when Louis XIV was reduced to exhaustion. What was that about? Nothing more or less than the question what royal house should have its power increased by a marriage that would ultimately enable it to control the territory and wield the power of Spain for its own aggrandizement. The interests of the people of Spain or the people of France or of any other country furnished no part of the motive power.

Underlying the whole age-long struggle to maintain the balance of power in Europe has been the assumption that increased power would be used for aggression and to secure further increase of power by the conquest of territory and the subjection of its inhabitants; and the common experience of mankind under the autocratic system of government by divine right has justified the assumption. It was a perfect understanding of this characteristic of autocratic government that inspired the words of President Monroe's famous declaration: "We should consider any attempt on their part (the European powers) to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."

Against the deep and settled purpose of a ruling family or a ruling aristocratic class to enlarge its power, continuing from generation to generation, usually concealed until the favorable moment for action comes, always justified or excused by specious pretexts, the advocates of peace, or justice, or humanity, or law, are helpless. All other causes of war can be reached. International misunderstandings can be explained away. Dislikes and suspicions can be dissipated by intercourse, and better knowledge, and courtesy, and kindness. Considerate justice can prevent real causes of war. Rules of action to prevent controversy may be agreed upon by

diplomacy and conferences and congresses. Honest differences as to national rights and duties may be settled by arbitration, or judicial decision; but, against a deep and persistent purpose by the rulers of a great nation to take away the territory of others, or to reduce others to subjection for their own aggrandizement, all these expedients are of no avail. The Congresses of Westphalia, of Vienna, of Berlin, and a multitude of others less conspicuous, have sought to curb the evil through setting limits upon power by treaty. They have all failed. The Peace Conferences at The Hague have sought to diminish the evil by universal agreement upon rules of action. The rules and the treaties have become "scraps of paper."

The progress of democracy, however, is dealing with the problem by destroying the type of government which has shown itself incapable of maintaining respect for law and justice and resisting the temptations of ambition; and by substituting a new form of government, which in its nature is incapable of proceeding by the same methods, and necessarily responds to different motives and pursues different objects from the old autocratic offenders. Only when that task has been substantially accomplished will the advocates of law among nations be free from the inheritance of former failure. There will then be a new field open for a new trial, doubtless full of difficulties of its own, but of fair hope and possibilities of success.

Self-governing democracies are indeed liable to commit great wrongs. The peoples who govern themselves frequently misunderstand their international rights, and ignore their international duties. They are often swayed by prejudice, and blinded by passion. They are swift to decide in their own favor the most difficult questions upon which they are totally ignorant. They are apt to applaud the jingo politician who courts popularity by public insult to a friendly people, and to condemn the statesman who modifies extreme demands through the concessions required by just consideration for the

rights of others. All these faults, however, are open and known to the whole world. The opinions and motives from which they proceed, the real causes of error, can be reached by reason, by appeal to better instincts, by public discussion, by the ascertainment and dissemination of the true facts.

There are some necessary features of democratic self-government which tend towards the progressive reduction of tendencies to international wrong-doing. One is that democracies are absolutely dependent for their existence upon the preservation of law. Autocracies can give commands and enforce them. Rules of action are a convenience, not a necessity for them. On the other hand, the only atmosphere in which a democracy can live between the danger of autocracy on one side and the danger of anarchy on the other is the atmosphere of law. Respect for law is the essential condition of its existence; and, as in a democracy the law is an expression of the people's own will, self-respect and personal pride and patriotism demand its observance. An essential distinction between democracy and autocracy is that while the government of an autocracy is superior to the law, the government of a democracy is subject to the law. The conception of an international law binding upon the governments of the world is, therefore, natural to the people of a democracy, and any violation of that law which they themselves have joined in prescribing is received with disapproval, if not with resentment. This is well illustrated by the attitude of the people of the separate states of the American Union toward the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States passing upon the exercise of power by state governments. Physical force has never been used to compel conformity to those decisions. Yet, the democratic people of the United States have answered Jefferson's contemptuous remark, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it." The answer is that it is the will of self-governed democracy to obey the law which it has itself established, and the decisions of the Great Tribunal which declares the law controlling state action

will be accepted and observed by common consent and enforced by the power of public opinion.

Another necessary feature of democratic government is that the exercise of the power of popular self-government is a continual training of all citizens in the very qualities which are necessary for the maintenance of law between nations. Democratic government cannot be carried on except by a people who acquire the habit of seeking true information about facts, of discussing questions of right and wrong, of interest, and of possible consequences, who have kindly consideration for opposing opinions, and a tolerant attitude towards those who differ. The longer a democracy preserves itself through the exercise of these qualities, the better adapted it is to apply the same methods in the conduct of its international business, and the result is a continually increasing certainty that international law will be observed in a community of democratic nations.

The most important difference, however, between the two forms of government is that democracies are incapable of holding or executing those sinister policies of ambition which are beyond the reach of argument and the control of law. A democracy cannot hold such policies, because the open and public avowal and discussion which must precede their adoption by a democracy is destructive of them; and it cannot execute such policies, because it uniformly lacks the kind of disciplined efficiency necessary to diplomatic and military affirmatives.

This characteristic of popular governments is well illustrated by the hundred years of peace which we are all rather proud of preserving throughout the 3000 miles of boundary between Canada and the United States without fortifications or ships of war or armies. There have been many occasions when the tempers of the men on either side of the line were sorely tried. The disputes regarding the Northeastern Boundary, the Oregon Boundary, the Alaska Boundary, were acute; the affair of the *Caroline* on the Niagara River, the Fenian Raid upon Lake Champlain, the enforcement of the Fisheries

regulations, were exasperating and serious, but upon neither side of the boundary did democracy harbor those sinister designs of aggrandizement and ambition which have characterized the autocratic governments of the world. On neither side was there suspicion of any such designs in the democracy across the border. The purpose of each nation was merely to stand up for its own rights, and so reason has always controlled, and every question has been settled by fair agreement, or by arbitral decision; and, finally, for the past eight years a permanent International Commission with judicial powers has disposed of the controversies arising between the citizens of the two countries along the border as unobtrusively and naturally as if the questions arose between citizens of Maryland and Virginia. Such has been the course of events, not because of any great design or far-seeing plan, but because it is the natural working of democratic government.

The incapacity of democracies to maintain policies of aggression may be fairly inferred from the extreme reluctance with which they incur the expense and make the sacrifices necessary for defense. Cherishing no secret designs of aggression themselves, they find it difficult to believe in the existence of such designs on the part of other nations. Only imminent and deadly peril awakens them to activity. It was this obstinate confidence in the peaceable intentions of all mankind which met Lord Roberts (honored, trusted, and beloved as he was) when long before the present war he vainly sought to awaken the people of England to the danger that he saw so plainly in Germany's stupendous preparation for conquest. It is well known that when the war came France was almost upon the verge of diminishing her army by a reduction in the years of service. In our own country a great people, virile, fearless, and loyal, have remained indifferent to all the voices crying in the wilderness for preparation, because the American people could not be made to believe that anything was going to happen inconsistent with the existence everywhere of those peaceful purposes of which they themselves were conscious.

There is a radical incompatibility between popular self-government and continuous military discipline, for military control is in itself despotic. As compared with military autocracies, the normal condition of democracies is a condition of inferior military efficiency. This invariable characteristic of democracy leaves it no option in its treatment of autocracy. The two kinds of government cannot live permanently side by side. So long as military autocracy continues, democracy is not safe from attacks, which are certain to come sometime, and certain to find it unprepared. The conflict is inevitable and universal; and it is *à l'outrance*. To be safe, democracy must kill its enemy when it can and where it can. The world cannot be half democratic and half autocratic. It must be all democratic or all Prussian. There can be no compromise. If it is all Prussian, there can be no real international law. If it is all democratic, international law honored and observed may well be expected as a natural development of the principles which make democratic self-government possible.

The democracies of the world are gathered about the last stronghold of autocracy, and engaged in the conflict thrust upon them by dynastic policy pursuing the ambition of rulers under claim of divine right for their own aggrandizement, their own glory, without regard to law, or justice, or faith. The issue to-day and to-morrow may seem uncertain, but the end is not uncertain. No one knows how soon the end will come, or what dreadful suffering and sacrifice may stand between; but the progress of the great world movement that has doomed autocracy cannot be turned back, or defeated.

That is the great peace movement.

There the millions who have learned under freedom to hope and aspire for better things are paying the price that the peaceful peoples of the earth may live in security under the protection of law based upon all-embracing justice and supreme in the community of nations.

THE CHALLENGE AND THE CONFLICT

David Lloyd George

[David Lloyd George (1863–) was born in Manchester, England, but spent most of his early life in Wales, the country of his parents. In 1890 he entered Parliament and has been a Cabinet minister since 1905. In 1909 as Chancellor of the Exchequer he introduced the budget which with its income taxes and other measures bore so heavily upon the landed and wealthy classes that it was rejected by the House of Lords — an act which ultimately led to the abolition of the Lords' veto. He became Prime Minister in 1916 with a cabinet formed of representatives of all parties, and has reorganized the British cabinet system to simplify the prosecution of the war. He is noted for his remarkable effectiveness as a public speaker and for a truly Celtic power of emotional appeal. The present selection is taken from a speech generally entitled "When the War Will End," delivered at Glasgow on June 29, 1917, and is noteworthy for its presentation of the underlying issues of the World War in terms that appeal to the ordinary man.]

Never did men stand more in need of sympathy and support of coöperation than the men who are guiding the fate of nations at this hour. In all lands we have been called to the helm in a raging tornado, the most destructive that has ever swept over the world on land or sea. Britain so far has weathered the storm. The hurricane is not yet over, and it will need all the efforts, all the skill, all the patience, all the courage, all the endurance of all on board to steer the country through without foundering in the angry deep. But with the coöperation of everybody we will guide it through once again. It is a satisfaction for Britain in these terrible times that no share of the responsibility for these events rests on her. She is not the Jonah in this storm. The part taken by our country in this conflict, in its origin, and in its conduct, has been as honorable and chivalrous as any part

ever taken in any country in any operation. We might imagine from declarations which were made by the Germans, aye! and even by a few people in this country, who are constantly referring to our German comrades, that this terrible war was wantonly and wickedly provoked by England — never Scotland — never Wales — and never Ireland. Wantonly provoked by England to increase her possessions, and to destroy the influence, the power, and the prosperity of a dangerous rival.

There never was a more foolish travesty of the actual facts. It happened three years ago, or less, but there have been so many bewildering events crowded into those intervening years that some people might have forgotten, perhaps, some of the essential facts, and it is essential that we should now and again restate them, not merely to refute the calumniators of our native land, but in order to sustain the hearts of her people by the unswerving conviction that no part of the guilt of this terrible bloodshed rests on the conscience of their native land. What are the main facts? There were six countries which entered the war at the beginning. Britain was last, and not the first. Before she entered the war Britain made every effort to avoid it; begged, supplicated, and entreated that there should be no conflict. I was a member of the Cabinet at the time, and I remember the earnest endeavors we made to persuade Germany and Austria not to precipitate Europe into this welter of blood. We begged them to summon a European conference to consider. Had that conference met, arguments against provoking such a catastrophe were so overwhelming that there would never have been a war. Germany knew that, so she rejected the conference, although Austria was prepared to accept it. She suddenly declared war, and yet we are the people who wantonly provoked this war, in order to attack Germany. We begged Germany not to attack Belgium, and produced a treaty, signed by the King of Prussia, as well as the King of England, pledging himself to protect Belgium

against an invader, and we said, "If you invade Belgium, we shall have no alternative but to defend it." The enemy invaded Belgium, and now they say, "Why, forsooth, you, England, provoked this war." It is not quite the story of the wolf and the lamb. I will tell you why — because Germany expected to find a lamb and found a lion. So much for our responsibility for war, and it is necessary that the facts should be stated and restated, because I want us to carry on this war with a pure, clear conscience to the end.

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Revolution is a fever brought about by the constant and reckless disregard of the laws of health in the government of a country. Whilst it is on, the strength of a country is diverted to the internal conflict which is raging in its blood, and it is naturally not so effective for external use during the period. The patient takes some time to recover his normal temperature, but when he begins to recover, if his constitution is good — and the Russian nation has as fine a constitution as any nation ever possessed in all the essence of fine manhood — then he will regain strength at a bound, and will be mightier and more formidable than ever.

That is the case in Russia: although this distraction has had the effect of postponing complete victory, it has made victory more sure than ever, more complete than ever. What is more important, it has made surer than ever the quality of the victory we will gain. What do I mean when I say it has insured a better quality of victory, because that is important? I will tell you why. There were many of us whose hearts were filled with gloomy anxiety when we contemplated all the prospects of a great peace conference summoned to settle the future of democracy with one of the most powerful partners at that table the most reactionary autocracy in the world. I remember very well discussing the very point with one of the greatest of the French statesmen, and he had great misgivings as to what would happen now that Russia is

unshackled. Russia is free, and the representatives of Russia at the Peace Congress will be representatives of a free people, fighting for freedom, arranging the future of democracy on the lines of freedom. That is what I mean when I say that not merely will the Russian revolution insure more complete victory, it will insure victory of the highest and more exalted than any one could have contemplated before.

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I wanted to say something about the terms of peace. When you get your victory, what use are you going to make of it? There are people asking when are you going to bring this war to an end, how are you going to bring it to an end, and when you have brought it to an end, what end do you want for it? All of them justifiable questions, and all of them demanding reasonable answer, and I propose to make my contribution to the solution of these direct and searching questions. In my judgment this war will come to an end when the Allied Powers have reached the aims which they set out to attain when they accepted the challenge thrown down by Germany to civilization.

These aims were set out recently by President Wilson with his unrivaled gift of succinct and trenchant speech. As soon as these objectives are reached, and guaranteed, this war ought to come to an end. But if it comes to an end a single hour before, it will be the greatest disaster that has ever befallen mankind. I hear there are people going about the country saying, "Germany is prepared to give you peace now. An honorable peace, and a satisfactory peace."

Well, you can have peace at that price, but do you know what it would be? The old policy of buying out the Goth, who eventually destroyed the Roman Empire and threw Europe into the ages of barbarous cruelties. Believe me, that policy had its undoubted advantages. I can hear the echoes of the pacifists of the day in the Roman forum dwelling on the fact that if they only buy out the Goths at

a small price compared with the war, a little territory, and a little cash, the Roman youth would be spared the terrors of war and their parents the anxieties of war. People of all ranks and classes would avoid the hardships of war, and be able to continue their lives of comfort and luxury and ease. The pacifists of the day, when they made their bargain, thought that they avoided bloodshed. They had only transmitted it to the children. You remember what the Roman Senator said of one of these bargains, which gave peace for the moment to the Roman Empire. He said, "This is not peace; it is a pact of servitude." So it was. If they had bravely and wisely faced their responsibilities, what would have happened? Rome would have thrown off its sloth, as Britain did in 1914. Its blood cleansed by sacrifice, the old vitality and the old virility of the race would have been restored. Rome would have been grander and nobler than ever, its rule would have been more beneficent, and the world would have been spared centuries of cruelties and chaos. You can have peace to-day, but it would be on a basis that history has demonstrated to be fatal to the lives of any great Commonwealth that purchased tranquillity upon it.

I am told that if you are prepared to make peace now, Germany, for instance, would restore the independence of Belgium. But who says so? There are men in this country who profess to know a good deal about the intentions of German statesmen. No German statesman has ever said they would restore the independence of Belgium. The German Chancellor came very near it, but the Junkers forthwith fell upon him, and he was boxed soundly on the ear by the mailed fist, and he has never repeated the offense. He said: "We will restore Belgium to its people, but it must form part of the economic system of Germany, of the military and naval defense of Germany. We must have some control over its ports." That is the sort of independence Edward I offered to Scotland, and after a good many years

Scotland gave its final answer at Bannockburn. That is not independence; that is vassalage.

Then there comes the doctrine of the *status quo*, no annexation, no indemnities. No German speeches are explicit on that, but what does indemnity mean? A man breaks into your house, turns you out for three years, murders some of the inmates, and is guilty of every infamy that barbarism can suggest, occupies your premises for three years, and turns round and says when the law is beginning to go against him, "Take your house, I am willing to give you the *status quo*, I will not even charge you any indemnity." But, you say, even a pacifist, if it were done in his house, would turn round and say: "You have wronged me. You have occupied these premises for three years. You have done me an injury. You must pay compensation. There is not a law in the civilized world that does not make it an essential part of justice that you should do so." And he says, in a lofty way, "My principle is no indemnity." It is not a question of being vindictive, it is not a question of pursuing revenge. Indemnity is an essential part of the mechanism of civilization in every land and clime. Otherwise what guarantee have you against a repetition, against the man remaining there for three years more, and when it has got rather too hot for him, clearing out and paying neither rent nor compensation? Why, every man in this land would be at the mercy of every strong-handed villain. There is no law, there is no civilization in that. You could not keep the community together. We are fighting for the essential principles of civilization, and unless we insist upon it we shall not have vindicated what is the basis of right in every land.

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No one wishes to dictate to the German people the form of government under which they choose to live. That is a matter entirely for themselves, but it is right we should say we could enter into negotiations with a free Government

in Germany with a different attitude of mind, a different temper, a different spirit, with less suspicion, with more confidence than we could with a Government whom we knew to be dominated by the aggressive and arrogant spirit of Prussian militarism. And the Allied Governments would, in my judgment, be acting wisely if they drew that distinction in their general attitude in a discussion of the terms of peace. The fatal error committed by Prussia in 1870 — the error which undoubtedly proves her bad faith at that time — was that when she entered the war, she was fighting against a restless military empire, dominated largely by military ideals, with military traditions behind them. When that empire fell, it would have been wisdom of Germany to recognize the change immediately. Democratic France was a more sure guarantee for the case of Germany than the fortress of Metz or the walled ramparts of Strasburg. If Prussia had taken that view, European history would have taken a different course. It would have acted on the generous spirit of the great people who dwell in France, it would have reacted on the spirit and policy of Germany herself. Europe would have reaped a harvest of peace and goodwill amongst men instead of garnering, as she does now, a whirlwind of hate, rage, and human savagery. I trust that the Allied Governments will take that as an element in their whole discussion of the terms and prospects of peace.

I have one thing to say in conclusion. In pursuing this conflict we must think not merely of the present but of the future of the world. We are settling questions which will affect the lives of people not merely in this generation, but for countless generations to come. In France last year I went along the French front, and I met one of the finest generals in the French Army, General Gouroud, and he said: "One of my soldiers a few days ago did one of the most gallant and daring things any soldier has ever done. It was reckless, but he managed to come back alive, and some one said to him, 'Why did you do that? You have got four

children, and you might have left it to one of the young fellows in the army. What would have happened to your children?' And his answer was, 'It was for them I did it.'"

This war involves issues upon which will depend the lives of our children and our children's children. Sometimes in the course of human events challenges are hurled from the unknown amongst the sons and daughters of men. Upon the answer which is given to these challenges, and upon the heroism with which the answer is sustained, depends the question whether the world would be better or whether the world would be worse for ages to come. These challenges end in terrible conflicts which bring wretchedness, misery, bloodshed, martyrdom in all its myriad forms to the world, and if you look at the pages of history, these conflicts stand out like great mountain ranges, such as you have in Scotland — scenes of destruction, of vast conflicts, scarred by the volcanoes which threw them up and drawing blessings from the heavens that fertilize the valleys and the plains perennially far beyond the horizon of the highest peaks. You had such a conflict in Scotland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the great fight for the rights of men to worship God according to their consciences. The Scottish Covenanters might have given this answer to the challenge. They might have said, "Let there be peace in our time, O Lord." They might have said: "Why should we suffer for privileges that even our fathers never enjoyed? If we win, we may never live to enjoy the fruits of it, but we have got to face privations, unspeakable torture, the destruction of our homes, the scattering of our families, shameless death. Let there be peace." Scotland would have been a thing of no account among the nations. Its hills would have bowed their heads in shame for the people they sheltered. But the answer of the old Scottish Covenanter, the old dying Covenanter Cargill, rings down the ages, even to us at this fateful hour, "Satisfy your conscience, and go forward."

That was the answer. That conflict was fought in the valleys of Scotland and the rich plains and market-places of England, where candles were lighted which will never be put out, and on the plains, too, of Bohemia, and on the fields and walled cities of Germany. There Europe suffered unendurable agonies and miseries, but at the end of it humanity took a great leap forward towards the dawn. Then came a conflict of the eighteenth century, the great fight for the right of men as men, and Europe again was drenched with blood. But at the end of it the peasantry were free, and democracy became a reality. Now we are faced with the greatest and grimmest struggle of all — liberty, equality, fraternity, not amongst men but amongst nations; great, yea small; powerful, yea weak; exalted, yea humblest; Germany, yea Belgium; Austria, yea Serbia — equality, fraternity, amongst peoples as well as amongst men. That is the challenge which has been thrown to us.

Europe is again drenched with the blood of its bravest and best, but do not forget these are the great successions of hallowed causes. They are the stations of the cross on the road to the emancipation of mankind. Let us endure as our fathers did. Every birth is an agony, and the new world is born out of the agony of the old world. My appeal to the people of this country, and, if my appeal can reach, beyond it is this — that we should continue to fight for the great goal of international right and international justice, so that never again shall brute force sit on the throne of justice, nor barbaric strength wield the scepter of right.

THE INVASION OF BELGIUM

THEOBALD T. F. A. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG

[Theobald Theodore Frederic Alfred von Bethmann-Hollweg (1856–——), German Chancellor at the outbreak of the World War in 1914, was born in the province of Brandenburg. After a university education he entered the Prussian civil service and became from early manhood the friend and adviser of William II. In 1909 he succeeded Prince von Bülow as German Chancellor, a position he held until 1917. His speech in the Reichstag on August 4, 1914, from which the following selection is an extract, is one of the frankest and clearest expressions of German thought in regard to international obligations.]

Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law! Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law. It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as her opponent respects it. We know, however, that France stood ready for the invasion. France could wait, but we could not wait. A French movement upon our flank upon the Lower Rhine might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong — I speak openly — that we are committing we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened, as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can have only one thought — how to hack his way through.

THE PRINCIPLES AT WAR[1]

H. G. DWIGHT

[Harrison G. Dwight (1875–) is an American who has spent much of his life in Turkey and Persia and belongs to a family which has been engaged in missionary work in the Ottoman Empire for several generations. At the present time he is perhaps the best authority in the United States on the life of the Near East. His best books are "Constantinople, Old and New" (1915) and "Persian Miniatures" (1917). This article, from which a number of the later paragraphs have been omitted, shows the natural reaction of the American mind intimately acquainted with the oppressed nationalities of the Near East to the "old imperialism of conquest."]

Il n'y a rien de plus grand qu'une force dévastatrice qui se règle.
ANDRÉ SUARÈS; "Sur La Vie"

To many of those for whom history is more than a stirring of dry bones, who have — at least in a geographical sense — seen something of the world, or whose destiny has given them to live in countries other than their own, nothing can be more incomprehensible than the pacifist movement in America. The present writer by no means proposes to go on record as standing for the continuance of hostile relations between peoples, rather than that state of harmony out of which alone can come the happiest fruits of civilization. But the doctrine of peace at any price is one which he confesses himself unable to understand. He cannot but marvel how that ideal of a Sybaritic ease can prevail, even in the most timid mind, above the sterner and loftier one implied by a war of national defense. And least of all can he account for the fact that a politician of the experience of Mr. Bryan, who may be all his critics claim, but who nevertheless was permitted to make his

[1] From *Unpopular Review*, April, 1916. Copyright, Henry Holt & Co.

way to one of the highest public posts in a great country, that an educator such as Dr. David Starr Jordan, that a successful and presumably not illiterate man of affairs like Mr. Henry Ford, that a woman of the personality and intelligence of Miss Jane Addams, who are four very conspicuous representatives of a considerable public, can seriously believe, as apparently they do, that there is no reason for the war which is now shaking the world, and that its immediate discontinuance could only further the happiness of all concerned.

What, the pacifists ask, is the war about? What common cause could unite such totally different civilizations as the English, the Japanese, the Latin, and the Slav, and as the Teuton and the Turkish, and array one group against the other? The question is an extremely pertinent one — and extremely complex. So many personal sympathies are involved in it, so many selfish interests, so many political loyalties, so many inconsistencies of all kinds, that no one can hope to dispose of them one by one and emerge triumphant with a shining theory which pacifist and belligerent alike will at once recognize as incontrovertible. Yet to more than one witness of that terrific conflict it seems obvious that a cause is at stake which is dearer than life. It also seems obvious enough that the forces for and against that cause had grown into an antagonism too acute for them to go on living at peace on the same continent. And I venture to add that if this war does not result in the victory of that cause, other wars must inevitably follow until men finally acknowledge the reasonableness and justice of the cause.

In a quarter of the globe where the modest locution "God's country" is understood among friends to refer to certain territories between the Arctic Circle and the Tropic of Cancer, separating the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the word empire is one to be used with circumspection. And it is true that certain ideas implied by that word flourish more luxuriantly in other soils than ours. But so far as the word connotes a

general idea of preponderance, rather than a particular one of hereditary monarchy, the most democratic American is often at one with the most autocratic Asian or European. While the American's opinion of imperial regalia is emphatic enough, he is less decided when it comes to offering the benefits of military protection to dark and distant peoples, or those of a great commercial or political monopoly to his own; and he speaks with perfect equanimity of capturing the trade of a continent, or of subverting its religion. He willingly entertains, furthermore, the possibility that his language may in time supplant certain others. Nor have there lacked Americans who looked forward to a day when their country should so extend its sway as to rule the entire continent, if not the entire hemisphere. If this notion be more freely uttered in commercial, philological, or religious circles than in political ones, it nevertheless underlies most popular discussion of international affairs. In another domain Buddhism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity have been simplifying and unifying forces of a remarkable kind. Then the revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries expressed an impulse of much the same nature, in the new form of democracy. And the statement of the Darwinian theory, with its corollary of the survival of the fittest, had a profound effect in awakening a more general consciousness of the process, in investing it with a new sanction, and in stimulating men's imaginations with regard to the destiny of races. What more natural, then, than that we should conceive of the process as continuing to its logical conclusion?

It would, of course, be claiming too much to assert that any such program has been definitely proposed. When it comes to logical conclusions, we are of a saving vagueness. Men are too divided as to which religion, which language, which race, will enjoy the ultimate supremacy; too unwilling to consider a possible transformation of their own. Yet certain pacifists, on the one hand, and certain imperialists, on the other, have evolved the thesis that the world, through the

triumph of some one idea, some one power, some one civilization, is destined to resolve itself at last into a relative if not an absolute political unity. Indeed not the most obscure of the belligerents in the present war, both before the outbreak of hostilities and during their course, has uttered very pointed declarations with regard to the importance of its own voice in the councils of mankind, and with regard to the destiny of its own *Kultur*. And the course of the war has made this order of speculation more and more pointed. We ask ourselves if events are working for this larger unity, and if so, in favor of which power they are working; or whether, on the contrary, the ruling powers of the world are to increase in number rather than to decrease; and which alternative may be more desirable.

In short, the whole question of the war may be said to resolve itself into a conflict between two views of government, two ideals of national destiny. There is of course a great danger in reducing so complicated a mass of phenomena to so simple a formula. It is too simple. At the same time, the only hope of clarifying a dark situation, at least for oneself, is to make of it what analysis one may. And through the smoke, the terror, the passions, the inconsistencies of this greatest of wars, the fact seems to emerge that the Turco-Teutonic powers, more characteristically than their enemies, stand for a theory of empire that certainly has time and precedent on its side. To hold the state exempt from the code of the individual, to consider the honor and might of the state as the only admissible might or honor, to enlarge the borders of the state at the expense of weaker states, to bring into the state and keep there, by force if need be, such alien elements as the interests of the state might demand, to regard the state as destined to lead or to survive all other states, was the principle of all ancient empires, as of Napoleon's epic experiment, and seems to be the principle animating the three empires in question. Austria-Hungary, the beginner of the war, is

notoriously an empire of patchwork, made up of elements the most diverse, speaking different languages, following different religions, held together partly by force, partly by political expediency. The Turks, who originated in a quarter of Asia far to the east of their present habitat, rule an empire more intricately diverse, because less divisible into distinct provinces — an empire into which they broke their way by force, and in a remnant of which they maintain themselves only by force. Germany, the strongest of the trio, is strongest for one reason because she is the most homogeneous; and no one disputes her secular right to the greater part of the territory she occupies. Yet during the last generation or two we have seen her extend those territories at the expense of peaceable neighbors, paying no heed to consequent outcries. We have heard her emit medieval theories with regard to mailed fists, scraps of paper, places in the sun. And we hear her asking to-day, in all seriousness, if the peace and happiness of mankind do not require that she should annex Belgium, further portions of France, and I know not how many other alien territories.

The reader, for his part, may very well ask whether this older imperialism be peculiar to the Turco-Teutonic powers. I make haste to assure him that I do not, because I truthfully cannot, put forth any such argument. Not even with regard to little Serbia, *fons et origo* of the war, does the argument hold; for at the outset of the war her frontiers included certain districts which were hers only by right of conquest. As for Russia, who took up the sword in Serbia's behalf, Bessarabia, the Crimea, Finland, and Poland are portions of the European continent which passed unwillingly under her sway. Russia's French ally possesses in Africa and Asia a great empire to which she has no right of blood. Italy has also planted her foot in Africa, and has shown symptoms of desiring to repeat the experiment in Asia Minor and the Balkan Peninsula. Japan has within a few years advanced beyond her own borders and proclaimed her preponderant interest in the affairs of a

neighboring empire; while Great Britain has grown in three hundred years from a rainy island of the Atlantic to an empire the vastest and most heterogeneous the world has ever seen. She it was, in fact, who widened the field of European competition from one continent to six, whose policies of sea power and colonization have had upon other countries an ascendancy out of all proportion to their needs, and who has the most to gain or to lose by the outcome of the war.

To these necessary admissions I will further add that neither in one group nor in the other are motives and responsibilities evenly distributed. We cannot say of one that it obviously and unanimously stands for this, or of the other that it alone represents that. But the fact that one is the attacking and the other the defending group indicates at once a line of cleavage. And if we follow the general example of our time, and countenance one standard of international relations for Europe, and one for those parts of the world which are outside the dominant civilization of our time, the line of cleavage becomes still more distinct. Germany, during the past year, has more than once demanded with astonishment and indignation why she receives so little outside sympathy. The answer is perfectly simple. No other country of our day in Europe has so loudly expressed its contempt of its neighbors, or has shown so little scruple with regard to their rights. Among the inhabitants of that continent the attacking powers are the ones that have to be most closely watched and most continuously guarded against by those about them. And if they should fail to win their war, the smaller races of Europe would come into far more of their own than if the defending powers came to grief.

I do not choose, however, to invoke a double standard of civilization. And it is in the very matter of empires beyond the seas that the line of cleavage between the attacking and the defending powers becomes most distinct. The course of the war has brought forward the British Empire as the principal object of attack. Its adversaries fail to say, however, that that empire is not one of conquest or cold-blooded calculation.

It is almost fantastically an empire of chance. The colonization of America, of Australia, of South Africa, however debatable from our present point of view, was perfectly in accordance with the public opinion of its time. It was the work of born sailors and pioneers, in whose sea-wanderings are bound up much that is most noble and chivalric of our race. As for India and Egypt, their occupation was in the beginning no less accidental. The foundations of the Indian Empire were unwittingly laid by a company of traders. And Great Britain would not have gone into Egypt if other European powers and the constituted suzerain of the country had not refused to intervene in a dangerous situation. What there is of calculation in the British Empire discovers itself in the gradual acquisition of strategic outposts and naval bases, protecting trade routes and vested interests which long went unquestioned. I perfectly agree with the attacking powers in being unable to regard such vested interests as superior, in the long run, to those of the alien subjects of Great Britain. Nor can I regard, Great Britain herself can hardly regard, her occupation of Egypt and India as permanent. But no one can deny — and least of all the former suzerain of Egypt — that Egypt and India, accustomed for centuries to the oppressions of conquerors, have vastly benefited by the British occupation, and that the day of their freedom has been hastened rather than retarded by that occupation. Furthermore it is the merest truism to repeat that Great Britain has always been the champion of local self-government. She has by no means an unbroken record in this regard, but her imperialism is notoriously of the democratic type. If the Anglo-Saxon race stands for anything, after all, it stands in the world for the liberty of the individual, and his right to make his way up if he be worthy of it. And then I have said nothing of France, whose classic experiment in democracy has had so profound an influence upon the modern world.

Of the attacking powers, on the other hand, it is no less a truism to say that they stand in the world as the upholders

of aristocracy, of centralization, of the will of the few as compared to the will of the many, of the empire of calculation and conquest. I do not say that their opponents, and certain of them more than others, are free from those tendencies, or that those tendencies are necessarily evil. Neither do I say that the attacking powers are without justification for their pretensions — though I must say that it is hardly for the masters of Shantung or Armenia to cast the first stone at the masters of Egypt. It is difficult to plead for the Turks that they have ever benefited the peoples who fell under their sway — save to quicken a dormant sense of nationality. But one must admit that an element of accident entered into their conquest of the Byzantine Empire, and that that conquest was also in accordance with the public opinion of its time. The Turks, therefore, like many another migrating race, have if only by the mere force of time acquired certain definite squatters' rights. And we can hardly criticize the instinct that urges them to become masters in their own house, however we may deprecate their methods in attaining that end. Of Austria-Hungary, again, one can say that that empire is founded even more solidly in the old imperialism, and that in modern times its diversity has partly been a willing one on the part of its non-Teuton and non-Magyar elements. Of Germany, furthermore, it is patent that she has had great temptation. It must be humiliating to so intelligently organized a people to consider that they were split into an infinity of petty princedoms long after the English and the French had settled those questions of internal policy. It must be bitter to a William II or to an Admiral von Tirpitz to reflect that as long ago as 1598 an obscure London schoolman was able to begin publishing "The Principall Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques, and Discoveries of the English Nation," and that the traders of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck allowed those of Havre and Southampton quietly to reach their hands across the seas — with the result that the largest, the strongest, and certainly not the least enlightened people of Europe

proper now finds itself at a disadvantage as regards access to the sea and colonies for its surplus population.

What is most curious in this situation, however, and most disquieting, is that in this day and generation Germany should carefully study the map, mark out in which directions it would be advantageous to herself to expand, and seriously say to herself: "I am the strongest nation in Europe, the most active, the most intelligent, and I have the least room in which to stretch myself. Why should I not have the position which is my due? Why should I hesitate to do now what in earlier times no other nation ever hesitated to do? Why should I not act on my belief that no good is higher than the good of the state? Why should I not create intelligently such an empire as one or two of my neighbors have blindly acquired at random? And why should I not be acknowledged the master of the world? Why shall I allow myself to be thwarted by a stupid and grasping race like the English, by a degenerate race like the French, by insignificant races like the Belgian, the Danish, the Dutch, the Serbian, perhaps even the Turkish, when by a little effort and a little temporary unpleasantness I can gain the place which my qualities deserve, and in the end really increase the happiness and well-being of the world at large?"

This question has the advantage of being both frank and logical. And, as I have said, one cannot wonder, from a detached point of view, that Germany should put it to herself. But, from the same detached point of view, one cannot watch without astonishment and uneasiness Germany's attempt to answer that question. One cannot, in the first place, help feeling a profound distrust of the merely verbal logic, the logic not of the spirit but of the letter, which has brought Germany to such conclusions as Louvain and Rheims and Ypres, as the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the shooting of Miss Cavell. Then the validity of the German premises is not beyond dispute. Opinions differ, for one thing, as to the truth of Germany's

apparent persuasion that she is best qualified to become the leader of the world and marked out by the Most High for that destiny. Opinions even differ, if I may put forward a suggestion of so little general credit, as to whether the good of the state be really the supreme good. Or, to put it in another way, some men are not convinced that the immediate worldly welfare of the state is in the long run the real good of the state. As yet, it is true, there exists no such international court of appeal as among individuals may protect a man from a powerful and unscrupulous neighbor. Yet, after all, there is a feeling abroad in the world that the code of the citizen, of which Germany has been so successful an upholder, the code according to which the thief, the bandit, and the murderer are not allowed to indulge their private inclinations with impunity, however gifted and competent they may be, is also a good code for the state. There is a feeling abroad in the world that the doctrine of democracy, which does not claim the superiority of the poor and the weak and the humble, but which claims the right of the poor and the weak and the humble to compete on equal terms with the rich and the strong and the proud, is a doctrine good for nations as for individuals. And there is a feeling abroad in the world that the theory of evolution, and its corollary of the survival of the fittest, are not quite so simple as the Germans seem to believe. The world is perfectly willing to grant that Germany is in certain ways the most fit. Her efficiency, both on the battlefield and in the fields of public administration and private enterprise, is beyond a doubt. Yet there are those who ask themselves whether efficiency, whether physical or mechanical fitness, be the chief end of man. And there are those who feel that the stupid and grasping Englishman, that the degenerate Frenchman, that the insignificant Belgian, not to mention the half-conscious Russian, have shown, even in comparison with the competent German, qualities not only quite as admirable as a clockwork efficiency but quite as likely to reach the final proof of success.

But there is another aspect of this questionable thesis of which Germany and her allies are the most open champions, that argues even more positively against their policy of "rectifying" frontiers. To the "logical" type of mind it may seem a simple enough matter to study the map and mark how by nudging back a neighbor here, fencing in a Naboth's vineyard there, or cutting off some one else's light, one may arrange oneself a comfortable place in the sun or haply make a push to the East. If the enterprising map-maker, however, has the courage to draw his paper frontier outside the real frontier of his race, he discovers that the matter is not quite so simple after all. In fact he only wills to his descendants problems and enmities that poison their enjoyment of their patrimony. For if history teaches us anything at all, it teaches us that nothing is more difficult than to "rectify" a racial frontier. In fact, after innumerable experiments in that direction, men have discovered only one satisfactory way of changing—at will—a racial frontier. That way is totally to get rid of all persons of the race impinged upon — either by the somewhat slow and expensive process of expelling them, or by the quicker, cheaper, and decidedly more effective method of massacring them.

There is, to be sure, another possible expedient of which there has been much talk in the world; namely, assimilation. Of the success in modern times of this expedient the attacking powers offer us evidence sufficiently striking. The Turks have been so little able to digest the foreign elements of their empire that six separate kingdoms — or seven, if we count Albania — have been formed out of their European possessions. And we have lately seen what steps they have taken to prevent a similar shrinkage of their territories in Asia. Austria-Hungary is racially an older empire, founded upon something more nearly approaching a system of federation. But the racial boundaries of that empire have scarcely shifted in a thousand years. And Germany — has it been the Prussification of Poland, of Schleswig-Holstein, of Alsace-Lorraine, that

encourages her to deliberate whether she shall not extend the benefits of that process to Belgium, to northern France, to western Russia, to I know not what other portions of the earth? Primitive and discredited as are certain of her ideas for this day of the world, I am not willing to suppose that she sanctions, at least for herself, the methods of her Turkish ally. But what ground can so intelligent a nation have for hoping to assimilate alien populations against their will, or to have peace without doing so?

Our own history gives us reason, perhaps, to wonder whether the period of the formation of races be entirely past. Yet it is so far past that we have little light on the origin of the principal races of the world. And although names and boundaries have fluctuated constantly since men first began to record such things, we should have learned by this time that nothing in history is less permanent than conquest. The assimilation on any scale of one race by another may perhaps have been possible in prehistoric times, when means for recording the identity of a people either did not exist or were confined to the very few, when communications were difficult and dangerous, when one country could live in complete ignorance of another, and when there was no such thing as an international public opinion. But we have no record of any such assimilation — by force. Such processes as the expansion of Rome under the Republic, as the unification of modern Italy and Germany, are one thing. Expansion among alien races is and always has been quite another. Did Rome really absorb the Briton, the Gaul, the Iberian, the Teuton? Has the Jew disappeared, two thousand years after the disappearance of his country? How lasting a mark did the great Latin, Greek, or Turkish empires, did the republics of Athens, Genoa, or Venice, leave upon the humble tribes of the Balkan Peninsula? No conqueror has ever been able to swallow an alien race. The nearest approach to that feat yet accomplished has sometimes been performed by an alien race in swallowing a conqueror — as happened to the Goths in Italy, the Normans in England

and Sicily. For the sole type of assimilation possible is by choice, not by force. And how slowly even an elective assimilation operates, we have lately had occasion to note on our own continent, where the United States receives all who come to her — on condition that they adopt her ways.

Thus we begin to arrive at the heart of our question. Nations have come, it is true, to deal in vaster terms than ever before. Modern means of communication have given government a scope and a centralization impossible to the empires of old. And the ancient imperialism has found flattering sanction in a new philosophy. It is small wonder that men find it easy to think of a paramount power. But side by side with this work of simplification and unification has silently gone on another process. Or, rather, the process of simplification and unification has reached a point where we begin to suspect that it has limits. The mainspring of the process has always been the human impulse that magnifies for a man his own house, his own district, his own race. From century to century that impulse has grown in consciousness, has drawn into closer and closer relations men of one tongue, has, as the sentiment of nationality, thrown up stronger and stronger barriers against the old imperialism. And it compels us to ask at last whether that imperialism can permanently operate outside the bounds of its own race. The answer of evolution, of the survival of the fit, is the most debatable of answers, since none agree who are the fit and who the unfit. Moreover, evolution tells us of another process, no less inevitable than that of integration; namely, the process of differentiation. As a matter of fact we have no reason whatever to suppose that nature cultivates a type. She cultivates types. It is only man that must have unities, hierarchies, hegemonies. There is room in the world for countries big and little, for languages and habits of many kinds, for that wide play of individuality which is shadowed in plant and animal life. A world containing such different civilizations as the Anglo-Saxon, the French, the German, the

Italian, the Japanese, the Russian, is infinitely richer than any world containing only one of them. And as among individuals civilization has made possible the survival of the physically unfit, and the discovery in some of them of rarer fitnesses, so, against our will, as it were, and almost without our knowledge, does it come to be among peoples. Force and size and numbers, which have always claimed the right for their side, are of less and less avail against something else of which we are but vaguely aware. At the very moment when the dream of world empire has more resources at its command than ever before, the attainment of its end retires to a greater distance. Nor is there any real menace to the harmony and progress of the world in the view that the world is to belong to many countries, not to one. And unjust as may seem the chain of accident that has done more for one nation than for another, it is surely time for nations to be aware that no standard of comparison is more unreliable or more dangerous. In the perspective of history the greatness of nations is seen to be not unlike the greatness of states in our own senate, where Delaware and Rhode Island have as many voices as New York and California, and where the intelligence of the voice has been known to count for more than the voting power of the state behind it. It is even within the bounds of possibility that King Albert of Belgium, who rules a shot-riddled acre of swamp and sand-dune, will in generations to come be remembered quite as long and quite as honorably as his great and good friend Kaiser Wilhelm II.

It is not without reason that, contrary to the unifying tendency of our time, we see the persistence of small countries like Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Portugal, Switzerland. They are not without affinity for neighboring countries. They could be subdued in an hour by those countries. But, strangely enough, they yet preserve their individuality. More striking still, we see fragments of populations, like the Irish, the Scotch, and the Welsh in Great Britain, the Finns in Russia, the Bohemians and southern Slavs in Austria-Hungary, the

Armenians, the Greeks, the Kürds, the Laz, and the Syrians in Turkey, and the dismembered Poles, maintaining to a greater or lesser extent their own language and identity. It would, of course, be no occasion for surprise if these smaller elements of society should ultimately be lost in the larger combinations. But neither, on the other hand, can any one marvel if they continue to remain distinct, if some of them even regain a complete independence.

The fundamental question of the war, then, is a conflict between the old imperialism of conquest and the principle of nationalities — the principle that a people, great or small, has the right to choose its own destiny. That question, between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, precipitated the war. And without a just settlement of that question there can be, there should be, no hope of permanent peace. For as long as the society of nations countenances the code of the outlaw, as long as a single member of that society holds that might makes right or claims his freedom to attack and pillage a neighbor, so long will it be necessary for other members of the society to carry arms. Peace is more desirable than war, but liberty and honor are more desirable than peace. I hold no brief for political assassinations. Neither do I put forward any special pleading on behalf of Serbia or her allies. What I put forward is the case of the Serbs — as contrary to that natural, human, just, and irresistible tendency of our time which created modern Italy and the German Empire, which freed Hungary and the Balkan States from an Asiatic conqueror, which in Asia itself has set alight a new unrest. The people of Serbia and Montenegro, of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Istria, are racially one and the same. They speak the same language, they share the same legends, traditions, and literature. It is the manifest destiny of that people, scattered from the Rhodope Mountains to the Danube, from the Danube to the Adriatic Sea, to reach, sooner or later, some form of political unity corresponding to their racial unity. And it is only fighting the stars in their courses to

attempt to thwart that destiny. The three empires who have set out to do so may for a moment succeed — by exterminating the Serbians. The leading paper of Constantinople recently remarked, apropos of the junction of the German and Turkish forces: "And if, in the realization of this plan, the annihilation of Serbia is essential, what is the objection?" Such an imperialism is none the less artificial, medieval, marked for ultimate disaster. There is of course, for the attacking powers, an element of tragedy in the situation. For Austria and Turkey in particular, whose imperial robes contain least purple of their own, the way of justice is all but the way of doom. But the situation will never be solved except on the principle of nationalities.

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At all events, if the nations of the two Americas can combine to intervene in the affairs of a turbulent neighbor, how much more can the non-combatant nations of the world, who also have suffered by the war, who also share in the destiny of the world, assert their claim to insist that the treaty of peace be drawn up neither in satisfaction of individual vengeances nor in support of an artificial balance of power, but in accordance with the principle of nationalities. Its acceptance, it is true, will necessarily entail problems the most harassing. But that most elementary principle of reason and justice is worth more to the world than peace or pride or wealth or happiness or the lives of its defenders. And if this war could establish it among men, Europe would not have thrown away her chosen youth in vain.

II

THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE WORLD WAR

THE RÔLE OF THE INFANTRY IN MODERN WARFARE[1]

GENERAL MALLETERRE

[General J. M. G. Malleterre is an officer of the French Army who was wounded at the first Battle of the Marne and is now Governor of the Invalides, Paris. He has also served as military critic of the Paris *Temps*. The article of which the present selection is only one part was put into English by Herbert Adams Gibbons, and is an admirable example of the simple exposition of a technical subject.]

In spite of the revolution that has been wrought by modern science, the chief rôle in everything that is done in this world is played by men working together. The forces that we have created by our brains are not a substitute for our own efforts, individually and collectively. They enable us only to do more than we would otherwise have done. They are not substitutes; they are accessories. They would be substitutes in warfare only if one side alone employed them. Employed by both sides, they neutralize each other, and we fall back upon man power as the final and decisive element.

Those who are not actually engaged in the new warfare think that it consists in long periods of stagnation, with an occasional local action here and there, and a rare offensive movement on a large scale. The daily bulletins issued by the armies lend color to this impression. It is, however, wholly wrong. Trench warfare is a continuous battle that will not end until the armistice is signed. On the front there is always firing, there is always fighting. The artillery has no rest night or day; the infantry, never ceasing its vigil, exposed all the time to shell fire and sniping, plies the shovel

[1] From "How Battles Are Fought To-Day," *Harper's Magazine*, October, 1917. Copyright, 1917, by Harper & Brothers. Reprinted by permission.

and the pick, with arms at hand to repel or attack. This has taught us to make the unit battalions instead of divisions or regiments, and to exert every effort to avoid daily losses from needless and thoughtless exposure, and to get the day's work accomplished by division of labor that will keep the men in condition for the test that may come at any moment.

It is by battalion that sectors are occupied, by battalion that offensive movements are carried on, by battalion that small operations are organized. The officer who commands a battalion does not have to think about tactical and strategic problems, but he is the chief reliance of the General Staff in the execution of an offensive movement. If we want to understand how an offensive is prepared and carried out — in a word, how war is being fought in the autumn of 1917, the rôle of the infantry must be treated from the standpoint of the battalion. A sector is that portion of the front lines occupied by a battalion. The battalions are the units. When a battalion moves up to relieve another battalion the problem of the organization of the sector confronts the commanding officer of the battalion. From the moment the order is given to move forward to occupy a sector until the battalion is brought back for rest, the responsibilities and duties of the commanding officer are as great and as onerous as those of his superiors. He is like the foreman in industrial life — constantly at it, responsible for what the men under him are doing, responsible to them as well as to the men higher up. He has to think of everything, carry a dozen different things at one time in his head, and be ready for any emergency. He must keep his men in good moral and physical condition by a just division of labor and by looking after their food and their safety. Psychologist, pathologist, carpenter, builder, engineer, cook, physician, scout, judge, father — get all these professions together, none of which are learned at St.-Cyr, and you have a good *chef de bataillon*.

The organization of a sector consists of: (*a*) accessory defenses (*élements de tranchée*) which are made to arrest and

retard the enemy advancing under fire of the defense; (*b*) first line of surveillance, occupied by very few men, from which all ground in front can be well seen; (*c*) line of resistance, occupied very strongly, which must be defended, in principle, whatever happens; (*d*) lines of support, which contain here and there strongly organized centers that can be defended while lines in the rear are being organized. These successive lines are connected by communication trenches (*boyaux*). The *boyaux* serve primarily for protecting the soldiers going forward or coming from the front lines, the transmission of ammunition and food, the evacuation of wounded, and the passage of officers on their rounds. But at the moment of an attack, if the enemy has broken through one or more lines, the *boyaux* can be used also as defensive trenches, and are extremely useful in subjecting the enemy to a flanking fire. All the lines of trenches, as well as the centers of resistance on the line of support and the *boyaux*, are now protected by a prodigality of barbed-wire entanglements. The parallel trenches, as far as is possible, are dug in zigzag form, following the old principle of fortification, not only in order to subject the attackers to cross fire, but also to enable the defenders to hold a portion of the trench more readily, if the enemy breaks through at any point. Just before a general offensive movement steps are dug in the wall of the trench nearest the enemy, to facilitate the climbing out of the attacking forces, and the *boyaux* are widened so that reënforcements and munitions can pass rapidly.

The accessory defenses depend entirely upon the nature of the ground that lies in front of the first line of surveillance, and this consideration dictates also how strongly it is advisable to occupy *élements de tranchée*. The first line of surveillance cannot always be a continuous line. Sometimes it means only a little post here and there. Watchers (*guetteurs*) must be on the *qui vive* in the first line night and day. With adequate artillery preparation, it is always possible for the

enemy to occupy the *élements de tranchée* and the *première ligne*. When one reads in the bulletins of the capture of these two advanced lines, the same or a following bulletin generally states that a counter attack has driven out the invaders. An offensive movement can be considered as serious only when the line of resistance, where the defenders are well dug in, has been carried. This line, too, can be smothered by heavy artillery. As we fight to-day, a big offensive is launched only after the line of resistance is supposed to be wholly destroyed, and the line of support subjected to a demoralizing shelling, which continues during the offensive. The line of support, occupied by entire companies, to whom reënforcements can be sent without delay, is where the attacking forces, if the artillery preparation has been sufficient, begin to suffer their first serious losses. The centers of resistance, villages and concrete forts, where existing buildings cannot be utilized, pour a deadly machine-gun fire upon the attackers.

Under these conditions one might think that the infantry, constantly exposed to annihilation, has to play a passive rôle — at least in the first three lines. What can be done against a crushing artillery fire? Nothing can be done in the sector or sectors upon which the enemy concentrates his fire. But we must remember that there never will be enough cannon and enough ammunition to batter down the first and second positions, and keep shelling during the attack the lines of support, for more than a few kilometers at a time. Even within the few kilometers chosen for a concentration of fire, we have learned that millions of shells do not create everywhere equally great ravages and equally favorable openings for the attackers. Consequently, while some sectors are doomed to destruction, others remain to take the enemy on the flank as he pours through the holes his artillery has made. This is true of offensives on a large scale as well as of local operations. Hence it is of a prime importance for each sector to keep in contact with the neighboring sectors, to be ready at any moment to go to the aid

of a threatened sector, or to help surround enemy forces that have advanced too far. The battalion commanders are in touch with their neighbors on both sides and with the higher command in the rear. If this contact be never lost, it is always possible for the commanders of groups of units, on up to General Headquarters, to know what is happening, and to direct operations in the *ensemble*.

At this point one may ask why I have started in to describe an offensive movement by talking about defensive organization. This is easily understood if one realizes that offensive warfare means now — unfortunately! — no more than the moving of a few sectors forward a few kilometers. The success of this limited biting into the enemy lines depends upon the rapid organization of the ground taken. The battalion commanders can tolerate no moment of repose, no matter how exhausted their soldiers may be. Hesitation, bungling, slowness, are fatal. For very soon new enemy batteries will enter into action, and violent counter-attacks to gain the lost ground must be expected. So every offensive implies a defensive. If the officers and men who attack are not able to organize without delay the ground they have won, not only will they be subjected to a heavy bombardment before they have dug themselves in, but they will be forced to defend themselves in positions inferior to ones they have left. With artillery conditions such as they are, the infantry is able to conquer ground with slight losses; but, by the same token, holding the ground won necessitates sacrifices.

For taking the offensive, then, the first training for officers and men is in organizing defensively a sector, and in learning how to keep in touch with the sectors on both sides and with the higher command in the rear. The use of pick and shovel is as important as that of rifle and bayonet and grenade. Learning how to avoid needless exposure, how to go back and forth in the *boyaux* at night, and how to bring up supplies, must be followed by instruction in the study of the enemy ground in front. Space forbids me even to mention the

numerous signs of enemy activity that a good watcher can detect. Surprises are now practically impossible, and some of the best help given to the artillery in warding off enemy attacks and in preparing the ground for offensives has come from information of simple soldiers, telephoned back by *chefs de bataillon* who kept "on the job" with their men twenty-four hours in the day.

Then follows the preparation of the soldiers, morally and technically, for an offensive movement. At the beginning of the war, raw soldiers who had never faced shell fire were thrown into action without the slightest preparation. We had to do it, although it was unfair to the men, for there was no other way to save France. Since the war has become a *guerre de tranchée*, it is possible to consider the psychology of the soldier. No matter how courageous and resourceful a man may be, he needs a progressive training to face death and to know how to think and act under fire. In the excitement of the actual forward movement, when men are fighting side by side, all may go well enough. But individual effort is required of the soldier after mass effort has won the ground. There comes the moment when men are separated in little groups, or find themselves alone. That is the critical moment in which the fruit of victory has to be reaped. Soldiers must be trained in such a way that they will be able to take full advantage of that moment.

This training is gained by the progressive use of the soldiers of the battalion in minor operations immediately in front of their sector. Under the pretext of carrying messages, they are sent in couples from one point to another in front lines. They learn how to use the *boyaux*, how to pass from shelter to shelter in exposed places, how to find their way in the dark, and become familiar with the system of organization of advanced defenses. Then, if there is a "no man's land" between their sector and the enemy trenches, they can be sent out into the open to build *élements de tranchée* and listening-posts, to put up and repair barbed wire, and — singly

now — to act as sentinels to protect others who are working thus in front of the sector. Next they go out in small groups for patrol and reconnoitering duty. This familiarizes them with the kind of country through which they must pass when the offensive is ordered, and they become expert in seizing upon everything that affords shelter and protection. The final step in training for the offensive is participation in raids (*coups de main*). Raids are not made upon the initiative of the *chef de bataillon*. They are ordered from headquarters, but the carrying out of the operation is left to the commanders of the sectors. Raids always have in view the general objects of making the enemy nervous, putting him off the scent, and causing him uselessly to expend his ammunition. Often there is a particular object of spoiling some plan the enemy is suspected of being about to carry out, reconnoitering to see if he has a plan on foot, or capturing and destroying a *minenwerfer*, a machine-gun position, an annoying *élement de tranchée*, or an advantageous observation post. Raids are welcomed by the *chef de bataillon*. They keep up the fighting spirit of his men, and, above all, they give him the opportunity to choose for the work men who need the final training for the offensive — acquaintance with hand-to-hand fighting with bayonet or knife or revolver, handling and facing grenades, machine-guns, liquid fires, and gases, passing into and across barbed wire, enemy trenches, and other obstacles, looking out and warding off sudden flanking fire attacks, and undergoing artillery bombardment in the open.

Preparation for the offensive never ends. It is not our American friends alone, coming fresh to the battle fields of Europe, who have to go through this training. New men are being constantly brought to the front in the French and British armies. From the depots in the rear recruits are being received, and conditions change so rapidly in a few months that men who have been evacuated sick or wounded, when they return to their old regiments, have to go through a new period of training. They have forgotten much, and there are new

tricks to learn. They need also to get hardened once more to pick and shovel, and to pass again progressively through the ordeal of being shelled.

The four stages of the offensive are: (1) when the artillery bombardment is deemed sufficient, the troops for the assault are brought up into the sectors opposite their objective; (2) the artillery concentrates its fire upon the first enemy line — at a moment that has been fixed the infantry advances from its trenches in successive lines and marches forward; (3) at that same moment the artillery fire moves forward equally — it is an advancing wall of steel, followed immediately by the infantry who enter into the enemy lines right behind shells; (4) when the objectives have been attained, or when farther advance becomes impossible, the organization against the enemy's counter-fire and counter-attack begins immediately. For the first and fourth stages the experience gained in the sectors ought to enable the battalions to do what is required of them without a hitch.

The second and third stages, which constitute the execution of the attack, will pass off smoothly if three conditions have been fulfilled: the men must be told what they are expected to accomplish and become familiar with the ground over which they will pass; the artillery must be able to live up to its program, both as regards the preliminary bombardment of objectives and the progressive advancement of the curtain of fire on schedule time after the attack has started; and the infantry must keep right along behind the artillery fire.

Before the attack the ground between the sector and the objective is carefully studied by means of maps and by personal observation, not only by the officers, but also by the men of the battalions. The artillery fire, directed by aëroplanes, may have been concentrated upon the front to be stormed for several days. The aëroplanes and the advance posts note, as closely as they possibly can, the effect of the artillery fire. The changes wrought by the bombardment are wirelessed and telephoned back to Divisional Headquarters,

where cartographers change every few hours the maps of the enemy lines according to the indications thus given them. At the moment of the attack the troops of assault have seen maps and photographs only a few hours old. Added to this information from headquarters, they have their own knowledge, from long study and constant observation, of just what obstacles are to be met on their particular route toward the objective. So thoroughly do the men know the ground to be traversed, each trench and center of resistance, each machine-gun emplacement, that they can go ahead in the dark with confidence. They have been informed also, as far as is humanly possible, just where the artillery may not have destroyed barbed wire and where machine-gun centers are supposed to remain intact. The officers of the sector have in their hands a time-table, which is rigidly adhered to, stating exactly when the artillery will advance its fire. So they know how fast to go to follow directly upon the heels of the shells. This is of prime importance, for if the march is not regulated in such a way as to follow from seventy-five to a hundred yards behind the artillery fire, the enemy will have time to come out of his dugouts, rig up *mitrailleuses*, and defend his line of support and centers of resistance. Trenches must be entered and centers of resistance surrounded immediately after the artillery fire has passed on — or there is no hope of success.

The formation for the assault is a series of waves (*vagues*) which leave the trenches successively from fifty to one hundred and fifty yards apart. Where there is reason to believe that the artillery cannot have completely demolished the first two enemy lines of trenches, it is frequently deemed advisable to send expert riflemen, either separately a few feet apart, or in groups, as the first line of assault. These have a better chance, at less risk, than solid lines, to silence what resistance may be encountered in the first trenches. But as the artillery can now be counted upon to do its work thoroughly, the waves of assault are generally formed from the start of men

who march elbow to elbow. In each line there is a mixture of specialists — lassoers, bomb-throwers, machine-gun and trench-cannon crews.

We have spoken of the artillery preparation, under the present conditions, as assuring the possibility of the advance of the infantry without great loss, and a very recent offensive, which won the Wyschaete-Messines salient, has demonstrated the possibility of complete success in this. However, it must be always borne in mind that everything cannot be expected to go well everywhere, and that not only machine-gun nests, but also concealed batteries may in places escape destruction and enter into action before the objective of the assault is reached. There is always danger, unless it is a salient that is being stormed, of flanking fire and attacks. We have not yet come to the point of overwhelming superiority in artillery and aëroplanes where we can assure our troops of assault protection until the moment of counter-fire and counter-attack. Hence the necessity still remains, during the second and third stages of the offensive, of keeping the lines moving, no matter what unexpected resistance may develop, and of assuring adequate reënforcements.

THE FRENCH ON THE SOMME[1]

"ODYSSEUS"

["Odysseus" is the pseudonym of a writer in *Blackwood's Magazine* who has, in a series of pen pictures called "The Scene of War," which appeared during 1916 and 1917, given perhaps the most artistic descriptions of the various battle fields and points of interest from the North Sea to Suez. From the present selection a few paragraphs relating to aviation have been omitted.]

I had seen the mighty effort of our people on the Somme, and had witnessed the battle for Morval and Lesbœufs from a point very near the left wing of our gallant allies; but I had not yet seen the French in action. I was therefore glad to know that an opportunity was now to be given me of doing so.

Our headquarters were in an old Cathedral town, in whose streets and squares there were almost as many Englishmen as Frenchmen; while at our hotel the khaki and the gray blue were closely intermingled. It was the meeting point here, a little in the rear, of the two armies.

The early morning found us on one of those straight, logical roads — unlike our own — that run with their French directness and singleness of purpose from one considered point to another. It was a road animated by all the stir and preparation of organized war; which, as it is developed by the patient and strenuous industry of her people throughout France, comes slowly, like the shaft of a lance to its blade-point, to its final conclusion here upon the Front. So overwhelming is the interest of the Fighting Line — that strange, shifting, and tragic area, where the thoughts and ideals of men are brought to the anvil of war — that one is prone to neglect

[1] From *Blackwood's Magazine*, February, 1917. Reprinted by permission.

these mighty preparations, this patient and faithful toil that is the prelude to victory.

As we swept along the straight white road, it was thronged with these symbols of the will and tenacity of France.

"Under the light, sparkling surface of this people," said my companion, "there resides a core of indestructible granite, and the Boche is up against it now."

So he is; and the granite is legible upon the faces of all those men who toil upon these long white roads that are the arteries of war.

Gone for the moment are the vivacity and the joy; but the infinite patience, the undying valor, these remain; and let us bow to them when we meet them on the road.

Here are the menders restoring to the road its traditional perfection; reclaiming it foot by foot from the indignity that has been put upon it. Here are the drivers of the wagons, carrying to their brethren the provender of battle; the food and the fuel they need for their sustenance, the shells and cartridges they claim for the intruder upon their ancient soil. White with the dust, seamed with the sweat and the stress of their traffic, hard and enduring, these men have but one purpose at heart, one end in view; and to this their strength is uncomplainingly directed.

Beside them, along the Light Railway that cleaves the fields, there move the great guns, the armored cars, and gallant engines, the steel wagons full of shells.

The Light Railways converge at the temporary terminus a little behind the battle line, and a great activity is concentrated here at the base of supply.

It is a busy scene, interrupted from time to time by the thrust of war. The German aëroplane, when it can get so far, drops its bombs, under cover of the night, upon the little colony, killing friend and foe alike; and Fritz and François lie beside each other stricken by the same missile. The sound of the battle is heard in the distance, and the shadows of evening are lit with the summer lightning of the guns.

Farther upon the road are the great guns that travel by rail, and heave their shells a distance of twenty kilometers. You can see them in the autumn mists like mammoths pointing their trunks towards the invader, and from time to time you can see the flame as it issues from their lips; you can hear the thunder of their voices as the *gros obus* go hurtling through the sky. If you go up to them, you will find them like Leviathan at home in a field, and behind each gun the wagon of steel in which his provender is laid.

When the door of the wagon is opened, one of the sleeping creatures is nipped by the claws of a traveling crane and deposited like a puppy in a cradle that moves along an aërial line of rail, until it is arrived at the mighty breach, its last resting place before it fulfills its destiny.

The slow twisting of a screw behind it sends it forth with a persuasive impulse into the open breach; the door is closed upon its mystery; and then with a mighty music it sweeps upon the world, a living thing.

Beside this portent the quiet cattle pasture, indifferent even to its voice; the women toil with bent shoulders in the fields they love, and the life of the hamlet moves upon its ancient course.

When evening comes, the people of the gun gather together like factory workers after the day's toil, and you can see them in a dark silhouette against the reddening sky, as a truck carries them away to their billets. One of the last to leave is the Battery Commander, a man who is the human equivalent of his charge; solid and direct; a hard and determined hitter.

Beyond the great guns and the Aviation Camp, the road now carries us into the dread Land of War. You cannot mistake it if you have once seen it here in France; for it is the negation of all that you have held most dear upon this earth. In this land Ruin walks hand in hand with Death. The green meadows and the russet orchards, the lovely woods that should be turning to gold and amber and cinnabar;

the creepers that should be climbing in crimson upon the cottage walls; the old people at their doors, the children at the gate, the rose-cheeked maidens blushing with the sap and flow of life; the blue smoke of each homestead curling into the quiet sky; the lights at the windows; the stir and music of the street, — all these have gone.

Aceldama, it has become a place of woe; and Golgotha, a place of skulls.

One cannot convey to another, who has not seen it, the desolation and horror of the scene. The fields are of a melancholy brown, where dying weeds hang their dejected and tattered heads; the woods are ghostly remnants of what once were trees, but are now misshapen and tortured forms that grieve the open sky; the houses where they retain any form at all are ruined beyond the semblance of human habitations, with roofs that grin at one like the teeth of a skull, and walls that look as if a leprosy had fastened upon their tottering remains. The white highway, that was once so superb and finished a thing, the lineal heir of Rome, is now as weary and as broken as if it led to Hell.

A side-road from it — one of those familiar and domestic things we love — leads to the hamlet and Château of ——, and it is the most pitiful semblance of a road upon which human footsteps ever echoed since man began to call himself civilized.

. . . . . .

As we emerged into the daylight, a French plane came flying low over the ruins of the Château, ringed about with black puffs of shrapnel, which pursued her like hounds.

All about us lay the remnants of the Château. That rubbish-heap there was its farm, and that blistered spot upon which no blade of grass was visible was its lawn. Those withered trees were its sheltering wood, and here and there we could trace the fragments of its encircling wall. The whole of its area was seamed with the German trenches.

An officer who was with me looked at it with a cool and deliberate air.

"Quite done for," he said, "and I happen to know that De K—— spent three hundred thousand francs on it just before the war broke out."

It is thus that you realize what France has endured.

We were now obliged to enter the shelter of the long communication trench; and from time to time as we stopped to look over its walls we could see the Artillery battle progressing with an increasing fury, the flight of the German aëroplanes, and the falling ever nearer and nearer of the shells. Here and there in the general waste there survived the fragment of a wall, a solitary tree which helped to mark the direction we were taking. All else was a void, blistered beyond all earthly semblance.

The black face of a nigger peeping out from this Inferno was a startling apparition.

We found him presently, one of a party, clearing the ruined trenches. Pipe in mouth, clad in the same blue helmet and uniform, they worked here side by side with their French brethren. Brethren they were, too, in their easy and friendly companionship. In the hospitals, too, you find them so — black face and white face near each other, bound by the tie of common sacrifice.

Every here and there a small wooden cross, standing up from the walls of the trench with some simple inscription, "Un brave Français," showed where lay the remnants of one who had died for his country.

And then we came to a point which the diggers had not yet reached; whence the tide of battle had barely ebbed, and the trenches still lay as they had been left by the beaten enemy.

"Here, where we stand now," said one who was with us, "you see the débris of a barrage across which the Boche and our people threw hand grenades at each other, until we broke through and drove them before us."

Every few yards there was a shaft leading down from the trench into a dugout, and in each of these dugouts there lay rifles and bandoliers and gas masks, hastily abandoned by the enemy; and sometimes these dugouts were sealed by the explosion of a shell, and in them there lay those who had been killed or buried alive.

And so we came to where the dead still lay unburied; the human creature with all his potentialities reduced to that which had better remain undescribed. . . .

We still went on, and as I turned to look back I found that I was alone with C——, an officer of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, who strode on before me gay and exultant.

"We are about 300 meters now from the Boche; let us see what's happening," said he, and climbing a little way up the broken wall of the trench, he looked out upon the howling waste.

It was the same tragic scene that had met our eyes since first we embarked upon this journey — but more deadly, more intense in its mournful expression. The increasing battle, the loud explosions of the shells, the rattle of the machine-guns, the German planes venturing here and there within our reach, the rising columns and masses of black smoke, the dead men lying below, gave me an impression that can never fade of the hell into which the best and bravest of the world go with a smile.

And then a little incident occurred which brought the scene to a sort of personal climax. For as I stood here, absorbed in its detail, I saw approaching me, racing across the gray waste, like some footballer dashing for his goal, a small black creature, clearly visible, swaying from side to side, yet furiously intent upon its course. I dropped into the trench to the sound of a smashing explosion; a shower of mud, and a heavy fall as de V——, who had been following us, rolled over at my feet.

"*Nous l'avons échappé belle,*" laughed C——, brushing the mud from his tunic, and as I did the same a small warm object fell from the folds of my coat.

"It was the wind of the damned thing that knocked me over," said de V——, picking himself up, somewhat abashed.

We found the shell on the lip of the trench fuming as if with rage at having failed of its purpose.

We were evidently in luck; for Mr. Bass, of an American paper — an old campaigner who carries with him a wound from the Russian front — who should have been where it fell, had fortunately dropped a couple of yards behind. The rest of our party, farther off, seeing the shell fall, retired to a dugout, assured that we should never meet again. A pause of a second or two — a yard this way or that, — such is the interval between all that life means to us and the bleak oblivion of death.

It is a risk that the soldier at the Front takes every day of his life.

"Don't be distressed for me if I fall," says he, writing to mother or wife, "it is a glorious death to die."

We ate our lunch in an underground mansion, which for the past two years had been the home of a German General and his Staff. And when we had finished, we climbed out into the open again to find François Flameng, with his fresh face and cheery air, his blue trench helmet on his head, and a pipe in the corner of his mouth, painting the villa. The French officers of our party were delighted to see him. There was much hand-shaking and friendly chaff, and we had the honor of being introduced to the painter.

It seems that M. Flameng has permission to go where he likes and to paint whatever pleases his eye. Since the beginning of the War he has been busy in this way, and there is no one better known in trench and camp than this distinguished and joyous personage. It was a great and a very unexpected pleasure to see him at work.

The scene amidst which these events transpired was of an impressive character. Above it there rose in its tragic and

misshapen lines the gaunt skeleton of a wood. At one end of it there was a cemetery of new-made graves, each with its wooden cross and simple inscription: "Guyot Pierre — Soldier of France" — "Lieutenant M——, an affectionate tribute from his Company." Beside them stood a tall man in a long buff coat with his cassock peeping from under it, a trench helmet on his head, and a face like that of Christ, with his blond beard and gentle eyes. Next to him stood the Divisional Surgeon, a humorous character: "Un vrai type," said an officer, laughing at his singular manner and speech; about them there moved upon their varied business the French infantry, hardy and matter-of-fact.

With a sudden whir an aëroplane came flying over the tree tops, almost brushing them with its wings. And beyond these the heavy batteries roared their menace, and the ground shook with their wrath. It was a beautiful sight, too, in its way: the low concealed valley; the blue figures moving amongst the trees; the Battery Commanders, cool and icy in their places of control, their clear, peremptory voices cleaving the welter of sound; the men at the guns like stokers at a furnace; the sudden flash, the bursting roar, the recoil; and in the gray sky, visible to the eye, the messenger of Death upon his way. Over all, ceaseless in their brooding, the French aviators flying low over the field of vision, the eyes of France fixed upon the enemy.

We met the General at work in his dugout in another part of the field. It was another habitation to that of his German rival. "Voilà mon Cabinet de travail," said he, ushering me into the smallest of little rooms by the roadside, with a table in it, a chair, a telephone, and a staff-map upon the wall. Some steps cut in the mud led down to his bedroom, which was like a steamer cabin. The bulb of an electric light hung beside his bed. "A present from the Boche," he said. Next door his Staff were at work, the telephone was constantly in action, and a dispatch rider occasionally came peppering up the road.

We climbed up into the field above. The same desolate waste, the same mournful void that war creates wherever it places its deadly hand. Upon the skyline I could see the faint outlines of the Bois de Trones, by which I had stood on the day of the British battle. French and English, hand in hand, good friends and loyal comrades, we go forward, never doubting, to the ultimate goal, sealing our compact with the blood of our peoples.

Can we ever forget them, or they us?

And then, as I stood here with the General — a man of the old type, vivid and martial, a soldier of France — some homing pigeons came flying through the gray sky, gentle of wing and faithful to their cause; and out of the tarnished waste a lark rose singing into the heavens, above the griefs and the turmoil of men, unconscious of the tragedy about her.

DINANT LA MORTE[1]

CAMILLE DAVID

In the early days of September the terrible news began to circulate in Brussels: "Dinant is razed to the ground! Its inhabitants have been either massacred or deported! Famine reigns amongst the people who are left!" This was a few days after Louvain, and the general depression made us loth to believe in a fresh misfortune. Yet the refugees gave exact details, and their grief was so sincere and their condition so wretched that we were finally convinced. One morning, desiring to see for ourselves, we started out for the place of martyrdom, making a terrible pilgrimage through the devastated countryside and burnt villages.

I had last seen Dinant on August 15th, when I watched the battle from the heights of Anhée as it raged from one hill to the next above the town. Now we found ourselves there once more, or rather on the site where Dinant had been. Under the citadel, which overhung the rock, was a hole. The old bell-tower of the thirteenth century cathedral, which had been built on the ruins of a Roman temple, was broken down. The tower looked pitiable — like a body without a head. The old houses which gave to the bright little town its archaic look and, withal, a note of unique gayety, were nothing but ruins, their scorched walls and tottering gables revealing the naked rocks behind. We went into the St. Médard quarter, which had been raked by fire and shell. The National Bank, the station, and a few houses are still standing; but their interiors show traces of unbridled pillage. In order to get at the safe in the bank the bandits had made a hole in the wall large enough for a man to pass through.

[1] From *Contemporary Review*, August, 1915. Reprinted by permission.

Of the 1400 houses which spread lazily along the river not 200 remain. The devastation is complete from Devant-Bouvignes all the way to Anseremme, itself also three quarters destroyed. One would think that a cyclone must have passed that way. That human hands could have caused such disaster is beyond the power of the imagination to believe. And yet it was men who made this fire with their own hands by means of the grenades they threw.

Towards the Rue Adolphe Sax the houses have been razed to the ground. In front of the church is a great empty space; the doorway of the cathedral looks on to the Meuse. Left and right, as far as one can see, there is not a roof, not a house, only blackened and crumbling walls, ruins, and rubbish. Higher up, the Hydrotherapeutic Institute, the villas, Bellevue College have disappeared. Above the hospital, which remains, the façade of a convent is riddled with holes. Over a wooden bridge supported by piles we pass the Hôtel de Ville and the elementary school, both destroyed. In the streets there is a mournful silence as of death. The Maison du Peuple has been overthrown by some "comrades." We step into the church of St. Pierre, and see walls — and the sky.

The horror continues right on to Leffe. As for noting what has been destroyed, it is far easier to write down what is left. The barracks, the police office, and the Athenæum have been spared. With death in our hearts we return to the center of the city and in the direction of the Faubourg St. Nicolas. Of the Grande Rue, so picturesque with its old shops full of articles in leather and Dinant shells, nothing remains. We stumble over the bricks of ruined houses. The Palais de Justice, the boarding-school, the Girls' Secondary School have not perished. But the St. Nicolas Church was set on fire. The Place de Meuse has been preserved. Guaranteed until the Sunday by the presence of the French on the left bank of the Meuse, it was subsequently spared through the intervention of a lady of German origin, from whom a Prussian soldier, nevertheless, stole 5000 francs' worth of jewelry. By what

providential accident the Faubourg St. Paul suffered comparatively little is not known. But towards the Rocher Bayard and further, and opposite at Neffe, the devastation begins again.

. . . . . .

If wealth had but been the only thing destroyed! But add to it the human suffering such as Dante himself could not have imagined!

What had happened?

From the first days of August the French artillery was installed on the heights of the left bank and their infantry in the valley in the St. Médard quarter. The Germans had taken up their position on the right bank. During the night, like brigands, taking advantage of the darkness, they came down through the "Fonds de Leffe," and threw themselves upon the town, shooting with their rifles and causing terror amongst the inhabitants. Yet the town had been peaceful, and was anxious only with regard to general events. There were neither guns, nor rifles, nor soldiers, only civilians without arms. The arms had all been collected by the authorities. The *garde civique* had been disarmed and disbanded before August 15th. After the bombardment which took place at the time of the first battle between the French and Germans on August 15th, when some buildings on the left bank were destroyed, part of the population had fled. In the days which followed there were only small artillery duels.

On Friday, August 21st, in the evening, began the awful sack of Dinant, which surpasses in horror the destruction of the town by Charles the Bold in the fifteenth century. It was half past nine at night. The town was calm and silent. The inhabitants were all indoors. Suddenly shots rang out, and dreadful groans were heard. A band of German soldiers was coming down the Rue St. Jacques firing into the windows of the houses. A man employed at the gasworks, Auguste Georges, was going into his house when he was killed. The butcher,

Cleda, who ventured to look out, was wounded, and the soldiers forced him to cry "Vive l'Empereur!" M. Sohet, hotel keeper, was hit in the stomach with the butt-end of a rifle.

The terrified inhabitants took flight. Along the walls of the houses, in the dark, shadows of fleeing people might be seen. An octogenarian scrambled over a wall and managed to escape into a garden. The doors were broken in by the Prussians, and they entered the houses, stealing, pillaging, and smashing. Then, without going further into the town, they returned by the way they had come, and went up the Monte de Ciney.

Saturday, August 22d, was quiet, except that towards evening there was artillery thunder in the valley.

Sunday was a terrible day. As early as a quarter past five in the morning, at dawn, the Germans, under the orders of Lieut.-Col. Blegen, began to bombard Dinant. Shells rained on the town. Soon the mitrailleuses, which were hidden in the trees, sent down a great shower of bullets. From the left bank the French replied vigorously. Hardly had the fight begun before several hundred Germans of the 108th Infantry Regiment advanced through the Fonds de Leffe and by the heights of St. Nicolas. The first victims fell at Leffe.

The faithful took refuge in the Eglise des Prémontrés, where mass was being celebrated, whilst outside was the crack of rifle fire. It was half past six o'clock. The German soldiers burst into the church and drove out the worshipers. They had heard their last mass!

Protests and supplications aroused no pity in the barbarians. With the butt-ends of their rifles they separated the men from the women, and made them stand in a group whilst they shot into the middle of them under the horrified eyes of the women. About fifty civilians fell dead. The women uttered terrifying shrieks. At the door of his house, and in the presence of his wife and children, they killed M. Victor Poncelet. Bloodthirsty fury took possession of the soldier-assassins. Street by street and house by house they pillaged the town and set fire to it, destroying Dinant from top to bottom. It was between

7 and 9 o'clock in the morning, in the Faubourg St. Pierre and in the Rue Grande, the center of the city, that this work of destruction took place. With wild shouts the soldiers of William-the-Murderer chased the people from their houses, and struck down at random those who tried to escape. Soon the soldiers were throwing in hand grenades. Fire shot up and spread with terrible rapidity. Everything was in flames, crackling, splitting, falling. Long clouds of smoke arose from the burning valley and wreathed the surrounding hills. The flames licked the mountain and leapt up to redden the sky. The conflagration was striking, grandiose, dantesque.

The valley was filled with awful noise. The sound of the falling houses, the roar of cannon, the cracking of rifles and guns, the hiss of bullets, the shouts of the soldiers, and the cries of the unfortunate inhabitants were all mingled. The Germans drove the population in groups to the places of torture; 160, however, managed to take refuge in the grotto of Montfort and 400 in the grotto of Rondpeine; they stayed there a day and a night without being discovered. Others were able to hide by day in cellars and by night in gardens.

At 9 o'clock a pitiable cortège approached the prison. It was composed of men, women, and children, about 700 of them. With their hands held up and surrounded by soldiers, these martyrs crossed the burning town. Tears flowed, sobs, lamentations, prayers arose from among them. No one listened. The officers and soldiers were unmoved. Until dusk these wretched people were kept prisoners. The soldiers passed backwards and forwards in front of them, saying: "You will all be shot this evening." Evening arrived. Darkness fell slowly, so slowly, prolonging the terrible agony. The battle had come to an end. Namur having fallen, the French had orders to retire towards Philippeville. The Germans were masters of the town.

At 6 o'clock a German captain had the women placed high up on the Montagne de la Croix. A cordon of infantry barred the street before them. Thirty steps away, against the wall of

the garden of M. Tchoffen, the public prosecutor, in the Rue Léopold, at the corner of the Place d'Armes, a row of men was placed standing, and in front of them a second row kneeling. Opposite the public prosecutor's house soldiers were stationed ready to shoot. To avoid the *ricochet* of the bullets they were aiming slantwise. A little further on, waiting their turn, another group of inhabitants helplessly watched these lugubrious preparations. The German officer passes in front of the crowd in reserve and chooses more victims. At this tragic moment a thrill of horror goes through the condemned men and through the crowd of relations and friends who are looking on at the scene. The women implore and wring their hands and throw themselves on their knees, the children weep, the men cry: "Mercy! Mercy! we did not shoot, we had no arms. Have pity on us for our children's sake."

It is in vain! The German officer will listen to nothing. He takes up his position, shouts an order, lowers his sword. The rifles go off, the bullets fly, and men fall. A great clamor is heard which makes the rocks tremble. Women are fainting. . . . The dead now rest in M. Tchoffen's garden. A few flowers and some little wooden crosses stuck in the ground mark the two big graves.

Not all the men, however, have been hit. About twenty were not touched. They fell down pell-mell amongst those who had been shot. Others were only wounded. One received a bullet in his head, another was hit by five bullets, another had his thigh perforated. All remain motionless in a pool of blood which gradually congeals, lying side by side with the corpses of their friends, now become cold and stiff in death. Not a cry, not a murmur, not a breath rises from this human heap. Agony and the will to live glue them to the pavement. Fear itself prevents their teeth from chattering. They feign death and await the darkness of the night. There is silence for a long, long time. Then a head lifts from among the dead in the shadow. Enemies are no longer to be seen near the prison. In a low voice, in a whisper, the owner speaks and says

in Walloon: "Can you see any one over St. Nicolas way?" A man lying on his back opens his eyes and answers: "No, nobody." "Let us go into the house opposite," says young G——. It is 8 o'clock and quite dark. The survivors, silently, with beating hearts, revived by hope, rise up, cross the street with a run, plunge into a house, climb through the gardens, the unhurt dragging and supporting the wounded, and hide in the mountain. They are covered with dark blood which is not their own. They rub themselves with leaves and grass. For several days and nights they live on carrots and beets and other roots. The wounded are untended. Their comrades tear up their shirts for bandages. They suffer terribly from thirst.

. . . . . .

That tragic Sunday, August 23d, saw other massacres. In the prison civilians were shut up, men and women together. At 6 o'clock in the evening a big gun started shooting from the upper part of the mountain, and dropped a rain of bullets on the prisoners, who were in the courtyard. A woman fell pierced through the body. Three other people perished at her side. Soldiers ran up to kill them. In order to save himself Doctor D—— smeared his face with the blood of the victims and pretended to be dead.

The butchery had been organized at various points in the town. Inhabitants who had taken refuge in cellars and were discovered were shot at once. At Leffe, at about 5 o'clock in the evening, the soldiers forced M. Himmer, the Argentine consul, director of the Oudin Works, a Frenchman, and fifty workmen, women, and children to come out of the cellars of the weaving factory, where they had fled. Four times did they set fire to the establishment. M. Himmer came out first with a white flag. "I am consul for Argentina," he said to the officer, "and I appeal to that country." What was that to the assassins? They were all shot. The officer said: "It would have been too much luck to spare you when your

fellow citizens were dead." The toll of the dead at Leffe is horrible. 140 civilians were shot. There are only seven sound men left.

In the garden next to that of M. Servais, ex-Secretary of the Commune, also shot, rest 80 of the inhabitants of Dinant. In the cemetery of the Faubourg de Leffe others lie buried. Others again to the right of the road, in a garden near the Catholic school, at the entrance to the Fonds de Leffe. And here it was the inhabitants shut up in the Couvent des Prémontrés who dug the grave. M. M—— told me, shaking with indignant feeling:

> They made us dig the grave, like martyrs, saying to us, "That's for you this evening." They made us bury our massacred fellow citizens. I saw seventeen bodies thrown into that enormous hole, and then the contents of three carts, each carrying fifteen murdered corpses. They were tossed in like bundles, without being identified.

Towards half past six the German savages passed along the Rue St. Roch. Against the house of M. B—— a group of civilians was shot. Then the soldiers threw the bodies into the cellar, which has been walled up. Forty victims are in that charnel house. In the Rue En Ile a paralytic was shot in his chair. In the Rue d'Enfer a young fellow of fourteen was killed by a soldier. He had with him a little child whom a soldier tossed into the burning house of M. François G——.

At Neffe, a southern suburb of Dinant, armed bandits sacked, pillaged, and stole, with fire and slaughter. Under the railway viaduct they shot men, women, and children. An old woman and all her children were killed in a cellar. A man, his wife, and son and daughter were put against a wall and killed. An old man of sixty-five, his wife, his son-in-law, and the young wife were shot. Down at the river bank there was further butchery. Inhabitants of Neffe who had gone by boat to the Rocher Bayard suffered the same horrible fate. Amongst them Madame Collard, aged eighty-three, and her husband, and many women and children. Ninety-eight civilians were

buried in M. B——'s garden, according to the accounts of the German soldiers themselves. And whilst this awful carnage was deluging the town with blood, the German soldiers gave demonstrations of their cowardice. For instance, this in the Faubourg St. Paul. Mme. L. P—— relates:

> Soldiers came into my house. They struck me with their fists in the chest, smashed everything in the house, then, with a revolver pointed at me, dragged me out of doors. Other women were there under the threats of these brutes. They pushed us before them to the parapet at the waterside, exposing us to the French fire, whilst the coward Prussians stooped and fired, sheltering themselves behind women.

It was there that Mdlle. Madeleine Massigny was killed.

I have heard of four cases of violation, a young woman who died after the abuses of fifteen horrid bandits. I have also had an account of a young mother who was confronted with a choice between the strangling of her little girl and her own dishonor. It will be readily understood that names cannot be given, and that the population keeps religious silence with regard to these cases.

Doctor A. L—— took refuge with his wife and a baby of a few months in a sewer. They had no food but a little sugar, and nothing to drink but the filthy water flowing by. To feed the child they had to damp the sugar with this noxious liquid. The horrible situation lasted two days.

The *kultur*-bearers have refinements of cruelty. In the barracks at Leffe three hundred civilian prisoners were placed in line along the wall with their arms up. Behind them a pastor recited the prayers for the dead, whilst an officer worked an unloaded gun! This torture was kept up for a quarter of an hour. It seemed a century long. In the Eglise St. Paul prisoners were kept for five days. In the Eglise des Prémontrés an officer of the 108th Infantry came to demand a candle. He was given a taper. He refused it, and the sacred lamp was taken down. He was satisfied, and marched all round the

assembly, jeering, and holding his revolver at the faces of the women. He carried his trophy away with a roar of laughter.

Pillage and fire continued on the Monday and Tuesday. The soldiers drank as much wine as they could steal. They wallowed in murder and blood, celebrating their triumph glass in hand. Drunken officers sat down with their men. They obliged the inhabitants who had survived to be present at their orgies on pain of death. On Monday the soldiers, just to amuse themselves, killed three old men of eighty. On Tuesday, at half past five in the morning, soldiers scattered through the town, shouting and setting fire to the houses on the Quai de Meuse and in the Rue du Moulin des Batteurs.

From the Monday processions had been formed. Surrounded by soldiers, who struck the French monks in the face with horsewhips, the prisoners were taken away towards Prussia, some by Ciney, others by Marche. About 400 went. How many will return? And what must have been the sufferings of those innocent victims on the long routes, who had not been able to dress themselves suitably or get their boots, who had been torn from their wives and children, leaving behind them that nightmare of bloodshed and ruin. One had only stockings on his feet. Many were in sabots. Already the dead were strewn along the roads. On the left of the Ciney road, on the "Tienne d'Aurcy," lie buried four old men who were found with their hands bound, unable to go any further, and exhausted by suffering and fatigue. They were MM. Jules Monard (70), Léon Simon (65), Couillard (75), and Bouchat (73). The farmer of Chesnois was harnessed between the shafts of a cart and forced to drag it up the hill of Sorinnes.

Such is the true and sad story of Dinant. It remains for the world to pass its judgment.

A FIGHT WITH GERMAN AIRPLANES[1]

"CONTACT" (ALAN BOTT)

[Captain Alan Bott was, before the World War, a correspondent of the *London Daily Chronicle* but soon enlisted in the British air forces. From his experiences on the Western Front were derived the personal narratives of which the account below is a part. They originally appeared in *Blackwood's Magazine* under the title "An Airman's Outings." He was later transferred to Palestine, where he was wounded and made prisoner by the Turks. The narrative has the merit of being equally good as an account of the fighting airman's real experience and as a specimen of simple but effective narration.]

For weeks we had talked guardedly of "it" and "them" — of the greatest day of the Push and the latest form of warfare. Details of the twin mysteries had been rightly kept secret by the red-hatted Olympians who really knew, though we of the fighting branches had heard sufficient to stimulate an appetite for rumor and exaggeration. Consequently we possessed our souls in impatience and dabbled in conjecture.

Small forts moving on the caterpillar system of traction used for heavy guns were to crawl across No Man's Land, enfilade the enemy front line with quick-firing and machine-guns, and hurl bombs on such of the works and emplacements as they did not ram to pieces, — thus a confidential adjutant, who seemed to think he had admitted me into the inner circle of knowledge tenanted only by himself and the G. S. O. people (I, II, and III, besides untabbed nondescripts). Veterans gave tips on war in the open country, or chatted airily about another tour of such places as Le Catelet, Le Cateau, Mons,

[1] From "Cavalry of the Clouds," copyright, 1918, by Doubleday, Page & Co. Reprinted by permission.

the Maubeuge district, and Namur. The cautious listened in silence, and distilled only two facts from the dubious mixture of fancy. The first was that we were booked for a big advance one of these fine days; and the second that, after the overture of bombardment, new armored cars, caterpillared and powerfully armed, would make their bow to Brother Boche.

The balloon of swollen conjecture floated over the back of the Front until it was destroyed by the quick-fire of authentic orders, which necessarily revealed much of the plan and many of the methods. On the afternoon of September 14 all the officers of our aërodrome were summoned to an empty shed. There we found our own particular general, who said more to the point in five minutes than the rumorists had said in five weeks. There was to be a grand attack next morning. The immediate objectives were not distant, but their gain would be of enormous value. Every atom of energy must be concentrated on the task. It was hoped that the element of surprise would be on our side, helped by a new engine of war, christened the Tank. The nature of this strange animal, male and female, was then explained.

Next came an exposition of the part allotted to the Flying Corps. No German machines could be allowed near enough to the lines for any observation. We must shoot all Hun machines at sight and give them no rest. Our bombers should make life a burden on the enemy lines of communication. Infantry and transport were to be worried, whenever possible, by machine-gun fire from above. Machines would be detailed for contact work with our infantry.

No more bubbles of hot air were blown around the mess table. Only the evening was between us and the day of days. The time before dinner was filled by the testing of machines and the writing of those cheerful, non-committal letters that precede big happenings at the Front. Our flight had visitors to dinner, but the shadow of to-morrow was too insistent for the racket customary on a guest night. It was as if the electricity had been withdrawn from the atmosphere and

condensed for use when required. The dinner talk was curiously restrained. The usual shop chatter prevailed, leavened by snatches of bantering cynicism from those infants of the world who thought that to a *beau sabreur* one must juggle verbally with life, death, and Archie shells. Even the war babies (three of them died very gallantly before we reassembled for breakfast next day) had bottled most of their exuberance. Understanding silences were sandwiched between yarns. A wag searched for the Pagliacci record, and set the gramophone to churn out "Vesti la Giubbà." The guests stayed to listen politely to a few revue melodies, and then slipped away. The rest turned in immediately, in view of the jobs at early dawn.

"Good-night, you chaps," said one of the flight commanders. "See you over Mossy-Face in the morning!"

In the morning some of us saw him spin earthwards over Mossy-Face Wood, surrounded by Hun machines.

Long before the dawn of September 15, I awoke to the roar of engines, followed by an overhead drone as a party of bombers circled round until they were ready to start. When this noise had died away, the dull boom of an intense bombardment was able to make itself heard. I rolled over and went to sleep again, for my own show was not due to start until three hours later. The Flying Corps program on the great day was a marvel of organization. The jobs fitted into one another and into the general tactical scheme of the advance as exactly as the parts of a flawless motor. At no time could enemy craft steal towards the lines to spy out the land. Every sector was covered by defensive patrols which traveled northward and southward, southward and northward, eager to pounce on any black-crossed stranger. Offensive patrols moved and fought over Boche territory until they were relieved by other offensive patrols. The machines on artillery observation were thus worried only by Archie, and the reconnaissance formations were able to do their work with little interruption, except when they passed well outside the patrol areas. Throughout the day those guerillas of the air, the bombing craft,

went across and dropped eggs on anything between general headquarters and a railway line. A machine first made known the exploit of the immortal Tank that waddled down High Street, Flers, spitting bullets and inspiring sick fear. And there were several free-lance stunts, such as aëroplane attacks on reserve troops or on trains.

The three squadrons attached to our aërodrome had to the day's credit two long reconnaissances, three offensive patrols, and four bomb raids. Six Hun machines were destroyed on these shows, and the bombers did magnificent work at vital points. At 2 A.M. they dropped eggs on the German Somme headquarters. An hour later they deranged the railway station of a large garrison town. For the remaining time before sunset they were not so busy. They merely destroyed two ammunition trains, cut two railway lines, damaged an important railhead, and sprayed a bivouac ground.

An orderly called me at 4.15 A.M. for the big offensive patrol. The sky was a dark gray curtain decorated by faintly twinkling stars. I dressed to the thunderous accompaniment of the guns, warmed myself with a cup of hot cocoa, donned my flying kit, and hurried to the aërodrome. We gathered around C., the patrol leader, who gave us final instructions about his method of attack. I tested my gun and climbed into the machine. By now the east had turned to a light gray with pink smudges from the forefinger of sunrise. Punctually at five o'clock the order, "Start up!" passed down the long line of machines.

"Contact, sir!" said the flight-commander's mechanic, his hand on a propeller blade.

"Contact," repeated the pilot. Around swung the propeller, and the engine began a loud metallic roar, then softened as it was throttled down. The pilot waved his hand, the chocks were pulled from under the wheels, and the machine moved forward. The throttle was again opened full out as the bus raced into the wind until flying speed had been attained, when it skimmed gently from the ground.

The morning light increased every minute, and the gray of the sky was merging into blue. The faint, hovering ground-mist was not sufficient to screen our landmarks. The country below was a shadowy patchwork of colored pieces. The woods, fantastic shapes of dark green, stood out strongly from the mosaic of brown and green fields. The pattern was divided and subdivided by the straight, poplar-bordered roads peculiar to France. We passed on to the dirty strip of wilderness which is the actual Front. The battered villages and disorderly ruins looked like hieroglyphics traced on wet sand. A sea of smoke rolled over the ground for miles. It was a by-product of the most terrific bombardment in the history of trench warfare. Through it hundreds of gun flashes twinkled like the lights of a Chinese garden.

Having reached a height of 12,000 feet, we crossed the trenches south of Bapaume. As the danger that stray bullets might fall on friends no longer existed, pilots and observers fired a few rounds into space to make sure their guns were behaving properly. Archie began his frightfulness early. He concentrated on the leader's machine, but the still dim light spoiled his aim, and many of the bursts were dotted between the craft behind. I heard the customary *wouff! wouff! wouff!* followed in one case by the *hs-s-s-s-s* of passing fragments. We swerved and dodged to disconcert the gunners. After five minutes of hide-and-seek, we shook off this group of Archie batteries.

The flight commander headed for Mossy-Face Wood, scene of many air battles and bomb raids. Around it are clustered several aërodromes. One of these, just east of the wood, was the home of the Fokker star, Boelcke. C. led us to it, for it was his great ambition to account for Germany's best pilot. As we approached, I looked down and saw eight machines with black Maltese crosses on their planes, about three thousand feet below. They had clipped wings of a peculiar whiteness, and they were ranged one above the other like platforms on scaffolding. A cluster of small scouts swooped down from

Heaven-knows-what height and hovered above us; but C. evidently did not see them, for he dived steeply on the Huns underneath, accompanied by the two machines nearest him. The other group of enemies then dived.

I looked up and saw a narrow biplane, apparently a Roland, rushing towards our bus. My pilot (in those days I was not myself a pilot, but acted as observer) turned on a steep bank and side-slipped to disconcert the Boche's aim. The black-crossed hawk swept over at a distance of less than a hundred yards. I raised my gun-mounting, sighted, and pressed the trigger. Three shots rattled off and my Lewis gun ceased fire. Intensely annoyed at being cheated out of such a splendid target, I applied immediate action, pulled back the cocking-handle, and pressed the trigger again. Nothing happened. After one more immediate action test, I examined the gun and found that an incoming cartridge and an empty case were jammed together in the breech. To remedy the stoppage, I had to remove spade-grip and body-cover. As I did this, I heard an ominous *ta-ta-ta-ta-ta* from the returning German scout. My pilot cart-wheeled round and made for the Hun, his gun spitting continuously through the propeller. The two machines raced at each other until only some fifty yards separated them. Then the Boche swayed, turned aside, and put his nose down. We dropped after him, with our front machine-gun still speaking. The Roland's glide merged into a dive, and we imitated him. Suddenly a streak of flame came from his petrol tank, and the next second he was rushing earthwards with two streamers of flame trailing behind.

I was unable to see the end of this vertical dive, for two more single-seaters were upon us. They plugged away while I remedied the stoppage, and several bullets ventilated the fuselage quite close to my cockpit. When my gun was itself again, I changed the drum of ammunition and hastened to fire at the nearest Hun. He was evidently unprepared, for he turned and moved across our tail. As he did so, I raked his bus from stem to stern. I looked at him hopefully, for the range was

very short, and I expected to see him drop towards the ground at several miles a minute. He sailed on serenely. This is an annoying habit of enemy machines when one is sure that, by the rules of the game, they ought to be destroyed. The machine in question was probably hit, however, for it did not return, and I saw it begin a glide as though the pilot meant to land. We switched our attention to the remaining Hun, but this one was not anxious to fight alone. He dived a few hundred feet, with tail well up, looking for all the world like a trout when it drops back into water. Afterwards he flattened out and went east.

During our fights we had become separated from the remainder of our party. I searched all round the compass, but could find neither friend nor foe. We returned to the aërodrome where hostile craft were first sighted. There was no sign of C.'s machine or of the others who dived on the first group of Huns. Several German machines were at rest in the aërodrome.

Finding ourselves alone, we passed on towards the lines. I twisted my neck in every direction, as if it were made of rubber, for over enemy country only a constant lookout above, below, and on all sides can save a machine from a surprise attack. After a few minutes, I spotted six craft bearing towards us from a great height. Through field glasses I was able to see their black crosses, and I fingered my machine-gun expectantly. The strangers dived in two lots of three. I waited until the first three were within 300 yards' range and opened fire. One of them swerved away, but the other two passed right under us. Something sang to the right, and I found that part of a landing wire was dangling helplessly from its socket. I thanked whatever gods there be that it was not a flying wire, and turned to meet the next three Huns. We side-slipped, and they pulled out of their dive well away from us. With nose down and engine full out, we raced towards the lines and safety. Three of the attackers were unable to keep up with us and we left them behind.

The other three Germans, classed by my pilot as Halberstadts, had more than our speed. They did not attack at close quarters immediately, but flew 200 to 300 yards behind, ready to pounce at their own moment. Two of them got between my gun and our tail-plane, so that they were safe from my fire. The third was slightly above our height, and for his benefit I stood up and rattled through a whole ammunition-drum. Here let me say I do not think I hit him, for he was not in difficulties. He dived below us to join his companions, possibly because he did not like being under fire when they were not. To my surprise and joy, he fell slick on one of the other two Hun machines. This latter broke into two pieces, which fell like stones. The machine responsible for my luck side-slipped, spun a little, recovered, and went down to land. The third made off east. In plain print and at a normal time, this episode shows little that is comic. But when it happened, I was in a state of high tension, and this, combined with the startling realization that a Hun pilot had saved me and destroyed his friend, seemed irresistibly comic. I cackled with laughter, and was annoyed because my pilot did not see the joke.

We reached the lines without further trouble from anything but Archie. The pink streaks of daybreak had now disappeared beneath the whole body of the sunrise, and the sky was of that intense blue which is the secret of France. What was left of the ground-mist shimmered as it congealed in the sunlight. The pall of smoke from the guns had doubled in volume. The Ancre sparkled brightly. We cruised around in a search for others of our party, but found none. A defensive patrol was operating between Albert and the trenches. We joined it for half an hour, at the end of which I heard a "Halloa!" from the speaking tube.

"What's up now?" I asked.

"Going to have a look at the war," was the pilot's reply.

Before I grasped his meaning he had shut off the engine and we were gliding towards the trenches. At 1200 feet we

switched on, flattened out, and looked for any movement below. There was no infantry advance at the moment, but below Courcelette what seemed to be two ungainly masses of black slime were slithering over the ground. I rubbed my eyes and looked again. One of them actually crawled among the scrap heaps that fringed the ruins of the village. Only then did the thought that they might be Tanks suggest itself. Afterwards I discovered that this was so.

The machine rocked violently as a projectile hurtled by underneath us. The pilot remembered the broken landing-wire and steered for home. When we had landed and written a combat report, we compared notes with others who had returned from the expedition. C., we learned, was down at last, after seventeen months of flying on active service, with only one break for any appreciable time. He destroyed one more enemy before the Boches got him. In the dive he got right ahead of the two machines that followed him. As these hurried to his assistance, they saw an enemy plane turn over, show a white, gleaming belly, and drop in zigzags. C.'s bus was then seen to heel over into a vertical dive, and plunge down, spinning rhythmically on its axis. Probably he was shot dead and fell over on to the joystick, and this put the machine to its last dive. The petrol tank of the second machine to arrive among the Huns was plugged by a bullet, and the pilot was forced to land. Weeks later, his observer wrote us a letter from a prison camp in Hanover. The third bus got back to tell the tale.

C. was one of the greatest pilots produced by the war. He was utterly fearless, and had more time over the German lines to his credit that anybody else in the Flying Corps. It was part of his fatalistic creed that Archie should never be dodged, and he would go calmly ahead when the A.A. guns were at their best. Somehow, the bursts never found him. He had won both the D.S.O. and the M.C. for deeds in the air. Only the evening before, when asked lightly if he was out for a V.C., he said he would rather get Boelcke than the V.C. — and in

the end Boelcke probably got him, for he fell over the famous German pilot's aërodrome, and that day the German wireless announced that Boelcke had shot down two more machines. Peace to the ashes of a fine pilot and a very brave man!

Two observers, other than C.'s passenger, had been killed during our patrol. One of them was "Uncle," a captain in the Northumberland Fusiliers. A bullet entered the large artery of his thigh. He bled profusely and lost consciousness in the middle of a fight with two Huns. When he came to, a few minutes later, he grabbed his gun and opened fire on an enemy. After about forty shots the clatter of the gun stopped, and through the speaking tube a faint voice told the pilot to look round. He did so, and saw a Maltese-crossed biplane falling in flames. Uncle faded into unconsciousness again, and never came back. It is more than possible that if he had put a tourniquet round his thigh, instead of continuing the fight, he might have lived. A great death, you say? One of many such. Only the day before I had helped to lift the limp body of Paddy from the floor of an observer's cockpit. He had been shot over the heart. He fainted, recovered his senses for ten minutes, and kept two Huns at bay until he died, by which time the trenches were reached.

Imagine yourself under fire in an aëroplane at 10,000 feet. Imagine that only a second ago you were in the country of shadows. Imagine yourself feeling giddy and deadly sick from loss of blood. Imagine what is left of your consciousness to be stabbed insistently by a throbbing pain. Now imagine how you would force yourself in this condition to grasp a machine-gun in your numbed hand, pull back the cocking handle, take careful aim at a fast machine, allowing for deflection, and fire until you sink into death. Some day I hope I shall be allowed to visit Valhalla for a few minutes, to congratulate Paddy and Uncle.

We refreshed ourselves with hot breakfast and cold baths. In the mess the fights were reconstructed. Sudden silences were frequent — an unconscious tribute to C. and the other

SIMS'S CIRCUS[1]

HERMAN WHITAKER

[Herman Whitaker (1867–) was born and educated in England. After serving in the British Army he spent several years in northern Canada and then removed to California. He has written several novels of frontier life. He has served as a war correspondent in Mexico and in France. This vivid sketch, which omits a number of paragraphs of the original, is an admirable example of popular descriptive writing of the war, and not only gives us a first-hand account of the capture of the first German submarine by the American forces, but also reproduces the atmosphere and spirit of the American navy in the World War.]

From the train window approaching the base I obtained my first view of "Sims's circus," as the flotilla has been named by the irreverent ensign. At least, I obtained my first astonished view of the minor portion thereof that chanced to be in port. For the base admiral is a most efficient man. His offices and house windows both overlook the water, and it's said by our skippers that his idea of heaven is "a harbor clear of ships and every destroyer at sea."

I may add from personal observation that never was there a man who did so much to make his idea of heaven obtain on earth. Nothing short of a "salty condenser" will procure from him a stay in port — which reminds me of a question put by a green ensign in our wardroom one day: "Is the water we drink pure enough to use in our boilers?"

To which was given in indignant chorus: "Of course not! What do you think you are?"

Returning again to the flotilla. A convoy was ready to sail, a dozen or so of our destroyers were to be seen nestling like speckled chickens under the wings of the mother repair ships.

[1] From *Independent*, June 1 and 8, 1918. Also in Herman Whitaker's "Hunting the German Shark." Copyrighted 1918, by The Century Company. Reprinted by permission.

I said "speckled." It is, however, too weak a term for the "dazzle" paint with which they were bedaubed. No wonder the irreverent ensign dubbed them "brick-yards."

Barred, striped, blotched, smudged, ring-straked with vivid pinks, arsenic greens, blowsy reds, violent blues, they looked like — like nothing in the world unless it be that most poisonous of drinks, a 'Frisco pousse-café. All of the giraffes, zebras, leopards, and tigers ever assembled in the "World's Greatest Aggregation" exhibit conventional patterns in comparison with this destroyer camouflage. The exception to this blazing color scheme, a recent arrival from home, looked in her dull lead paint like a Puritan maiden that had fallen by accident into a blowsy company of painted Jezebels.

The vessel I went out on had struck America's first blow in the war by attacking one of the submarines that opposed our transports in the Atlantic. The thought was hot in my mind when after boarding her my eyes wandered from the knifelike bows back over the shotted guns, grim torpedo tubes, along the low, rakish hull to the stern, where two depth mines hung poised for instant use.

Of all the enginery of destruction produced in the war, there is no weapon more terrible than these. The explosion of one lifts a column of water thirty yards wide fifty feet above the sea. One that was discharged nearly 200 yards away from a 30,000-ton ocean liner heaved her up six inches in the water. So terrible are they that destroyers only drop them when running at high speed to insure a "get-away," and even then the iron floor plates of the boiler room are often lifted by the concussion.

From the bridge I watched this slender arrow of a ship slip out through the harbor headlands, where a number of other destroyers were at work combing the offing for submarines before the convoy came out. They were beautiful to see, shooting like a school of rainbow flying fish over the long green seas; careening on swift turns, laying the white lace of their wakes over sixty square miles of sea. Among them,

graceful as a swallow, was the unfortunate vessel which, torpedoed two weeks later, now lies with sixty-four of our brave lads at the bottom of the sea. It is only necessary to record that she did not die unavenged.

Meanwhile there had been no let up in the combing of the offing for submarines. Here and there, back and forth, the destroyers swooped with birdlike circlings, and no words can describe the thoroughness of the watch upon the sea. From the bridge by officers and quartermasters, by the men in the crows' nests fore and aft, by the deck lookouts ahead, amidships, and astern, vigilant watch was maintained. Multiply this steady eye-searching by the number of destroyers and you can easily imagine that scarcely an inch of ocean remained for more than a minute unswept by human eye. And yet — Fritz was there.

There? Why, for two days he had been there lying in wait for the convoy which was now poking cautiously out through the heads, and when he attacked it was like the leap of a lone wolf on a flock with the following rush of shepherd dogs at his throat. As he rose to take his sight at the leading steamer a destroyer almost ran him down. Indeed it was going full speed astern to avoid the collision when his periscope showed above water.

It was only an instant, and the periscope was of the finger variety, an inch and a half in diameter. It was raised in that instant scarcely a foot above the water, but was still picked up by the sharp, young eyes of the lookout on the next destroyer. The submarine had submerged at once, but rushing along his wake the destroyer dropped a depth mine that wrecked the motors, damaged the oil leads, blew off the rudder, tipped the stern up, and sent the "sub" down on a headlong dive fully two hundred feet.

Afterward the commander said that he thought she would never stop. In a desperate effort to check her before she was crushed by deep-sea pressure he blew out all his four water ballast tanks and so came shooting back up with such velocity

that the "sub" leaped thirty feet out of the water like a beaching whale.

Instantly, the first destroyer, which had swung on a swift circle, charged and dropped a second depth mine as the submarine went down again. As the first cleared out of the way the second destroyer opened with her bow guns on the conning tower, which was now showing again.

Having no rudder the "sub" was "porpoising" along, now up, now down, and every time the conning tower showed the destroyer sent a shot whistling past it. They had fired three shots each before the hatch flew up and the crew came streaming out and ranged along the deck with hands up.

As the destroyers hove alongside, covering the crew with their guns, two of the men were seen to run back below. They were only gone a minute. But that was sufficient. Undoubtedly they had opened the sea cocks and scuttled the vessel, for she sank three minutes thereafter.

The crew jumped into the water and were hauled aboard the destroyer as fast as they could catch a line, all but one poor chap who could not swim and was nearly drowned before he was seen. Then in vivid contrast to the German practice under similar circumstances, two of our men leaped overboard and held him up till he could be hauled aboard.

All had happened in no more than ten minutes from the dropping of the first depth charge.

How I ached to talk to those prisoners! But discipline demanded that we keep our stations; neither is a large convoy to be held up while a correspondent chatters. We moved on, leaving one destroyer to take the prisoners back to the base.

But I heard a good deal more about them afterward. The bag consisted of one captain-lieutenant, one lieutenant, one ober-lieutenant, one ober-engineer, and thirty-six men. As the "sub" had been out from port about six days and had come straight to our base, it carried down with it a full complement of twelve torpedoes; a loss greater than that of the submarine.

The crew appeared to be well nourished, but the faces of the officers, in particular, were deeply lined, haggard from strain and nervous anxiety. They all appeared stolidly indifferent to capture. Indeed, after they had been given coffee and sandwiches — contrast this treatment with that accorded by a German submarine commander to the murdered crew of the *Belgian Prince* — the crew began to sing. When they were placed in the boats to go ashore on the first lap of their journey to a prison camp, they gave their captors three cheers.

The prisoners were cross-examined, of course, and from a plentiful chaff of misinformation were gleaned a few kernels of truth. The commander said, for instance, that no submarine captain who knew his business would waste a torpedo on a destroyer! That which caused our first casualty did not come from the hand of a "greenhorn" out on his first voyage! All very nice and friendly, but in course of an intimate conversation with the ensign in whose cabin he was billeted for the night, he let out the fact that every submarine kept two torpedoes gauged for a depth of six feet — destroyers, of course!

The piece of information that most concerned us came in a radio three hours later — the base port was "closed to commerce." The poor harmless submarine that would not waste a torpedo on a destroyer, not even if it went to sleep on the water, had sown the offing with mines. All those evolutions of ours, swallowlike dips and swoopings, had been executed in a mine field.

I confess to a little gasp. But gasps, if you are given that way, come thick and fast on a destroyer.

All the time a stream of radios had been coming up to the bridge from shore stations hundreds of miles away, from ships far out at sea, from patrol boats and mine sweepers reporting subs. Some were so close that we were heading across their course. Others came from a great distance — up the Channel, the Bay of Biscay, north of Scotland; as far off as the Mediterranean.

While they were coming in the sun rolled down its western slant and hung poised for a few moments in a glory of crimson and gold before it slipped on down into a purple sea. Above stretched a dappled vault that blazed in rainbow color, save where in the west a great tear in the radiant tapestries revealed a wall of pale jade.

It was intensely beautiful, so lovely that the mind refused further commerce with the petty squabbles of man; refused to picture the sea murderers that were lying in wait beneath those jeweled waters.

That evening displayed destroyer life at its best. A brilliant moon—which the "bridge" most fluently cursed for an ally of the Boche — laid a path of silver along the sleepy sea. Our boat laid her long, slim cheek against the slow, soft waves lovingly as a girl on that of her lover. From the deck below a mixed tinkle of a mandolin and guitar came floating up to the bridge, accompanying a mixed repertoire of ragtime and those sentimental ballads which the sailor so dearly loves.

It had quite the flavor of a Coney Island picnic, but, once every hour, a dark figure slowly raised and lowered the guns and swung them the round of the firing circle. The gunners were taking no chances of the mechanism "freezing" through cold, stiffened grease, nor failure of the electric sighting lamps.

This remarkable weather held till we dropped our convoy well out of the danger zone and picked up a second inward bound at a rendezvous a hundred miles further south. Two days later we gave half of our charge to a British flotilla that led it on other ways. We had expected to drop the remaining ships on the following morning, but destiny, alias the base admiral, decreed otherwise. Piqued, no doubt, by his small bag of one small ship the preceding week, Fritz had broken into waters which, for him, were extremely unsafe, and was shooting right and left, like a drunken cowboy on the Fourth of July. A radio informed us at dawn:

"Area X is closed."

This meant the delivery of each ship at its port. During the additional day and night required to do this subs were operating to the right of us, subs to the left of us, subs in front, subs behind us. Often we crossed their courses, but though they sank several ships around us that were unconvoyed, they left us strictly alone.

Twice the alarm sounded "general quarters" and we all piled out — a certain correspondent with his hair standing on end — to find the alarm was caused by a short circuit. Twice during the night porpoises charged the ship along gleaming wakes of phosphorescence and turned the hair of the engine room crews gray with emergency calls for full speed astern. But without hitch or mishap we delivered our ships at their destinations.

All the last day the wind had been stiffening. After we headed back for the base it raised to half a gale, real destroyer weather. As we sat at supper in the wardroom that night the twinkle in Admiral Sims's eye was recalled when, with celerity that almost equaled sleight of hand, the tablecloth slid with its load of food and dishes swiftly to the floor.

The casual manner in which the steward accepted and swept up the ruin betrayed familiarity with the phenomenon. When he reset the table, we held the tablecloth down and he had got safely to the coffee when, with his cup poised at his lip, the skipper tobogganed on his chair back to the transom. Swallowing the coffee while she hung in balance, he came back to us on the return roll.

Profiting by his commander's example, the executive officer, who sat opposite, had hooked his ankles around those of the table; so took it with him to the other transom. When it returned, further journeyings were restrained by a rope lashing, but that unfortunately had no effect on the motion. It kept on just the same; grew worse; more of it; then some.

By midnight the vessel was rearing like a frightened horse and rolling like a barrel churn, a queer mixture of metaphor and motion. A Western "outlaw" had nothing on that boat.

She would rear, shiver with rage just as though she were trying to shake the bridge off her back; plunge forward in a wild buck with her back humped and screws in the air.

It was sickening. When she did her best and beastliest, the waves would drop from under, leaving two thirds of her length exposed; then, when the thousand tons of her came down on the water, she raised everything animate and inanimate that was not bolted down to the deck. I was lifted so often out of my bunk that I spent almost half the night in midair, and am now quite convinced of the possibility of levitation.

I confess to making a modest breakfast on one dill pickle. While I was engaged in the gingerly consumption thereof the wardroom comforted me with the news that this was "only half the blow," and that we might "expect the other half before we made port." They assured me it was fair weather by comparison with a nine days' gale they had ridden out last month; fine weather when measured by a blow the preceding trip when for thirty-six hours the waves swept her from stem to stern; the living compartments were flooded; everything and everybody wet; freezing to boot, while the wind howled through the rigging at 110 miles an hour. Think of it, you folks who live in warm houses, work in steam-heated offices!

Fair or fine, the bridge was nearly dipping its ends when I climbed up there after — after the dill pickle. At every plunge her nose would go under a solid sea and we would have to duck to avoid flying water that went over the top of the bridge. Watery mist veiled the tossing seas. All night we had been shoved along by a five-knot current running by dead reckoning. It was now impossible to take a "sight" to establish position; so just as a lost boy might inquire his way from a policeman we ran inshore to a lightship to get a new fix.

The lightship keeper megaphoned a direction which in his unnautical language amounted to this. If we would proceed so many blocks to the northward, then take the first turning

to the left after we passed a lighthouse, we should come into a harbor where lay the half dozen ships we were to escort back to our base.

The direction proved correct. As the convoy came filing out after us a few hours later I was able to see for myself one of those humorous flashes that sometimes lighten the gloom of the radios. Perceiving still another vessel in harbor after the convoy came out our skipper sent a radio to inquire if she would care to make use of our escort.

He received a polite reply: "Thanks very much. Think I'll stay in. I was torpedoed going out yesterday."

She was one of the luckless of the preceding day.

The delivery of this convoy at the base the following day completed my cruise. During a period of twelve days we had steamed 1600 miles and convoyed a total number of sixty-odd vessels to and fro in the danger zone. Under the old patrol system, when our fleet first began its labors, the Germans were sinking from thirty to fifty ships a week and the seas through which we sailed were loaded with wreckage, dead cows, horses, pigs, lumber, barrels, anything that would float. Smashed boats were often found, and sometimes drowned people held up from sinking by life preservers. But since the convoy system was adopted, wreckage is seldom seen; will, with its extension to all ships in the near future, become a thing of the past.

In the great improvement already effected our crews and captains have displayed a fine part. The sixty vessels of ours were simply one small item in the thousands convoyed through the danger zone with a loss, as aforesaid, of only one eighth of one per cent. In the course of this duty the American flotilla has steamed jointly well over a million miles, a distance equivalent to the circumnavigation of the globe over forty times, and their journeyings have always been through mined seas, subject to attack by submarines.

As I sit here in cozy London chambers writing before a cheery sea-coal fire and think of my late messmates out upon

those dangerous waters the thing which stands out most clearly in my remembrance is their loyalty to each other, the friendly spirit of the fine, clean sailor lads, the mutual respect for each other of officers and crews, the unswerving belief of both in their ships and commanders; finally, the faith and complete devotion of every man in the fleet to Sims, their Admiral.

I shall not soon forget my last view of the fleet. Looking down from a high hill behind the town, I could see the destroyers that had cruised with us lying like tired dogs on the harbor's bosom. Far out on the heads signal lights began to wink and blink — no doubt the tale of a submarine. From the heights to my left the Admiralty station answered. Then, very slowly, a destroyer opened one eye and blinked a response. Shortly thereafter three slim, dark shapes slid down stream and headed to sea.

I was for home, but Sims's captains were again out on the job.

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THE PROMISE [1]

FREDERIC BOUTET

[Frederic Boutet is one of the chief French writers of short stories who have come into prominence since the beginning of the World War. His especial field is the people who stay behind and do not go to the front, as is shown by the title of one of his volumes of war stories, "Those Who Wait for Them." The story below first appeared in the pages of the *New York Tribune*, and is an admirable example of the simplicity and delicacy of the best French short stories.]

The afternoon was wearing on. The threat of a coming storm had deepened the shade of the forest as the soldier who was following the wooded path debouched into a large clearing. He recognized this at once, remembering the description of it which had been given to him, and he also recognized by its ivy-covered roof the house which he was seeking. In haste he crossed the clearing and, as the first drops of rain imprinted themselves in the dust of the path, he knocked at the door, which was promptly opened.

"M. Maray?" he asked.

"Papa is not here; he has gone to town," answered a fresh voice. "But if you wish to see his assistant, he lives only a little distance away."

A young girl had appeared on the doorstep, followed by a huge dog, who growled and whom she told to keep quiet. She seemed to be about sixteen or seventeen years old. In her gray cloth dress she looked tall and well developed. Her clear face showed lines that were still childish; but her eyes were serious, calm, serene. With her hand she brushed from her brow some unruly strands of chestnut hair.

[1] From "Tales of Wartime France," translated by William J. McPherson. Copyright, 1918, by Dodd, Mead & Co., Inc. Reprinted by permission.

"I wanted to speak first to M. Maray," the soldier stammered.

On seeing her he had recoiled involuntarily, and she now gazed at him with astonishment, for he was obviously and painfully embarrassed, and that didn't go well with his great height, his vigorous features, and his frank and open expression.

"If I could come back again," he murmured. "But that is impossible. I must take my train this evening. And after all it is you — you are the one with whom I must speak."

The young girl had scarcely caught those last words, so violent was the beating of the rain. She asked him to enter the house, and closed the door after him. They both remained standing in a large, dimly lighted room.

"I see that you do not know," he began, feeling his way. "I thought that you might already have had some news. I wanted to break it first to your father. But I am obliged to return at once, and I must keep the promise which I gave. I came from the front, you know. My name is Jean Vautier, and I was the comrade of one whom you know well. Yes — Paul Tullier. He is wounded — gravely, very gravely —"

"Mon Dieu!" she cried. "He is not — Tell me the truth!"

He made no answer, realizing that she understood. He was grieved and annoyed that he should have told his tragic news so abruptly, when he had intended to lead up to it more circumspectly. Venturing to look at the young girl, he saw that she had turned pale and that her cheeks were wet with tears. But he had a feeling of surprise. There was no trace there of that terrible despair which he had feared to see. He began again, in a low voice:

"I promised him to bring here, if anything should happen to him, some of his effects — as souvenirs. Here they are."

On the table between them he placed a little package, tied with a black ribbon.

"*Mon Dieu! Mon Dieu!* Poor Louise! What a misfortune!" murmured the young girl.

"Louise? You are not Louise? You are not Paul's fiancée?"

"No, no," she answered, shuddering in confusion and anguish. "Louise is my sister. She is twenty years old. They were engaged before the war. I was only fourteen then. Poor Louise! She loved him so much! These last days she has been very uneasy. She had received no letter for a long time. She went to town with papa to try to get some news."

"You are Emilie?" said the soldier. "He talked to me about you — but as if you were a child."

"Yes, I am Emilie," she replied.

After a moment of silence he began again, motioning to the package:

"That is for your sister. He said that I must bring it here if anything happened to him. He fell beside me, killed on the spot. As soon as I was able to do so I kept my promise. He was my best comrade, Tullier; for months we were together. When he made me swear to come here, he offered to do the same thing for me, if I should fall. Only, in my case, it was not worth while."

"Why?" asked Emilie, raising her eyes.

"Why?" he returned, with a forced smile. "Because I am alone in the world — absolutely alone. I have neither parents, nor relatives, nor fiancée — nobody who cares for me. In short, I am without any personal attachments. And even down there, you know, there are moments when it is hard to have to say that. But I am talking about things which do not interest you."

She said softly that they did interest her. Then the soldier, after a little hesitation, ventured another question.

"Have you a fiancé down there?"

She shook her head and her face reddened. They stood there silent, both under the spell of a vague feeling of tenderness, with which was mingled the sadness of mourning, evoked by the poor souvenirs which lay on the table between them. The soldier thought confusedly of the death which he had so

narrowly escaped, and he had an imperious desire to live and to love, the image in which that desire flowered being that of a budding young girl with chestnut hair. But he did not dare to put his thoughts into words. He merely said:

"I must go. But I should like to ask a favor of you before I go. Will you allow me to tell a comrade, if anything happens to me, to send you some things which I shall leave behind? That will not displease you?"

She looked at him, her gray eyes filled with pity and emotion, and, trembling a little, answered:

"You will come back — I am sure you will come back."

Hesitating to read the true meaning of her look and tone, he said very softly:

"I shall come back — here?"

She nodded assent. He took her hand, bent across the table on which the little package lay and awkwardly kissed her on the forehead. Then he went away in the dusk, following the path through the woods, which smelt of verdure and freshly moistened earth.

III

THE SPIRIT OF THE WARRING NATIONS

THE SPIRIT OF FRENCH YOUTH[1]

MAURICE BARRÈS

[Auguste Maurice Barrès (1862–) was born in Lorraine and was educated at the Lycée at Nancy. Since 1883, when he went to Paris and entered literary and political life, he has devoted himself to efforts to arouse the French people to patriotic and nationalistic feeling. In 1906 he was made a member of the French Academy. The present article is only part of an address delivered in London at the Hall of the Royal Society under the auspices of the British Academy on July 12, 1916. Like most of M. Barrès' writings since the beginning of the World War it is filled with letters from young French soldiers who have fallen in battle. For their unrestrained revelation of love of country and heroic self-confidence to a degree almost impossible for Americans these letters are invaluable.]

Every year at Saint-Cyr the *Fête du Triomphe* is celebrated with great pomp. Upon this occasion is performed a traditional ceremony in which the young men who have just finished their two years' course at the school proceed to christen the class following it and bestow a name upon their juniors.

In July, 1914, this ceremony came just at the time of the events which in their hasty course brought on the war, and for that reason was to assume a more than usually serious character.

On the thirty-first of the month the general in command at the school made known to the *Montmirails* (the name of the graduating class), that they would have to christen their juniors that same evening, and only according to military regulations, without the accustomed festivities.

All understood that perhaps during the night they would have to join their respective regiments.

[1] From "The Undying Spirit of France," translated by Margaret W. B. Corwin. Copyright, 1917, by Yale University Press. Reprinted by permission.

Listen to the words of a young poet of the *Montmirail* class, Jean Allard-Méeus, as he tells his mother of the events of this evening, already become legendary among his compatriots:

After dinner the Assumption of Arms (*prise d'armes*) before the captain and the lieutenant on guard duty, the only officers entitled to witness this sacred rite. A lovely evening; the air is filled with almost oppressive fragrance; the most perfect order prevails amidst unbroken silence. The *Montmirails* are drawn up, officers with swords, "men" with guns. The two classes take their places on the parade ground under command of the major of the higher class. Excellent patriotic addresses; then, in the midst of growing emotion, I recited

'TO-MORROW'

Soldiers of our illustrious race,
Sleep, for your memories are sublime.
Old time erases not the trace
Of famous names graved on the tomb.
Sleep; beyond the frontier line
Ye soon will sleep, once more at home.

Never again, dearest mother, shall I repeat those lines, for never again shall I be on the eve of departure for out there, amongst a thousand young men trembling with feverish excitement, pride and hatred. Through my own emotion I must have touched upon a responsive chord, for I ended my verses amidst a general thrill. Oh, why did not the clarion sound the Call to Arms at their close! We should all have carried its echoes with us as far as the Rhine.

It was surrounded by this atmosphere of enthusiasm that the young officers received the title of *Croix du Drapeau* for their class upon their promotion, and it was at this juncture that one of the *Montmirails*, Gaston Voizard, cried out: "Let us swear to go into battle in full dress uniform, with white gloves and the plume (*casoar*) in our hats."

"We swear it," made answer the five hundred of the *Montmirail.*

"We swear it," echoed the voices of the five hundred of the *Croix du Drapeau.*

A terrible scene and far too characteristically French, permeated by the admirable innocence and readiness to serve of these young men, and permeated, likewise, with disastrous consequences.

They kept their rash vow. It is not permissible for me to tell you the proportion of those who thus met death. These attractive boys of whom I have been telling you are no more. How have they fallen?

There were not witnesses in all cases, but they all met death in the same way as did Lieutenant de Fayolle.

On the twenty-second of August Alain de Fayolle of the *Croix du Drapeau* was at Charleroi leading a section. His men hesitate. The young sub-lieutenant has put on his white gloves but discovers that he has forgotten his plume. He draws from his saddle-bag the red and white plume and fastens it to his shako.

"You will get killed, my lieutenant," protested a corporal.

"Forward!" shouts the young officer.

His men follow him, electrified. A few moments later a bullet strikes him in the middle of his forehead, just below the plume.

On the same day, August 22, 1914, fell Jean Allard-Méeus, the poet of the *Montmirail,* struck by two bullets.

Gaston Voizard, the youth who suggested the vow, outlived them by only a few months. He seems to offer apologies for this in the charming and heart-breaking letter which follows.

December 25, 1914.

It is midnight, Mademoiselle and good friend, and in order to write to you I have just removed my white gloves. (This is not a bid for admiration. The act has nothing of the heroic about it; my last colored pair adorn the hands of a poor foot-soldier — *piou-piou* — who was cold.)

I am unable to find words to express the pleasure and emotion caused me by your letter which arrived on the evening following a

terrific bombardment of the poor little village which we are holding. The letter was accepted among us as balm for all possible racking of nerves and other curses. That letter, which was read in the evening to the officers of my battalion, — I ask pardon for any offense to your modesty, — comforted the most cast down after the hard day and gave proof to all that the heart of the young girls of France is nothing short of magnificent in its beneficence.

It is, as I have said, midnight. To the honor and good fortune which have come to me of commanding my company during the last week (our captain having been wounded), I owe the pleasure of writing you at this hour from the trenches, where, by prodigies of cunning, I have succeeded in lighting a candle without attracting the attention of the gentlemen facing us, who are, by the way, not more than a hundred meters distant.

My men, under their breath, have struck up the traditional Christmas hymn, "He is born, the Child Divine." The sky glitters with stars. One feels like making merry over all this, and, behold, one is on the brink of tears. I think of Christmases of other years spent with my family; I think of the tremendous effort still to be made, of the small chance I have for coming out of this alive; I think, in short, that perhaps this minute I am living my last Christmas.

Regret, do you say? . . . No, not even sadness. Only a tinge of gloom at not being among all those I love.

All the sorrow of my thoughts is given to those best of friends fallen on the field of honor, whose loyal affection had made them almost my brothers; — Allard, Fayolle, so many dear friends whom I shall never see again! When on the evening of July 31, in my capacity of *Père Système* of the Class of 1914 (promotion), I had pronounced amidst a holy hush the famous vow to make ourselves conspicuous by facing death wearing white gloves, our good-hearted Fayolle, who was, I may say, the most of an enthusiast of all the friends I have ever known, said to me with a grin: "What a stunning impression we shall make upon the *Boches!* They will be so astounded that they will forget to fire." But, alas, poor Fayolle has paid dearly his debt to his country for the title of Saint-Cyrien! And they are all falling around me, seeming to ask when the turn of their *Père Système* is to come, so that *Montmirail* on entering Heaven may receive God's blessing with full ranks.

But a truce to useless repinings! Let us give thought only to our dear France, our indispensable, imperishable, ever-living country! And, by this beauteous Christmas night, let us put our faith more firmly than ever in victory.

I must ask you, Mademoiselle and good friend, to excuse this awful scrawl. Will you also allow me to hope for a reply in the near future and will you permit this young French officer very respectfully to kiss the hand of a great-souled and generous-hearted maiden of France?

On the eighth of April, 1915, came his turn to fall.

. . . . . .

Roland, on the evening after Roncevaux, murmurs with dying breath: "O Land of France, most sweet art thou, my country." It is with similar expressions and the same love that our soldiers of to-day are dying. "*Au revoir*," writes Jean Cherlomey to his wife, "promise me to bear no grudge against France if she requires all of me." — "*Au revoir*, it is for the sake of France," were the dying words of Captain Hersart de La Villemarqué. — "*Vive la France*, I am well content, I am dying for her sake," said Corporal Voituret of the Second Dragoons, and expired while trying to sing the *Marseillaise*. — Albert Malet, whose handbooks are used in teaching history to our school children, enlisted for the war; his chest is pierced by a bullet, he shouts: "Forward, my friends! I am happy in dying for France," and sinks upon the barbed wire in front of the enemy's trenches. — "*Vive la France*, I die, but I am well content," cry in turn, one after another, thousands of dying men, and the soldier Raissac of the Thirty-first of the line, mortally wounded on the twenty-third of September, 1914, finds strength before expiring to write on the back of his mother's photograph: "It is an honor for the French soldier to die."

They do not wish to be mourned. Georges Morillot, a graduate of the École Normale and sub-lieutenant in the Twenty-seventh Infantry, died for France in the forest of Apremont on December 11, 1914, leaving a letter to his parents:

If this letter comes into your hands it will be because I am no more and because I shall have died the most glorious of deaths. Do not bewail me too much; my end is of all the most to be desired. . . . Speak of me from time to time as of one of those who have given their blood that France may live, and who have died gladly. . . . Since my earliest childhood I have always dreamed of dying for my country, my face toward the foe. . . . Let me sleep where the accident of battle shall have placed me, by the side of those who, like myself, shall have died for France; I shall sleep well there. . . . My dear Father and Mother, happy are they who die for their native land. What matters the life of individuals if France is saved? My dearly-beloved, do not grieve. . . . *Vive la France!*

Louis Belanger, twenty years of age, killed by the enemy on September 28, 1915, had written to his family:

I hope that my death will not be to you a cause of sorrow, but an occasion for pride. It is my wish that mourning should not be worn for me, for, in the glorious day when France shall be restored, the somber garb must not be allowed to dull the sunlight with which all French souls will be irradiated.

In obedience to his desire the cards announcing his death were not framed in black, but edged with silver. Hubert Prouvé-Drouot was a Saint-Cyrien of the class called *La Grande Revanche*, who died on the field of honor; when leaving home to join his regiment, he makes this his last request to his mother: "When the troops come home victorious through the *Arc de Triomphe*, if I am no longer amongst them, put on your finest apparel and be there."

The fact is that the French mothers, sustained by a power above, believe that their sons, in yielding their lives for France, find, not death, but an evolution. One of them, who is unwilling that her name should be given, uses this word in a letter radiant with sacred beauty.

Paris, October 20, 1915.

Commandant,

I cannot thank you adequately for the accuracy of your sorrowful recollections. The anniversary of the sacrifice of my brave boy

is at the same time particularly cruel and particularly sweet; cruel, because it recalls to mind a day when I was thinking of him, without misgivings as to the anguish which his valor was to cost me; sweet, because I could not visualize the abrupt end of this pure and brief life under any other aspect than that of a supreme evolution.

I thank you, Commandant, for all that you tell me of my dear young soldier; may his glorious death contribute to the victory of our country; when that time comes I shall kneel and once more say "I thank you." My mother's heart remains shattered in face of the death of this boy of twenty years who was all my joy. Oh, how proud and how unhappy one can be at the same time!

Will you, Commandant, allow me to transmit through you my tender feeling toward all those who cherish a remembrance of him who has fallen in his country's defense, and say to them that my thoughts turn frequently to that Land of Lorraine, so dear to all French hearts?

"A supreme evolution," she says. It would seem, indeed, that we have known only the chrysalis form and that an entire people is unfolding its wings. The ever-living France is freeing herself. It is for her that the sons of France are dying a death devoutly accepted by their mothers.

DIAGNOSIS OF THE ENGLISHMAN[1]

JOHN GALSWORTHY

[John Galsworthy (1867–) lives in Devonshire, England, and is one of the best-known contemporary novelists and dramatists. His chief novels are "The Man of Property" (1906) and "The Freelands" (1915); his best-known play "Justice" (1910). This skillful analysis originally appeared in the *Amsterdamer Revue;* it was reprinted later in the *Fortnightly Review* for May, 1915. Its stern vigor well reflects the strength of feeling in regard to the World War on the part of even the most cultivated and fastidious Englishmen.]

. . . . . .

In attempting to understand the real nature of the Englishman, certain salient facts must be borne in mind.

THE SEA. To be surrounded generation after generation by the sea has developed in him a suppressed idealism, a peculiar impermeability, a turn for adventure, a faculty for wandering, and for being sufficient unto himself, in far surroundings.

THE CLIMATE. Whoso weathers for centuries a climate that, though healthy and never extreme, is, perhaps, the least reliable and one of the wettest in the world, must needs grow in himself a counterbalance of dry philosophy, a defiant humor, an enforced medium temperature of soul. The Englishman is no more given to extremes than is his climate; against its damp and perpetual changes he has become coated with a sort of bluntness.

THE POLITICAL AGE OF HIS COUNTRY. This is by far the oldest settled Western Power, politically speaking. For eight hundred and fifty years England has known no serious military disturbance from without; for over one hundred and

[1] From "A Sheaf." Copyright, 1916, by Charles Scribner's Sons. Reprinted by permission.

fifty she has known no military disturbance and no serious political turmoil within. This is partly the outcome of her isolation, partly the happy accident of her political constitution, partly the result of the Englishman's habit of looking before he leaps, which comes, no doubt, from the mixture in his blood and the mixture in his climate.

THE GREAT PREPONDERANCE FOR SEVERAL GENERATIONS OF TOWN OVER COUNTRY LIFE. Taken in conjunction with centuries of political stability, this is the main cause of a certain deeply engrained humaneness, of which, speaking generally, the Englishman appears to be rather ashamed than otherwise.

THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS. This potent element in the formation of the modern Englishman, not only of the upper, but of all classes, is something that one rather despairs of making understood — in countries that have no similar institution. But: Imagine one hundred thousand youths of the wealthiest, healthiest, and most influential classes, passed, during each generation, at the most impressionable age, into a sort of ethical mold, emerging therefrom stamped to the core with the impress of a uniform morality, uniform manners, uniform way of looking at life; remembering always that these youths fill seven eighths of the important positions in the professional administration of their country and the conduct of its commercial enterprise; remembering, too, that through perpetual contact with every other class, their standard of morality and way of looking at life filters down into the very toes of the land. This great character-forming machine is remarkable for an unself-consciousness which gives it enormous strength and elasticity. Not inspired by the State, it inspires the State. The characteristics of the philosophy it enjoins are mainly negative, and, for that, the stronger. "Never show your feelings — to do so is not manly, and bores your fellows. Don't cry out when you're hurt, making yourself a nuisance to other people. Tell no tales about your companions, and no lies about yourself. Avoid all 'swank,' 'side,' 'swagger,'

He is quite wrongly credited with being attached to money. His island position, his early discoveries of coal, iron, and processes of manufacture, have made him, of course, into a confirmed industrialist and trader; but he is more of an adventurer in wealth than a heaper-up of it. He is far from sitting on his money-bags — has absolutely no vein of proper avarice; and for national ends will spill out his money like water, when he is convinced of the necessity.

In everything it comes to that with the Englishman — he must be convinced; and he takes a lot of convincing. He absorbs ideas slowly, reluctantly, he would rather not imagine anything unless he is obliged; but in proportion to the slowness with which he can be moved is the slowness with which he can be removed! Hence the symbol of the bulldog. When he does see and seize a thing, he seizes it with the whole of his weight, and wastes no breath in telling you that he has got hold. That is why his Press is so untypical; it gives the impression that he does waste breath. And, while he has hold he gets in more mischief in a shorter time than any other dog, because of his capacity for concentrating on the present, without speculating on the past or future.

For the particular situation which the Englishman has now to face, he is terribly well adapted. Because he has so little imagination, so little power of expression, he is saving nerve all the time. Because he never goes to extremes, he is saving energy of body and spirit. That the men of all nations are about equally endowed with courage and self-sacrifice has been proved in these last six months; it is to other qualities that one must look for final victory in a war of exhaustion. The Englishman does not look into himself; he does not brood; he sees no further forward than is necessary; and he must have his joke. These are fearful and wonderful advantages. Examine the letters and diaries of the various combatants, and you will see how far less imaginative and reflecting (though shrewd, practical, and humorous) the English are than any others; you will gain, too, a profound, a deadly

conviction that behind them is a fiber like rubber, that may be frayed and bent a little this way and that, but can neither be permeated nor broken.

When this war began, the Englishman rubbed his eyes steeped in peace, he is still rubbing them just a little, but less and less every day. A profound lover of peace by habit and tradition, he has actually realized by now that he is in for it up to the neck. To any one who really knows him—*c'est quelque chose!*

It shall freely be confessed that from an æsthetic point of view the Englishman, devoid of high lights and shadows, coated with drab, and superhumanly steady on his feet, is not too attractive. But for the wearing, tearing, slow, and dreadful business of this war, the Englishman — fighting of his own free will, unimaginative, humorous, competitive, practical, never in extremes, a dumb, inveterate optimist, and terribly tenacious — is equipped with Victory.

PRO PATRIA[1]

MAURICE MAETERLINCK

[Maurice Maeterlinck (1862– .) was born in Ghent, but in 1896 settled in Paris as a man of letters. He has written many plays and poems, the best known of the former being "L'Oiseau Bleu" (1909). Among his other literary works are "La Vie des Abeilles" ("The Life of the Bees") and "Mon Chien" ("My Dog") published in 1906. In 1911 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. In his method he is a symbolist. The present address was delivered at the Scala Theater in Milan, Italy, on November 30, 1914, and not only presents the attitude of the Belgians toward the German invasion, but is a skillful plea for Italy to abandon her neutrality and enter the war on the side of the Allies.]

I need not here recall the events that hurled Belgium into the depths of distress most glorious where she is struggling to-day. She has been punished as never nation was punished for doing her duty as never nation did before. She saved the world while knowing that she could not be saved. She saved it by flinging herself in the path of the oncoming barbarians, by allowing herself to be trampled to death in order to give the defenders of justice time, not to rescue her, for she was well aware that rescue could not come in time, but to collect the forces needed to save our Latin civilization from the greatest danger that has ever threatened it. She has thus done this civilization, which is the only one whereunder the majority of men are willing or able to live, a service exactly similar to that which Greece, at the time of the great Asiatic invasions, rendered to the mother of this civilization. But, while the service is similar, the act surpasses all comparison.

[1] From "The Wrack of the Storm," translated by Alexander Teixeira de Mattos. Copyright, 1916, by Dodd, Mead & Co., Inc. Reprinted by permission.

We may ransack history in vain for aught to approach it in grandeur. The magnificent sacrifice at Thermopylæ, which is perhaps the noblest action in the annals of war, is illumined with an equally heroic but less ideal light, for it was less disinterested and more material. Leonidas and his three hundred Spartans were in fact defending their homes, their wives, their children, all the realities which they had left behind them. King Albert and his Belgians, on the other hand, knew full well that, in barring the invader's road, they were inevitably sacrificing their homes, their wives, and their children. Unlike the heroes of Sparta, instead of possessing an imperative and vital interest in fighting, they had everything to gain by not fighting and nothing to lose — save honor. In the one scale were fire and the sword, ruin, massacre, the infinite disaster which we see; in the other was that little word honor, which also represents infinite things, but things which we do not see, or which we must be very pure and very great to see clearly. It has happened now and again in history that a man standing higher than his fellows perceives what this word represents and sacrifices his life and the life of those whom he loves to what he perceives; and we have not without reason devoted to such men a sort of cult that places them almost on a level with the gods. But what had never yet happened — and I say this without fear of contradiction from whosoever cares to search the memory of man — is that a whole people, great and small, rich and poor, learned and ignorant, deliberately immolated itself thus for the sake of an unseen thing.

And observe that we are not discussing one of those heroic resolutions which are taken in a moment of enthusiasm, when man easily surpasses himself, and which have not to be maintained when, forgetting his intoxication, he lapses on the morrow to the dead level of his everyday life. We are concerned with a resolution that has had to be taken and maintained every morning, for now nearly four months, in the midst of daily increasing distress and disaster. And not only

has this resolution not wavered by a hair's breadth, but it grows as steadily as the national misfortune; and to-day, when this misfortune is reaching its full, the national resolution is likewise attaining its zenith. I have seen many of my refugee fellow countrymen: some used to be rich and had lost their all; others were poor before the war and now no longer owned even what the poorest own. I have received many letters from every part of Europe where duty's exiles had sought a brief instant of repose. In them there was lamentation, as was only too natural, but not a reproach, not a regret, not a word of recrimination. I did not once come upon that hopeless but excusable cry which, one would think, might so easily have sprung from despairing lips:

"If our king had not done what he did, we should not be suffering what we are suffering to-day."

The idea does not even occur to them. It is as though this thought were not of those which can live in that atmosphere purified by misfortune. They are not resigned, for to be resigned means to renounce the strife, no longer to keep up one's courage. They are proud and happy in their distress. They have a vague feeling that this distress will regenerate them after the manner of a baptism of faith and glory and ennoble them for all time in the remembrance of men. An unexpected breath, coming from the secret reserves of the human race and from the summits of the human heart, has suddenly passed over their lives and given them a single soul, formed of the same heroic substance as that of their great king.

They have done what had never before been done; and it is to be hoped for the happiness of mankind that no nation will ever again be called upon for a like sacrifice. But this wonderful example will not be lost, even though there be no longer any occasion to imitate it. At a time when the universal conscience seemed about to bend under the weight of long prosperity and selfish materialism, suddenly it raised by several degrees the political morality of the world and lifted it all at once to a height which it had not yet reached

and from which it will never again be able to descend, for there are actions so glorious, actions which fill so great a place in our memory, that they found a sort of new religion and definitely fix the limits of the human conscience and of human loyalty and courage.

They have really, as I have already said and as history will one day establish with greater eloquence and authority than mine, they have really saved Latin civilization. They had stood for centuries at the junction of two powerful and hostile forms of culture. They had to choose and they did not hesitate. Their choice was all the more significant, all the more instructive, inasmuch as none was so well qualified as they to choose with a full knowledge of what they were doing. You are all aware that more than half of Belgium is of Teutonic stock. She was therefore, thanks to her racial affinities, better able than any other to understand the culture that was being offered her, together with the imputation of dishonor which it included. She understood it so well that she rejected it with an outbreak of horror and disgust unparalleled in violence, spontaneous, unanimous, and irresistible, thus pronouncing a verdict from which there was no appeal and giving the world a peremptory lesson sealed with every drop of her blood.

But to-day she is at the end of her resources. She has exhausted not her courage but her strength. She has paid with all that she possesses for the immense service which she has rendered to mankind. Thousands and thousands of her children are dead; all her riches have perished; almost all her historic memories, which were her pride and her delight, almost all her artistic treasures, which were numbered among the fairest in this world, are destroyed forever. She is nothing more than a desert whence stand out, more or less intact, four great towns alone, four towns which the Rhenish hordes, for whom the epithet of barbarians is in point of fact too honorable, appear to have spared only so that they may keep back one last and monstrous revenge for the day of the

inevitable rout. It is certain that Antwerp, Ghent, Bruges, and Brussels are doomed beyond recall. In particular, the admirable Grand'place, the Hôtel de Ville, and the Cathedral at Brussels are, I know, undermined: I repeat, I know it from private and trustworthy testimony against which no denial can prevail. A spark will be enough to turn one of the recognized marvels of Europe into a heap of ruins like those of Ypres, Malines, and Louvain. Soon after — for, short of immediate intervention, the disaster is as certain as though it were already accomplished — Bruges, Antwerp, and Ghent will suffer the same fate; and in a moment, as I was saying the other day, there will vanish from sight one of the corners of this earth in which the greatest store of memories, of historic matter and artistic beauties had been accumulated.

The time has come to end this foolery! The time has come for everything that draws breath to rise up against these systematic, insane, and stupid acts of destruction, perpetrated without any military excuse or strategic object. The reason why we are at last uttering a great cry of distress, we who are above all a silent people, the reason why we turn to your mighty and noble country is that Italy is to-day the only European power that is still in a position to stop the unchained brute on the brink of his crime. You are ready. You have but to stretch out a hand to save us. We have not come to beg for our lives: these no longer count with us and we have already offered them up. But, in the name of the last beautiful things that the barbarians have left us, we come with our prayers to the land of beautiful things. It must not be, it shall not be, that on the day when at last we return, not to our homes, for most of these are destroyed, but to our native soil, that soil is so laid waste as to become an unrecognizable desert. You know better than any others what memories mean, what masterpieces mean to a nation, for your country is covered with memories and masterpieces. It is also the land of justice and the cradle of the law, which is simply justice that has taken cognizance of itself. On this account,

Italy owes us justice. And she owes it to herself to put a stop to the greatest iniquity in the annals of history, for not to put a stop to it when one has the power is almost tantamount to taking part in it. It is for Italy as much as for France that we have suffered. She is the source, she is the very mother of the ideal for which we have fought and for which the last of our soldiers are still fighting in the last of our trenches.

THE SOUL AND STONES OF VENICE[1]

GABRIELE D'ANNUNZIO

[Gabriele d'Annunzio (1864–) is perhaps the most prominent Italian novelist and poet of the present day. His first poetical work was published in 1879 and his first novel in 1889. By 1895 he had achieved an international reputation. By many Italians he is considered an excellent poet, especially in his presentation of the beauty and romance of Italian life during the Renaissance period, but as the product of materialistic influences of the present day which make him incapable of appreciating the social problems of Italy since it has achieved its national unity. He is, however, one of the principal voices in the demand that Italia Irredenta should be wrested from Austria and added to the Italian kingdom. He is now an aviator in the Italian Air Service. The sketch presented was originally published in the *London Daily Telegraph* for September 14, 1915, and presents in a striking fashion the feelings of many Italians toward the World War.]

In belligerent Venice, that reënforces her airy arches, her delicate triforæ, with rough walls of bricks, cement, and beams; in the Venice that has transformed her hotels, formerly sacred to leisure and love, into hospitals full of bleeding heroes; in the dark and silent Venice, whose soul is in intense expectation of the roar of the far-away guns; in courageous and determined Venice, which hourly waits the apparition in the sky, where there still linger Tiepolo's and Veronese's soft clouds, of winged death-bearing craft; in the Venice of the greater Italy, the Land of Abraham Lincoln has to-day an extraordinary representative and admirable witness, whose mission has assumed unexpected importance.

This representative is an American woman, who has consecrated herself to our Saint Francis of Assisi. I like to think of her as one of those saints who bear in the palm of their

[1] From the *Current History Magazine*, published by the New York Times Company, November, 1915. Reprinted by permission.

open hand either a tower or a church or a palace. She was sent to Venice many years ago to execute miniature plaster copies of the most artistic buildings. If the stupid Austrian ferocity should ruin one of St. Mark's domes, a wing of the Procuratie, a lodge of the Ducal Palace, a nave of SS. John and Paul's Church, the choir of the Frari, or the gentle miracle of the Ca' d' Oro, there will remain a souvenir of the beautiful things destroyed in the plaster models of the patient artificeress.

The Venetian knows her well under the name which I myself bestowed on her years ago, the Franciscan sister of the Guidecca. The Ca' Frollo, where she resides, is a yellow structure overlooking a large garden bordering on the Lagoon. A steep oak stairway leads up to the living room. Above the entrance there is an iron shield, with ornamental edges resembling a frying pan, which in ancient times was used to dish out polenta. It is Miss Clara's coat-of-arms.

She comes and meets me smiling on the threshold. On her face a smile multiplies as a ray of sun on a rippled water surface. I have the immediate and strong impression of finding myself before that strange phenomenon represented by a person truly full of life. She wears a bluish cassock, like an artificer. Her hair is white, of the brightest silver, raised on the forehead and thrown back. The eyes are sky blue, shining, innocent, infantine, and in them the internal emotions ebb constantly like flowing water. She has the strong, rough hand of the working woman.

Her attic is very large. The massive beams fastened with iron are as numerous as the trunks of a forest, moth-eaten, with all their fibers exposed, of a golden brown color. Along the wall plaster casts of architectonic details are disposed: capitals, arches, tailpieces, cornices, bas reliefs. There is a complete fireplace by Lombardo, the very fireplace of the Ducal Palace. There are Madonnas, busts and masks. Suspended on two ropes is a model of an ancient Venetian galley, a hull of which the lines are most beautiful.

"I rescued it at Chioggia with a few cents from a fisherman who was in the act of burning it to cook his polenta," Miss Clara told me.

On one side the windows look out on the Guidecca Canal, which shows the Ducal Palace, the Piazzetta, the library, and the anchored ships, and on the other they look into the garden and the Lagoon. At intervals a rumbling is heard in the distance. Miss Clara sits by the window.

"With the hands of a saint, with religious hands," I tell her, "you have copied the most beautiful churches and palaces of Venice. Now these beautiful things are threatened, are in danger. We expect to see them in ruin any day. There will at least live the copies that you have sent beyond the seas."

Her blue eyes suddenly fill with tears, and the horror of war, the horror of blind destruction, draws all the lines of her face.

"My God, my God!" she murmurs, joining her hands. "Will you allow such a crime?"

"What does it matter," I venture to say, "if the old stones perish, so long as the soul of Italy is saved and renewed?"

She stares at me intently with profound sadness, shaking her white head, over which there plays the purest light of sunset.

"Have you seen the blinded Ducal Palace?" she asked me, meaning the lodges which the curators have had immured.

We have before us the plaster model of the Palace, on which she has been working for several years. With infinite care she has modeled every arch, every column, every capital, every smallest detail. Her work is an enormous toy, built for an infant nation. She removes the roof and bends to look into it, resembling in the proportions the image of a gigantic saint in the act of guarding a refuge which she protects. Nobody knows better than she the structure of the edifice which incloses the blackened paradise. In my presence she dismounts the copy piece by piece, organ by organ; almost, I

would say, limb by limb, even as an anatomist would do with the parts composing the human body in order to learn to know their number, their form, their location, and their relation to each other.

As the shadows begin to invade the attic, she lights an old brass lamp with four arms. The wicks crackle, diffusing a smell of olive oil, which mixes with that of the wax. In the attic the prints of the many matrices pile up, and it seems to be as if an impalpable sentiment of vigor rises from the concave matrices whence the copies of the beautiful things emerge.

Miss Clara works there together with a few workmen, who also compose her simple family. She eats with them the polenta, at the same table. She takes me by the hand and leads me into her kitchen, where there is a single hearth, with a rack full of common but decorated dishes. Truly there breathes the spirit of St. Francis. She is a kind of nun in freedom who has passed from contemplation to action. Before all those beams I think of the worn-out, splintered wood of the Santa Chiara choir. Before the ears of corn which I see in a rustic vase my mind goes to the cluster of brown ears which I saw at the top of the reading desk in the choir of St. Bernardino of Siena.

"I am very poor," she tells me.

Whole treasures of goodness, indulgence, and love shine at the bottom of the flowing waters of her blue eyes. There is in the structure of her head something virile, and at the same time tender, something intrepid and meek. As the lines of her face seem rays, so her work, her solitude, her poverty are transfigured into divine happiness.

"I am very poor," she says, and she shows me her naked hands, strong and pure, the only source of her daily wealth.

I know she distributes all her earnings; I know that on more than one occasion she suffered hunger and cold. To-day she had not even a bag of plaster for her work. Sitting by the window, she talks to me of her perennial joy, of the joy

of working from dawn to sunset. Slowly the garden grows dark in the dusk. Night begins to fall on the Venice that no longer lights her lamps, not even the lights before the virgins watching over the deserted canals. The nocturnal horror of war begins to expand on the Lagoon. In the distance a rumbling is heard coming, perhaps from Aquilega or Grado where they are fighting for redemption. The vast attic illuminated by the four-armed lamp becomes alive with shadows and quiverings.

Sitting by the window, simple, candid, sweet, she searches my innermost soul, then she observes my hands, too white, and my nails, too polished, and, lo! poverty appears to me as the nakedness of force, as the sincerest and most noble statue of life.

"I also work," I tell her, as if ashamed of hands too white and my nails too polished. Then I speak to her of my discipline, of my nights spent at the desk, of my patient researches, of my constancy in remaining bent over my desk for fifteen, twenty hours at a stretch, of the enormous quantity of oil I consume in my lamp, of the pile of paper, bundles of pens, of the large inkstand, of all the tools of my trade. Then I show her a tangible proof; on my middle finger, deformed by the constant use of the pen, a smooth furrow and a callosity. She is immediately touched. All her face expresses a maternal tenderness. She takes my finger, examines the sign. Then suddenly, with a gesture of human grace which I shall never forget, she gently touches it with her lips.

"God bless you," she says.

The flowing water ebbs between her eyebrows, glittering, rippling, ever new.

"God keep you ever."

My heart is full of tender gratitude. I am going to the war, and the blessing of this pure creature will bring me back. My hands shall become rough and dark. I shall work for the God of Italy, fight for the God of Italy.

"God keep Italy ever," she adds.

In leaving I stroll by the plaster models of the churches, palaces, lodges, bell-towers. The American nun, holding my hand, escorts me to the threshold. As I descend the oak stairway she vanishes in the shadow.

Night is already falling on Venice as an azure avalanche. As I raise my head to spy the appearance of the first star, I hear coming over from the deserted sky the rumbling of an aëroplane approaching from Malamocco.

"May God keep the stones of Venice."

And it seems to me that Miss Clara weeps, over there, in her attic amid the images of the beautiful things over which there hangs the threat of destruction.

THE AMERICAN FLAG[1]

RÉNÉ VIVIANI

[Réné Viviani (1863–), French premier at the opening of the World War, and one of the most brilliant leaders and orators of the Socialist party in France, was born in French North Africa. He has been in Parliamentary life since 1893. This short oration was delivered in St. Louis, Missouri, in May, 1917, during the visit to the United States of the French Mission, of which M. Viviani and Marshal Joffre were both members. In its simple and stirring phrasing of the emotions evoked by the occasion, the presentation of an American flag to a regiment, it is characteristic of French feeling toward American participation in the World War.]

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

I wish my voice were powerful enough, and I wish my words could be expressed in your own language, so clear and ringing, so that they might reach across this hall and at the same time find a way to your hearts. But still, for only a few minutes, allow me to voice to-night, not only in my name, but in all my countrymen's name, to whom you have given such a hearty welcome, a welcome so worthy of France, the feelings of emotion and pride which are swelling up in our souls.

We are happy to find ourselves in this great city of St. Louis. Amidst your welcome, we shall not forget that if to-day living men stand up to escort us, we also find here the shades of our ancestors, of the first Frenchmen who found themselves in this city. We are happy to meet here people of all races, merged into the very heart of the fatherland, merged into the life of this city, and we know that, whoever they may be,

[1] From "Balfour, Viviani and Joffre, Their Speeches and Other Public Utterances in America," edited by Francis W. Halsey. Copyright, 1917, by Funk & Wagnalls Co. Reprinted by permission.

they remain unflinchingly faithful to their American fatherland in this vast conflict, faithful to the country of which, first of all, they are sons.

And I am also happy, for my part, to speak here under the auspices of Mr. Long, our friend, your representative, and the descendant of that illustrious family, one of whom has a statue on one of your squares. I am happy to greet the venerable and distinguished mother of the assistant secretary of the Department of State, who, ever since we landed on American soil, has stretched out to us brotherly hands, and in whose heart we feel the love he bears to France, our fatherland.

Here, ladies and gentlemen, you have not lost the memory of the great historical event which took place here a few months ago. It is in this hall, where you now sit, that was held the Democratic convention, which designated as its presidential candidate your illustrious fellow countryman, President Wilson. At that time his own party and you, ladies, and you also, citizens, did not realize that war was so near at hand; you were hoping you might long enjoy the blessings of peace, and at that very moment you were going through the same drama that we, the French people, went through three years ago. France, generous and pacific France, who had made supreme sacrifices for the peace of the world, who turned toward humanity with feelings of love, who had one thought only, to bring forth liberty for all nations — this very same France was attacked, and then she rose for the defense of her honor and of her independence.

For nearly three years, with her faithful allies, but, at the start of the conflict, almost alone, she has been struggling breast against breast, hand against hand, weapon against weapon. For close upon three years, in the deep trenches, the sons of France held in check the enemies who were striving to invade her. For close upon three years immortal France, faithful at all times to herself, preserving her sacred image pure through all storms, the France of to-day, worthy of the

France of the past, raises the flag which is torn by shot and shell, but which is yet held aloft by the valiant hand of her soldiers.

And, a few minutes ago, in that touching ceremony, touching as all those earnest and solemn ceremonies in which soldiers speak in plain and laconic language, but a language which comes from the depth of their hearts, when, in the name of the Fifth Regiment of St. Louis, one of your officers handed to Marshal Joffre the flag which he at once returned with a few earnest words, it seemed to me that I was witnessing a spectacle comparable to that which I witnessed on the soil of France. How often have we seen our generals hand over flags to our children? How often have we seen our children leave for the hell of the fighting line, their heads erect, their hearts full of a virile joy, for they knew that they were defending their fatherland. All of them, they kept their eyes fixed on the flag, on the flag which is the symbol of liberty and justice.

And, just as we were able to preserve the flag from any stain, just as our children would rather die where they stood than permit that sacred flag to fall to the ground, just as we realized that it was the soul of the fatherland that was being carried forward in the folds of the tricolor flag, in the same way — because all people are one in that — it is the soul of the American fatherland which shines radiant through the stars of the American flag, and Mr. Mayor was right when he said that already it is bringing us the promise of final victory. To-morrow that flag will be waved on the battle fields.

To-morrow it also will know the glory of conflict. Oh, it was never meant to sleep in peace in a hall, to be placed over a monument and to feel only the gentle breath of a pacific mind. Because it was the symbol of a free fatherland, it was meant to face the risks of the battle fields, and to return in glory, so that you may keep it in a temple high enough and sacred enough to pay back the homage which is due to it.

Au revoir, then, soldiers of the Fifth Regiment, sons of the American fatherland, you who to-morrow, clothed in warlike uniform, will bring on the battle field all the courage which you have shown for 140 years. Au revoir, soldiers of the American fatherland. Perhaps you will meet over there, across the Atlantic Ocean, the sons of the French fatherland, the sons of the Allies. All together you will march to the fight. And why will you march to the fight? Is it in order to rend others, is it to conquer territory, is it to wrench away robber hands, a province or a city? No, no. It is not thus we wage war; we wage war for justice, for universal democracy, for right, that autocracy may perish, that at last free men may draw free breath in the full enjoyment of peace and in the pursuit of their labors.

AMERICA OFFERS HER TROOPS

JOHN J. PERSHING

[General John Joseph Pershing (1860–) was educated at West Point and has spent his life as an officer in the United States Army. He served in various Indian campaigns, in the Spanish-American War, and during the insurrection in the Philippines. In 1916 he commanded the expedition into Mexico against Villa, and was sent to France as head of the American Expeditionary Force in May, 1917. The following offer was made at the height of the German offensive which began in March, 1918, and marked the fusion of all the Allied armies into one command under the Supreme War Council and General Foch.]

PARIS, March 30, 1918. — General Pershing visited General Foch, the new supreme commander of the allied forces, yesterday and placed all the men and resources of the United States at his disposal in the following words:

I come to say to you that the American people would hold it a great honor for our troops were they engaged in the present battle. I ask it of you, in my name and in that of the American people.

There is at this moment no other question than that of fighting. Infantry, artillery, aviation — all that we have are yours to dispose of them as you will. Others are coming which are as numerous as will be necessary. I have come to say to you that the American people would be proud to be engaged in the greatest battle in history.

THE DECISION TO MAKE WAR [1]

FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI

[General Friedrich von Bernhardi began to publish military books in 1889, when his "Cavalry in the Next War" appeared. In 1896 he published his most famous book, "Germany and the Next War," which went through several editions in the original and was translated into English in 1911, in which year it had been revised by the author. The ideas which Bernhardi presents are largely taken from Treitschke, but the vigor and frankness of the disciple is even greater than that of the master. The present selection is part of Chapter II, entitled "The Duty to Make War," and in the light of subsequent events in Germany when war was actually determined upon displays the mental processes of the ruling class and the military leaders.]

Prince Bismarck repeatedly declared before the German Reichstag that no one should ever take upon himself the immense responsibility of intentionally bringing about a war. It could not, he said, be foreseen what unexpected events might occur, which altered the whole situation, and made a war, with its attendant dangers and horrors, superfluous. In his "Thoughts and Reminiscences" he expresses himself to this effect: "Even victorious wars can only be justified when they are forced upon a nation, and we cannot see the cards held by Providence so closely as to anticipate the historical development by personal calculation." [2]

We need not discuss whether Prince Bismarck wished this dictum to be regarded as a universally applicable principle, or whether he uttered it as a supplementary explanation of the peace policy which he carried out for so long. It is

[1] From "Germany and the Next War," translated by Allen H. Powles. Authorized American Edition. Copyright, Longmans, Green & Co. Reprinted by permission.

[2] "Gedanken und Erinnerungen," vol. ii., p. 93. [Author's note.]

difficult to gauge its true import. The notion of forcing a war upon a nation bears various interpretations. We must not think merely of external foes who compel us to fight. A war may seem to be forced upon a statesman by the state of home affairs, or by the pressure of the whole political situation.

Prince Bismarck did not, however, always act according to the strict letter of that speech; it is his special claim to greatness that at the decisive moment he did not lack the boldness to begin a war on his own initiative. The thought which he expresses in his later utterances cannot, in my opinion, be shown to be a universally applicable principle of political conduct. If we wish to regard it as such, we shall not only run counter to the ideas of our greatest German Prince, but we exclude from politics that independence of action which is the true motive force.

The greatness of true statesmanship consists in a knowledge of the natural trend of affairs, and in a just appreciation of the value of the controlling forces, which it uses and guides in its own interest. It does not shrink from the conflicts, which under the given conditions are unavoidable, but decides them resolutely by war when a favorable position affords prospect of a successful issue. In this way statescraft becomes the tool of Providence, which employs the human will to attain its ends. "Men make history," [1] as Bismarck's actions clearly show.

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It may be, then, assumed as obvious that the great practical politician Bismarck did not wish that his words on the political application of war should be interpreted in the sense which has nowadays so frequently been attributed to them, in order to lend the authority of the great man to a weak cause. Only those conditions which can be ascertained and estimated should determine political action.

[1] Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i, p. 28. [Author's note.]

For the moral justification of the political decision we must not look to its possible consequences, but to its aim and its motives, to the conditions assumed by the agent, and to the trustworthiness, honor, and sincerity of the considerations which led to action. Its practical value is determined by an accurate grasp of the whole situation, by a correct estimate of the resources of the two parties, by a clear anticipation of the probable results — in short, by statesmanlike insight and promptness of decision.

If the statesman acts in this spirit, he will have an acknowledged right, under certain circumstances, to begin a war, regarded as necessary, at the most favorable moment, and to secure for his country the proud privilege of such initiative. If a war, on which a Minister cannot willingly decide, is bound to be fought later under possibly far more unfavorable conditions, a heavy responsibility for the greater sacrifices that must then be made will rest on those whose strength and courage for decisive political action failed at the favorable moment.

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The man whose high and responsible lot is to steer the fortunes of a great State must be able to disregard the verdict of his contemporaries; but he must be all the clearer as to the motives of his own policy, and keep before his eyes, with the full weight of the categorical imperative, the teaching of Kant: "Act so that the maxim of thy will can at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." [1]

He must have a clear conception of the nature and purpose of the State, and grasp this from the highest moral standpoint. He can in no other way settle the rules of his policy and recognize clearly the laws of political morality.

He must also form a clear conception of the special duties to be fulfilled by the nation, the guidance of whose fortunes rests in his hands. He must clearly and definitely formulate

[1] Kant, "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft," p. 30. [Author's note.]

these duties as the fixed goal of statesmanship. When he is absolutely clear upon this point, he can judge in each particular case what corresponds to the true interests of the State; then only can he act systematically in the definite prospect of smoothing the paths of politics, and securing favorable conditions for the inevitable conflicts; then only, when the hour for combat strikes and the decision to fight faces him, can he rise with a free spirit and a calm breast to that standpoint which Luther once described in blunt, bold language: "It is very true that men write and say often what a curse war is. But they ought to consider how much greater is that curse which is averted by war. Briefly, in the business of war men must not regard the massacres, the burnings, the battles, and the marches, etc. — that is what the petty and simple do who only look with the eyes of children at the surgeon, how he cuts off the hand or saws off the leg, but do not see or notice that he does it in order to save the whole body. Thus we must look at the business of war or the sword with the eyes of men, asking, Why these murders and horrors? It will be shown that it is a business, divine in itself, and as needful and necessary to the world as eating or drinking, or any other work." [1]

Thus in order to decide what paths German policy must take in order to further the interests of the German people, and what possibilities of war are involved, we must first try to estimate the problems of State and of civilization which are to be solved, and discover what political purposes correspond to these problems.

[1] Luther, "Whether soldiers can be in a state of salvation." [Author's note.]

IV

DEMOCRATIC AND AUTOCRATIC IDEALS OF GOVERNMENT

THE ESSENTIALS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION [1]

ELIHU ROOT

[For a sketch of Elihu Root see page 12. The analysis selected is part of two articles which appeared in the *North American Review* for July and August, 1913. They were originally delivered at Princeton in 1913, and were intended as a discussion of the initiative, referendum, and recall.]

. . . . . .

The Constitution of the United States deals in the main with essentials. There are some non-essential directions, such as those relating to the methods of election and of legislation, but in the main it sets forth the foundations of government in clear, simple, concise terms. It is for this reason that it has stood the test of more than a century with but slight amendment, while the modern state constitutions, into which a multitude of ordinary statutory provisions are crowded, have to be changed from year to year. The peculiar and essential qualities of the Government established by the Constitution are:

First. It is representative.

Second. It recognizes the liberty of the individual citizen as distinguished from the total mass of citizens, and it protects that liberty by specific limitations upon the power of government.

Third. It distributes the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, which make up the sum total of all government, into three separate departments, and specifically limits the powers of the officers in each department.

[1] From "Experiments in Government and Essentials of the Constitution." Copyright, 1913, by the Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission.

Fourth. It superimposes upon a federation of state governments a National Government with sovereignty acting directly not merely upon the states, but upon the citizens of each state, within a line of limitation drawn between the powers of the National Government and the powers of the state governments.

Fifth. It makes observance of its limitations requisite to the validity of laws, whether passed by the Nation or by the states, to be judged by the courts of law in each concrete case as it arises.

Every one of these five characteristics of the Government established by the Constitution was a distinct advance beyond the ancient attempts at popular government, and the elimination of any one of them would be a retrograde movement and a reversion to a former and discarded type of government. In each case it would be the abandonment of a distinctive feature of government which has succeeded, in order to go back and try again the methods of government which have failed. Of course, we ought not to take such a backward step except under the pressure of inevitable necessity.

The first two of the characteristics which I have enumerated, those which embrace the conception of representative government and the conception of individual liberty, were the products of the long process of development of freedom in England and America. They were not invented by the makers of the Constitution. They have been called inventions of the Anglo-Saxon race. They are the chief contributions of that race to the political development of civilization.

The expedient of representation first found its beginning in the Saxon witenagemot. It was lost in the Norman Conquest. It was restored step by step, through the centuries in which Parliament established its power as an institution through the granting or withholding of aids and taxes for the King's use. It was brought to America by the English colonists. It was the practice of the colonies which formed the Federal Union.

It entered into the Constitution as a matter of course, because it was the method by which modern liberty had been steadily growing stronger and broader for six centuries as opposed to the direct unrepresentative method of government in which the Greek and Roman and Italian Republics had failed. This representative system has in its turn impressed itself upon the nations which derived their political ideas from Rome and has afforded the method through which popular liberty has been winning forward in its struggle against royal and aristocratic power and privilege the world over. Bluntschli, the great Heidelberg publicist of the last century, says:

> Representative government and self-government are the great works of the English and American peoples. The English have produced representative monarchy with parliamentary legislation and parliamentary government. The Americans have produced the representative republic. We Europeans upon the Continent recognize in our turn that in representative government alone lies the hoped-for union between civil order and popular liberty.

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In the first of these lectures I specified certain essential characteristics of our system of government, and discussed the preservation of the first — its representative character. The four other characteristics specified have one feature in common. They all aim to preserve rights by limiting power.

Of these the most fundamental is the preservation in our Constitution of the Anglo-Saxon idea of individual liberty. The Republics of Greece and Rome had no such conception. All political ideas necessarily concern man as a social animal, as a member of society — a member of the state. The ancient republics, however, put the state first and regarded the individual only as a member of the state. They had in view the public rights of the state in which all its members shared, and the rights of the members as parts of the whole, but they did not think of individuals as having rights independent of the state, or against the state. They never escaped from the

attitude toward public and individual civil rights which was dictated by the original and ever-present necessity of military organization and defense.

The Anglo-Saxon idea, on the other hand, looked first to the individual. In the early days of English history, without theorizing much upon the subject, the Anglo-Saxons began to work out their political institutions along the line expressed in our Declaration of Independence, that the individual citizen has certain inalienable rights — the right to life, to liberty, to the pursuit of happiness, and that government is not the source of these rights, but is the instrument for the preservation and promotion of them. So when a century and a half after the Conquest the barons of England set themselves to limit the power of the Crown they did not demand a grant of rights. They asserted the rights of individual freedom and demanded observance of them, and they laid the corner stone of our system of government in this solemn pledge of the Great Charter:

> No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his free hold, or his liberties, or his free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or otherwise destroyed, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.

Again and again in the repeated confirmations of the Great Charter, in the Petition of Rights, in the habeas corpus act, in the Bill of Rights, in the Massachusetts body of liberties, in the Virginia Bill of Rights, and, finally, in the immortal Declaration of 1776 — in all the great utterances of striving for broader freedom which have marked the development of modern liberty, sounds the same dominant note of insistence upon the inalienable right of individual manhood under government, but independent of government, and, if need be, against government, to life and liberty.

It is impossible to overestimate the importance of the consequences which followed from these two distinct and opposed theories of government. The one gave us the dominion, but

also the decline and fall of Rome. It followed the French declaration of the rights of man, with the negation of those rights in the oppression of the Reign of Terror, the despotism of Napoleon, the popular submission to the second empire, and the subservience of the individual citizen to official superiority which still prevails so widely on the Continent of Europe. The tremendous potency of the other subdued the victorious Normans to the conquered Saxon's conception of justice, rejected the claims of divine right by the Stuarts, established capacity for self-government upon the independence of individual character that knows no superior but the law, and supplied the amazing formative power which has molded, according to the course and practice of the common law, the thought and custom of the hundred millions of men drawn from all lands and all races who inhabit this continent north of the Rio Grande.

The mere declaration of a principle, however, is of little avail unless it be supported by practical and specific rules of conduct through which the principle shall receive effect. So Magna Charta imposed specific limitations upon royal authority to the end that individual liberty might be preserved, and so to the same end our Declaration of Independence was followed by those great rules of right conduct which we call the limitations of the Constitution. Magna Charta imposed its limitations upon the kings of England and all their officers and agents. Our Constitution imposed its limitations upon the sovereign people and all their officers and agents, excluding all the agencies of popular government from authority to do the particular things which would destroy or impair the declared inalienable right of the individual.

Thus the Constitution provides: No law shall be made by Congress prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not

be violated. No person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except in case of rebellion or invasion. No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. And by the fourteenth amendment, no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.

We have lived so long under the protection of these rules that most of us have forgotten their importance. They have been unquestioned in America so long that most of us have forgotten the reasons for them. But if we lose them we shall learn the reasons by hard experience. And we are in some danger of losing them, not all at once, but gradually, by indifference.

As Professor Sohm says: "The greatest and most far-reaching revolutions in history are not consciously observed at the time of their occurrence."

Every one of these provisions has a history. Every one stops a way through which the overwhelming power of government has oppressed the weak individual citizen, and may do so again if the way be opened. Such provisions as these are not mere commands. They withhold power. The instant any

officer, of whatever kind or grade, transgresses them he ceases to act as an officer. The power of sovereignty no longer supports him. The majesty of the law no longer gives him authority. The shield of the law no longer protects him. He becomes a trespasser, a despoiler, a lawbreaker, and all the machinery of the law may be set in motion for his restraint or punishment. It is true that the people who have made these rules may repeal them. As restraints upon the people themselves they are but self-denying ordinances which the people may revoke, but the supreme test of capacity for popular self-government is the possession of that power of self-restraint through which a people can subject its own conduct to the control of declared principles of action.

These rules of constitutional limitation differ from ordinary statutes in this, that these rules are made impersonally, abstractly, dispassionately, impartially, as the people's expression of what they believe to be right and necessary for the preservation of their idea of liberty and justice. The process of amendment is so guarded by the Constitution itself as to require a lapse of time and opportunity for deliberation and consideration and the passing away of disturbing influences which may be caused by special exigencies or excitements before any change can be made. On the contrary, ordinary acts of legislation are subject to the considerations of expediency for the attainment of the particular objects of the moment, to selfish interests, momentary impulses, passions, prejudices, temptations. If there be no general rules which control particular action, general principles are obscured or set aside by the desires and impulses of the occasion. Our knowledge of the weakness of human nature and countless illustrations from the history of legislation in our own country point equally to the conclusion that if governmental authority is to be controlled by rules of action, it cannot be relied upon to impose those rules upon itself at the time of action, but must have them prescribed for it beforehand.

The second class of limitations upon official power provided in our Constitution prescribe and maintain the distribution of power to the different departments of government and the limitations upon the officers invested with authority in each department. This distribution follows the natural and logical lines of the distinction between the different kinds of power — legislative, executive, and judicial. But the precise allotment of power and lines of distinction are not so important as it is that there shall be distribution, and that each officer shall be limited in accordance with that distribution, for without such limitations there can be no security for liberty. If whatever great officer of state happens to be the most forceful, skillful, and ambitious is permitted to overrun and absorb to himself the powers of all other officers and to control their action, there ensues that concentration of power which destroys the working of free institutions, enables the holder to continue himself in power, and leaves no opportunity to the people for a change except through a revolution. Numerous instances of this very process are furnished by the history of some of the Spanish-American Republics. It is of little consequence that the officer who usurps the power of others may design only to advance the public interest and to govern well. The system which permits an honest and well-meaning man to do this will afford equal opportunity for selfish ambition to usurp power in its own interest. Unlimited official power concentrated in one person is despotism, and it is only by carefully observed and jealously maintained limitations upon the power of every public officer that the workings of free institutions can be continued.

The rigid limitation of official power is necessary not only to prevent the deprivation of substantial rights by acts of oppression, but to maintain that equality of political condition which is so important for the independence of individual character among the people of the country. When an officer has authority over us only to enforce certain specific laws at particular times and places, and has no authority regarding

anything else, we pay deference to the law which he represents, but the personal relation is one of equality. Give to that officer, however, unlimited power, or power which we do not know to be limited, and the relation at once becomes that of an inferior to a superior. The inevitable result of such a relation long continued is to deprive the people of the country of the individual habit of independence. This may be observed in many of the countries of Continental Europe, where official persons are treated with the kind of deference, and exercise the kind of authority, which are appropriate only to the relations between superior and inferior.

So the Massachusetts constitution of 1780, after limiting the powers of each department to its own field, declares that this is done "to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men."

The third class of limitations I have mentioned are those made necessary by the novel system which I have described as superimposing upon a federation of state governments a national government acting directly upon the individual citizens of the states. This expedient was wholly unknown before the adoption of our Constitution. All the confederations which had been attempted before that time were simply leagues of states, and whatever central authority there was derived its authority from and had its relations with the states as separate bodies politic. This was so of the old Confederation. Each citizen owed his allegiance to his own state and each state had its obligations to the Confederation. Under our constitutional system, in every part of the territory of every state there are two sovereigns, and every citizen owes allegiance to both sovereigns — to his state and to his nation. In regard to some matters, which may generally be described as local, the state is supreme. In regard to other matters, which may generally be described as national, the nation is supreme. It is plain that to maintain the line between these two sovereignties operating in the same territory and upon the same citizens is a matter of no little difficulty and delicacy.

Nothing has involved more constant discussion in our political history than questions of conflict between these two powers, and we fought the great Civil War to determine the question whether in case of conflict the allegiance to the state or the allegiance to the nation was of superior obligation. We should observe that the Civil War arose because the Constitution did not draw a clear line between the national and state powers regarding slavery. It is of very great importance that both of these authorities, state and national, shall be preserved together and that the limitations which keep each within its proper province shall be maintained. If the power of the states were to override the power of the nation, we should ultimately cease to have a nation and become only a body of really separate, although confederated, state sovereignties continually forced apart by diverse interests and ultimately quarreling with one another and separating altogether. On the other hand, if the power of the nation were to override that of the states and usurp their functions, we should have this vast country, with its great population, inhabiting widely separated regions, differing in climate, in production, in industrial and social interests and ideas, governed in all its local affairs by one all-powerful central government at Washington, imposing upon the home life and behavior of each community the opinions and ideas of propriety of distant majorities. Not only would this be intolerable and alien to the idea of free self-government, but it would be beyond the power of a central government to do directly. Decentralization would be made necessary by the mass of government business to be transacted, and so our separate localities would come to be governed by delegated authority — by proconsuls authorized from Washington to execute the will of the great majority of the whole people. No one can doubt that this also would lead by its different route to the separation of our Union. Preservation of our dual system of government, carefully restrained in each of its parts by the limitations of the Constitution, has made possible our growth in local

self-government and national power in the past, and, so far as we can see, it is essential to the continuance of that government in the future.

All of these three classes of constitutional limitations are therefore necessary to the perpetuity of our Government. I do not wish to be understood as saying that every single limitation is essential. There are some limitations that might be changed and something different substituted; but the system of limitation must be continued if our governmental system is to continue — if we are not to lose the fundamental principles of government upon which our Union is maintained and upon which our race has won the liberty secured by law for which it has stood foremost in the world.

Lincoln covered this subject in one of his comprehensive statements that cannot be quoted too often. He said in his first inaugural:

> A majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinion and sentiment is the only true sovereign of a free people. Whoever rejects it does of necessity fly to anarchy or despotism.

Rules of limitation, however, are useless unless they are enforced. The reason for restraining rules arises from a tendency to do the things prohibited. Otherwise no rule would be needed. Against all practical rules of limitation — all rules limiting official conduct — there is a constant pressure from one side or the other. Honest differences of opinion as to the extent of power, arising from different points of view, make this inevitable, to say nothing of those weaknesses and faults of human nature which lead men to press the exercise of power to the utmost under the influence of ambition, of impatience with opposition to their designs, of selfish interest and the arrogance of office. No mere paper rules will restrain these powerful and common forces of human nature. The agency by which, under our system of government, observance

of constitutional limitation is enforced is the judicial power. The Constitution provides that:

> This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.

Under this provision an enactment by Congress not made in pursuance of the Constitution or an enactment of a state contrary to the Constitution is not a law. Such an enactment should strictly have no more legal effect than the resolution of any private debating society. The Constitution also provides that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Whenever, therefore, in a case before a Federal court rights are asserted under or against some law which is claimed to violate some limitation of the Constitution, the court is obliged to say whether the law does violate the Constitution or not, because if it does not violate the Constitution, the court must give effect to it as law, while if it does violate the Constitution, it is no law at all and the court is not at liberty to give effect to it. The courts do not render decisions like imperial rescripts declaring laws valid or invalid. They merely render judgment on the rights of the litigants in particular cases, and in arriving at their judgment they refuse to give effect to statutes which they find clearly not to be made in pursuance of the Constitution, and therefore to be no laws at all. Their judgments are technically binding only in the particular case decided; but the knowledge that the court of last resort has reached such a conclusion concerning a statute, and that a similar conclusion would undoubtedly be reached in every case of an attempt to found rights upon the same statute, leads to a general acceptance of the invalidity of the statute.

There is only one alternative to having the courts decide upon the validity of legislative acts, and that is by requiring the courts to treat the opinion of the legislature upon the validity of its statutes, evidenced by their passage, as conclusive. But the effect of this would be that the legislature would not be limited at all except by its own will. All the provisions designed to maintain a government carried on by officers of limited powers, all the distinctions between what is permitted to the national government and what is permitted to the state governments, all the safeguards of the life, liberty, and property of the citizen against arbitrary power would cease to bind Congress, and on the same theory they would cease also to bind the legislatures of the states. Instead of the Constitution being superior to the laws the laws would be superior to the Constitution, and the essential principles of our Government would disappear. More than 100 years ago Chief Justice Marshall, in the great case of Marbury *v.* Madison, set forth the view upon which our Government has ever since proceeded. He said:

> The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited and to what purpose is that limit committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested that the Constitution controls any legislative ac repugnant to it, or that the legislature may alter the Constitution by an ordinary act.

Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The Constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts

on the part of the people to limit a power, in its own nature, illimitable.

Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be that an act of the legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void. This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution and is consequently to be considered by this court as one of the fundamental principles of our society.

And of the same opinion was Montesquieu, who gave the high authority of the Esprit des Lois to the declaration that —

There is no liberty if the power of judging be not separate from the legislative and executive powers; were it joined with the legislative the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control.

It is to be observed that the wit of man has not yet devised any better way of reaching a just conclusion as to whether a statute does or does not conflict with a constitutional limitation upon legislative power than the submission of the question to an independent and impartial court. The courts are not parties to the transactions upon which they pass. They are withdrawn by the conditions of their office from participation in business and political affairs out of which litigations arise. Their action is free from the chief dangers which threaten the undue extension of power, because, as Hamilton points out in the *Federalist*, they are the weakest branch of government; they neither hold the purse, as does the legislature, nor the sword, as does the executive. During all our history they have commanded and deserved the respect and confidence of the people. General acceptance of their conclusions has been the chief agency in preventing here the discord and strife which afflict so many lands and in preserving peace and order and respect for law.

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A number of countries have copied our Constitution, coupled with a provision that the constitutional guaranties may be

suspended in case of necessity. We are all familiar with the result. The guaranties of liberty and justice and order have been forgotten; the government is dictatorship and the popular will is expressed only by revolution.

Nor, so far as our national system is concerned, has there yet appeared any reason to suppose that suitable laws to meet the new conditions cannot be enacted without either overriding or amending the Constitution. The liberty of contract and the right of private property which are protected by the limitations of the Constitution are held subject to the police power of government to pass and enforce laws for the protection of the public health, public morals, and public safety. The scope and character of the regulations required to accomplish these objects vary as the conditions of life in the country vary. Many interferences with contract and with property which would have been unjustifiable a century ago are demanded by the conditions which exist now and are permissible without violating any constitutional limitation. What will promote these objects the legislative power decides with large discretion, and the courts have no authority to review the exercise of that discretion. It is only when laws are passed under color of the police power and having no real or substantial relation to the purposes for which the power exists that the courts can refuse to give them effect.

By a multitude of judicial decisions in recent years our courts have sustained the exercise of this vast and progressive power in dealing with the new conditions of life under a great variety of circumstances. The principal difficulty in sustaining the exercise of the power has been caused ordinarily by the fact that carelessly or ignorantly drawn statutes either have failed to exhibit the true relation between the regulation proposed and the object sought or have gone further than the attainment of the legitimate object justified. A very good illustration of this is to be found in the Federal employer's liability act, which was carelessly drawn and passed by Congress in 1906 and was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court,

but which was carefully drawn and passed by Congress in 1908 and was declared constitutional by the same court.

Insistence upon hasty and violent methods rather than orderly and deliberate methods is really a result of impatience with the slow methods of true progress in popular government. We should probably make little progress were there not in every generation some men who, realizing evils, are eager for reform, impatient of delay, indignant at opposition, and intolerant of the long, slow processes by which the great body of the people may consider new proposals in all their relations, weigh their advantages and disadvantages, discuss their merits, and become educated either to their acceptance or rejection. Yet that is the method of progress in which no step, once taken, needs to be retraced, and it is the only way in which a democracy can avoid destroying its institutions by the impulsive substitution of novel and attractive but impracticable expedients.

The wisest of all the fathers of the Republic has spoken, not for his own day alone, but for all generations to come after him, in the solemn admonitions of the Farewell Address. It was to us that Washington spoke when he said:

> The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and to alter their constitutions of government, but the Constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. . . . Towards the preservation of your Government and the permanency of your present happy state it is requisite not only that you steadily discountenance irregular oppositions to its acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however specious the pretexts. One method of assault may be to effect in the forms of the Constitution alterations which will impair the energy of the system, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited remember that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true character of governments as of other human institutions; that experience is the surest standard by which to test the real tendency of the existing constitution of a

country; that facility in changes, upon the credit of mere hypothesis and opinion, exposes to perpetual changes from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion.

While in the nature of things each generation must assume the task of adapting the working of its government to new conditions of life as they arise, it would be the folly of ignorant conceit for any generation to assume that it can lightly and easily improve upon the work of the founders in those matters which are, by their nature, of universal application to the permanent relations of men in civil society.

Religion, the philosophy of morals, the teaching of history, the experience of every human life, point to the same conclusion — that in the practical conduct of life the most difficult and the most necessary virtue is self-restraint. It is the first lesson of childhood; it is the quality for which great monarchs are most highly praised; the man who has it not is feared and shunned; it is needed most where power is greatest; it is needed more by men acting in a mass than by individuals, because men in the mass are more irresponsible and difficult of control than individuals. The makers of our Constitution, wise and earnest students of history and of life, discerned the great truth that self-restraint is the supreme necessity and the supreme virtue of a democracy. The people of the United States have exercised that virtue by the establishment of rules of right action in what we call the limitations of the Constitution, and until this day they have rigidly observed those rules. The general judgment of students of government is that the success and permanency of the American system of government are due to the establishment and observance of such general rules of conduct. Let us change and adapt our laws as the shifting conditions of the times require, but let us never abandon or weaken this fundamental and essential characteristic of our ordered liberty.

THE STRENGTH OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY [1]

JAMES BRYCE

[James Bryce (1838–) has been prominent in English political and intellectual life since 1864, when he published his brilliant history "The Holy Roman Empire." He is best known in America as British Ambassador from 1907 to 1913 and as the author of "The American Commonwealth" (1888, revised in 1910), generally admitted to be the best exposition of the American system of government, Federal and state, yet written. Since the beginning of the World War, he has headed two important commissions, on Belgian and Armenian atrocities respectively. See page 305 for another selection by the same author.]

Those merits of American government which belong to its Federal Constitution have already been discussed: [2] we have now to consider such as flow from the rule of public opinion, from the temper, habits, and ideas of the people.

The first is that of stability. As one test of a human body's soundness is its capacity for reaching a great age, so it is high praise for a political system that it has stood no more changed than any institution must change in a changing world, and that it now gives every promise of durability. The people are profoundly attached to the form which their national life has taken. The Federal Constitution has been, to their eyes, an almost sacred thing, an Ark of the Covenant, whereon no man may lay rash hands. All over Europe one hears schemes of radical change freely discussed. There is still a monarchical party in France, a republican party in Italy and Spain, a social democratic party everywhere, not to speak of sporadic anarchist groups. Even in England, it is impossible to feel

[1] From Chapter CII, "The American Commonwealth." Copyright, 1910, The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

[2] See Chapters XXVII–XXX in vol. i. [Author's note.]

confident that any one of the existing institutions of the country will be standing fifty years hence. But in the United States the discussion of political problems busies itself with details, so far as the native Americans are concerned, and assumes that the main lines must remain as they are forever. This conservative spirit, jealously watchful even in small matters, sometimes prevents reforms, but it assures to the people an easy mind, and a trust in their future which they feel to be not only a present satisfaction but a reservoir of strength.

The best proof of the well-braced solidity of the system is that it survived the Civil War, changed only in a few points which have not greatly affected the balance of national and state powers. Another must have struck every European traveler who questions American publicists about the institutions of their country. When I first traveled in the United States, I used to ask thoughtful men, superior to the prejudices of custom, whether they did not think the states' system defective in such and such points, whether the legislative authority of Congress might not profitably be extended, whether the suffrage ought not to be restricted as regards negroes or immigrants, and so forth. Whether assenting or dissenting, the persons questioned invariably treated such matters as purely speculative, saying that the present arrangements were too deeply rooted for their alteration to come within the horizon of practical politics. So when serious trouble arises, such as might in Europe threaten revolution, the people face it quietly, and assume that a tolerable solution will be found. At the disputed election of 1876, when each of the two great political parties, heated with conflict, claimed that its candidate had been chosen President, and the Constitution supplied no way out of the difficulty, public tranquillity was scarcely disturbed, and the public funds fell but little. A method was invented of settling the question which both sides acquiesced in, and although the decision was a boundless disappointment to the party which had cast the majority of

the popular vote, that party quietly submitted to lose those spoils of office whereon its eyes had been feasting.

Feeling the law to be their own work, the people are disposed to obey the law. In a preceding chapter I have examined instances of the disregard of the law, and the supersession of its tardy methods by the action of the crowd. Such instances, serious as they are, do not disentitle the nation as a whole to the credit of law-abiding habits. It is the best result that can be ascribed to the direct participation of the people in their government that they have the love of the maker for his work, that every citizen looks upon a statute as a regulation made by himself for his own guidance no less than for that of others, every official as a person he has himself chosen, and whom it is therefore his interest, with no disparagement to his personal independence, to obey. Plato thought that those who felt their own sovereignty would be impatient of all control: nor is it to be denied that the principle of equality may result in lowering the status and dignity of a magistrate. But as regards law and order the gain much exceeds the loss, for every one feels that there is no appeal from the law, behind which there stands the force of the nation. Such a temper can exist and bear fruits only where minorities, however large, have learned to submit patiently to majorities, however small. But that is the one lesson which the American government through every grade and in every department daily teaches, and which it has woven into the texture of every citizen's mind. The habit of living under a rigid constitution superior to ordinary statutes — indeed two rigid constitutions, since the state constitution is a fundamental law within its own sphere, no less than is the Federal — intensifies this legality of view, since it may turn all sorts of questions which have not been determined by a direct vote of the people into questions of legal construction. It even accustoms people to submit to see their direct vote given in the enactment of a state constitution nullified by a decision of a court holding that the Federal Constitution has been contravened. Every page

of American history illustrates the wholesome results. The events of the last few years present an instance of the constraint which the people put on themselves in order to respect every form of law. The Mormons, a community not exceeding 140,000 persons, persistently defied all the efforts of Congress to root out polygamy, a practice eminently repulsive to American notions. If they had inhabited a state, Congress could not have interfered at all, but as Utah was then only a territory, Congress had not only a power of legislating for it which overrides territorial ordinances passed by the local legislature, but the right to apply military force independent of local authorities. Thus the Mormons were really at the mercy of the Federal government, had it chosen to employ violent methods. But by intrenching themselves behind the letter of the Constitution, they continued for many years to maintain their "peculiar institution" by evading the statutes passed against it and challenging a proof which under the common law rules of evidence it was usually impossible to give. Declaimers hounded on Congress to take arbitrary means for the suppression of the practice, but Congress and the Executive submitted to be outwitted rather than depart from the accustomed principles of administration, and succeeded at last only by a statute whose searching but strictly constitutional provisions the recalcitrants failed to evade. The same spirit of legality shows itself in misgoverned cities. Even where it is notorious that officials have been chosen by the grossest fraud and that they are robbing the city, the body of the people, however indignant, recognize the authority, and go on paying the taxes which a Ring levies, because strict legal proof of the frauds and robberies is not forthcoming. Wrongdoing supplies a field for the display of virtue.

There is a broad simplicity about the political ideas of the people, and a courageous consistency in carrying them out in practice. When they have accepted a principle, they do not shrink from applying it "right along," however disagreeable

in particular cases some of the results may be. I am far from meaning that they are logical in the French sense of the word. They have little taste either for assuming abstract propositions or for syllogistically deducing practical conclusions therefrom. But when they have adopted a general maxim of policy or rule of action they show more faith in it than the English for instance would do, they adhere to it where the English would make exceptions, they prefer certainty and uniformity to the advantages which might occasionally be gained by deviation. If this tendency is partly the result of obedience to a rigid constitution, it is no less due to the democratic dislike of exceptions and complexities, which the multitude finds not only difficult of comprehension but disquieting to the individual who may not know how they will affect him. Take for instance the boundless freedom of the press. There are abuses obviously incident to such freedom, and these abuses have not failed to appear. But the Americans deliberately hold that in view of the benefits which such freedom on the whole promises, abuses must be borne with and left to the sentiment of the people and to the private law of libel. When the Ku Klux outrages disgraced several of the Southern States after the military occupation of those states had ceased, there was much to be said for sending back the troops to protect the negroes and Northern immigrants. But the general judgment that things ought to be allowed to take their natural course prevailed; and the result justified this policy, for the outrages after a while died out, when ordinary self-government had been restored. When recently a gigantic organization of unions of working men, purporting to unite the whole of American labor, attempted to enforce its sentences against particular firms or corporations by a boycott in which all laborers were urged to join, there was displeasure, but no panic, no call for violent remedies. The prevailing faith in liberty and in the good sense of the mass was unshaken; and the result soon justified this tranquil faith. Such a tendency is not an unmixed blessing, for it

sometimes allows evils to go too long unchecked. But in giving equability to the system of government it gives steadiness and strength. It teaches the people patience, accustoming them to expect relief only by constitutional means. It confirms their faith in their institutions, as friends value one another more when their friendship has stood the test of a journey full of hardships.

American government, relying very little on officials, has the merit of arming them with little power of arbitrary interference. The reader who has followed the description of Federal authorities, state authorities, county and city or township authorities, may think there is a good deal of administration; but the description has been minute just because the powers of each authority are so carefully and closely restricted. It is natural to fancy that a government of the people and by the people will be led to undertake many and various functions for the people, and in the confidence of its strength will constitute itself a general philanthropic agency for their social and economic benefit. Of later years a current has begun to run in this direction.[1] But the paternalism of America differs from that of Europe in acting not so much through officials as through the law. That is to say, when it prescribes to a citizen a course of action it relies upon the ordinary legal sanctions, instead of investing the administrative officers with inquisitorial duties or powers that might prove oppressive, and when it devolves active functions upon officials, they are functions serving to aid the individual and the community rather than to interfere with or supersede the action of private enterprise. Having dwelt on the evils which may flow from the undue application of the doctrine of direct popular sovereignty, I must remind the European reader that it is only fair to place to the credit of that doctrine and of the arrangements it has dictated, the intelligence which the average native American shows in his political judgments, the strong sense he entertains of the duty of giving a vote,

[1] See Chapter XCV. [Author's note.]

the spirit of alertness and enterprise, which has made him self-helpful above all other men.

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The government of the Republic, limited and languid in ordinary times, is capable of developing immense vigor. It can pull itself together at moments of danger, can put forth unexpected efforts, can venture on stretches of authority transcending not only ordinary practice but even ordinary law. This is the result of the unity of the nation. A divided people is a weak people, even if it obeys a monarch; a united people is doubly strong when it is democratic, for then the force of each individual will swells the collective force of the government, encourages it, relieves it from internal embarrassments. Now the American people is united at moments of national concern from two causes. One is that absence of class divisions and jealousies which has been already described. The people are homogeneous: a feeling which stirs them stirs alike rich and poor, farmers and traders, Eastern men and Western men — one may now add, Southern men also. Their patriotism has ceased to be defiant, and is conceived as the duty of promoting the greatness and happiness of their country, a greatness which, as it does not look to war or aggression, does not redound specially, as it might in Europe, to the glory or benefit of the ruling caste or the military profession, but to that of all the citizens. The other source of unity is the tendency in democracies for the sentiment of the majority to tell upon the sentiment of a minority. That faith in the popular voice whereof I have already spoken strengthens every feeling which has once become strong, and makes it rush like a wave over the country, sweeping everything before it. I do not mean that the people become wild with excitement, for beneath their noisy demonstrations they retain their composure and shrewd view of facts. I mean only that the pervading sympathy stirs them to unwonted efforts. The steam is superheated, but the effect is seen only in the

greater expansive force which it exerts. Hence a spirited executive can in critical times go forward with a courage and confidence possible only to those who know that they have a whole nation behind them. The people fall into rank at once. With that surprising gift for organization which they possess, they concentrate themselves on the immediate object; they dispense with the ordinary constitutional restrictions; they make personal sacrifices which remind one of the self-devotion of Roman citizens in the earlier days of Rome.

Speaking thus, I am thinking chiefly of the spirit evolved by the Civil War in both the North and the South. But the sort of strength which a democratic government derives from its direct dependence on the people is seen in many smaller instances. In 1863, when on the making of a draft of men for the war, the Irish mob rose in New York City, excited by the advance of General Robert E. Lee into Pennsylvania, the state governor called out the troops, and by them restored order with a stern vigor which would have done credit to Radetzsky or Cavaignac. More than a thousand rioters were shot down, and public opinion entirely approved the slaughter. Years after the war, when the Orangemen of New York purposed to have a 12th of July procession through the streets, the Irish Catholics threatened to prevent it. The feeling of the native Americans was aroused at once; young men of wealth came back from their mountain and seaside resorts to fill the militia regiments which were called out to guard the procession, and the display of force was so overwhelming that no disturbance followed. These Americans had no sympathy with the childish and mischievous partisanship which leads the Orangemen to perpetuate Old World feuds on New World soil. But processions were legal, and they were resolved that the law should be respected, and the spirit of disorder repressed. They would have been equally ready to protect a Roman Catholic procession.

Given an adequate occasion, executive authority in America can better venture to take strong measures, and feels more

sure of support from the body of the people, than is the case in England. When there is a failure to enforce the law, the fault lies at the door, not of the people, but of timid or time-serving officials who fear to offend some interested section of the voters.

Democracy has not only taught the Americans how to use liberty without abusing it, and how to secure equality: it has also taught them fraternity. That word has gone out of fashion in the Old World, and no wonder, considering what was done in its name in 1793, considering also that it still figures in the program of assassins. Nevertheless, there is in the United States a sort of kindliness, a sense of human fellowship, a recognition of the duty of mutual help owed by man to man, stronger than anywhere in the Old World, and certainly stronger than in the upper or middle classes of England, France, or Germany. The natural impulse of every citizen in America is to respect every other citizen, and to feel that citizenship constitutes a certain ground of respect. The idea of every man's equal rights is so fully realized that the rich or powerful man feels it no indignity to take his turn among the crowd, and does not expect any deference from the poorest. Whether or no an employer of labor has any stronger sense of his duty to those whom he employs than employers have in continental Europe, he has certainly a greater sense of responsibility for the use of his wealth. The number of gifts for benevolent and other public purposes, the number of educational, artistic, literary, and scientific foundations, is larger than even in Britain, the wealthiest and most liberal of European countries. Wealth is generally felt to be a trust, and exclusiveness condemned not merely as indicative of selfishness, but as a sort of offense against the public. No one, for instance, thinks of shutting up his pleasure-grounds; he seldom even builds a wall round them, but puts up only a low railing, so that the sight of his trees and shrubs is enjoyed by passers-by. That any one should be permitted either by opinion or by law to seal up many miles

of beautiful mountain country against tourists or artists is to the ordinary American almost incredible. Such things are to him marks of a land still groaning under feudal tyranny.

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The characteristics of the American people which I have passed in review, though not all due to democratic government, have been strengthened by it, and contribute to its solidity and to the smoothness of its working. As one sometimes sees an individual man who fails in life because the different parts of his nature seem unfitted to each other, so that his action, swayed by contending influences, results in nothing definite or effective, so one sees nations whose political institutions are either in advance of or lag behind their social conditions, so that the unity of the body politic suffers, and the harmony of its movements is disturbed. America is not such a nation. There have, no doubt, been two diverse influences at work on the minds of men. One is the conservative English spirit, brought from home, expressed, and (if one may say so) intrenched in those fastnesses of the Federal Constitution, and (to a less degree) of the state constitutions, which reveal their English origin. The other is the devotion to democratic equality and popular sovereignty, due partly to Puritanism, partly to abstract theory, partly to the circumstances of the Revolutionary struggle. But since neither of these two streams of tendency has been able to overcome the other, they have at last become so blent as to form a definite type of political habits, and a self-consistent body of political ideas. Thus it may now be said that the country is made all of a piece. Its institutions have become adapted to its economic and social conditions and are the due expression of its character. The new wine has been poured into new bottles: or to adopt a metaphor more appropriate to the country, the vehicle has been built with a lightness, strength, and elasticity which fit it for the roads it has to traverse.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN A DEMOCRACY[1]

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES

[Charles Evans Hughes (1862–) was educated at Brown University and first came into prominence by his fearless investigation of insurance companies in New York City. He has served as Governor of New York and as an associate justice of the United States Supreme Court. In 1916 he was the Republican candidate for President. The present selection is part of the first of three addresses delivered at Yale in 1910, and vigorously restates in terms of to-day "the public duty of educated men."]

When one is about to loose the ties of delightful association in college and to face a world of competitive efforts, he naturally asks himself, "What is to be my lot in life?" "Where shall I find a chance to prove what I can do?" "How shall I win for myself a place of security protected by my energy or ingenuity or thrift from the possible assaults of misfortune?" "How can I achieve a competence or a fortune, or distinction?" For many, perhaps most, young men, the pressure of necessity is so strong, or ambition is so keen or the vision of opportunity is so alluring that these questions seem to transcend all others and too frequently suggest the dominant motive.

But there is another question, too rarely defined in conscious self-discipline, yet urged by a myriad of voices whose appeal dimly heard in the medley and confusion of the market place sounds the deep tone of democracy, — "What shall be my attitude toward the community?" "How shall I relate myself to that struggling, achieving mass of humanity, — the people

[1] From "Conditions of Progress in Democratic Government." Copyright, 1910, by Yale University Press. Reprinted by permission.

of this great country?" "What part shall I play, not as a unit fighting other units for individual advantage, but as a citizen of a Republic?"

Probably every one of you has been impressed with the forces of progress. I do not refer merely to those represented in production and exchange, significant as are these activities of an energetic and talented people. The large success and expansion of industry, the increase of wants and the ability to supply them, the extraordinary development in facilities of communication, are a sufficient answer to any who would speak of decadence in energy or will. But even more significant are the multiplying indications of earnest desire for the betterment of community life. I refer to the fine endeavors that are being made to extend and perfect the means of education; to improve conditions of labor; to secure better housing and sanitation; to stay the ravages of communicable disease; to provide proper care for the afflicted and defective in body and mind; to increase reformatory agencies and to improve penal methods to the end that society may protect itself without the travesty of making its prisons schools of crime; to secure higher standards of public service and a higher sense of loyalty to the common weal.

Slight consideration of the course of these endeavors emphasizes the lesson that progress is not a blessing conferred from without. It merely expresses the gains of individual efforts in counteracting the sinister and corrupting influences which, if successful, would make democratic institutions impossible. Gratifying as is the vast extent and variety of our accomplishment, one cannot be insensible to the dangers to which we are exposed. No greater mistake can be made than to think that our institutions are fixed or may not be changed for the worse. We are a young nation and nothing can be taken for granted. If our institutions are maintained in their integrity, and if change shall mean improvement, it will be because the intelligent and the worthy constantly generate the motive power which, distributed over a thousand lines of

communication, develops that appreciation of the standards of decency and justice which we have delighted to call the common sense of the American people.

Increasing prosperity tends to breed indifference and to corrupt moral soundness. Glaring inequalities in condition create discontent and strain the democratic relation. The vicious are the willing, and the ignorant are the unconscious, instruments of political artifice. Selfishness and demagoguery take advantage of liberty. The selfish hand constantly seeks to control government, and every increase of governmental power, even to meet just needs, furnishes opportunity for abuse and stimulates the effort to bend it to improper uses. Free speech voices the appeals of hate and envy as well as those of justice and charity. A free press is made the instrument of cunning, greed, and ambition, as well as the agency of enlightened and independent opinion. How shall we preserve the supremacy of virtue and the soundness of the common judgment? How shall we buttress Democracy? The peril of this nation is not in any foreign foe! We, the people, are its power, its peril, and its hope!

The causes of indifference to the obligations of citizenship may be traced in part to the optimistic feeling that nothing can go seriously wrong with us. This may indeed spring from belief in the intelligence and moral worth of the people, but that belief has ground only as there are predominant evidences of a growing sense of the duties imposed by democratic government, of an appreciation of responsibility enlarging apace with the seductions that are incident to material advancement. There is also the difficulty of realizing that government is not something apart from us, or above us, that it is we ourselves organized in a grand coöperative effort to protect mutual rights and to secure common opportunity and improvement. More potent still is the feeling of helplessness in the presence of organized agencies which, with their effective combinations based upon mutual interest, seem to make of slight consequence the efforts of citizens who are not members of inner

circles of power. But no organized agency and no combination, however strong, can outrage the rights of any community, if the community sees fit to assert them. The character of the agencies of the community, its instruments of expression, the forms of its organized effort are simply what it may desire or tolerate. Whatever evil may exist in society or politics simply points the question to the individual citizen, "What are you doing about it?"

Before we deal with particular problems and relations, I desire to consider the fundamental question of attitude and the principles of action which must be regarded as essential to the faithful discharge of the civic duties.

It is of first importance that there should be sympathy with democratic ideals. I do not refer to the conventional attitude commonly assumed in American utterances and always taken on patriotic occasions. I mean the sincere love of Democracy. As Montesquieu says: "A love of the republic in a democracy is a love of the democracy; as the latter is that of equality."

It would be difficult to find an association in which wealth, or family, or station are of less consequence, and in which a young man is appraised more nearly at his actual worth than in an American college. Despite the increase of luxury in college living, the number of rich men's sons who frequent these institutions, and the amount of money lavishly and foolishly expended, our colleges are still wholesomely democratic. A young man who is decent, candid, and honorable in his dealings will not suffer because he is poor, or his parents are obscure, and the fact that he may earn his living in humble employment in order to pay for his education will not cost him the esteem of his fellows. He will be rated, as the rich man's son will be rated, at the worth of his character, judged by the standards of youth which maintain truth and fair dealing and will not tolerate cant or sham. This is so largely true that it may be treated as the rule, and regrettable departures from it as the exception.

But a larger sympathy and appreciation are needed. The young man who goes out into life favorably disposed toward those who have had much the same environment and opportunity may still be lacking in the broader sympathy which should embrace all his fellow countrymen. He may be tolerant and democratic with respect to those who, despite differences in birth and fortune, he may regard as kindred spirits, and yet in his relation to men at large, to the great majority of his fellow beings, be little better than a snob. Or despite the camaraderie of college intercourse he may have developed a cynical disposition or an intellectual aloofness which, while not marked enough to interfere with success in many vocations, or to disturb his conventional relations, largely disqualifies him from aiding his community as a public-spirited citizen. The primary object of education is to emancipate; to free from superstition, from the tyranny of worn-out notions, from the prejudices, large and small, which enslave the judgment. His study of history and of the institutions of his country has been to little purpose if the college man has not caught the vision of Democracy and has not been joined by the troth of heart and conscience to the great human brotherhood which is working out its destiny in this land of opportunity.

The true citizen will endeavor to understand the different racial viewpoints of the various elements which enter into our population. He will seek to divest himself of antipathy or prejudice toward any of those who have come to us from foreign lands, and he will try, by happy illustration in his own conduct, to hasten appreciation of the American ideal. For him "American" will ever be a word of the spirit and not of the flesh. Difference in custom or religion will not be permitted to obscure the common human worth, nor will bigotry of creed or relation prevent a just appraisement. The pitiful revelations of ignorance and squalor, of waste and folly, will not sap his faith. He will patiently seek truly to know himself and others, and with fraternal insight to enter into the world's

work, to share the joys of accomplishment, and to help in the bearing of the burdens of misery. He will be free from the prejudice of occupation or of residence. He will not look askance either at city or at country. For him any honest work will be honorable, and those who are toiling with their hands will not be merely economic factors of work, but human beings of like passions and possessed of the "certain unalienable rights." Neither birth nor station, neither circumstance nor vocation, will win or prevent the esteem to which fidelity, honesty, and sincerity are alone entitled. He will look neither up nor down, but with even eye will seek to read the hearts of men.

This sense of sympathetic relation should increase respect both for individual interests and for community interests and should give a better understanding of what is involved in each. They are not in opposition; properly speaking, they cannot be divorced. By individual interests I mean those interests which concern the normal development of the individual life, which relate to freedom in choice of work and individual pursuits, to the conservation of opportunities for the play of individual talent and initiative, to the enjoyment of property honestly acquired. The liberty of the individual in communities must of course be restrained by the mutual requirements imposed upon each by the equal rights of others, and by the demands of the common welfare. It may be difficult to define the precise limitations of such restrictions, but the guiding principle must be that the common interest cannot be preserved if individual incentive is paralyzed, and that to preserve individual incentive there must be scope for individual effort freely expended along lines freely chosen and crowned by advantages individually acquired and held. There is no alchemy which can transmute the poverty of individual hope into communal riches. Restrictions, to be justified, must be such as are essential to the maintenance of wholesome life and to prevent the liberty of some from accomplishing the enthraldom of all.

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In all its efforts, democracy will make progress in the degree that the people cultivate the patience and steadiness of justice. The obligations of citizenship are not to be met by spasmodic outbursts or by feverish demonstrations of public interest. It is true that we make our most important choices of the representatives of the people amid the tumult of exaggerated and interested appeals. To a superficial observer the excitements of a political campaign would seem to imply the dethronement of reason. But it is to the credit of our people that they are so largely deliberative and have proved themselves so well able to sift the chaff from the wheat in political arguments, and are so skillful in following the thread of truth through the maze of prejudiced assertion and cunning perversion. If we were governed by gusts of passion and lost our heads in the turmoil of political strife, our freedom would be a travesty.

The desire to know the truth and to deal fairly with men and measures is of the essence of good citizenship. The most dangerous foes of democratic government are those who seek through special privilege to pervert it to selfish uses, and those who, by reckless, untruthful, and inflammatory utterances, corrupt the public sentiment. The more dangerous is the latter. For the motive power of any remedial effort must be found in public opinion, and to achieve good results it must be just. There are those who take a poor view of our prospects because of the recklessness of the sensational press. It is difficult for them to conceive that the community can steady itself against these constant and insidious assaults upon its judgment and sense of proportion. If indeed the people believed all they read and their mental attitude and emphasis were accurately reflected in headlines and type, it would seem cause for despair. But those who are pessimistic with regard to the influence of certain portions of the press fail to take account of the many forces that determine public sentiment. The habit of exaggeration furnishes to a large degree its own corrective, and its sensational exhibitions are taken seriously by few. The average man is very curious, and the fact that

his curiosity will tempt him to buy and read does not necessarily indicate that what he has read has made much of an impression. Men are in constant communication with each other, in the shop, in the office, in going to and from their work, in the family, in their varied social relations, and in this intercourse information and opinions derived from many sources are freely interchanged. Their experience of life largely determines their point of view. What is read with regard to men and measures is generally accepted or rejected not upon mere assertion, but as it may or may not accord with the general opinions which experience has produced. This fact points the lesson that the most serious consequences of breaches of public trust and of corruption in high places are not to be found in the particular injuries inflicted, but in the undermining of the public confidence and in the creating of a disposition to give credit to charges of similar offending. But, as has been said, much of reckless and disproportionate statement, much of malicious insinuation, much of frenzied and demagogical appeal, fails of its mark.

While we may be grateful for this, and fully appreciate that with the spread of education this capacity of the people to resist such assaults will tend to increase, we cannot but be sensible of the evil influence that is actually exerted. To combat this and to maintain in the community standards of candor and justice should be the aim of every citizen.

If it be asked how an individual can accomplish aught in this direction, it may be answered that it lies with the individual to accomplish everything. The man who demands the facts, who is willing to stand or fall by the facts, who forms his convictions deliberately and adheres to them tenaciously, who courts patient inquiry and "plays fair," is a tower of strength in any group to which he may be related. We have no greater advantage than a free press and the freedom of public utterance. We would not lose its benefits because of its abuses. Demagoguery will always have a certain influence, and the remedy is to be found not in repression or impatient

denunciation, but in the multiplication of men of intelligence who love justice and cannot be stampeded.

The citizen should contribute something more than sympathy with democracy, something more than respect for individual and community interests, something more than adherence to the standards of fair dealing. Sympathy and sentiment will fail of practical effect without independence of character. A man owes it to himself so to conduct his life that it be recognized that his assent cannot be expected until he has been convinced. He should exhibit that spirit of self-reliance, that sense of individual responsibility in forming and stating opinion, which proclaims that he is a man and not a marionette. This of course is a matter of degree varying with personality and depends for its beneficial effect upon intelligence and tact. None the less, the emphasis is needed. There are so many who with respect to public affairs lead a life largely of self-negation! They are constantly registering far below their capacity and never show anything like the accomplishment for which they were constructed and equipped. We have too many high-power vessels whose power is never used.

It is constantly urged that men must act in groups and through organizations to accomplish anything. This is obviously true and describes such a marked tendency that it is hardly necessary to point the lesson. The difficulty is not to get men to act in groups and through organization, but to have groups and organizations act properly and wisely by reason of the individual force and independent strength of their members. Groups and organizations constantly tend to represent the influence and power of one man or a few men, who are followed not because they are right, but because they lead, and who maintain themselves not so much by the propriety and worth of leadership as by their skill and acumen in availing themselves of the indifference of others and by use of solicitations, blandishments, and patronage. This is illustrated in all forms of association, and to the extent that it exists, the association loses its strength and capacity to

accomplish the results for which it is intended. Groups and organizations within democracy depend upon the same conditions as those which underlie the larger society. If they come into the strong control of a few by reason of the indifference and subservience of the many, the form is retained without the substance and the benefits of coöperative action are lost.

It is of course a counsel of wisdom that men should be tactful and desirous of coöperating, and not in a constant state of rebellion against every effort at group action. But men who are eccentric and impossible are proof against counsel; and their peculiarities simply illustrate the exceptional and abnormal in society. The normal man naturally tends to work with others; to him the sentiment of loyalty makes a powerful appeal. And the counsel that is most needed is that men in the necessary action of groups should not lose their individual power for good by blind following. The man who would meet the responsibilities of citizenship must determine that he will endeavor justly, after availing himself of all the privileges which contact and study afford, to reach a conclusion which for him is a true conclusion, and that the action of his group shall if possible not be taken until, according to his opportunity and his range of influence, his point of view has been presented and considered. This does not imply sheer obstinacy or opinionated stubbornness. Progress consists of a series of approximations. But it does imply self-respect, conscientious effort to be sound in opinion, respect for similar efforts on the part of others, and accommodations in the sincere desire for coöperative achievement which shall be rational and shall be sensibly determined in the light of all facts and of all proposals. It also implies that there shall be no surrender that will compromise personal integrity or honor, or barter for gain or success one's fidelity to the oath of office or to the obligation of public trust.

A consideration of the obstacles which are found to be successfully interposed to this course is not flattering to those of our citizens who have had the greatest advantages. There is, in the first place, the base feeling of fear. Lawyers are

afraid that they will lose clients; bankers, that they will lose deposits; ministers, that important pew-holders will withdraw their support; those who manage public service corporations, that they will suffer retaliation. Throughout the community is this benumbing dread of personal loss which keeps men quiet and servile.

The first lesson for a young man who faces the world with his career in his own hands is that he must be willing to do without. The question for him at the start and ever after must be not simply what he wants to get, but what he is willing to lose. "Whosoever shall lose his life shall preserve it," is the profoundest lesson of philosophy. No one can fight as a good soldier the battles of democracy who is constantly seeking cover.

But still more influential is the desire to avoid controversy and to let things go. The average American is good-hearted, genial, and indisposed not simply to provoke a quarrel, but even to enter into a discussion. By the constant play of his humor he seeks to avoid sharp contacts or expression of differences. But independence of conviction and the exercise of one's proper influence do not imply either ill nature or constant collisions with opposing forces. The power of the man who is calm and temperate, just and deliberate, who seeks to know the truth and to act according to his honest convictions, is after all not best figured by the force of arms, but by the gracious influence of sunshine and of rain and the quiet play of the beneficent forces of nature. In suitably expressing his individuality, in presenting his point of view, he need not sacrifice his geniality or the pleasures of companionship which are always enhanced by mutual respect.

Then there are the fetters of accumulated obligations. The strongest appeal that can be made to an American is to his generous sense of obligation because of favors received. Men whom no wealth could bribe and no promise could seduce will fall in public life victims to a chivalrous regard for those who have helped them climb to public place. This is because of a strange inversion of values. The supposed private debt

is counted more important than the public duty. But there are no obligations which friendship or kindly action can impose at the expense of public service. It is simply a perverted sentiment which suggests such a demand or the necessity of meeting it. It is a strange notion, which courses in ethics and the benefits of higher education so frequently find it difficult, if not impossible, to dislodge.

Whether you like it or not, the majority will rule. Accept loyally the democratic principle. The voice of the majority is that neither of God nor of devil, but of men. Do not be abashed to be found with the minority, but on the other hand do not affect superiority or make the absurd mistake of thinking you are right or entitled to special credit merely because you do not agree with the common judgment. Your experience of life cannot fail to impress you with the soundness of that judgment in the long run, and I believe you will come to put your trust, as I do, in the common sense of the people of this country, and in the verdicts they give after the discussions of press, of platform, and of ordinary intercourse. The dangers of the overthrow of reason and of the reign of passion and prejudice become serious only as resentment is kindled by abuses for which those who have no sympathy with popular government and constantly decry what they call "mob rule" are largely responsible. But whether the common judgment shall exhibit that intelligence and self-restraint which have given to our system of government so large a degree of success, will depend upon your attitude and that of the young men of the country who will determine the measure of capacity for self-government and progress in the coming years.

Prize your birthright and let your attitude toward all public questions be characterized by such sincere democratic sympathy, such enthusiasm for the common weal, such genuine love of justice, and such force of character, that your life to the full extent of your talent and opportunity shall contribute to the reality, the security, and the beneficence of government by the people.

THE PALE SHADE[1]

GILBERT MURRAY

[George Gilbert Aimé Murray (1866–), one of the most famous of English scholars and poets, was born in Australia, but was educated at the Merchant Taylors' School, London, and at Oxford. Since 1908 he has been Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford. He is widely known for his unequaled translations from the Greek, especially his renderings of Euripides into English verse of superb felicity and eloquence. Since the beginning of the World War he has written extensively in advocacy of a liberal and democratic solution of its problems. This admirable essay, from which a considerable number of paragraphs have been omitted, is a brilliant discussion of the British Constitution.]

The British soldier fought in the pale shade of aristocracy. — NAPIER

The conception which one country entertains of another is always several generations out of date, and nearly always based on something romantic or startling. There are still plenty of Englishmen, and many more Frenchmen, who in their secret hearts conceive of America as a mixture of Bret Harte and the "Last of the Mohicans," with a rather regrettable surface-dressing of skyscrapers and great inventors and millionaires mourning for their kidnaped sons. And I have noticed in American popular theaters traces of a belief that our farmers still dress in the costumes of George III's day, and that kings, princesses, earls, and — oddly enough — pickpockets play a more prominent part in our daily life than is warranted by experience. And neither party likes to lose its illusion. Our people are distinctly saddened when they hear that there are no more wild buffaloes and that Indians are taking university degrees, and sympathetic Americans

[1] From *North American Review*, September, 1917. Reprinted by permission.

are a little pained and incredulous when our statesmen describe England as a "great democracy" and discuss social problems without even mentioning the wishes of the King.

The fact is that in Great Britain the King and the House of Lords are both survivals. They are relics of a form of government and a structure of society that have both passed out of existence. In other countries they would have been swept away by a clean-cut revolution about the years 1830–1848, but the English habit in reform is never to go further than you really want. If your eye offends you, try shutting it for a bit; or use a little ointment or lotion; or give up reading by artificial light. But do not be such a fool as to have it taken out until you are perfectly certain you must. And still more, if your neighbor offends you: try to put up with him, try to get round him, try to diminish his powers in the particular point where he is most offensive; but do not hang him or shoot him unless he absolutely insists upon it; and, if you must fight him, do not forget that you will have to live with him or his friends afterwards.

It is this characteristic which has won for England two reputations which seem at first sight contradictory. She is known as the most Liberal of European nations and also as the most Conservative. Both statements are fairly true, and they both mean almost the same thing. She is Liberal because she believes in letting people do as they like and think as they like: she hates oppression and espionage and interference except where they are absolutely necessary for the public safety; and for that very same reason she is Conservative. She adapts herself to new conditions with as little disturbance as she conveniently can, and never destroys institutions or worries individuals for the sake of mere logical consistency. The people who praise her for being Liberal would seldom claim that she was specially Progressive. Those who call her Conservative would never think of her as Reactionary. The fact is that, for various reasons, she has enjoyed greater security, both inside and out, than most

European nations; and, being free from fear, she could afford, as a general rule, to be patient and good-natured.

Of these ancient undemocratic institutions which English Conservatism has left in being while in other democracies they have disappeared, the Crown is at once the most conspicuous and the most harmless. No king has ever asserted his will against that of the nation since George III, and no one seems to anticipate that any king is likely again to do so. Such republican feeling as there is in Great Britain — and it is markedly less than it was thirty years ago — is idealist and theoretic. It is not a protest against felt oppression; it is an echo from Mazzini and Kossuth and 1848, and, in the last few months, from the great wind of the Russian Revolution. The only grievance of a practical kind that could be charged against the monarchy is its supposed expensiveness. About half a million yearly is voted by Parliament to the King's "Civil List." But then many of the services now charged to the Civil List would have to continue under any system; only instead of being put down under this heading, they would be under the Board of Works or Public Health or some other government department. And experts differ as to whether the expenses actually due directly and indirectly to the maintenance of the Crown are greater or less than the expenses of a recurrent Presidential election would be.

The real strength of the monarchy lies in its practical convenience. It hurts no one, and it solves a number of difficult problems. The races of India and Egypt and Afghanistan understand loyalty to a king; many of them would not understand loyalty to a Parliament. Princes and Rajahs of ancient birth and accustomed to magnificence are flattered by a message from the King-Emperor, or his Viceroy: it might be less easy to win their homage for an elected official. More important than these considerations is the advantage of not having the head of the Empire a party leader. Party feeling runs very high in Great Britain. Opinion in the

colonies and the dominions is often greatly out of touch with opinion at home; it is generally more democratic, it is often less liberal. And it might make a strain on the loyalty, say, of Indian soldiers and officials if a radical leader, whom they were accustomed to curse every morning at tiffin, were suddenly made the chief magistrate of the Empire. As it is, the King has no politics, and people of all views can be loyal to him. He represents something permanent amid the changes of ministries, something that seems to be England itself, and, if people feel disposed to idealize it, does nothing to prevent them.

The same consideration has some force at home also. When party feeling is strong, a change of government produces a great strain; but it would be a far greater strain if the hated head of the opposite political party became actually the President of the whole British people. As it is the Crown and the civil service remain unchanged, so the beaten party can comfort itself; the whole government of the nation has not quite been given over into the hands of the wicked!

By the British Constitution the King is a mythical being built up by a mass of legal fictions. He is king "by the Grace of God"; he can do no wrong; he never dies; he is never under age; he cannot be taxed; he cannot be arrested. Conversely he is the only person in the realm who cannot arrest a suspected criminal, because if he arrested by mistake an innocent man, no action at law could be taken against him, and therefore there would be "a wrong without a remedy"! He is also the fountain of justice and the fountain of honor, and the sole repository of the prerogative of pardon. But when you examine into the meaning of all these wonderful statements, they melt into mist. He does no wrong because he never does anything. He cannot act except by the advice of his ministers. And his ministers are the leaders of the political party which represents the majority of the nation. He pardons criminals or reduces their sentences, but only when the Home Secretary on behalf of the Government advises him to do so. He is the fountain of honor and he alone

can create peers; but he only creates those whom the Prime Minister recommends. No Act of Parliament is valid without his signature, and he can in theory refuse to sign. But it is over 200 years since Queen Anne refused the royal assent to a certain Scotch Militia Act, and no sovereign since has attempted to follow her example. At a few great constitutional crises, like the passing of the Reform Bill, the hotheads of the minority party have talked of persuading the King to veto some bill which they thought particularly monstrous; but they have never had their way.

Does the King then really count for nothing? No; clearly it would not be true to say that. But it is very hard to say what his power actually is. Though he cannot ever overrule the ministers with whom the House of Commons provides him, it must be remembered that he is always in office whereas the ministers change. He sees a great deal of the most important business of state. He gets to know all the persons of political importance in the Kingdom. If he is a man of character himself or a good judge of character in others, he is pretty sure to obtain sooner or later a considerable personal influence, dependent not on his supposed prerogative but on his experience and position. Published memoirs enable us to say with confidence that in the last generation a proposal which had the approval of King Edward or of Queen Victoria had generally a smoother career than one which those sovereigns thought harmful. But of course there would be no question in either case of the Crown setting itself up against the known will of Parliament.

It is true then that, to a slight extent, in a matter where the will of Parliament and people was not clear, and ministers were not interested or were divided among themselves, the wish of the King, a hereditary and unrepresentative officer, might be the deciding force. That is, as far as it goes, a defect in the British Constitution from the standpoint of pure democracy. But there are few democracies in the world that have not worse defects than that.

The ardent republican will no doubt insist upon something more fundamental. "The Crown," he will say, "produces inevitably a false social atmosphere. The air of the Court, with its immense interest in small personal questions, with its honors and distinctions which depend on the pleasure of particular individuals, with its regard for hereditary rank and its false standards in judging the world, is an influence essentially hostile to human dignity and to the spiritual equality of man with man. It concentrates attention on itself, and, among the masses of thoughtless people at any rate, that means concentrating attention on a wrong object. When George III was speaking with Dr. Johnson, certainly most people in England would have been more interested in listening to the King than to the philosopher. And if instead of Dr. Johnson, His Majesty had been speaking to Socrates and George Washington and Shakespeare all at once, I daresay it would have been much the same. When Burke was studying the French Revolution he was so dazzled by the thought of the suffering Queen that he could not see the social and economic distresses of the people of France. 'He pitied the plumage and forgot the dying bird,' and that is just the state of mind which the false glitter of monarchy leads to."

This argument, as far as it goes, is probably quite true: but it is just the sort of argument that middle-aged Englishmen, as a rule, are not much affected by. A Frenchman or an Italian perhaps feels it more. An Englishman is apt to smile indulgently and say he sees what you mean, but that after all in practice he thinks there is not much harm done, and that snobbish people would be just as snobbish without a Court as with one.

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The House of Lords is, from the political point of view, a body hard to defend. It is unrepresentative, it is too large, it is drawn too predominantly from one class, and that a class whose interests are exceptionally exposed to criticism. Such

a Second Chamber stands condemned. Yet we may put in some pleas in mitigation of sentence. It would be wrong to conceive of the House of Lords as a great mass meeting of nearly seven hundred hereditary landowners sitting permanently to obstruct all Liberal reforms. It is only on very rare occasions that the mass of peers — the "backwoodsmen" as they are called — turn up to vote; only on the great party issues, such as the Home Rule Bill, the Parliament Bill, and the like. On ordinary occasions the House of Lords is attended by some forty to sixty members, nearly all of them serious, eminent, and hard-working public men, and a good number of them Liberals.

The ranks of the peerage are recruited every year by new creations; and, to one who does not expect too much of our frail human nature, especially in a region where it is apt to be seen at its frailest, the new creations, though far from ideal, are, on the whole, by no means unrespectable. The obviously bad appointments attract lively public interest; the good ones pass by unnoticed. Of course mere money bags count far too much; of course party services are unduly rewarded. Of course the people who work and scheme industriously to get a title are more likely to receive one than those who do not. Occasionally there is a scandal. One or two have echoed across the Atlantic. But if you make a list of the most recent peers, you will find among them a very large proportion of men who are at the head of their respective professions or walks of life, especially of course if they have been engaged in law or public administration. Turn up the record of a few old House of Lords debates and notice the speakers. You will find first several of these recent peers, whose rank is not hereditary but has been conferred on them for public services: Lord Cromer, a very great governor who reformed the finances of Egypt; Lord Morley, the famous radical philosopher and man of letters, friend of Mr. Gladstone and John Stuart Mill; Lord Milner, an extreme imperialist, who is strongly distrusted in Liberal circles but certainly achieved his peerage by hard

work and personal qualities; Lord Loreburn, a great lawyer and a former Liberal Lord Chancellor; Lord Courtney, formerly Chairman of Committees in the House of Commons, a leading radical and pacifist; Lord Parmoor, a Conservative lawyer; two or three Bishops, some very conservative, some moderate like the Archbishop of Canterbury, some Socialist, like the Bishop of Oxford. Then there are many peers whose title is hereditary, but who would probably have attained eminence in whatever rank of life they had been born: Lord Rosebery, the famous orator; Lord Crewe, Lord Lansdowne, the very accomplished leaders of the Liberal and Conservative peers respectively; Lord Curzon, a great traveler, a distinguished ex-Viceroy of India, and a man of academic distinction. These are all men whose opinion is of real importance, and who probably ought to be members of any second chamber, however democratically constructed. Then there are a number of successful business men, brewers, doctors, and men of science.

The House of Lords on ordinary days is not at all an unsatisfactory senate. An old friend of the writer, a Liberal of undoubted soundness and an enthusiastic admirer of Abraham Lincoln, avers that on ordinary occasions, where no great party question is at issue, he finds the debates in the House of Lords better than those which he remembers in the Commons. Above all there is more freedom, and more power of expressing unpopular views. When certain Quakers and other Conscientious Objectors to military service were shown to have been harshly or unfairly treated, the best statement of their case was made in the House of Lords. When the Government, by way of "reprisals" against German cruelty, sent an expedition to drop bombs on the open town of Freiburg, by far the best and most effective protest was made in the House of Lords — and made by Liberals, Bishops, and Conservatives alike. Again when abstruse questions affecting remote parts of the world come up for debate, there are generally some peers present who have special knowledge

of them. Only those peers attend who are really interested in public affairs; there is no obstruction or "filibustering," no "talking out" of proposals, no threats by party leaders against their too independent followers. There is just the one absolutely fatal defect, that, whenever the Conservative leader thinks fit to take the trouble, he can whip up an overwhelming majority to destroy any Liberal bill; and that majority will consist largely of quite undistinguished and unpolitical persons, some few of them perhaps of indifferent character and intelligence, and most of them not known to him by sight.

It is England all over, this anomalous and indefensible institution, which generally happens to work rather well because most of its members do not attend, and has not — until lately — made itself so serious an obstacle to progress and the popular will that the nation was willing to take the trouble of "ending or mending it." However, reform is now inevitable. The only question is whether the House of Lords itself will consent to a reform sufficiently thorough to satisfy the feeling of the country, or whether it prefers to follow the counsel of its own "Die-hards" and "Last-ditchers," and will go down fighting. It will no longer be a grave obstacle to the progress of democracy. That may be taken as certain.

If you consulted at this moment the feeling of radical and socialist circles in Great Britain, you would probably find comparatively little bitterness against the House of Lords; rather the reverse. It has proved itself the one place where the unpopular views of the pacifists can be fully expressed and accorded a courteous hearing. The real object of bitterness would be the pseudo-democratic capitalist press — which is quite another story.

"This is all very well," an American reader may say. "It may be that your King has no political power and your House of Lords is having its claws clipped at the moment, so far as the poor things needed clipping. But you are an

aristocratic nation. We know it in our bones. We feel it when we meet Englishmen. The first thing they ask about a man is whether he is or is not a 'gentleman,' — it is the all-important question. And the answer to it seems to depend neither on the man's moral qualities, which we would respect, nor on the size of his income, which we could at least understand, but on the abstruse points connected with his pronunciation, and his relatives, and the way he wears his necktie. Your aristocrats are supposed to have exquisite manners, but as a matter of fact they often offend us. They are too much accustomed to deference from common people; they stand aside and expect to be waited on. And, when we go to England, we may not see as much gross luxury as in New York or Newport, but we do see that life is made extraordinarily comfortable for the 'upper classes,' and for them alone. They do no doubt care about the 'poor'; they are charitable and they are public-spirited; but they despise, or, at any rate, they exclude from their society whole classes of people who seem to us just as good as they are — commercial men, wealthy shop-keepers, leaders of industry and others, just because they have not the same way of talking."

Now there is some truth in this, and some falsehood. And it is exceedingly difficult to unravel the two, even in the roughest and most elementary way. I should not dare to attempt it if I were a born Englishman, educated at Eton or Winchester. Because in that case, I believe I should think it mere nonsense. But, having come to England from Australia, and been at one time a stranger to the well-to-do English public-school society which sets the tone in the British upper class, I think I can understand the criticism.

It is a fact that in Great Britain the aristocracy, which America on the whole shook off when it shook off the British connection, still survives and is in some ways still powerful. And I think, perhaps, in no way more than this: that its standard of behavior and minor morals is more or less accepted as a model by the whole nation. It is true that

Englishmen, more than other nations, do consider whether a man is a gentleman; and the average Englishman of all classes normally considers that he himself is a gentleman and expects to be treated as one. This may sound like mere servility or class-worship; but of course it is not that. It does not mean that the average man tries to behave exactly as he has seen some earl or viscount behave, or as he reads that such persons did behave in the eighteenth century. It means that a certain ideal has been formed of the way in which a "gentleman" ought to behave, and that practically every self-respecting British citizen feels himself — theoretically at least — bound to live up to it.

It is in part a class imitation and in part a genuine moral standard; it is based in part on snobbishness and in part on idealism. That is just what gives it its power. It appeals to every kind of person. No doubt it would be far better to aim at being a philosopher or a true Christian; but thousands of people who have no ambition in either of those directions will be very strong on conducting themselves like gentlemen. And some will do it in a superficial way and some in a sincere and searching way.

All this, as I re-read it, sounds somewhat oligarchical, somewhat inconsistent with the true and complete ideal of democracy. But the truth is that no democracy can thrive without a widespread and vigorous sense of self-respect and mutual respect among its members. And the British democracy has set about acquiring that sense by the means that happened for historical reasons to lie ready to its hand. In an old aristocratic society, such as existed in the eighteenth century, where only the select Few were really respected, wider and wider circles of the nation determined to live up to the standard of that Few in honor and courtesy and self-discipline, and so to earn the respect which that standard gave.

I do not feel ashamed when I think of it. If the standard were, owing to the war, to break down, as some people say

it will, I should be bitterly sorry, not glad. When I heard people attack a late Foreign Minister on the ground that he was "too much of a gentleman for the work that is wanted in war," I found it difficult within the limits of gentlemanly language to express the vehemence of my dissent. I will not for a moment plead, on behalf of my country, that she once had these somewhat aristocratic standards but is now throwing them over. And the majority of any working class audience in the country will feel as I do.

We want to democratize the country, true, but we do not want to vulgarize it. Just the reverse. I remember twenty years ago hearing two members of Parliament discuss who was the truest gentleman in the House of Commons, and the choice fell on a Northumberland miner, sent by his fellow miners to represent them. It is not from the working classes that any danger to this ideal will come. Money and intrigue and insincerity and lying advertisement: those are the enemies to true "gentleness," not hard work nor poverty.

We are no doubt still affected by the tradition of the aristocracy which once governed Great Britain, a tradition already made legendary and greatly idealized. The class of gentlefolk has enormously widened and no man living is necessarily shut out from it. It still largely fills the civil service and governs the outlying portions of the empire. The public services are now, with few exceptions, filled by open competitive examination. The examinations are severe and skillful, and their fairness has never been questioned. If the services still remain somewhat select and aristocratic, that is because the higher education has in Great Britain, as in all industrial societies, remained too much a privilege of the upper and middle classes. We must not forget the immense and steady effort made to counteract this tendency from the Renaissance onwards. No nation has had such rich provision for the education of "poor scholars" as England had after the foundation of the great public schools. No nation has such a system of "scholarships," or large money prizes lasting for

four years or so, and open to the best pupils in competitive examinations in all parts of the country. The present writer was supported almost entirely by scholarships from the age of fourteen to the age of twenty-three, and could not have got through the University otherwise. So it is not for him to complain of the exclusion of poor boys from the highest education that England can provide. And his case is perfectly normal and common. If you look through the lists of "scholars" and "exhibitioners" compiled by several Oxford colleges of recent years, you will find a majority coming from homes by no means wealthy and a large proportion actually from the working class. And these men go on to fill high positions in the civil service, politics, the law, the Church, or other "gentlemanly" professions. And if this was done under the old system with its "great Public Schools," with high fees, numbering less than a hundred all told, how much more will be done when the new State-aided Secondary Schools, numbering over nine hundred already, with very low fees and an abundance of free places and university scholarships, have begun to exert their full influence in the national education? Of course we must not delude ourselves. It remains difficult, by any measures of public help, entirely to get over the inherent disadvantages to a working-class child of the poverty of its parents. They will want it to bring in wages at once instead of improving its education. They will not be able to provide it at home with a background of cultured thought or interesting conversation. However, we see those difficulties and we mean to face them. I must not allow them now to make me digress from my main subject. . . . Hitherto the public services and learned professions, the original preserves of the "upper classes," have absorbed without any loss of standard, indeed with a considerable rise in standard, the hundreds of "poor scholars" who came to them from the old Public Schools and Universities. They will absorb equally the thousands of chosen boys and girls who come from the new Secondary Schools and the cheap modern Universities.

I have spoken of the civil side of life, since that is the only side of which I have personal knowledge. The army and navy used to be the great strongholds of aristocratic privilege, the impregnable fortresses of anti-liberal thought. The famous phrase quoted at the head of this essay has lingered in men's memories. But it is well to remember that it referred to the Engand of 1812, and even then only to the army. The army of 1917 is very different from the army of a hundred years ago, or even of three years ago. The soldier in whom the nation now places its chief trust, Sir William Robertson, was himself a working man. Promotions from the ranks are now the rule, not the exception. I make no profession of knowing the army from inside; but I believe one is safe in saying that if the nation as a whole is moving forward in a democratic direction, the opposite tendency will find no stronghold any longer in the army. The British soldier fights no more "in the pale shade of aristocracy."

Yet the standard of honor remains untouched. War makes good men do horrible things; there is no shutting of the eyes to that. Yet I believe all good judges will agree that our soldiers now have more chivalry, not less, than those of Wellington.

There are bad symptoms here and there: vulgarities, meannesses, intrigues, and blatancies. Such things exist in every large society, and a state of long and desperate warfare calls them into prominence. But, on the whole, there is no visible decay in the strength of that ideal of manners which is descended originally from a bygone aristocracy but is now felt to be part of the birthright of every free Briton: an obligation imposed on him by his own freedom and by the position which his race holds in the world. How can a member of so great a Commonwealth consent to be anything but a Gentleman? A rule of duty as of the strong towards the weak, courage and gentleness, no bullying and no intrigue: it may be based ultimately on mere pride, but it is better to be proud of these qualities than of their opposites. And such pride, as America herself is the best witness, is no bad ornament to a great and sovereign democracy.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS[1]

JAN CHRISTIAN SMUTS

[Lieutenant-General Smuts (1870–) is a native of South Africa, but was educated at Christ's College, Cambridge, where he distinguished himself as a scholar. In the Boer War of 1899–1902 he fought against the British, but in the World War he commanded the British troops which drove the Germans out of East Africa. During 1917 he visited England as South African representative in the Imperial War Cabinet, and his speeches on the war and the question of Imperial federation made a profound impression. This after-dinner speech was delivered at a banquet given in his honor by members of both Houses of Parliament on May 15, 1917, and was characterized by the London *Daily Telegraph* as "one of the finest and most statesmanlike utterances that the war has produced." It is especially valuable for its presentation before a not entirely sympathetic audience of the attitude of the British "colonials" to the British Crown and Constitution.]

Ever since I have come to this country, about two months ago, I have received nothing but the most profound and charming kindness and hospitality, which has culminated in this unique banquet to-night. I appreciate it all the more because I know it is given at a time when the greatest storm in the world's history is raging, and when nobody in this country or great city feels inclined to indulge in any festivities or banquets. When I return home, I shall be able to tell the people of South Africa that I have been received by you not as a guest, not as a stranger, but simply as one of yourselves. Speaking with a somewhat different accent, and laying a different emphasis on many things, as no doubt becomes a barbarian from the outer marches of the Empire — and one whose mind is not yet deeply furrowed with trenches and dugouts — I would like first of all to say how profoundly

[1] From *International Conciliation*, November, 1917. Reprinted by permission.

thankful I am to Lord French for the words which have fallen from his lips. Your expressions in regard to myself are largely, I feel, undeserved. At any rate, I accept them as coming from an old opponent and comrade in arms. I know they are meant in the best spirit, and I accept them as such.

Your words recall to my mind many an incident of those stirring times when we were opposing commanders in the Boer War. I may refer to two. On one occasion I was surrounded by Lord French — and was practically face to face with disaster. Nothing was left me but, by the most diligent scouting, to find a way out. I ventured into a place which bore the very appropriate name of Murderers' Gap — and I was the only man who came out alive. One account of that stated that one Boer escaped, but he probably had so many bullets in him that he would be no further danger. I survived to be your guest to-night. Two days after I broke through — blessed words in these times — and on a very dark night, I came to a railway, which I was just on the point of crossing, when we heard a train. Some of us felt inclined to wreck and capture that train, but for some reason or other I said, "No, let it pass." You can imagine my feelings when some time afterwards I learned that the only freight on that train was Sir John French with one or two A.D.C.'s, moving round from one part of his front to another to find out how I had broken through. If I had not missed that chance, he would have been my guest, no doubt very welcome, though no doubt embarrassing. Fate has willed otherwise. I am his guest.

Those were very difficult and strenuous days in which one learned many a valuable lesson, good for all life. One of those lessons was that under stress of great difficulty practically everything breaks down ultimately, and the only things that survive are really the simple human feelings of loyalty and comradeship to your fellows, and patriotism which can stand any strain and bear you through all difficulty and privation. We soldiers know the extraordinary value of these simple feelings, how far they go, and what strain they can bear, and

how ultimately they support the whole weight of civilization. That war was carried on by both sides in a sportsmanlike spirit, and in a clean, chivalrous way — and out of that calamity has been produced the happy state of affairs that you see to-day in South Africa, and which led to a new basis on which to build the larger and happier South Africa which is arising to-day.

I am sure in the present great struggle now being waged you will see some cause leading to lasting results. Here you have from all parts of the British Empire young men gathering on the battle fields of Europe, and whilst your statesmen keep planning a great scheme of union for the future of the Empire, my feeling is that very largely the work is already done. The spirit of comradeship has been borne in this campaign on the battle fields of Europe, and many of the men from the various parts of the Empire will be far more powerful than any instrument of government that you can elect in the future. I feel sure that in after days, when our successors come to sum up what has happened and draw up a balance-sheet, there will be a good credit balance due to this common feeling of comradeship which will have been built up. Now once more, as many ages ago during the Roman Empire, the Germanic volcano is in eruption, and the whole world is shaking. No doubt in this great evolution you are faced in this country with the most difficult and enormous problems which any Government or people have ever been called upon to face — problems of world-wide strategy, of man-power, communications, food supply, of every imaginable kind and magnitude, so large that it is almost beyond the wit of man to solve them, and it is intelligible that where you have so many difficulties to face, one forgets to keep before one's eye the situation as a whole. And yet that is very necessary.

It is most essential that even in this bitter struggle, even when Europe is looming so large before our eyes, we should keep before us the whole situation. We should see it steadily and see it whole. I would ask you not to forget in these times

the British Commonwealth of nations. Do not forget that larger world which is made up of all the nations that belong to the Empire. Bear in mind that after all Europe is not so large, and will not always continue to loom so large as at present. Even now in the struggle the pace of Europe is being permanently slowed down. Your Empire is spread all over the world, and even where the pace is slowed down in one portion it is accelerated in another, and you have to keep the whole before you in order to judge fairly and sanely of the factors which affect the whole.

I wish to say a few words to-night on this subject, because I think there is a tendency sometimes to forget certain aspects of the great questions with which we are now confronted. That is one of the reasons why I am glad the Imperial Conference was called at this time, apparently a very opportune moment, and yet the calling of this Conference at this time has already directed attention once more to that other aspect of the whole situation which is so important to us. Remember, it is not only Europe that we have to consider, but also the future of this great commonwealth to which we all belong. It is peculiarly situated; it is scattered over the whole world; it is not a compact territory; it is dependent for its very existence on world-wide communications, which must be maintained or this Empire goes to pieces. In the past thirty years you see what has happened. Everywhere upon your communications Germany has settled down; everywhere upon the communications of the whole globe you will find a German colony here and there, and the day would have come when your Empire would have been in very great jeopardy from your lines of communication being cut.

Now, one of the by-products of this war has been that the whole world outside Europe has been cleared of the enemy. Germany has been swept from the seas, and from all continents except Central Europe. Whilst Germany has been gaining ground in Central Europe, from the rest of the world she has been swept clean; and, therefore, you are now in this

position — almost providentially brought to this position — that once more you can consider the problem of your future as a whole. When peace comes to be made you have all these parts in your hand, and you can go carefully into the question of what is necessary for your future security and your future safety as an Empire, and you can say, so far as it is possible under war circumstances, what you are going to keep and what you are going to give away.

That is a very important precedent. I hope when the time comes — I am speaking for myself, and expressing nobody's opinion but my own — I feel when the time comes for peace we should not bear only Central Europe in mind, but the whole British Empire. As far as we are concerned, we do not wish this war to have been fought in vain. We have not fought for material gain, or for territory; we have fought for security in the future. If we attach any value to this group of nations which compose the British Empire, then we, in settling peace, will have to look carefully at our future safety and security, and I hope that will be done, and that no arrangement will be made which will jeopardize the very valuable and lasting results which have been attained.

That is the geographical question. There remains the other question — a very difficult question — of the future constitutional relations and readjustments in the British Empire. At a luncheon given recently by the Empire Parliamentary Association I said, rather cryptically, that I did not think this was a matter in which we should follow precedents, and I hope you will bear with me if I say a few words on that theme, and develop more fully what I meant. I think we are inclined to make mistakes in thinking about this group of nations to which we belong, because too often we think of it merely as one State. The British Empire is much more than a State. I think the very expression "Empire" is misleading, because it makes people think as if we are one single entity, one unity, to which that term "Empire" can be applied. We are not an Empire. Germany is an Empire, so was Rome, and so is India,

but we are a system of nations, a community of states and of nations far greater than any empire which has ever existed; and by using this ancient expression we really obscure the real fact that we are larger and that our whole position is different, and that we are not one nation, or state, or empire, but we are a whole world by ourselves, consisting of many nations and states, and all sorts of communities under one flag. We are a system of states, not only a static system, a stationary system, but a dynamic system, growing, evolving all the time towards new destinies.

Here you have a kingdom with a number of Crown colonies; besides that you have large protectorates like Egypt, which is an empire in itself, which was one of the greatest empires in the world. Besides that you have great dependencies like India — an empire in itself, one of the oldest civilizations in the world, and we are busy there trying to see how East and West can work together, how the forces that have kept the East going can be worked in conjunction with the ideas we have evolved in Western civilization for enormous problems within that State. But beyond that we come to the so-called Dominions, a number of nations and states almost sovereign, almost independent, who govern themselves, who have been evolved on the principles of your constitutional system, now almost independent states, and who all belong to this group, to this community of nations, which I prefer to call the British Commonwealth of nations. Now, you see that no political ideas that we evolved in the past, no nomenclature will apply to this world which is comprised in the British Empire; any expression, any name which we have found so far for this group has been insufficient, and I think the man who would discover the real appropriate name for this vast system of entities would be doing a great service not only to this country, but to constitutional theory.

The question is, how are you going to provide for the future government of this group of nations? It is an entirely new problem. If you want to see how great it is, you must take the

United States in comparison. There you find what is essential — one nation, not perhaps in the fullest sense, but more and more growing into one; one big State, consisting of subordinate parts, but whatever the nomenclature of the United States Constitution, you have one national State, over one big, contiguous area. That is the problem presented by the United States, and for which they discovered this federal solution, which means subordinate governments for the subordinate parts, but one national Federal Parliament for the whole.

Compare with that state of facts this enormous system comprised in the British Empire of nations all over the world, some independent, living under diverse conditions, and all growing towards greater nations than they are at present. You can see at once that the solution which has been found practicable in the case of the United States probably never will work under our system. That is what I feel in all the empires of the past, and even in the United States — the effort has been towards forming one nation. All the empires that we have known in the past and that exist to-day are founded on the idea of assimilation, of trying to force different human material through one mold so as to form one nation. Your whole idea and basis is entirely different. You do not want to standardize the nations of the British Empire. You want to develop them into greater nationhood. These younger communities, the offspring of the Mother Country, or territories like that of my own people, which have been annexed after various vicissitudes of war — all these you want not to mold on any common pattern, but you want them to develop according to the principles of self-government and freedom and liberty. Therefore, your whole basic idea is different from anything that has ever existed before, either in the empires of the past or even in the United States.

I think that this is the fundamental fact which we have to bear in mind — that the British Empire, or this British Commonwealth of nations, does not stand for unity, standardization, or assimilation, or denationalization; but it stands for

a fuller, a richer, and more various life among all the nations that compose it. And even nations who have fought against you, like my own, must feel that they and their interests, their language, their religions, and all their cultural interests are as safe and as secure under the British flag as those of the children of your household and your own blood. It is only in proportion as that is realized that you will fulfill the true mission which you have undertaken. Therefore, it seems, speaking my own individual opinion, that there is only one solution, that is the solution supplied by our past traditions of freedom, self-government, and the fullest development. We are not going to force common Governments, federal or otherwise, but we are going to extend liberty, freedom, and nationhood more and more in every part of the Empire.

The question arises, how are you going to keep this world together if there is going to be all this enormous development towards a more varied and richer life among all its parts? It seems to me that you have two potent factors that you must rely on for the future. The first is your hereditary kingship. I have seen some speculations recently in the papers of this country upon the position of the kingship of this country; speculations by people who, I am sure, have never thought of the wider issues that are at stake. You cannot make a Republic in this country. You cannot make a Republic of the British Commonwealth of nations, because if you have to elect a President not only in these Islands, but all over the British Empire, who will be the ruler and representative of all these peoples, you are facing an absolutely insoluble problem. Now, you know the theory of our Constitution is that the King is not merely your King, but he is the King of all of us. He represents every part of the whole Commonwealth of nations. If his place is to be taken by anybody else, then that somebody will have to be elected by a process which, I think, will pass the wit of man to devise. Therefore let us be thankful for the mercies we have. We have a kingship here which is really not very different from a hereditary Republic,

and I am sure that more and more in the future the trend will be in that direction, and I shall not be surprised to see the time when our Royal princes, instead of getting their Consorts among the princelings of Central Europe, will go to the Dominions and the outlying portions of the Empire.

I think that in the theory of the future of this great Empire it is impossible to attach too much importance to this institution which we have existing, and which can be developed, in my opinion, to the greatest uses possible for its future preservation and development. It will, of course, be necessary to go further than that. It is not only the symbol of unity which you have in the Royal ruler, but you will have to develop further common institutions.

Every one admits that it would be necessary to devise better machinery for common consultation than we have had hitherto. So far we have relied upon the Imperial Conference which meets every four years, and which, however useful for the work it has done hitherto, has not, in my opinion, been a complete success. It will be necessary to devise better means for achieving our ends. A certain precedent has been laid down of calling the Prime Ministers and representatives from the Empire of India to the Imperial Cabinet, and we have seen the statement made by Lord Curzon that it is the intention of the Government to perpetuate that practice in future. Although we have not yet the details of the scheme, and we have to wait for a complete exposition of the subject from his Majesty's Government, yet it is clear that in an institution like that you have a far better instrument of common consultation than you have in the old Imperial Conference, which was called only every four years, and which discussed a number of subjects which were not really of first-rate importance. After all, what you want is to call together the most important statesmen in the Empire from time to time — say once a year, or as often as may be found necessary — to discuss matters which concern all parts of the Empire in common, and in order that causes of friction and misunderstanding

may be removed. A common policy should be laid down to determine the true orientation of our Imperial policy.

Take foreign policy, for instance, on which the fate of the Empire may from time to time depend. I think it is highly desirable that at least once a year the most important leaders of the Empire should be called together to discuss these matters, and to determine a common policy, which would then be carried out in detail by the various executive Governments of the commonwealth nations. This Imperial Council or Cabinet will not themselves exercise executive functions, but they will lay down the policy which will be carried out by the Governments of the various parts of the Empire. A system like that, although it looks small, must in the end lead to very important results and very great changes. You cannot settle a common policy for the whole of the British Empire without changing that policy very considerably from what it has been in the past, because the policy will have to be, for one thing, far simpler. We do not understand diplomatic finesse in other parts of the Empire. We go by large principles, and things which can be easily understood by our undeveloped democracies. If your foreign policy is going to rest, not only on the basis of your Cabinet here, but finally on the whole of the British Empire, it will have to be a simpler and more intelligible policy, which will, I am sure, lead in the end to less friction, and the greater safety of the Empire.

Of course, no one will ever dispute the primacy of the Imperial Government in these matters. Whatever changes and developments come about, we shall always look upon the British Government as the senior partner in this concern. When this Council is not sitting, the Imperial Government will conduct the foreign affairs of the Empire. But it will always be subject to the principles and policy which have been laid down in these common conferences from time to time, and which, I think, will be a simpler and probably, in the long run, a saner and safer policy for the Empire as a whole. Naturally, it will lead to greater publicity. There is no doubt

that, after the catastrophe that has overtaken Europe, nations in future will want to know more about the way their affairs are conducted. And you can understand that, once it is no longer an affair of one Government, but of a large number of Governments who are responsible ultimately to their Parliaments for the action they have taken, you may be sure there will be a great deal more publicity and discussion of foreign affairs than there has ever been.

I am sure that the after effects of a change like this, although it looks a simple change, are going to be very important, not only for this community of nations, but for the world as a whole. Far too much stress is laid upon the instruments of government. People are inclined to forget that the world is getting more democratic, and that forces which find expression in public opinion are going to be far more powerful in the future than they have been in the past. You will find that you have built up a spirit of comradeship and a common feeling of patriotism, and that the instrument of government will not be the thing that matters so much as the spirit that actuates the whole system of all its parts. That seems to me to be your mission. You talk about an Imperial mission. It seems to me this British Empire has only one mission, and that is a mission for greater liberty and freedom and self-development. Yours is the only system that has ever worked in history where a large number of nations have been living in unity. Talk about the League of Nations — you are the only league of nations that has ever existed; and if the line that I am sketching here is correct, you are going to be an even greater league of nations in the future; and if you are true to your old traditions of self-government and freedom, and to this vision of your future and your mission, who knows that you may not exercise far greater and more beneficent influence on the history of mankind than you have ever done before?

In the welter of confusion which is probably going to follow the war in Europe, you will stand as the one system where

liberty to work successfully has kept together divers communities. You may be sure the world such as will be surrounding you in the times that are coming will be very likely to follow your example. You may become the real nucleus for the world government for the future. There is no doubt that is the way things will go in the future. You have made a successful start; and if you keep on the right track, your Empire will be a solution of the whole problem.

I hope I have given no offense. When I look around this brilliant gathering, and see before me the most important men in the Government of the United Kingdom, I am rather anxious that we should discuss this matter, which concerns our future so very vitally — a matter which should never be forgotten even in this awful struggle, in which all our energies are engaged. Memories of the past keep crowding in upon me. I think of all the difficulties which have surrounded us in the past, and I am truly filled with gratitude for the reception which you have given me, and with gratitude to Time, the great and merciful judge, which has healed many wounds — and gratitude to that Divinity which "shapes our ends, rough hew them how we will." I think of the difficulties that still lie ahead of us, which are going to test all the nations fighting for liberty far more than they have ever been tested in the past, and I hope and pray that they all may have clearness of vision and purpose, and especially that strength of soul in the coming days, which will be more necessary than strength of arm. I verily believe that we are within reach of priceless and immeasurable good, not only for this United Kingdom and group of nations to which we belong, but also for the whole world. But, of course, it will depend largely upon us whether the great prize is achieved now in this struggle, or whether the world will be doomed to long, weary waiting in the future. The prize is within our grasp, if we have strength, especially the strength of soul, which I hope we shall have, to see this thing through without getting tired of waiting until victory crowns the efforts of our brave men in the field.

THE IDEA OF LIBERTY IN FRANCE[1]

ÉMILE BOUTROUX

[Étienne Émile Marie Boutroux (1845–) is a professor of philosophy in the University of Paris and is one of the most distinguished of French philosophers. He has been an Exchange Professor at Harvard University, and was in 1912 elected to the French Academy. He has written, among other works, "Education and Ethics" (1913) and lives of Pascal and of William James. This is part of an address delivered on December 5, 1915, before the Conference de Foi et Vie in Paris. In its presentation of the double origin of the French ideal of government and attitude toward life and the perfect combination of the two tendencies, it is a valuable contribution to an understanding of European principles of government.]

The French idea of liberty is not a modern invention. It is the blossoming of a double tradition: the Græco-Roman and the Christian.

Opposed to the Orient, which subjected man and the world to an absolute empire of transcendent powers and indeterminable fatalities, ancient Greece considered the world to be self-animated, and as tending to realize its own destinies within itself. The directing ideal of Greek thought is Art. Now, in a work of art such as the Greeks conceived it, matter and form are so exactly adjusted to one another, that one is unable to say whether form is the result of the spontaneous development of matter, or whether matter has been purely and simply disciplined by form. In the eyes of the Greek artist matter and form are one. It is neither a foreign force nor an oppressive one which develops matter under the laws of form. According to the voice of Amphion's lyre there arise,

[1] Translated by Morris Edmund Speare from "L'Idée de Liberté en France et en Allemagne." Paris, 1915.

of their own accord, pliable materials which develop into walls and towers. The great blind man of Mœonie[1] opens his mouth.

". . . and the ancient boughs already
Incline their foliage softly and in cadence!"

If nature in general possesses, within itself, the power of elevating itself toward the ideal, by a much stronger reason is human nature capable of manifesting the attributes of the true, the beautiful, and the good, and of its own accord pressing toward them. When he loves and seeks for knowledge, man thus constitutes morality, convention, the social life, and the political life. From thence springs the Hellenic ideal of education. To uplift men is not, according to the Platonists and the Aristotelians, to impose upon them any plan which one might judge useful, without taking into consideration their natures and their aspirations; it is, on the contrary, to consummate their most intimate wishes, to help them to reach the goal which they themselves aim for. Art, says Aristotle, makes masterpieces with which Nature should be content. It is so with Education, which is the supreme art.

If Greece, above all other things, put forth the power of initiative and of perfection which reside in the nature of man, the more peculiarly practical genius of Rome expressly deduced from this notion of man the moral and the juridical consequences which it embodied. Capable of self-mastery and of reflecting upon his own acts man is subjected to the law of Duty. He is not only a plant which blossoms through liberty. He is a will which must obey. And, capable of assuming dignity and moral worth, he possesses as an essential attribute that eminent quality which we call Right.

As the Græco-Latin civilization conceives him, man is thus a being capable of personally fashioning himself, of aspiring to the true, the beautiful, and the good, subject to the higher laws which impose upon him duties, and he is provided with essential rights which are born out of this very dignity of his.

[1] André Chénier, *L'Aveugle.*

If French thought comes out of this so-called Classical tradition, it is also heir to the Christian tradition. The latter does not contradict the classical ideal at all. But, while the Greeks and the Romans had considered above all things Reason in man, reason through which all men tend to mold themselves into a single being, universal and impersonal, Christianity exalted, in particular, the individual, with his conscience and with his own traits of character. It gives first importance, in God and in man, to love, sentiment, — that is to say, to the peculiarly individualistic element of the soul. It is not simply the human species which, according to the doctrine of Christ, is privileged to approach God and to commune with him; it is every man taken separately, however humble his condition and however limited his vision. "Behold," says Jesus, "this poor widow casting thither, into the alms-box, her two mites. Of a truth I say unto you that she hath cast in more than they all. For they have cast of their abundance; but she of her penury hath cast in all the living that she had." Such are the examples that Jesus gave to his disciples; such are the servants of God to whom He promises the first places in the Kingdom of Heaven. Every individual, according to this doctrine, is called upon as such to save himself from sin and from death, and to live in God. And the salvation of all, taken every single one, is equally dear to the Father who is all-powerful and all-good.

Nourished upon this twofold tradition, French thought has affirmed an ideal of liberty which is vitally identical in the conscience of the people and in the writings and speeches of scholars and statesmen.

Liberty, according to this way of looking at things, implies a power of disposing of oneself, of desiring, of thinking, of acting for oneself which belong to the individual as an individual. This power is expressed by the phrase: free agent, which, according to the French point of view, designates a faculty at the same time very genuine and very superior.

Each man, through this free agent, is like a personal empire within a universal empire. His very conscience, in fact, is not an insignificant secondary phenomenon, but an original and efficacious reality. Through it each individual is somehow master of himself. Not that the individual is sufficient unto himself nor has the right to regard himself as superior to all laws. French thought does not ratify the exaggerated assertion of Rousseau attributing to the individual "an absolute existence and a naturally independent one." Man finds in his own conscience with irresistible clearness the laws of justice and of humanity. He considers himself therefore as under obligation to his kind and to the universal order of things. The aim which he should impose upon himself is, in this sense, not to differentiate between an absolute individual sovereignty and an absolute abdication, but to conciliate within himself the liberty and the right of the individual with the right of the ideal and the sovereignty of moral laws. If every individual is, by some means, an entire being, it is perforce an entire being that individuals ought to consummate by their union. So that the problem of moral life for French conscience is the very problem which a Greek poet put forth in these words

Πῶς δέ μοι ἓν τι τὰ πάντ' ἐσται
καὶ χωεὶς ἕκαστον;

"How can we so bring it about that the All be One, and at the same time that each member possess an individual existence?"

The conception of liberty in the individual is, according to the French doctrine, determined by nations, in the measure that these latter can be held responsible as you would hold people responsible; that is to say, in the measure with which they are endowed with a national conscience and possess the necessary elements for self-government. They also belong to themselves, and must be masters of their own destinies; they also, at the same time, must recognize the existence of a

universal justice for the realization of which they are in duty bound to collaborate with all the others.

One cannot deny that in the course of our own history this idea of liberty has not, at times, changed, and has not, sometimes, failed to suffer destruction while working out its own salvation. It is evident that in teaching men that they have a personal worth, that they are capable and worthy of personally determining themselves and of governing themselves, we expose them to forgetting that they are dependent upon a superior authority and so to take themselves as if they were in themselves the ultimate end of action. It would be more simple, surely, to mold them to the necessary obedience; to inculcate in them that belief that of themselves they are nothing, and that they acquire a value and a reality only in acting under the impulse of a higher power. Hence the French conception of liberty has fallen in certain crises, a fact which has endangered the social order and liberty itself. Ill-willed critics have been able to say that France oscillated between despotism and anarchy. And it is fashionable, notably beyond the Rhine, to maintain that the French are vowed to an ungovernable individualism. The individual, according to this opinion, would consider himself in France as literally sovereign. In the satisfaction of his own wishes, his desires, his caprices, he would place the only law for his conduct. He would recognize in his governors no other rôle, no other right, than that of assuring, of guaranteeing to each person the integral development of his individuality.

That those who have thus estimated France are mistaken is what the attitude of the French people in the present war shows most forcibly. Certainly every one is his very self, every one acts according to the dictates of his own conscience. Does it follow that France is given over to anarchy; that the revolution or the civil war which its enemies foresaw are ready to open up our country; that its unity is only superficial and illusory? There can be nothing more false than such a deduction. The unanimity of these free minds is real. This

war, more than any other perhaps, is a national war for the people of France. It is for this reason that the general will is now more united than ever before. We distinguish no longer between the soldiers of the regular army, the reserves, or the territorials, between the civilian and the military, between the army and the nation. All offer themselves for the common cause, each according to the place which he occupies or which is assigned to him. A single thought fills all hearts: to free the country, Europe, and the world, and to establish the rule of Right among the nations. One dominating ideal pervades all our action, great or small: the good of the service. Before this necessity personal pride disappears. Politics itself, in fact, bows before the national duty. The country has resolved in its entirety and to the limit to perform valiantly all the physical and the moral sacrifices which patriotism demands of it.

What does that mean? Has France become transformed, or resuscitated, or galvanized?

France is to-day what she was yesterday; but the frightful danger with which she saw herself menaced has now spared her the necessity of coördinating, of combining, and of leading back to unity the individual liberties, if those liberties were to have efficacious action. To find principles capable of thus disciplining liberties, without doing them any violence, France has only to study its own conscience. She found there profoundly rooted sentiments of a sovereign grandeur and potency. The first is worship of the Past. There resides in every Frenchman the love of the soil where his ancestors repose, and of the monuments which betoken their piety, their glories, and their genius. The second is that love of Justice and of ideal humanity which, no less than the reverence for the Past, is traditional in the country of France.

If the present war has especially recalled Frenchmen to the duty of subjecting their individual wills to a higher Law, it has, by that challenge, simply excited them to develop harmoniously all their instincts. Man, says Descartes, is

naturally endowed with free will. But free will is, itself, only a faculty of which one may make bad use as well as good use. The destiny of free will is to become Liberty. Free will attains that dignity only when it spends itself in realizing, not any kind of end at all but those alone which dictate or admit Reason.

A CLUE TO RUSSIA[1]

H. N. BRAILSFORD

[Henry Noel Brailsford (1873–) is an English political writer and journalist who is identified with the Liberal Party. He has made several visits to the Near East, in 1913 serving on the Carnegie International Commission sent there. His chief writings are "Macedonia" (1906) and "A League of Nations" (1917). The following article owes its value to its succinct explanation of an intricate matter which is at the base of much of the unrest in Russia.]

About the Russian revolution one feels what Heraclitus felt about the nature of things. It is in continual flux, and any assertion which one may make about it will have ceased to be true as one speaks. The safest plan would be to wag a symbolic finger, as the wise man recommended, by way of indicating that "it flows." Ministries chase each other across the field of vision; after one congress to restore the nation's unity, it is safe to predict that another will be necessary in a month; the little Cossack Korniloff, in spite of his pitiable failure, may not be the last of the Napoleons; and the Maximalists will "demonstrate" again and yet again. It is the way of revolutions to generate energy by explosion. To the steady gaze, however, the flux reveals itself as a stream which moves in conscious and determined currents. The instability and confusion at the center of power is far from meaning chaos; it is, on the contrary, the oscillating index of a struggle of tendencies as rational and inevitable as any clash of wills which can occur in any human society. Our English newspapers attribute the whole conflict to disputes over the conduct of the war or the promotion of peace. The Maximalists are for them merely traitors, bought by German

[1] From *New Republic*, October 20, 1917. Reprinted by permission.

gold, who work to make a separate peace, while Korniloff was the pure-minded patriot whose single purpose was to "get on with the war." This elegant simplification misses the whole point of the internal conflict. To be sure, each side accuses the other of working for a separate peace; the charge is merely a way of saying with due emphasis that one disagrees with a man. The root of the whole misunderstanding is that few of us realize, even yet, that there is latent in the revolution a social as well as a political upheaval.

The general view was that Russia had got rid of Tsardom, and all that now remained for her to do was to adopt at leisure something resembling the French Republican constitution. That, to be sure, was an immense change, but the country seemed to be wonderfully unanimous about it. The partisans of Tsardom dared not show themselves, and the conservative elements, who would have preferred a constitutional monarchy, were embarrassed by the difficulty of finding a suitable dynasty. The Romanoffs, after the Rasputin scandal, were finally impossible, and Russia could hardly go, like a Balkan state, to pick up a foreign princeling in a Viennese café. The graver dispute turned on the question whether the republic should be a federal system, based on full autonomy for such regions as Finland, the Ukraine, the Baltic provinces, and Siberia. That question, in spite of the preference of the Cadets and other Liberal-Conservatives for a strong centralized government, has practically settled itself. It became clear that these non-Russian regions must receive the fullest measure of home rule; the only practical alternative was independence. The great Russian majority had neither the will nor the power to coerce them. One might have supposed that the foundations of the future Russia were already laid, and that no controversy could shake them. Republicanism on the French pattern, federation of a loose and generous type, universal suffrage for all classes and both sexes, these were fixed by the will of the people or the pressure of irresistible forces. What then is the source of unrest?

The source of unrest is the thing which destroyed the abortive revolution of 1905–1906. When the first Duma met, its first act was to set to work to draft an ambitious scheme of land purchase, under the inspiration of the Cadets. Bold as their scheme looked to English eyes, it did not satisfy the Socialists, while the landed class, which included the officers of the army, saw in it red ruin. The result of attempting this immense social change, before the representative system was consolidated or civil rights secure, was that autocracy triumphed, while the people split into three camps — Liberal property, Conservative property, and the half-aroused proletariat. The raising of the land question at that moment seemed a gross error in tactics, but the more one talked with Russians about it, the more one realized that it was inevitable. No revolution can succeed in Russia without peasant support, and the peasants will follow a revolution only when its leaders promise them land. The present revolution was made by peasants, since the revolted regiments of the Petrograd garrison, whose delegates formed the Soviet (Council), were all composed of reservists only recently called up. The main body of the Socialists has been commendably willing to coöperate with "bourgeois" parties, but from the first there has been one point on which it admits no compromise. It stands for the abolition of private property in land. The Russian revolution was inspired by Socialists, and in those first days of fighting when the Liberals watched it inactive from a balcony they lost all chance of directing it. It was rather naïve to imagine, as our English press did and still does, that Socialists had shed their blood merely to set up a Liberal republic.

A great victory was won for democratic diplomacy, when M. Miliukoff fell from office as a result of his defense of the secret treaties. But a still more important change occurred during those stirring days of May. The Ministry of Agriculture was confided to a Revolutionary Socialist leader, M. Tchernoff. His views are those of his whole party, and

they are shared on the land question by the more cautious peasant "Party of Toil." M. Tchernoff set to work to draft a scheme of land settlement for submission to the constituent assembly, which in spite of postponement must some day meet. Its outlines became known, and M. Tchernoff was at once the butt of Liberal and Conservative attacks, which soon degenerated into personal calumny. When Kerensky became premier in July, the first proclamation of his government established as a principle the abolition of private property in land.

The general idea of the Social Revolutionaries and the Party of Toil is to vest the ownership of land in the commune or parish. The Social Democrats differ only in preferring national to communal ownership. Each family will have the use of as much land as it can cultivate with its own hands, with its share of pasture. The average, it is reckoned, will be, including pasture, about thirty or thirty-five acres. The quantity, to English notions, seems handsome; but Russian agriculture is very primitive, and the Russian family is very large. Forests will belong to the whole commune or to groups of communes. The old crown estates, the lands of the monasteries, and the excessive portions of private estates are all to be thrown into the common stock. There will have to be a good deal of migration, much rearrangement of communal boundaries, and a bold subdivision of private estates, before the great settlement can be completed. Finally, and this is the grave feature of the scheme, it is not proposed that either the state or the peasant shall pay any compensation whatever for the prairie value of confiscated land. That something will be allowed for improvements is probable, but Russian landlords did not usually sink much capital in their land as English proprietors do. Even allowing for the many compromises and alterations in detail which are certain to be introduced, the scheme means broadly that the Russian landed class may find itself possessed, as the result of the revolution, of just as much land as each aristocratic family can till with

its own white hands. That is the real issue between revolution and counter-revolution.

The western reader may be tempted to dismiss such a scheme as this as visionary doctrinaire socialism. It is far from being that. Socialism in western countries has a visionary look, because it is the product of theoretic thinking with no basis of tradition behind it. Even the peasant in the West believes in the private ownership of land. The Russian peasant, on the contrary, regards private ownership as a criminal usurpation. He grew up in the Mir, or village commune, which owned the inadequate stock of common land as its collective proprietor and parceled it out periodically in thin and hungry strips among its families. The institution is as ancient as our common Indo-European origin, and it has formed all the peasant's conceptions of property. To him the immoral, the antisocial thing is to seize and possess and bequeath more land than one can till. Again and again, from Pogatcheff's rebellion in the seventeenth century down to the emancipation of the serfs, the rumor has spread among the peasants that the Tsar was going to give back to them the land which the aristocracy had filched from them. The revolution is going at last to do what the Little Father never did. M. Stolypin, realizing that a conservative Russia must be based on private property, began in 1907, through a law carried by a coup d'état, to break up the Mir and to create a class of peasant owners. That law in ten years had wrought a good deal of destruction, but it could not reverse the thinking of centuries.

It is idle to discuss the expediency of restoring the land — the morality of it seems to me to need no defense. It is what nine tenths of the Russian people demand. Even the Liberal-Conservative Cadets would have to deal with this question, as they tried to do in 1906, and in one way or another would have to insure to each peasant family a holding on which it could live. The dangerous point of the scheme is its insistence on expropriation without compensation. Here

again, it is fact rather than theory which is decisive. "The State," as a Russian Socialist expert put it to me, "cannot pay compensation, and the peasants will not." With the ruble at about a quarter of its pre-war exchange value, and the external war debt mounting to a total which threatens bankruptcy, it seems idle to the purpose that the state should buy out the landlords. As for the peasants, who is going to coerce them? Not the army, for it is composed of peasants reckoning on the day when peace will mean for them the conquest of Russian soil. Not the police, it is all disbanded. Not the constituent assembly, for nine tenths of it will be elected by peasant votes. The municipal elections in the towns result in immense Socialist majorities. The Cadets have no early prospect of attaining power. The peasants care nothing for Socialist theory and have a certain intuitive dread of "Maximalists" and of Petrograd. But they will vote only for candidates who promise them the land.

It is a fairly safe axiom in politics that land is one of the two or three things for which a propertied class will always be willing to make a civil war. Its interests are solid, for when once you have abolished private property in agricultural land, the oil-wells and mines suggest themselves as interesting marginal cases, and when the owners of these begin to tremble, the whole capitalist world feels nervous. But what is property to do? A direct frontal attack is hopeless. It can only conduct a guerrilla warfare, disparage the revolution as far as it can, sow dissensions in its ranks, make the utmost use of the war, and postpone the evil day by putting off the date of the constituent assembly. It has attempted one counter-revolution already, but Korniloff's venture does not suggest that this is a hopeful expedient. The Cossacks, who are all small landowners holding by military tenure, may be induced to fight for it. The wilder non-Russian soldiery, Turcomans, Moslem Tartars, and the rest, might be united or bribed into supporting it. But with these exceptions, the rank and file of the army is solid for the revolution. So long

as it is mobilized, a military coup d'état in its present condition is doomed to failure. Its condition might perhaps be changed. The restoration of discipline, even by the drastic and wholesale revival of the death penalty, was a good war cry while the Germans were breaking through on a wavering point.

My own belief is that the demoralization of the Russian army has been grossly and deliberately exaggerated. Honest men exaggerated it, in the hope of rousing Russia to a sense of shame. Less honest men exaggerated it in order to discredit the revolution. German military critics, including a progressive writer like Colonel Gadke, were amazed by these lamentations, and placed on record the view of the German army that, on the whole, the Russians fought well even in their retreats. There was real demoralization only at one point, but that was after a too rash and gallant offensive had ended in mere massacre. In the retreats of 1915 the Russian army lost 900,000 prisoners. Was there no demoralization then? In the retreat of this summer the prisoners amounted to 23,000. Newspapers have one measure for a Grand Ducal commander in chief and another for a revolutionary army. The intention behind all this excessive insistence on discipline was partly to discredit the provisional government and partly to pave the way for the introduction of the old iron rule which would again make an automatic army — the kind of army which will follow its chiefs wherever they may lead. To-day these chiefs may lead it against the Germans, to-morrow they may march on Petrograd. It is this fear that the army may again be hammered into a dull tool for despotism, which explains the anxiety of the Socialists as they listen to proposals for restoring the habit of passive obedience. If Korniloff had been a little less sanguine and impatient, if he had restored discipline effectively before he launched his picked divisions against Kerensky, it is just possible that he might have had a temporary success.

The conflict is postponed, it is not settled. No propertied class would accept defeat at this stage. Before the plan of

confiscation is adopted, it will try other expedients. In the last resort, it may appeal to foreign aid. For the moment this counter-revolutionary tendency, popularized by a conservative press, undoubtedly has the sympathy of most of our English middle class. The issue is not understood. Our public sees that revolutionary Russia is useless as an aggressive element in the war, it forgets that after May, 1915, Tsarist Russia did no better. The plain fact is that this military failure is not so much moral as material. Three nations in Europe have shown the capacity to conduct war year after year on the modern scale: France, Britain, and Germany. Austria, backward when compared with these three, advanced when compared with Russia, is almost at the end of her endurance. It is only the developed industries, the elaborate railways, the good roads, the diffused education, the habit of orderly work of a modern civilization, which enables Britain, France, and Germany to endure the strain. Russia, with her infant industries, her sparse railways, her execrable roads, her general illiteracy and the slack rhythm of unorganized peasant labor, is unable to adapt herself to the trial. The food problem threatens this winter to make general famine, and the reason is primarily that the whole capacity of the railways is required to feed the army at the front. Production has fallen off, but distribution is the chief problem. No gallant Cossack adventurer, however childlike, can alter a situation like this. Neither Kerensky's speeches, nor the Soviet proclamations, nor even the death penalty, can enable a backward, neglected, primitive, agricultural country to wage war on the modern industrial scale.

The chief difference between revolution and counter-revolution is that while the former appeals to us to moderate our war aims, summons us to council at Stockholm, and works with all its sincerity for an early general peace, the latter would be only too likely to seek an accommodation by some devious back way. What the counter-revolutionary party does as an opposition, or might do if it were in power, is

determined, however, not so much by its opinions on European policy as by the exigencies of the internal Russian struggle. It is battling for the rights of property as it conceives them, it is opposing a movement which has latent in it a social revolution. It will make war and peace, it will call in the foreigner or drive out the foreigner, according as it reckons that one course or the other will serve its class interests in its dire peril. The internal lines of division in Russia are fast becoming sharper and deeper than any frontier.

THE GERMAN IDEAL OF THE STATE[1]

HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE

[Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–1896) was born in Saxony and first came into prominence as lecturer on history at the University of Leipzig. His ardent advocacy of German unity under Prussian leadership in 1866 caused him to remove to Berlin, where from 1873 he was Professor of History in the University of Berlin. His chief works are "Die Politik" (1897–1898) and his "History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century" (1874–1894). During his lifetime he was the most popular and influential exponent of the Hohenzollern theory of the supremacy of the state over the individual and of the righteousness and necessity of war.]

Let us now apply the standard of a deeper and real Christian civilization to the State, and let us bear in mind that the existence of this great collective personality is power, and that therefore the highest moral duty of the State is to foster this power. The individual is bound to sacrifice himself for the next higher community of which he is a member; but the State itself is the highest among the communities of men, and therefore the duty of self-abnegation cannot apply to it. The Christian duty of self-sacrifice for something higher does not exist for the State, for the reason that there is nothing above and beyond it in the world's history, and consequently it cannot sacrifice itself for another. When the State sees its downfall approaching, we praise it if it goes to its downfall sword in hand. A sacrifice for a foreign nation is not only non-moral, but it is contrary to the idea of self-assertion which is the highest law of the State.

Thus we find it necessary to distinguish between public and private morality. The rank of the various duties must

[1] From "Die Politik," translated for "Germany's War Mania." London, 1914.

necessarily be very different for the State and the individual man. There is a whole series of these duties which are imposed upon the individual which are absolutely out of question for the State. The State's highest law is that of self-assertion; that is for it the absolute morality. Therefore, one must assert that of all political sins, the worst and most contemptible is weakness; it is the sin against the holy ghost of politics. In private life certain weaknesses of the soul are excusable. But of these there is no question in the State; for the State is might, and if it should belie its very essence, there would be no judgment severe enough for it. Think of the reign of Frederick William IV. Magnanimity and gratitude are certainly political virtues, but only when they are not opposed to the main object of politics, the maintenance of its own power. In the year 1849 the thrones of every possible German principality were shaken. Frederick William took a step which in itself was justifiable; he sent Prussian troops into Saxony and Bavaria, and restored order therein. But now came the mortal sin. Were the Prussians there in order to shed their blood for the King of Saxony or of Bavaria? There must be some permanent advantage for Prussia to be derived therefrom. We had the little ones in our grip; we only needed to allow the troops to remain there until these princes had adapted themselves to the new German Empire. Instead of this, the King withdrew his troops and quite properly the little ones made a long nose behind their backs as they marched away. That was simply unthinkable weakness; the blood of the Prussian nation had been sacrificed for nothing.

It further follows from the nature of the State as sovereign power, that it can recognize no arbiter above itself, and that moreover constitutional obligations must be subject in a last resort to its jurisdiction. We have to bear that in mind in order that in times of crisis we may not judge like Philistines from the advocate's point of view. When Prussia broke the treaty of Tilsit, she was from the standpoint of the civil

procedure in the wrong. But who is there to-day who will have the brazen face to assert this? Even the French could not do so any longer. That also holds in the case of national treaties which are not quite so immoral as was that one enforced on Prussia by France. Thus every State reserves to itself the right to judge of its treaty obligations for itself, and the historian cannot here step in with his purely conventional standards. He must ask the deeper question as to whether the unconditional duty of self-preservation does not justify the State. It was thus in Italy in 1859. Piedmont was the virtual aggressor; and Austria and her servile dependents in Germany did not fail to complain of the disturbance of the everlasting peace. But in reality Italy had been for years in a state of siege. No noble nation will ever tolerate such a position, and in reality it was not Piedmont, but Austria, which took the offensive, because she had for years shamefully sinned by helping herself to Italy's greatest treasures.

Thus it is the upholding of its own power that is the supreme moral duty of the State. But if we follow up the natural consequence of this truth, it becomes clear that the State must only set itself moral aims, or else it would be contradicting itself.

Up to now the earnest thinker can hardly find any subject for disagreement, but now we come to a series of most difficult questions with the consideration of how far political aims, moral in themselves, may be allowed the use of means which in civil life would be considered reprehensible. The well-known jesuitical saying is in its unvarnished directness rough and radical, but no one can deny that it contains a certain amount of truth. There are in political life innumerable cases, as in the life of individuals, in which the use of pure methods is quite impossible. If it be possible, if it be feasible to obtain an objective moral in itself by moral means, then these are to be preferred even though their action may be slower and more inconvenient.

We have already seen that the power of truth and frankness in politics is greater than is usually supposed. The newer conception is that there is no impulse of truth inherent in man, and that it has arisen conventionally from the political aims. But not so. An impulse towards truth is indeed inherent in man, but it varies according to times and nations. Even amongst the most mendacious of nations, the Orientals, we find this striving for truth. The elder brother of Wellington won for himself an enormous influence in India owing to the fact that the Nabobs knew that this man always said what he thought. On the whole, however, it is clear that political methods with nations on a lower grade of culture must be adapted to their powers of sensation and understanding. The historian who tried to judge European politics in Africa or in the East by the same standards as in Europe would be a fool. *He who cannot inspire fear over there is lost.*

THE ARMY AND NATIONAL UNITY[1]

HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE

[For a sketch of Professor Treitschke see page 224. The following selection consists of extracts from various parts of Treitschke's work, all dealing with his views on the value of war and the relation of the individual to the state.]

One must certainly, when considering war, remember that it does not always appear as a judgment of God; there are also temporary results, but the life of a people is reckoned by centuries. The decisive verdict can only be obtained by the review of great epochs. A State like Prussia, which was freer and more rational than the French, might, owing to momentary exhaustion, be brought near annihilation, but it would then call to mind its inner life, and would thus regain its superiority. One must say with the greatest determination: War is for an afflicted people the only remedy. When the State exclaims: My very existence is at stake! then social self-seeking must disappear and all party hatred be silent. The individual must forget his own *ego* and feel himself a member of the whole, he must recognize how negligible is his life compared with the good of the whole. Therein lies the greatness of war, that the little man completely vanishes before the great thought of the State. The sacrifice of nationalities for one another is nowhere invested with such beauty as in war. At such a time the corn is separated from the chaff. All who lived through 1870 will understand the saying of Niebuhr with regard to the year 1813, that he then experienced the "bliss of sharing with all his fellow-citizens,

[1] From "Die Politik," translated for "Germany's War Mania." London, 1914.

with the scholar and the ignorant, the one common feeling — no man who enjoyed this experience will to his dying day forget how loving, friendly, and strong he felt."

To the historian who lives in the realms of the Will, it is quite clear that the furtherance of an everlasting peace is fundamentally reactionary. He sees that to banish war from history would be to banish all progress and becoming. It is only the periods of exhaustion, weariness, and mental stagnation that have dallied with the dream of everlasting peace.

We are now in the third epoch (and again after a great war) which seems to have destroyed all the idealism of Germany. For to-day an outburst of loud and shameless laughter from the vulgar greets the destruction of anything which Germany has made great. The very foundations of our noble, ancient culture are now being destroyed. All that which has raised us into a very aristocracy among the nations is derided and trodden under foot. Truly it is the right time now to indulge in fantastic ravings of everlasting peace! It is not worth spending one's breath talking of such things. The living God will see to it that war returns again and again as a terrible medicine for humanity.

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From the fact that the army constitutes the aggregate physical power of a nation follows, moreover, that it is also interwoven in the most intimate fashion with the idea of the unity of the State. One may even assert that there is no institution which brings home to the thoughtful man so sharply the thought of the unity of the State and of the interdependence of the whole as an army organized in accordance with the real conditions of the nation. Commerce, art, and science are cosmopolitan and lead the way beyond the boundaries of the nation. The common activity of elections, of the judge and jury, certainly strengthen the feeling of the State community; but parliamentary life does not only unite the citizens together in a common political labor, it also splits

them up again and sets parties against one another and unavoidable hatred.

A really popularly organized army is the only one of all political institutions that unites the burghers with burghers; in the army alone do they feel themselves all united as sons of the Fatherland. After the experience we have had in the new German Empire this will hardly be disputed. The German army has become beyond all doubt the most supremely real and effective bond of national unity, and this most certainly cannot be claimed for the German Reichstag, as had formerly been hoped. That institution is rather responsible for the fact that Germans have once again begun mutually to hate and calumniate one another. But the army has trained us into practical unity.

For the reason that it embodies in the most striking manner for the masses of the people the idea of the unity of the State, the monarchy is therefore especially suited to take the direction of the army; the King is the natural Commander in Chief.

. . . . . .

After all, it is the normal and reasonable course for a great nation to embody and train the very essence of the State, which is in itself power, in its organized military system and by means of its physical strength. And since we have lived in a warlike age, the hyper-delicate, philanthropic way of looking at these things has more and more been pressed into the background, so that with Clausewitz we have once again come to regard war as the forceful continuation of politics. Not all the advocates of peace in the world will ever succeed in bringing about such a state of affairs that all the political powers will be of one mind; if they are not of one mind, then there is nothing but the sword that can decide their differences of opinion.

We have learned to recognize as the civilizing majesty of war precisely what appears to the superficial observers to be

brutality and inhumanity. That one should for the sake of the Fatherland overcome the natural feelings of humanity, that men should murder one another who have never wronged one another, who perhaps highly esteem one another as chivalrous foes, that appears at first sight to be the frightful side of war, but also at the same time its greatness. Man must not only be ready to sacrifice his life, but also the natural deeply rooted feelings of the human soul; he must devote his whole *ego* for the furtherance of a great patriotic idea: that is the moral sublimity of war.

V

THE NEW EUROPE AND A LASTING PEACE

GAINS FROM THE WAR[1]

CHARLES W. ELIOT

[Charles William Eliot (1834–), a graduate of Harvard and its president from 1869 to 1909, has wielded a great influence on American education, especially in securing the adoption of the elective system in colleges. He has written largely on education and public affairs, and is one of the clearest thinkers on the problems of American life. Since the beginning of the World War he has written extensively on its issues and problems. His best essays are "American Contributions to Civilization" (1897), especially "The Working of American Democracy," and "The Modern Definition of the Cultivated Man" (1903). The present article, a few paragraphs of which have been omitted, presents perhaps as comprehensive a survey of the war from a liberal point of view as can be found.]

In a few weeks or months the American people will begin to sacrifice their sons by the thousand in the most savage and cruel war that has ever been waged. They have already begun to expend the savings of generations on preparations for fighting and destruction, and they have stopped innumerable forms of expenditure which contributed to their welfare and that of their descendants. Under these circumstances it is fitting that the voters and their political leaders review the war situation as it stands to-day, and take account of the gains for human liberty and the democratic form of government which have already been secured.

The principal features of the war situation are as follows:

(1) The two principal contestants — the Central Monarchies and the Entente Allies — have demonstrated that each can hold the other in trench warfare; so that no considerable, well-defended areas can be conquered by either party. In open country where the means of communication

[1] From *New York Times*, August 5, 1917. Reprinted by permission.

are scanty or difficult each can successfully come back against the other after defeat or withdrawal, and neither side when occupying new territory has thus far been able to disarm or extinguish the opposing army. The Belgian, Serbian, and Rumanian armies are still on foot in large numbers, and no considerable body of German or Austro-Hungarian troops has thus far been forced to surrender. In three years neither side has won a military victory in the old sense. There has been no Austerlitz, or Waterloo, or Sedan, or Yorktown; and there is not likely to be. In this sense, President Wilson was right when he used the ambiguous phrase "peace without victory." It has been a war without victory on land and without any victory on sea of the Nelson sort.

(2) Industrial and financial strength having been proved necessary to the acquisition and maintenance of great military power, it appears that the manufacturing nations are the only ones that can endure long wars; because they alone can create and maintain inexhaustible supplies of munitions and of the modern means of rapid transportation on land and water for both men and supplies. An agricultural or pastoral people engaged in serious war will require the aid of a manufacturing people. Hence, ultimate success in war will go to the side which has been made wealthiest and strongest by successful commerce, agriculture, mining, and manufacturing; provided that this wealth and these industrial achievements have not impaired the public morality and energy.

(3) The success of Great Britain and France in developing under the most trying circumstances a greater efficiency than that of Germany in the manufactures indispensable to modern war has settled the question whether despotically ruled peoples have an advantage over free peoples in warfare in which every resource of modern science is utilized, and settled it in favor of the freer.

(4) The war has also proved already that violations of treaties on the ground of military necessity and oppressive exactions on the population remaining in conquered territory

do not profit the conqueror in the present state of the civilized world, except as he appropriates for immediate use machinery, fuel, foods, and raw material, but on the contrary are disastrous to him and his cause. In other words, the war has proved that the moral and physical forces which can be rallied to the side of international justice are sufficient to make acts of international injustice inexpedient and unprofitable.

(5) It clearly appears that all the nations of Europe now recognized as such can command the services in proper proportion to their population of soldiers who are robust, brave, and patriotic, and that there is no nation in Europe so degenerate morally or physically that a strong and healthy nation may rightfully seize it and govern it for its own good. Both sides exhibit full capacity for acquiring the skill needed to use artillery, airplanes, telephones, photographs, and motor trucks; and all are capable of hand-to-hand fighting with bayonets, swords, knives, and hand grenades. The primitive savage with all his hunting and fighting instincts reappears to-day in civilized white men as well as in Turks, Turcos, and Gurkhas.

(6) As the war has gone on the conviction has gradually penetrated all the governments and peoples concerned that the redressing of three great international wrongdoings must be included in any terms of settlement which are to have a fair chance of leading to durable peace. These wrongs are the partition of Poland (1772), the wresting of Alsace-Lorraine from France by Germany (1871), accompanied by an attempt to "bleed France white," and the Treaty of Berlin (1878), which outraged Russia and planted seeds of fierce discord among the Balkan peoples. All thinking people have come to understand that no permanent peace for Europe or any relief from competitive armaments can be obtained without disinfecting these festering sores. And yet this disinfection cannot but prove a very difficult task.

(7) The war has greatly strengthened the conviction, held by most publicists who have had occasion to consider the

causes of grave international disputes, that the peace of the world would be much more secure if nations which possess few ports or none could obtain, under firm international conventions, free access to the seas and oceans through the territories and ports of other nations. An interior country, like Serbia, or a great interior sub-arctic region like the Russian empire or Canada, needs for its own free life and growth access to the seas and oceans through the ports of other countries, if it has few or none of its own. For the full enjoyment of such rights durable peace is necessary. Remove from the European world, or the whole world, the apprehension of war, and the dread that an insular population, or a population confined within an interior area, naturally feels lest it be deprived of an adequate supply of foods or raw materials, and a principal cause of war would be removed. The Germans' dread of such compression and such deprivation, coupled with an extraordinary belief in the superiority of German civilization to every other civilization, seems to have been the underlying cause of the present war.

(8) Although the strength and endurance of the belligerents are by no means exhausted, there is a new disposition to speculate and talk about peace ever since President Wilson requested the Central Monarchies on the one side and the Entente Allies on the other to state the terms on which they would consent to make peace. Although the two parties are still wide apart in regard to the preliminary terms or conditions on which negotiations for peace might be opened, and although the present condition of Russia has raised new hopes in the minds of the German oligarchy, the disposition of the several governments to talk about terms of peace is an important feature of the present situation. It is supported, if not induced, by the state of mind among the soldiers of all the nations at war. It will be a dire calamity for the human race if peace negotiations are opened before the Central Monarchies publicly repent of the invasion of Serbia, the violation of the neutrality treaties on behalf of Belgium, the sinking of

the *Lusitania*, and the Prussian-Turkish treatment of non-combatants.

Two new implements of warfare have been developed during the war — the airplane and the submarine; but the capacities of neither for destruction have been fully revealed. Both violate in practice — by necessity — most of the rules which international law has tried to establish for the protection of non-combatants and the mitigation of the horrors of war. Those who use them require singular skill, courage, and endurance; but neither mercy nor chivalry can often influence their deeds. Those, too, whose duty is to destroy either airplanes or submarines must do so without the least regard to their human occupants. The submarine forces on everybody, assailant or defendant, the policy of killing at sight. Drown or choke your adversary without giving any chance of escape. Take no prisoners. These policies or methods are not yet publicly and avowedly adopted on land. The airplane involves single combat, or combat in small groups, under very dangerous conditions for both parties, and with little chance to surrender for either side. It is kill or be killed. "Bombing" by airplanes means miscellaneous destruction of life and property without taking good aim. This kind of warfare is peculiarly revolting, in spite of the extraordinary bravery and fortitude of the men who engage in it. The use made of submarines by Germany proves that during war *à l'outrance* between great powers neutrals have no protection against being sunk while passing between neutral ports. This is a new barbarity in war. All nations with exterior trade are interested in determining now, if possible, the future of the submarine.

Such is the formidable scene in which the American people are about to become one of the principal actors. As they enter on this fearful task they can reasonably draw inspiration and hope from the great gains for liberty and democracy which have been already achieved through the war.

The war has brought about extraordinary progress for democracy in Europe, especially in Great Britain and Russia.

In Great Britain the gains of democracy within three years have been much more considerable than in all the hundred years previous. They have taken effect chiefly in the executive branch of the Government, including the army and navy, but also in the legislative; and the gains seem likely to be permanent. Three years ago no one familiar with the conditions of public life in Great Britain would have believed that three men with the antecedents of Kitchener, Bonar Law, and Lloyd George could exercise supreme powers in the civil government during the greatest crisis in British history, or that a democratic, extemporized British army could succeed to the former aristocratic regular army, and fight better. After ten days' discussion the House of Commons lately adopted by a vote of eight to one a large measure of suffrage reform under the title of "Representation of the People Bill." In Russia, the coup d'état was a sudden act and premature, but long foretold in the growing strength and capacity for local government of the provincial and municipal councils, and in the increasing activity in large business of the cooperative societies. It is as yet impossible to tell whether the inexperienced Russian democracy will or will not prove itself capable of establishing at this first effort a firm and efficient Government in a democratic form; but the revolution has already accomplished much preliminary work toward that end, and it is almost impossible to believe that the Czardom, or anything like it, can be reproduced in Russia, or that the landed nobility and the permanent official class, both military and civil, can regain the power they have lost.

It is equally difficult to believe that the professional, commercial, and manufacturing classes which have now assumed political leadership with strong support from large portions of the agricultural class will be compelled to resign it to labor agitators, socialistic extremists, or disciples of Tolstoy. The United States, believing that Russia will no more return to a Romanoff Czar than France to a Bourbon King, is cooperating with the Provisional Government in every possible

way — with its money, supplies, and engineering experience, and with its practice in political and religious liberty and its hearty sympathy. Such coöperation between two huge democracies augurs well for the future safety of democracy throughout the world. The unexampled experiment which the mission to Russia from the United States has had in hand is one of extraordinary interest; for it is an effort on the part of a people long accustomed to public liberty to help a multitudinous people with no experience of political freedom and but lately escaped from serfdom to establish in wartime a firm and effective republican Government.

It is an immense permanent gain for democracy that the democratic Governments of Great Britain and France have proved themselves capable of great efficiency in time of war. Comparative study of democratic and autocratic Governments during the last 130 years has revealed the fact that in times of peace democratic Governments are not so effective as autocratic Governments can sometimes be in promoting the physical welfare of the people governed. Germany had cleaner and better ordered cities, more effective vocational schools, and better sanitary and medical supervision than any democratic government in Europe or America could show; so that many people doubted whether a democratic government could develop as much efficiency in war as an autocratic government. But both Great Britain and France have already exhibited, and the United States is about to exhibit, a greater efficiency in war and in the industries that support war than Germany or any other autocratic Government has ever attained.

The war has also proved that free peoples, in which financial and industrial corporate management has been largely developed and many citizens possess a high degree of personal initiative and energy in their daily work, can outdo in industrial productiveness any peoples that are autocratically governed. The free peoples may start far in the rear when war breaks out; but in a year or two they will catch up with and

surpass their autocratically governed opponents. This is a demonstration of high importance to the democracies of the future, as well as of great significance in regard to the outcome of the present war, for these methods of democratic society, which are quite independent of government processes, are prime sources of democratic efficiency.

It has also been proved that democratic armies fight better than armies aristocratically organized and autocratically governed; or, in other words, that the armies of nations in which the mass of the people determine legislation, elect their public servants, and settle questions of peace and war, fight better than the armies of an autocrat who rules by right of birth and by commission from the Almighty. The obedient, submissive soldier who always acts under orders without personal initiative or intelligent comprehension of his immediate task is outclassed by the independent soldier who possesses personal initiative, and is capable of understanding both the ultimate purpose of the fighting and the immediate object of the movement in which he is to take part. The soldier who is to take effective part in trench warfare must be capable of fighting intelligently and persistently without seeing or hearing an officer, or even a non-commissioned officer, during the actual charge. The great war has developed in the democratic countries a new and more effective kind of private soldier and a new and more effective kind of officer; and in producing these better kinds of soldier and officer a democracy has a great and permanent advantage over an autocracy.

The war and Germany's elaborate preparation for it have proved beyond all doubt that no reliance for the peace of the world can be placed on any of the Utopian schemes which for centuries have been from time to time announced as sure methods of preventing war and leaving mankind free to advance, unafraid and at ease, on peaceful paths of gradual political, industrial, and social development. Discussions of world Parliaments, world public opinion, world courts, vast leagues to prevent war, societies of nations, and schemes to

reform the world through improved methods of education and improved international law, were never so rife as in the twenty years before the present war broke out. No one of these schemes has even approached fulfillment, or, indeed, definite formulation; but the two Hague Conferences, although they were in many respects disappointing, had persuaded some people inclined to political and philanthropic speculation that the time was near when international law and international organization could prevent international war without the use of force.

All these plans and hopes were completely defeated by the outbreak of the present war; and they will remain defeated and powerless so long as a single strong nation in Europe adheres to the principles and practices of autocratic government allied with a large class of professional soldiers. The same may be said of the official religions which prevail among the various belligerents to-day. No one of the national churches or religious institutions concerned — Buddhist, Greek, Roman, Mohammedan, or Protestant — has shown the least capacity to obstruct or condemn the long and elaborate preparation for war by Germany, or to oppose the unchristian philosophy concerning the State which justified that preparation, or to prevent the outbreak of the war, or to mitigate its unexampled ferocity. It is a large gain for humanity to have learned, once for all, that no inchoate international organization and no instituted religion or established church can be depended on to secure to the civilized world of to-day an enduring peace and to all nations a rightful liberty. Peace, liberty, and justice must be secured by practicable measures of obvious immediate serviceableness. The world in agony is in no mood for remote goals or vast and hazy imaginings; it will take the one step which seems feasible and be satisfied with that. It will be a martial step; but its goal will be human brotherhood.

The war has also demonstrated that the progress of mankind in knowledge of nature and its laws, and in skill in

NATIONALITY AND THE NEW EUROPE[1]

ARCHIBALD C. COOLIDGE

[Archibald Cary Coolidge (1866–) was educated at Harvard, and, after several years' connection with the American diplomatic service in European capitals, returned to Harvard and is now Professor of European History. In 1914 he was Harvard Exchange Professor at the University of Berlin. He has written "The United States as a World Power" (1908) and "The Origins of the Triple Alliance" (1918). The discussion below, from which some paragraphs have been omitted, summarizes with admirable detachment the basic facts on which a settlement of the World War in accordance with the principle of nationality must be made.]

Apart from whatever sympathies we may feel in regard to the war now devastating Europe, most of us fervently hope that at least it may not soon be followed by another; that is to say, that when peace is concluded, the settlement arrived at may contain the elements of some sort of permanence. This does not mean that every one can be or will be satisfied and that many seemingly reasonable desires, even of the victors, will not have to be relinquished. It does mean that in as many cases as possible the settlement shall be based on broad grounds of human rights and legitimate interests which will content those who profit by them, while not appearing too unjust to the rest of the world.

A first condition of this is that in the Europe of the future, so far as may be, no people and especially no great people shall be forced to live in a manner to which it cannot be expected to resign itself. The defeated parties in the conflict will doubtless have to give up or postpone indefinitely what are to them natural and proper ambitions. This is the common lot of the vanquished. Nevertheless, if peace is to be lasting,

[1] From *Yale Review*, April, 1915. Reprinted by permission.

existence must not be made intolerable for them. For instance, such a régime as Napoleon imposed on Prussia cannot in the long run be fastened on a defeated enemy, nor can any complete economic or geographic servitude. Thus it is safe to predict that if Germany, as a result of victory over Russia, were to hand over Finland to Sweden and to take the Baltic provinces for herself, Russia would sooner or later risk another struggle in order to regain a sufficient shore on the Baltic. Conversely, in the case of the triumph of the Allies, a treaty of peace which should deprive of direct access to the Adriatic the German populations not only of Austria but, through her, of the German Empire, might be pregnant with trouble for the future. Even the retention of certain isolated positions of vantage, however tempting as immediate booty, might mean such serious consequences that the advisability would be more than questionable. Could any good that Germany might obtain from the possession of Constantinople compensate for the permanent hostility of Russia, which such possession must engender? Would it even be wise for England to take back Helgoland when experience has shown that Spain can never get reconciled to her owning Gibraltar, which will always remain a stumbling-block to good relations between the two countries? A permanent sore spot should not be lightly created even by the most successful power.

Another class of considerations turns on the desire of the populations themselves in any future determination of frontiers. We Americans in particular believe in government with the consent of the governed. When exceptions must be made, we think of them as justified only by temporary necessity, as in the South after our Civil War, or by the racial inferiority of the governed, as, let us say, in the case of the negro. None the less, we hold to the general principle, and it is one that is admitted even by the most reactionary autocracy as being desirable. Now, in the disputed regions of Europe to-day, not only the consent but the ardent aspirations of the governed on the whole correspond with what

we call nationality. And aspirations of the nationalities to shape their own destinies are not a matter of internal politics only. In the last hundred years, the strivings of Greeks, Italians, Germans, Magyars, South Slavs, Alsatians, and others against foreign rulers have been of the utmost international as well as national consequence. It is true the discontent of the Irish has seldom, owing to the insular position of the United Kingdom, been of more than local importance, but the Polish question has been a running sore in general European politics ever since the partitions in the eighteenth century.

Let us hope, therefore, that in the reconstruction of Europe the wishes of the various nationalities shall be important factors in determining the bounds of the different states. There may be confederations among the smaller ones for the common advantage, but such unions should be voluntary and should leave sufficient play for the individuality of each. At first sight this seems simple. We take a race map of the Continent, note the chief splashes of color on it, and evolve the ideal Europe of the future to correspond with these splashes, leaving out of account the little detached ones that interfere with the general scheme. This kind of map-making has been popular of late. Any imaginative contributor to a newspaper may indulge in it, it can be understood by the meanest intelligence, and it appeals to the sympathies as a generous attempt to reconstruct society in accordance with the fundamental rights of man. Unfortunately, when we come to look at solutions of this sort with a little care, we perceive that they bristle with difficulties. We soon learn that our race map alone is not a safe guide, for it leaves out such physical features as mountains. Ethnical and natural physical frontiers seldom coincide exactly. For instance, they do not in a good part of the western Alps, or of the Pyrenees, or of the Carpathians. To which frontier are we to give the preference, the geographical or the racial? This is perhaps a minor problem that can often be solved by a few mutual concessions; but it is a part of the general question as to

what extent rights of nationality are superior to those based on other considerations.

At the very outset, we are faced by uncertainty as to the meaning of our terms. What is nationality? On what is it based? Not on race — most of the nations of Europe are of too mixed and uncertain origin to have blood count for much. The skull measurements in the different parts of the Continent suggest totally different divisions from the modern political and linguistic ones. It is worth remarking here that an imaginary descent may be of more importance than the real one. It matters little whether the modern Greeks are or are not descended from the ancient Hellenes. What is of consequence is that they believe they are. This belief affects them profoundly; it permeates their national consciousness and is a fundamental part of their psychology. In the same way, we need not care to what extent the modern Rumanians are the children of the Roman legionaries and colonists and to what extent they are of Dacian, Slavic, or other origin. The thing that counts is that, speaking a Latin language, they regard themselves as a Latin people, akin to the French, Italians, and Spaniards, something different from the Slavs about them, something more western, the heirs to an older civilization. Although they belong to the Greek Orthodox church, they turn for inspiration not to Constantinople and Moscow, but to Rome and Paris.

We know that the Swiss are a nation though composed of several nationalities, and that as long as these prefer to remain in their present glorious little republic no one has a right to interfere with them, though this doctrine is hardly acceptable to the extreme partisans of Pan-Germanism or of Italia Irredenta. We apply the same principle to the Belgians though they speak two languages; but of what nationality are the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine? The Germans claim the Alsatians as German by speech and descent as well as by most of their history. The French base their arguments on what they regard as a more modern conception, that of

national consciousness and desire, of common ideas and aspirations. They declare that, though the French language is that of the great mass of the people in France, and is the official and literary vehicle of expression — one they believe superior to any other — nevertheless a Basque, a Breton, a Fleming, an Alsatian, may be a genuine and most patriotic Frenchman even if he knows nothing but his local dialect. It must be admitted that in this instance the claim to a nationality, as based on language and history, cannot well be reconciled with our belief in government with the consent of the governed. Had the Germans, during the last forty years, been as successful in Alsace-Lorraine as the Americans have been in our own South, the situation would be different. As it is, compromise or reconciliation has not been reached, and the question of the future allegiance of Alsace-Lorraine has once more been referred to arbitrament of the sword.

In many European countries, ethnographical statistics are to be accepted with much caution. To be sure, partisan guesses are still more unreliable, for where no official figures exist, the widest play is left to passion and imagination; witness the extraordinary estimates that have been made frequently in good faith of the strength of the various elements in Macedonia. In lands where there are official statistics, we may take it for granted that the nationality which has charge of the census will get more than its share in the returns. Doubtful and neutral elements can always be used to swell the figures. For instance, in the Austrian province of Galicia, 808,000 out of a total of 871,000 Jews are officially recorded as speaking Polish, which assures to the Poles a good majority of the population. In the neighboring province of Bukowina, out of 192,000 Jews, 95,000 are put down as Germans. In both cases the real language of most of the Jews is Yiddish. Now, if as a result of the present war, Russia keeps Galicia, the Jews of the eastern half of the province will no longer be reckoned as Poles; and if at the same time Rumania gets Bukowina, the Jews there will soon go to swell the Rumanian

element in that province, and there is no reason why they should not. Why should not the Jew in the Dual Empire transfer his linguistic allegiance? It is often transferred for him. If he lives in southern Hungary, he may be to-day an ardent Magyar, though his father was counted as a German; and it may be the duty of his son to be a good Rumanian or Servian without his wishes being consulted in any event. This does not mean that the Jews as a race are always prompt to change their linguistic or other allegiance with each shift of their political fortune. There are plenty of cases to the contrary. Many Jews have, for example, been good Polish patriots. A more surprising recent instance of their abiding loyalty to one country is the obstinacy with which the colony of Jews from Livorno, settled in Tunis, have remained irreconcilably Italian in their opposition to French rule.

But even after admitting language to be the chief though not the only determinant of nationality, we still have to inquire what constitutes a language, and the answer is sometimes far from easy. Whatever the philologists may have decided, there is sometimes from a political point of view great difficulty in distinguishing between a language and a dialect. Such things may be matters of national consciousness rather than of grammar or vocabulary; indeed, practically the same tongue may be regarded as a dialect or as a language, according to where it happens to be spoken. Dutch is a language, but the claim of Flemish is a little more doubtful; and they are both mere branches of Low German which is admittedly nothing but a dialect. In the same way, Portuguese is a language, but Gallejo, which hardly differs from it, counts as a dialect of Spanish. Modern languages have grown out of certain local dialects, and the process is still going on. Astonishing as it may seem, the tendency in Europe to-day, in spite of the tremendous increase of the ease and the need of communication throughout mankind, and in spite of the strength of such cosmopolitan movements as socialism, appears to be rather towards the multiplication

than to the diminution of tongues. Within recent years, written Norwegian has been drawing further away from written Danish, with which it formerly was almost identical. Slovak has come to regard itself as an independent speech not as a dialect of Bohemian, and Moravian may possibly do the same. All the efforts of the Russian government to maintain the unity of the national language and to keep Little Russian in the position of a mere dialect, like Plattdeutsch in Germany, have not prevented the growth of a strong Ukrainophil party in southern Russia, which in time may menace the political as well as the linguistic unity of the empire; indeed it is one of the most serious perils that threatens its future. The Little Russians have among themselves local differences that may develop, and to the north of them are the White Russians, as yet without a separatist consciousness, but capable of finding one. In Ireland, Irish still lingers, and at least the teaching of it is on the increase; and even in France all the intense patriotism and pride in *la patrie* and her language that every Frenchman feels, have been required to keep the Provençal movement in the nineteenth century within the bounds of a harmless literary cult, and prevent its getting into politics and weakening the unity of the French nation.

Enthusiasts for liberty are apt to overlook the sad truth that, however admirable the development of national and linguistic consciousness may be of itself, it does not necessarily make for peace among nationalities any more than do free institutions and advanced civilization. On the contrary, in mixed districts, as long as there are no schools or legislative bodies, the question of what language shall prevail in such institutions does not come up. When, at least in the form of newspapers, posters, and shop-signs, the written word becomes a necessity for the most inert minds, the need of a common medium increases. Here progress and friction are apt to go hand in hand. The very fact that men are thrown together so much more than they used to be makes it the more irritating if they are unable to understand one another. To admit that

any other tongue has superior merits to your own or should enjoy greater privileges argues a sad want of patriotism. All the European movements of emancipation and unification of the last century have been accompanied by higher national consciousness and have meant keener national rivalries if not hatreds. The awakening of modern Russia was accompanied by fierce nationalistic strife. It was also in the usual order of things that after the Turks and Christians in the Ottoman Empire had combined to overthrow the despotism of Abdul Hamid the Second, their antagonisms towards one another should have soon become more acute, for they were relieved of the pressure that had kept down their vitality and desire for expansion. Like all such parties, the Young Turks have been ultra-nationalists.

Everywhere in Europe to-day where we find two nationalities in considerable numbers in the same state, the outlook is discouraging. In Russia and Germany, the minorities have been frankly oppressed; in Austria-Hungary, the various peoples are in fierce antagonism with one another; in Belgium, the Flemish movement, however justified, has threatened the future of the kingdom; and even in Switzerland, where, thanks to a federal constitution and a splendid common patriotism and pride, representatives of three great nationalities have lived on an equal footing in such harmony as nowhere else, there has been increasing friction in the last few years between the French and the German elements. The circumstance that in the present war their respective sympathies are, as is natural, on the side of the belligerent whose language they speak, can hardly contribute to good feeling between themselves.

But granting that it would be desirable that in the Europe of the future each national group should be as far as possible self-governing, there is an obvious limit to the principle. Under modern conditions, a state, and particularly an inland state, requires a certain size for independent political and economic existence. In these days of large countries, such isolated groups as the Saxons in Transylvania, the Slovaks

in North Hungary, the Wends in the Lausitz, the Basques in France and Spain, cannot be expected to exist as independent communities; indeed they have no desire to. All they ask for is certain local privileges, but it is doubtful whether these can be preserved much longer. The future seems to offer little promise to small detached minorities, however historically or culturally interesting.

The claims of historical possession cannot always be lightly dismissed. Has a people no right to maintain its supremacy in the homes and the lands that have come to it through long generations? If it has been too hospitable to strangers, is it therefore a fit subject for dismemberment or conquest? In any equitable territorial adjustment, the historical unity of a country may legitimately demand consideration. For instance, the Czechs in Bohemia do not desire an independence or greater self-government than would sever them from the frontier portions of their territory which have a German population. In like manner, to deprive Hungary of all the parts of the kingdom where the Magyars do not form the majority of the inhabitants would be to sin against a state which, though its boundaries may have varied, has had a unity and fixed abode in the same region for over nine hundred years, during which its history has counted many glorious pages.

But by and large, accepting the principle of nationality as representing legitimate aspirations which command our sympathy, it is interesting to see how some of them may be expected to fare in case of the decisive triumph of either side in the present war.

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If . . . the Allies are successful, Alsace-Lorraine will go back to France. Luxemburg also may be given to her or to Belgium as being too small to defend itself and too strategically important to be left in a position of neutrality which experience has shown is not respected. Schleswig-Holstein is in a different situation. People who propose that it be handed back

to Denmark are presumably ignorant of the fact that the Germans in the duchies far outnumber the Danes, being over a million strong. That is to say, they would make up more than twenty-five per cent of the population of the enlarged Danish kingdom, and would be as restive under Danish rule as they were in the past when they so often revolted against it. Sooner or later they would return to Germany. On the other hand, the cession to Denmark of the Danish-speaking region of north Schleswig, as looked forward to in the Treaty of Prague in 1866, but never carried out, would be quite within the bounds of reason and right.

The defeat of Austria would doubtless mean the building up of a greater Servia, including Bosnia, and if the defeat were complete, Croatia and all or most of Dalmatia and perhaps the Slovenian regions. If this happens, Bulgaria, with the aid and friendship of the Allies, may recover the larger part of Macedonia, which would be another satisfaction of the principle of nationality and of the desire of the inhabitants.

No people, not even the Belgians, are more to be pitied in the present war than are the Poles. Not only is a great part of their country the fighting ground for huge armies and suffering terribly in the process, but they themselves, whatever their sympathies may be, are forced into the hosts on both sides and are killing each other at the behest of foreign masters. It is at least some compensation that, whichever side wins, the Poles may hope for an amelioration of their present lot and perhaps the revival of a Polish state — though hardly an independent one, and not in either case with the boundaries desired by Polish patriots. If the victory goes to Germany and Austria, it is quite likely we shall witness a new kingdom of Poland as part of the federal empire of the Hapsburgs or under a Hapsburg prince. This kingdom would be made up of Galicia and of such part of Poland as could be taken away from Russia. To be sure, Germany would scarcely view the new state with favor on account of the attraction it would exercise on her own Polish

subjects, and she certainly would not give up any of them for its sake. This Polish kingdom would also include a considerable disaffected element, the Ruthenian or Little Russian population of the eastern half of Galicia, which in recent years has been growing increasingly anti-Polish in spite of its Polish aristocracy. On the other hand, Russia in the event of her success has promised an autonomous Poland to include and unite practically the whole Polish nation. This would mean, in addition to the strictly Polish provinces of Russia, much at least of the Polish parts of Prussia as well as western Galicia, but it would not include eastern Galicia, which would be treated as being Russian not Polish. Such a provision would not please the Polish upper class there, nor the Poles anywhere, and probably none too well the mass of the population, for to-day the language of the Little Russians enjoys greater rights in Austria than it does on the Muscovite side of the frontier, where it is treated as a mere dialect of Russian proper and suppressed as far as possible for fear it may endanger the unity of the national language. Besides that, the Little Russians in eastern Galicia belong not to the Greek Orthodox, but to the United Greek church, one which the Russian government has in the past treated as having no real right to exist.

In the case of Rumania also, there are two opposite possibilities of expansion which have tempted ardent and acquisitive patriots. Had Rumania joined Germany and Austria in the war, as she would have done up to three years ago, and as her former king, it is said, still wished to do last summer, she might perhaps have acquired the province of Bessarabia, which was hers historically until 1812, and where still about half the population are Rumanians. Should she now take side with the Allies, she will hope for the Austrian province of Bukowina (where a large percentage of the people are Rumanians), and a bit of southern Hungary as well as Transylvania. The case of Transylvania is peculiar. The Rumanians there make up not far from two thirds of the inhabitants, and they claim to be the oldest settlers though the claim is

disputed. Yet for the last nine hundred years, Transylvania has almost without interruption been a part of the kingdom of Hungary. The whole story of its past in that time, its rulers, its civilization, its articulate life, have been Hungarian, save in the regions where the German colonists of the twelfth century, the so-called Saxons, have had special privileges and have maintained their individuality. To every Magyar, Transylvania is as much an integral part of Hungary as Wales is of Great Britain or as Brittany of France. We have here a striking instance of the conflict between historical right and the predominance of nationality.

Italy, too, has dallied with rival attractions. She has now apparently rejected once and for all those held out to her by her former partners; that is, Tunis, where the Italian element is larger than the French, and Nice and Corsica, which she still regards as fundamentally Italian. On the other hand, she expects in return for assistance to the Allies or as a reward for mere friendly neutrality to obtain Italian-speaking territory to the north and east of her; namely, the Trentino, Trieste, and perhaps the Dalmatian coast. But there are certain obstacles besides the military ones that may interfere with her desires. The Trentino, or Italian-speaking southern Tyrol, could be handed over to her with little difficulty, though she has no better historical or linguistic right to it than she has to the Swiss Canton of the Ticino. Still the preferences of the people count for something, and whereas the inhabitants of Ticino have no wish to become subjects of King Victor Emmanuel, most of the population of the Trentino would probably be glad to. With Trieste, the question is more complicated. The city would suffer economically by coming under Italian rule; and restricting ourselves to the question of nationality, we must remember that though in Trieste itself the greater part of the population is Italian, yet if we include with the city its natural background made up of the rest of the peninsula of Istria and the territory that connects it with Italy, we get a majority of Slavs.

In Dalmatia the case is much worse. Most of the Dalmatian towns for centuries belonged to the republic of Venice, and its atmosphere still lingers about them. Public opinion in Italy regards them as part of Italia Irredenta, and the casual traveler knowing a little Italian and no Slav shares that opinion. In actual fact, if the latest statistics are to be trusted, the Italians make up less than three per cent of the total population of Dalmatia, an absurdly insignificant minority on which to found nationalistic claims. They are in the majority only in the one town of Zara, and even there the rest of the district is Slav. Now, the times are past when Slavs were content with being the docile subjects of a superior Italian civilization. A greater Servia will claim Dalmatia, and likewise the territory of Trieste, on the ground of nationality; but Italy, although her own unification has been in the name of that principle, has shown that she is quite capable of paying no attention to it when it conflicts with her ambitions. Some day we shall hear more about the question of Italian *versus* Slav in the Adriatic, besides which we must not forget that the strongest geographical and economic considerations would seem to indicate that the Germans cannot be permanently cut off from direct access to these waters.

But all such speculations about the future have an element of futility in them. The great conflict now raging in Europe still has surprises in store for us, and when the time comes to fix the terms of peace, the rulers and statesmen who have to formulate and to agree to them will not be as free to follow their fancies as are irresponsible map-makers. Perchance when peace is at last made, it will be based on no principles except those of common exhaustion and of *beati possidentes*. But the fact that the rights, the aspirations, the dreams of so many nations and interesting nationalities, large and small, are now at stake is one reason why the present gigantic struggle makes such deep appeal to the imagination and the sympathies of all of us.

FORCE AND PEACE[1]

HENRY CABOT LODGE

[Henry Cabot Lodge (1850–) was educated at Harvard and has represented Massachusetts in the United States Senate since 1893. He is a distinguished statesman, a writer on historical-political subjects, best known for his lives of Washington and Hamilton, "Hero Tales from American History," and several volumes of essays and addresses. This vigorous discussion is, with the omission of a few paragraphs, a Commencement address delivered at Union College, Schenectady, New York, on June 9, 1915. By its thorough analysis and effective illustration of the basic principles of "preparedness" it brilliantly presents the viewpoint of an important section of American opinion.]

In the general Commination service to which Carlyle devoted so much time and space he always found opportunity to hymn the praise of the strong, silent man who looked facts in the face. Very characteristically he dismissed with a sneer the most silent, perhaps, of all great men, one certainly who looked at the many hostile facts which he encountered in life with a steady gaze, undimmed by illusions, to a degree rarely equaled. I do not mean by this that Washington never spoke, never in speech or writing uttered his thoughts. Many volumes attest the supreme sufficiency of his dealings with all the crowding questions of war and peace which in such victorious manner he met and answered. But there was one subject upon which he held his peace, and that was himself. I once searched every line of his writings which have been printed, as well as those of his contemporaries, and all that could be found in regard to the man himself were a few sentences of his own capable of an inference, and elsewhere some

[1] From "War Addresses," 1915–1917. Copyright, 1917. Reprinted by special arrangement with Houghton Mifflin Company, authorized publishers.

stray anecdotes. We have his opinions, frank and free, on all the transactions of his life, but nothing about himself. There silence reigns, and hence he may be called in the truest sense the most silent of the great men of modern times. A very noble quality this, worthy of consideration in any age and especially in an age of much delivery of personal feelings and much self-advertising, where publication is easy and passing notoriety extremely cheap. From the many necessary words, however, written and spoken by this most silent man upon all the far-reaching business of his life and about the world of men and things which he touched at so many points, there emerge, very luminous and distinct, an unfailing power of looking facts, whether favorable or unfavorable, in the face, a fine freedom from illusions and complete refusal to admit self-deception or to attempt the deception of others. In these days when the readiness to accept words for deeds, language for action, and a false or maudlin sentimentality for true sentiment, one of the noblest and purest of human motives, — when, I repeat, the cheerful acceptance of these unrealities seems at least to be extremely prevalent, such veracity of mind and character as that possessed by Washington would appear more than usually worthy of contemplation and imitation.

. . . . . .

How is peace to be established and maintained hereafter among the nations of the earth? One thing is certain, it cannot be done by words. Nothing will be accomplished by people who are sheltered under neutrality gathering outside the edges of the fight and from comfortable safety summoning the combatants to throw down their arms and make peace because war is filled with horrors and women are the mothers of men. The nations and the men now fighting, as they believe, for their lives and freedom and national existence know all this better than any one else, and would heed such babble, if they heard it, no more than the twittering

of birds. In our Civil War, when we were fighting for our national life, England and France and other outsiders were not slow in telling us that the Union could not be saved, that the useless carnage ought to cease, that peace must be made at once. Except as an irritating impertinence we regarded such advice as of no more consequence than the squeaking of mice behind the wainscot when fire has seized upon the house. Neither present peace, nor established peace in the future for which we hope, is helped by fervent conversation among ourselves about the beauties of peace and the horrors of war, interspersed with virtuous exhortations to others, who are passing through the valley of the shadow, to give up all they are fighting for and accept the instructions of bystanders who are daring and sacrificing nothing and who have nothing directly at stake. Peace will not come in this way by vain shoutings nor by mere loudness in shrieking uncontested truths to a weary world. No men or women possessed of ordinary sense or human sympathies need arguments to convince them that peace among nations is a great good, to be sought for with all their strength, but the establishment and maintenance of peace cannot be accomplished by language proclaiming the virtues of peace and demonstrating the horrors of war. The many excellent people who may be described as habitual if not professional advocates of peace appear to be satisfied with making and listening to speeches about it. They seem to think great advances are made if we put our official names to a series of perfectly empty and foolish agreements which it is charitable to describe as harmless follies, for they weaken and discredit every real treaty which seeks to promote international good-will and settle international differences. They are so vain and worthless that, when the hour of stress came, no one would think it worth while even to tear them up. Treaty agreements looking to the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and which can be carried out, are valuable to the extent to which they go, but treaty agreements which go beyond the

point of practical enforcement, which are not meant to be enforced, and which have neither a sense of obligation nor force to sustain that obligation behind them, are simply injurious. If we are to secure our own peace and do our part toward the maintenance of world peace, we must put rhetoric, whether in speech or on paper, aside. We must refuse to be satisfied with illusions. We must refuse to deceive ourselves or others. We must pass by mere words and vague shows, and come clear-eyed to the facts and the realities. The dominant fact to-day, I repeat, is the physical force now unchained in this great war. Some people seem to think that if you can abolish force and the instruments of force you can put an end to the possibilities of war. Let us for a moment go to the roots of existing things. Let us make the last analysis.

When I was a very young man I saw a large part of my native city swept away by fire in a single night. The calamity brought with it an enormous destruction of property, of the accumulated savings of years and much consequent suffering, both direct and indirect. What was the cause of this destruction and suffering? There was only one — fire. Not fire from the heaven above or the earth beneath, but fire produced and used by man, set loose without control. The abolition of fire would undoubtedly have prevented a repetition of this disaster, but no one suggested it. The impossibility of attempting to stop the destruction of life and property through fire by abolishing fire itself was as apparent as its absurdity. Somewhere in the dim, unwritten history of man upon earth a great genius, perhaps several great geniuses, discovered the production and control of fire. In the earliest traces of man there is, I think, as yet no proof of his existence without fire, and yet we know that at some period he must have discovered its production and control. Even when we come to the little fragment of time covered by man's recorded history, we find that the thought of the production and control of fire as the greatest of discoveries still lingered in the human mind and found its expression in symbolism of the beautiful Promethean

myth. Fire, therefore, has probably been with man as his servant for a period which could only be expressed in the vast terms of geology. In large measure, society and civilization rest upon the use of fire. Without it, great spaces of the earth's surface would become not only useless to man but uninhabitable. Without it, the huge and intricate fabric of modern civilization in its present form would not exist. Therefore, no argument is needed to convince men that the miseries and misfortunes caused by uncontrolled fire cannot be escaped by the abolition of fire itself. Relief must be sought, not in abolition, but in a better and wiser control which will render it difficult at least for man's best servant at any time to become his master. It is unchained force, with the dread accompaniments of science, which is to-day destroying life and limb, happiness, industry, property, and the joys and beauties of the art and devotion of the dead centuries. Is the terrible problem here presented to be solved by the abolition of the physical force possessed by nations? Go back again to the dark beginnings and study the comparatively few years, eight or ten thousand at the outside, of which we may be said to have a record.

In the dim light of that remote dawn we see men engaged in an unending conflict with the forces of nature, struggling with the forces of nature, struggling with the wilderness, with wild beasts, with hot and cold, and continually fighting with each other. Gradually they emerge in tribes with leaders, and then come states, communities, kingdoms, empires. But among all these confused events which make up history we find, I think, that the one fact which marks the development of every organized society, whether rude or complicated, of every political entity, whether great or small, is the substitution of the will of the community and the protection of the community for the will of the individual and for the self-protection which each man naturally exercises. The one unfailing mark of what, for lack of a better word, we call civilization, is this substitution of the force of the community,

embodied in law and administered by what we describe as government, for the uncontrolled sporadic force of each individual member of the community. Wherever man is left to his own protection and his own defense, there is nothing possible but personal fighting and general anarchy. The man possessed of the greatest physical force and the most effective weapons is the best protected. About him others gather and submit to his leadership and give him their support in return for his protection. Then we have the predatory band which found its highest expression in the feudal system. Gradually one band or lordship conquers or unites with itself other bands, and they establish control over a certain territory; a state emerges, and the process is repeated on a larger scale by the conquest or union of other states. Physical is supplemented by intellectual force and we have at last the kingdom, the great republic, or the mighty empire. But under it all lies the replacement of the scattered force of the individual by the consolidated force of the community, and power, order, commerce, art, and peace rest in the last analysis upon the force of the community expressed in government of some sort, such government being merely its instrument and manifestation. You may carry your inquiry across the whole range of history and over the earliest human societies of which we have knowledge, to the vigilance committees of the Far West, and you will find that law, order, and peace were brought about by men coming together and exercising the united force of the community, great or small, in order to put an end to the chaos and disorders of uncontrolled force exercised by each individual. When the civilization and the society reach a high point of organization, the underlying force upon which the entire social and political fabric rests is exerted and is often effective through what may be called merely a symbol. The longest period of general peace covering a large region of the earth of which we have knowledge in historic times was probably that of the Roman Empire, which endured for some three centuries. There was fighting

on the widely extended frontiers, at intervals diminishing in length as the end approached. After the decline began there were internal wars also at intervals with the imperial purple as the prize, but on the whole through the first three centuries of our era the general condition of the Roman Empire and throughout most of its extent was one of peace. That time is still referred to as the period of the Pax Romana.

In his romance of the "Last Days of Pompeii," Bulwer makes a dramatic point of the Roman sentry motionless at his post while the darkness and the flame and the burning flood were rushing down upon the doomed city. That solitary sentry was the symbol of the force of the Roman Empire. Peace, order, and law reigned throughout all western Europe, but it was the gleam upon the sword and corselet of the Roman legionary which made men realize that behind that law and peace and order was the irresistible force of the Empire of Rome. Let us take a more homely illustration. We have all seen in London and New York police officers stationed at points where the traffic is densest regulating and guiding its movement by merely raising one hand. They would be perfectly incapable of stopping the vehicles carrying on that traffic, by their own physical force. It could pass over them and destroy them in a moment, and yet it is all governed by the gesture of one man. The reason is simple; the policeman is the symbol of the force of the community against which no individual force can prevail, and of this the great mass of individuals are thoroughly if unconsciously aware. Law is the written will of the community. The constable, the policeman, the soldier, is the symbol of the force which gives sanction to law and without which it would be worthless. Abolish the force which maintains order in every village, town, and city in the civilized world and you would not have peace — you would have riot, anarchy, and destruction; the criminal, the violent, and the reckless would dominate until the men of order and the lovers of peace united and restored the force of the community which had been swept

away. It is all obvious enough, it all rests on human nature, and if there was not somewhere an organized force which belonged to the whole community there would be neither peace nor order anywhere. No one has suggested, not even the most ardent advocates of peace, that the police of our cities should be abolished on the theory that an organization of armed men whose duty it is to maintain order, even if they are compelled often to wound and sometimes to kill for that purpose, are by their mere existence an incitement to crime and violence. If order, peace, and civilization in a town, city, or state, rest as they do rest in the last analysis, upon force, upon what does the peace of a nation depend? It must depend, and it can only depend, upon the ability of the nation to maintain and defend its own peace at home and abroad. Turn to the Constitution of the United States. In the brief preamble one of the chief purposes of the Constitution is set down as provision for the "common defense." In the grant of powers to Congress one of the first powers conferred is to provide for the "common defense of the United States." For this purpose they are given specific powers: to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, to provide for calling forth the militia, suppressing insurrections and repelling invasions. The States are forbidden to engage in war unless actually invaded, and the United States is bound to protect each of them against invasion and, on their request, to protect them also against domestic violence. In other words, the Constitution provides for the maintenance of order at home and peace abroad through the physical force of the United States. The conception of the Constitution is that domestic order as well as peace with other nations rests upon the force of the nation. Of the soundness of this proposition there can be no doubt, I think, in the mind of any reasonable man. This obvious principle embodied in the Constitution and recognized by every organized government in the world is too often overlooked at the present moment in the clamor against armament. The people who urge the disarmament of one nation in an

armed world confuse armament and preparation with the actual power upon which peace depends. They take the manifestation for the cause. Armament is merely the instrument by which the force of the community is manifested and made effective, just as the policeman is the manifestation of the force of the municipal community upon which local order rests. The fact that armies and navies are used in war does not make them the cause of war, any more than maintaining a fire in a grate to prevent the dwellers in the house from suffering from cold warrants the abolition of fire because where fire gets beyond control it is a destructive agent. Alexander the Great was bent on conquest, and he created the best army in the world at that time, not to preserve the peace of Macedonia, but for the purpose of conquering other nations, to which purpose he applied his instrument. The wars which followed were not due to the Macedonian phalanx, but to Alexander. The good or the evil of national armament depends, not on its existence or its size, but upon the purpose for which it is created and maintained. Great military and naval forces created for purposes of conquest are used in the war which the desire of conquest causes. They do not in themselves cause war. Armies and navies organized to maintain peace serve the ends of peace because there is no such incentive to war as a rich, undefended, and helpless country, which by its condition invites aggression. The grave objections to overwhelming and exhausting armaments are economic. A general reduction of armaments is not only desirable, but is something to be sought for with the utmost earnestness. But for one nation to disarm and leave itself defenseless in an armed world is a direct incentive and invitation to war. The danger to the peace of the world, then, lies not in armament, which is a manifestation, but in the purposes for which the armament was created. A knife is frequently dangerous to human life, but there would be no sense in abolishing knives, because the danger depends solely on the purpose or passion of the individual in whose hand the knife is and not upon the

fact that the knife exists. The peace of a nation depends in the last resort, like domestic order, upon the force of the community and upon the ability of the community to maintain peace, assuming that the nation lives up to its obligations, seeks no conquest, and wishes only to be able to repel aggression and invasion. If a nation fulfills strictly all its international obligations and seeks no conquest and has no desire to wrong any other nation, great or small, the danger of war can come only through the aggression of others, and that aggression will never be made if it is known that the peace-loving nation is ready to repel it. The first step, then, toward the maintenance of peace is for each nation to maintain its peace with the rest of the world by its own honorable and right conduct and by such organization and preparation as will enable it to defend its peace.

This should be our policy. We should show the world that democracy, government by the people, makes for peace, in contrast to the government of a military autocracy which makes for war. We should demonstrate this by our conduct, by justice in our dealings with other nations, by readiness to make any sacrifices for the right and stern refusal to do wrong; by deeds, not words, and finally by making the whole world understand that while we seek no conquests we are able to repel any aggression or invasion from without for the very reason that we love peace and mean to maintain it. We should never forget that if democracy is not both able and ready to defend itself, it will go down in subjection before military autocracy because the latter is then the more efficient. We must bear constantly in mind that from the conflict which now convulses the world there may possibly come events which would force us to fight with all our strength to preserve our freedom, our democracy, and our national life. But this concerns ourselves and will have only the slow-moving influence of example. What can be done now? What can we do in the larger sense toward securing and maintaining the peace of the world? This is a much more difficult question, but

turn it back and forth as we may there is no escape from the proposition that the peace of the world can be maintained only, as the peace and order of a single community are maintained, as the peace of a single nation is maintained, by the force which united nations are willing to put behind the peace and order of the world. Nations must unite as men unite in order to preserve peace and order. The great nations must be so united as to be able to say to any single country, you must not go to war, and they can only say that effectively when the country desiring war knows that the force which the united nations place behind peace is irresistible. We have done something in advancing the settlement by arbitration of many minor questions which in former times led to wars and reprisals, although the points of difference were essentially insignificant, but as human nature is at present constituted and the world is at present managed there are certain questions which no nation would submit voluntarily to the arbitration of any tribunal, and the attempt to bring such questions within the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal not only fails in its purpose, but discredits arbitration and the treaties by which the impossible is attempted. In differences between individuals the decision of the court is final, because in the last resort the entire force of the community is behind the court decision. In differences between nations which go beyond the limited range of arbitrable questions, peace can be maintained only by putting behind it the force of united nations determined to uphold it and to prevent war. No one is more conscious than I of the enormous difficulties which beset such a solution or such a scheme, but if we are to pass beyond the limits of voluntary arbitration, it is in this direction alone that we can find hope for the maintenance of the world's peace and the avoidance of needless wars. It may well be that it is impossible, that we cannot go beyond voluntary arbitration. Even if we could establish such a union of nations, there would be some wars that could not be avoided, but there might certainly be others which could be prevented.

It may be easily said that this idea, which is not a new one, is impracticable, but it is better than the idea that war can be stopped by language, by speech-making, by vain agreements which no one would carry out when the stress came, by denunciations of war and laudations of peace, in which all men agree; for these methods are not only impracticable, but impossible and barren of all hope of real result. It may seem Utopian at this moment to suggest a union of civilized nations in order to put a controlling force behind the maintenance of peace and international order, but it is through the aspiration for perfection, through the search for Utopias, that the real advances have been made. At all events, it is along this path that we must travel if we are to attain in any measure to the end we all desire of peace upon earth. It is at least a great, a humane purpose to which, in these days of death and suffering, of misery and sorrow among so large a portion of mankind, we might well dedicate ourselves. We must begin the work with the clear understanding that our efforts will fail if they are tainted with the thought of personal or political profit or with any idea of self-interest or self-glorification. We cannot possibly succeed in any measure if we mix up plans for future peace with attempts to end this war now raging. We must be content to work within rigid limitations. We may not now succeed even in this restricted way, but I believe that in the slow process of the years others who come after us may attach to it some result not without value. At least we can feel that the effort and the sacrifice which we make will not be in vain when the end in sight is noble, when we are striving to help mankind and lift the heaviest burdens from suffering humanity.

A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE[1]

A. LAWRENCE LOWELL

[A. Lawrence Lowell (1856–) was educated at Harvard, taught political science there from 1897 to 1909, and has since been its president. His chief writings are "Governments and Parties in Continental Europe" (1896) and "The Government of England" (1908). The present selection illustrates very well the careful working out of an argument in favor of a cause, with emphasis upon the most serious objection to it.]

In spite of its ominous sound, the suggestion of a league of nations to enforce peace has no connection with any effort to stop the present war. It is aimed solely at preventing future conflicts after the terrific struggle now raging has come to an end; and yet this is not a bad time for people in private life to bring forward proposals of such a nature. Owing to the vast number of soldiers under arms, to the proportion of men and women in the warring countries who suffer acutely, to the extent of the devastation and misery, it is probable that, whatever the result may be, the people of all nations will be more anxious to prevent the outbreak of another war than ever before in the history of the world. The time is not yet ripe for governments to take action, but it is ripe for public discussion of practicable means to reduce the danger of future breaches of international peace.

The nations of the world to-day are in much the position of frontier settlements in America half a century ago, before orderly government was set up. The men there were in the main well disposed, but in the absence of an authority that could enforce order, each man, feeling no other security from attack, carried arms which he was prepared to use if danger threatened. The first step, when affrays became unbearable,

[1] From *Atlantic Monthly*, September, 1915. Reprinted by permission.

was the formation of a vigilance committee, supported by the enrollment of all good citizens, to prevent men from shooting one another and to punish offenders. People did not wait for a gradual improvement by the preaching of higher ethics and a better civilization. They felt that violence must be met by force, and when the show of force was strong enough, violence ceased. In time the vigilance committee was replaced by the policeman and by the sheriff with the *posse comitatus*. The policeman and the sheriff maintain order because they have the bulk of the community behind them, and no country has yet reached, or is likely for an indefinite period to reach, such a state of civilization that it can wholly dispense with the police.

Treaties for the arbitration of international disputes are good. They have proved an effective method of settling questions that would otherwise have bred ill-feeling without directly causing war; but when passion runs high, and deep-rooted interests or sentiments are at stake, there is need of the sheriff with his *posse* to enforce the obligation.

There are, no doubt, differences in the conception of justice and right, divergencies of civilization, so profound that people will fight over them, and face even the prospect of disaster in war rather than submit. Yet even in such cases it is worth while to postpone the conflict, to have a public discussion of the question at issue before an impartial tribunal, and thus give to the people of the countries involved a chance to consider, before hostilities begin, whether the risk and suffering of war are really worth while. No sensible man expects to abolish wars altogether, but we ought to seek to reduce the probability of war as much as possible. It is on these grounds that the suggestion has been put forth of a league of nations to enforce peace.

Without attempting to cover details of operation (which are, indeed, of vital importance and will require careful study by experts in international law and diplomacy), the proposal contains four points stated as general objects. The first is

that before resorting to arms the members of the league shall submit disputes with one another, if justiciable, to an international tribunal; second, that in like manner they shall submit non-justiciable questions — that is, such as cannot be decided on the basis of strict international law — to an international council of conciliation, which shall recommend a fair and amicable solution; third, that if any member of the league wages war against another before submitting the question in dispute to the tribunal or council, all the other members shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against the state that so breaks the peace; and fourth, that the signatory powers shall endeavor to codify and improve the rules of international law.

The kernel of the proposal, the feature in which it differs from other plans, lies in the third point, obliging all the members of the league to declare war on any member violating the pact of peace. This is the provision that provokes both adherence and opposition; and at first it certainly gives one a shock that a people should be asked to pledge itself to go to war over a quarrel which is not of its making, in which it has no interest, and in which it may believe that substantial justice lies on the other side. If, indeed, the nations of the earth could maintain complete isolation, could pursue each its own destiny without regard to the rest; if they were not affected by a war between two others or liable to be drawn into it; if, in short, there were no overwhelming common interest in securing universal peace, the provision would be intolerable. It would be as bad as the liability of an individual to take part in the *posse comitatus* of a community with which he had nothing in common. But in every civilized country the public force is employed to prevent any man, however just his claim, from vindicating his own right with his own hand instead of going to law, and every citizen is bound when needed to assist in preventing him, because that is the only way to restrain private war, and the maintenance of order is of paramount importance for every one. Surely

the family of nations has a like interest in restraining war between states.

It will be observed that the members of the league are not to bind themselves to enforce the decision of the tribunal or the award of the council of conciliation. That may come in the remote future, but it is no part of this proposal. It would be imposing obligations far greater than the nations can reasonably be expected to assume at the present day; for the conceptions of international morality and fair play are still so vague and divergent that a nation can hardly bind itself to wage war on another, with which it has no quarrel, to enforce a decision or a recommendation of whose justice or wisdom it may not be itself heartily convinced. The proposal goes no further than obliging all the members to prevent, by a threat of immediate war, any breach of the public peace before the matter in dispute has been submitted to arbitration; and this is neither unreasonable nor impracticable. There are many questions, especially of a non-justiciable nature, on which we should not be willing to bind ourselves to accept the decision of an arbitration, and where we should regard compulsion by armed intervention of the rest of the world as outrageous. Take, for example, the question of Asiatic immigration, or a claim that the Panama Canal ought to be an unfortified neutral highway, or the desire by a European power to take possession of Colombia. But we ought not, in the interest of universal peace, to object to making a public statement of our position in these matters at a court or council before resorting to arms; and in fact the treaty between the United States and England, ratified on November 14, 1914, provides that all disputes between the high contracting parties, of every nature whatsoever, shall, failing other methods of adjustment, be referred for investigation and report to a permanent international commission, with a stipulation that neither country shall declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and before the report is submitted.

What is true of this country is true of others. To agree to abide by the result of an arbitration, on every non-justiciable question of every nature whatsoever, on pain of compulsion in any form by the whole world, would involve a greater cession of sovereignty than nations would now be willing to concede. This appears, indeed, perfectly clearly from the discussions at the Hague Conference of 1907. But to exclude differences that do not turn on questions of international law from the cases in which a state must present the matter to a tribunal or council of conciliation before beginning hostilities, would leave very little check upon the outbreak of war. Almost every conflict between European nations for more than half a century has been based upon some dissension which could not be decided by strict rules of law, and in which a violation of international law or of treaty rights has usually not even been used as an excuse. This was true of the war between France and Austria in 1859, and, in substance, of the war between Prussia and Austria in 1866. It was true of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, of the Russo-Turkish War in 1876, of the Balkan War against Turkey in 1912, and of the present war.

No one will claim that a league to enforce peace, such as is proposed, would wholly prevent war, but it would greatly reduce the probability of hostilities. It would take away the advantage of surprise, of catching the enemy unprepared for a sudden attack. It would give a chance for public opinion on the nature of the controversy to be formed throughout the world and in the militant country. The latter is of great importance, for the moment war is declared argument about its merits is at once stifled. Passion runs too high for calm debate, and patriotism forces people to support their government. But a trial before an international tribunal would give time for discussion while emotion is not yet highly inflamed. Men opposed to war would be able to urge its injustice, to ask whether, after all, the object is worth the sacrifice, and they would get a hearing from their fellow citizens which

they cannot get after war begins. The mere delay, the interval for consideration, would be an immense gain for the prospect of a peaceful settlement.

In this connection it may be of interest to recall the way in which the medieval custom of private war was abolished in England. It was not done at one step, but gradually, by preventing men from avenging their own wrongs before going to court. The trial by battle long remained a recognized part of judicial procedure, but only after the case had been presented to the court, and only in accordance with judicial forms. This had the effect of making the practice far less common, and of limiting it to the principals in the quarrel instead of involving a general breach of the peace in which their retainers and friends took part. Civilization was still too crude to give up private war, but the arm of the law and the force in the hands of the crown were strong enough to delay a personal conflict until the case had been presented to court. Without such a force the result could not have been attained.

Every one will admit this in the case of private citizens, but many people shrink from the use of international force to restrain war; some of them on the principle of strict non-resistance, that any taking of life in war cannot be justified, no matter what its purpose or effect. Such people have the most lofty moral ideals, but these are not a part of true statesmanship, unless they aim at the total welfare which may require the attacking of evils even by forcible means. Many years ago when an Atlantic steamship was wrecked, it was said that some of the crew made a rush for the boats, beating the passengers off, and that the captain, who was urged to restore order by shooting a mutineer, replied that he was too near eternity to take life. The result was a far greater loss of life than would have been suffered had he restored order by force. Probably no man with the instincts of a statesman would defend his conduct to-day. He was not a coward, but his sentiments unfitted him for a responsible post in an emergency.

Most people who have been thinking seriously about the maintenance of peace are tending to the opinion that a sanction of some kind is needed to enforce the observance of treaties and of agreements for arbitration. Among the measures proposed has been that of an international police force, under the control of a central council which could use it to preserve order throughout the world. At present such a plan seems visionary. The force would have to be at least large enough to cope with the army that any single nation could put into the field, — under existing conditions let us say five millions of men fully equipped and supplied with artillery and ammunition for a campaign of several months. These troops need not be under arms, or quartered near The Hague, but they must be thoroughly trained and ready to be called out at short notice. Practically that would entail yearly votes of the legislative bodies of each of the nations supplying a quota; and if any of them failed to make the necessary appropriation, there would be great difficulty in preventing others from following its example. The whole organization would, therefore, be in constant danger of going to pieces.

But quite apart from the practical difficulties in the permanent execution of such a plan, let us see how it would affect the United States. The amount of the contingents of the various countries would be apportioned with some regard to population, wealth, and economic resources; and if the total were five million men, our quota on a moderate estimate might be five hundred thousand men. Is it conceivable that the United States would agree to keep anything like that number drilled, equipped, and ready to take the field on the order of an international council composed mainly of foreign nations? Of course it will be answered that these figures are exaggerated, because any such plan will be accompanied by a reduction in armaments. But that is an easier thing to talk about than to effect, and especially to maintain. One must not forget that the existing system of universal military compulsory service on the continent of

Europe arose from Napoleon's attempt to limit the size of the Prussian army. He would be a bold or sanguine man who should assert that any treaty to limit armaments could not in like manner be evaded; and however much they were limited, the quantity of troops to be held at the disposal of a foreign council would of necessity be large, while no nation would be willing to pledge for the purpose the whole of its military force. Such a plan may be practicable in some remote future when the whole world is a vast federation under a central government, but that would seem to be a matter for coming generations, not for the men of our day.

Moreover, the nations whose troops were engaged in fighting any country would inevitably find themselves at war with that country.

One cannot imagine saying to some foreign state, "Our troops are killing yours, they are invading your land, we are supplying them with recruits and munitions of war, but otherwise we are at peace with you. You must treat us as a neutral, and accord to our citizens, to their commerce and property, all the rights of neutrality." In short the plan of an international police force involves all the consequences of the proposal of a league to enforce peace, with other complex provisions extremely hard to execute.

A suggestion more commonly made is that the members of the league of nations, instead of pledging themselves explicitly to declare war forthwith against any of their number that commits a breach of the peace, should agree to hold at once a conference, and take such measures — diplomatic, economic, or military — as may be necessary to prevent war. The objection to this is that it weakens very seriously the sanction. Conferences are apt to shrink from decisive action. Some of the members are timid, others want delay, and much time is consumed in calling the body together and in discussions after it meets. Meanwhile the war may have broken out, and be beyond control. It is much easier to prevent a fire than to put it out. The country that is planning war is

likely to think it has friends in the conference, or neighbors that it can intimidate, who will prevent any positive decision until the fire is burning. Even if the majority decides on immediate action, the minority is not bound thereby. One great power refuses to take part; a second will not do so without her; the rest hesitate, and nothing is done to prevent the war.

A conference is an excellent thing. The proposal of a league to enforce peace by no means excludes it; but the important matter, the effective principle, is that every member of the league should know that whether a conference meets or not, or whatever action it may take or fail to take, all the members of the league have pledged themselves to declare war forthwith on any member that commits a breach of the peace before submitting its case to the international tribunal or council of conciliation. Such a pledge, and such a pledge alone, can have the strong deterrent influence, and thus furnish the sanction that is needed. Of course the pledge may not be kept. Like other treaties it may be broken by the parties to it. Nations are composed of human beings with human weaknesses, and one of these is a disinclination to perform an agreement when it involves a sacrifice. Nevertheless, nations, like men, often do have enough sense of honor, of duty, or of ultimate self-interest, to carry out their contracts at no little immediate sacrifice. They are certainly more likely to do a thing if they have pledged themselves to it than if they have not; and any nation would be running a terrible risk that went to war in the hope that the other members of the league would break their pledges.

The same objection applies to another alternative proposed in place of an immediate resort to military force: that is the use of economic pressure, by a universal agreement, for example, to have no commercial intercourse with the nation breaking the peace. A threat of universal boycott is, no doubt, formidable, but by no means so formidable as a threat of universal war. A large country with great natural resources

which has determined to make war, might be willing to face commercial non-intercourse with the other members of the league during hostilities, when it would not for a moment contemplate the risk of fighting them. A threat, for example, by England, France, and Germany to stop all trade with the United States might or might not have prevented our going to war with Spain; but a declaration that they would take part with all their armies and navies against us would certainly have done so.

It has often been pointed out that the threat of general non-intercourse would bear much more hardly on some countries than on others. That may not in itself be a fatal objection, but a very serious consideration arises from the fact that there would be a premium on preparation for war. A nation which had accumulated vast quantities of munitions, food, and supplies of all kinds might afford to disregard it; while another less fully prepared could not.

Moreover, economic pressure, although urged as a milder measure, is in fact more difficult to apply and maintain. A declaration of war is a single act, and when made sustains itself by the passion it inflames; while commercial non-intercourse is a continuous matter, subject to constant opposition exerted in an atmosphere relatively cool. Our manufacturers would complain bitterly at being deprived of dyestuffs and other chemical products on account of a quarrel in which we had no interest; the South would suffer severely by the loss of a market for cotton; the shipping firms and the exporters and importers of all kinds would be gravely injured; and all these interests would bring to bear upon Congress a pressure well-nigh irresistible. The same would be true of every other neutral country, a fact that would be perfectly well known to the intending belligerent and reduce its fear of a boycott.

But, it is said, why not try economic pressure first, and, if that fails, resort to military force, instead of inflicting at once on unoffending members of the league the terrible calamity of

war? What do we mean by "if that fails"? Do we mean, if, in spite of the economic pressure, the war breaks out? But then the harm is done, the fire is ablaze and can be put out only by blood. The object of the league is not to chastise a country guilty of breaking the peace, but to prevent the outbreak of war, and to prevent it by the immediate prospect of such appalling consequences to the offender that he will not venture to run the risk. If a number of great powers were to pledge themselves, with serious intent, to wage war jointly and severally on any one of their members that attacked another before submitting the case to arbitration, it is in the highest degree improbable that the *casus fœderis* would ever occur, while any less drastic provision would be far less effective.

An objection has been raised to the proposal for a league to enforce peace on the ground that it has in the past often proved difficult, if not impossible, to determine which of two belligerents began a war. The criticism is serious, and presents a practical difficulty, grave but probably not insurmountable. The proposal merely lays down a general principle, and if adopted, the details would have to be worked out very fully and carefully in a treaty, which would specify the acts that would constitute the waging of war by one member upon another. These would naturally be, not the mere creating of apprehension, but specific acts, such as a declaration of war, invasion of territory, the use of force at sea not disowned within forty-eight hours, or an advance into a region in dispute. This last is an especially difficult point, but those portions of the earth's surface in which different nations have conflicting claims are growing less decade by decade.

It must be remembered that the cases which would arise under a league of peace are not like those which have arisen in the past, where one nation is determined to go to war and merely seeks to throw the moral responsibility on the other while getting the advantage of actually beginning hostilities. It is a case where each will strive to avoid the specific acts

of war that may involve the penalty. The reader may have seen, in a country where personal violence is severely punished, two men shaking their fists in each other's faces, each trying to provoke the other to strike the first blow; and no fight after all.

There are many agreements in private business which are not easy to embody in formal contracts; agreements where, as in this case, the execution of the terms calls for immediate action, and where redress after an elaborate trial of the facts affords no real reparation. But if the object sought is good, men do not condemn it on account of the difficulty in devising provisions that will accomplish the result desired; certainly not until they have tried to devise them. It may, indeed, prove impossible to draft a code of specific acts that will cover the ground; it may be impracticable to draft it so as to avoid issues of fact that can be determined only after a long sifting of evidence, which would come too late; but surely that is no reason for failure to make the attempt. We are not making a treaty among nations. We are merely putting forward a suggestion for reducing war, which seems to merit consideration.

A second difficulty that will sometimes arise is the rule of conduct to be followed pending the presentation of the question to the international tribunal. The continuance or cessation of the acts complained of may appear to be, and may even be in fact, more important than the final decision. This has been brought to our attention forcibly by the sinking of the *Lusitania*. We should have done very wisely to submit to arbitration the question of the right of submarines to torpedo merchant ships without warning, provided Germany abandoned the practice pending the arbitration; and Germany would probably not have refused to submit the question to a tribunal on the understanding that the practice was to continue until the decision was rendered, because by that time the war would be over. This difficulty is inherent in every plan for the arbitration of international disputes,

although more serious in a league whose members bind themselves to prevent by force the outbreak of war. It would be necessary to give the tribunal summary authority to decree a *modus vivendi*, to empower it, like a court of equity, to issue a temporary injunction.

In short, the proposal for a league to enforce peace cannot meet all possible contingencies. It cannot prevent all future wars, nor does any sensible person believe that any plan can do so in the present state of civilization. But it can prevent some wars that would otherwise take place, and if it does that, it will have done much good.

People have asked how such a league would differ from the Triple Alliance or Triple Entente, — whether it would not be nominally a combination for peace which might in practice have quite a different effect. But in fact its object is quite contrary to those alliances. They are designed to protect their members against outside powers. This is intended to insure peace among the members themselves. If it grew strong enough, by including all the great powers, it might well insist on universal peace by compelling the outsiders to come in. But that is not its primary object, which is simply to prevent its members from going to war with one another. No doubt if several great nations, and some of the smaller ones, joined it, and if it succeeded in preserving constant friendly relations among its members, there would grow up among them a sense of solidarity which would make any outside power chary of attacking one of them; and, what is more valuable, would make outsiders want to join it. But there is little use in speculating about probabilities. It is enough if such a league were a source of enduring peace among its own members.

How about our own position in the United States? The proposal is a radical and subversive departure from the traditional policy of our country. Would it be wise for us to be parties to such an agreement? At the threshold of such a discussion one thing is clear. If we are not willing to urge

our own government to join a movement for peace, we have no business to discuss any plan for the purpose. It is worse than futile, it is an impertinence, for Americans to advise the people of Europe how they ought to conduct their affairs if we have nothing in common with them; to suggest to them conventions with burdens which are well enough for them, but which we are not willing to share. If our peace organizations are not prepared to have us take part in the plans they devise, they had better disband, or confine their discussions to Pan-American questions.

To return to the question: would it be wise for the United States to make so great a departure from its traditional policy? The wisdom of consistency lies in adherence to a principle so long as the conditions upon which it is based remain unchanged. But the conditions that affect the relations of America to Europe have changed greatly in the last hundred and twenty years. At that time it took about a month to cross the ocean to our shores. Ships were small and could carry few troops. Their guns had a short range. No country had what would now be called more than a very small army; and it was virtually impossible for any foreign nation to make more than a raid upon our territory before we could organize and equip a sufficient force to resist, however unprepared we might be at the outset. But now, by the improvements in machinery, the Atlantic has shrunk to a lake, and before long will shrink to a river. Except for the protection of the navy, and perhaps in spite of it, a foreign nation could land on our coast an army of such a size, and armed with such weapons, that unless we maintain forces several times larger than at present, we should be quite unable to oppose an attack before we had suffered incalculable damage.

It is all very well to assert that we have no desire to quarrel with any one, or any one with us; but good intentions in the abstract, even if accompanied by long-suffering and a disposition to overlook affronts, will not always keep us out of strife. When a number of great nations are locked in a death-grapple,

they are a trifle careless of the rights of the bystander. Within fifteen years of Washington's Farewell Address we were drawn into the wars of Napoleon, and a sorry figure we made for the most part of the fighting on land. A hundred years later our relations with the rest of the world are far closer, our ability to maintain a complete isolation far less. Except by colossal self-deception we cannot believe that the convulsions of Europe do not affect us profoundly, that wars there need not disturb us, that we are not in danger of being drawn into them; or even that we may not some day find ourselves in the direct path of the storm. If our interest in the maintenance of peace is not quite so strong as that of some other nations, it is certainly strong enough to warrant our taking steps to preserve it, even to the point of joining a league to enforce it. The cost of the insurance is well worth the security to us.

If mere material self-interest would indicate such a course, there are other reasons to confirm it. Civilization is to some extent a common heritage which it is worth while for all nations to defend, and war is a scourge which all peoples should use every rational means to reduce. If the family of nations can by standing together make wars less frequent, it is clearly their duty to do so, and in such a body we do not want the place of our own country to be vacant.

To join such a league would mean, no doubt, a larger force of men trained for arms in this country, more munitions of war on hand, and better means of producing them rapidly; for although it may be assumed that the members of the league would never be actually called upon to carry out their promise to fight, they ought to have a potential force for the purpose. But in any case this country ought not to be so little prepared for an emergency as it is to-day; and it would require to be less fully armed if it joined a league pledged to protect its members against attack, than if it stood alone and unprotected. In fact the tendency of such a league, by procuring at least delay before the outbreak of hostilities, would

be to lessen the need of preparation for immediate war, and thus it would have a more potent effect in reducing armaments than any formal treaties could have, whether made voluntarily or under compulsion.

The proposal for a league to enforce peace does not conflict with plans to go further, to enforce justice among nations by compelling compliance with the decisions of a tribunal by diplomatic, economic, or military pressure. Nor, on the other hand, does it imply any such action, or interfere with the independence or sovereignty of states except in this one respect, that it would prohibit any member, before submitting its claims to arbitration, from making war upon another on pain of finding itself at war with all the rest. The proposal is only a suggestion, defective probably, crude certainly; but if, in spite of that, it is the most promising plan for maintaining peace now brought forward, it merits sympathetic consideration both here and abroad.

AMERICA'S TERMS OF PEACE[1]

(Message to Congress January 8, 1918)

WOODROW WILSON

[For a sketch of Woodrow Wilson see page 3. The following address was delivered to both Houses of Congress by President Wilson on January 8, 1918 and gives the most definite statement of the American attitude toward terms of peace. It has been publicly approved by statesmen of all the Allied nations as the best expression of conditions of peace.]

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS:

Once more, as repeatedly before, the spokesmen of the Central Empires have indicated their desire to discuss the objects of the war and the possible basis of a general peace. Parleys have been in progress at Brest-Litovsk between Russian representatives and representatives of the Central Powers to which the attention of all the belligerents has been invited for the purpose of ascertaining whether it may be possible to extend these parleys into a general conference with regard to terms of peace and settlement. The Russian representatives presented not only a perfectly definite statement of the principles upon which they would be willing to conclude peace, but also an equally definite program of the concrete application of those principles. The representatives of the Central Powers, on their part, presented an outline of settlement which, if much less definite, seemed susceptible of liberal interpretation until their specific program of practical terms was added. That program proposed no concessions at all, either to the sovereignty of Russia or to the preferences of the population with whose fortunes it dealt, but meant, in a

[1] From *International Conciliation*, February, 1918. Reprinted by permission.

word, that the Central Empires were to keep every foot of territory their armed forces had occupied — every province, every city, every point of vantage — as a permanent addition to their territories and their power. It is a reasonable conjecture that the general principles of settlement which they at first suggested originated with the more liberal statesmen of Germany and Austria, the men who have begun to feel the force of their own peoples' thought and purpose, while the concrete terms of actual settlement came from the military leaders who have no thought but to keep what they have got. The negotiations have been broken off. The Russian representatives were sincere and in earnest. They cannot entertain such proposals of conquest and domination.

The whole incident is full of significance. It is also full of perplexity. With whom are the Russian representatives dealing? For whom are the representatives of the Central Empires speaking? Are they speaking for the majorities of their respective Parliaments or for the minority parties, that military and imperialistic minority which has so far dominated their whole policy and controlled the affairs of Turkey and of the Balkan States, which have felt obliged to become their associates in this war? The Russian representatives have insisted, very justly, very wisely, and in the true spirit of modern democracy that the conferences they have been holding with the Teutonic and Turkish statesmen should be held within open, not closed, doors, and all the world has been audience, as was desired. To whom have we been listening, then? To those who speak the spirit and intention of the resolutions of the German Reichstag of the 9th of July last, the spirit and intention of the liberal leaders and parties of Germany, or to those who resist and defy that spirit and intention and insist upon conquest and subjugation? Or are we listening, in fact, to both, unreconciled and in open and hopeless contradiction? These are very serious and pregnant questions. Upon the answer to them depends the peace of the world.

But whatever the results of the parleys at Brest-Litovsk, whatever the confusions of counsel and of purpose in the utterances of the spokesmen of the Central Empires, they have again attempted to acquaint the world with their objects in the war and have again challenged their adversaries to say what their objects are and what sort of settlement they would deem just and satisfactory. There is no good reason why that challenge should not be responded to, and responded to with the utmost candor. We did not wait for it. Not once, but again and again we have laid our whole thought and purpose before the world, not in general terms only, but each time with sufficient definition to make it clear what sort of definite terms of settlement must necessarily spring out of them. Within the last week Mr. Lloyd George has spoken with admirable candor and in admirable spirit for the people and government of Great Britain. There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central Powers, no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail. The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite statement of the objects of the war, lies with Germany and her allies. The issues of life and death hang upon these definitions. No statesman who has the least conception of his responsibility ought for a moment to permit himself to continue this tragical and appalling outpouring of blood and treasure unless he is sure beyond a peradventure that the objects of the vital sacrifice are part and parcel of the very life of society and that the people for whom he speaks think them right and imperative as he does.

There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and of purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people. They are prostrate and all but helpless, it would seem, before the grim power of Germany, which has hitherto known no relenting and no pity. Their power apparently is shattered. And yet their soul is not

subservient. They will not yield either in principle or in action. Their conception of what is right, of what is humane and honorable for them to accept, has been stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind; and they have refused to compound their ideals or desert others that they themselves may be safe. They call to us to say what it is that we desire, in what, if in anything, our purpose and our spirit differ from theirs; and I believe that the people of the United States would wish me to respond with utter simplicity and frankness. Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open, and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow now or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealings by

the other peoples of the world, as against force and selfish aggression. All of the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us.

The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program, and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

I. Open covenants of peace must be arrived at, after which there will surely be no private international action or rulings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will reduce to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. Free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the population concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest coöperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished

from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right, we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.

For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace, such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this program does remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade, if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world — the new world in which we now live — instead of a place of mastery.

Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination.

We have spoken now, surely in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the

principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation, no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle, and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything that they possess. The moral climax of this, the culminating and final war for human liberty, has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test.

THE CONDITIONS OF PERMANENT PEACE

(Address in New York City on September 27, 1918)

WOODROW WILSON

[For sketch of Woodrow Wilson see page 3. The address here presented was delivered at the Metropolitan Opera House, New York City, on September 27, 1918 at the opening of the Fourth Liberty Loan Campaign. It is especially valuable for its discussion of the deeper issues of the war and of the establishment of a League of Nations.]

MY FELLOW CITIZENS:

I am not here to promote the loan. That will be done — ably and enthusiastically done — by the hundreds of thousands of loyal and tireless men and women who have undertaken to present it to you and to our fellow citizens throughout the country; and I have not the least doubt of their complete success; for I know their spirit and the spirit of the country. My confidence is confirmed, too, by the thoughtful and experienced coöperation of the bankers here and everywhere, who are lending their invaluable aid and guidance. I have come, rather, to seek an opportunity to present to you some thoughts which I trust will serve to give you, in perhaps fuller measure than before, a vivid sense of the great issues involved, in order that you may appreciate and accept with added enthusiasm the grave significance of the duty of supporting the Government by your men and your means to the utmost point of sacrifice and self-denial. No man or woman who has really taken in what this war means can hesitate to give to the very limit of what they have; and it is my mission here to-night to try to make it clear once more what the war

really means. You will need no other stimulation or reminder of your duty.

At every turn of the war we gain a fresh consciousness of what we mean to accomplish by it. When our hope and expectation are most excited we think more definitely than before of the issues that hang upon it and of the purposes which must be realized by means of it. For it has positive and well-defined purposes which we did not determine and which we cannot alter. No statesman or assembly created them: no statesman or assembly can alter them. They have arisen out of the very nature and circumstances of the war. The most that statesmen or assemblies can do is to carry them out or be false to them. They were perhaps not clear at the outset; but they are clear now. The war has lasted more than four years and the whole world has been drawn into it. The common will of mankind has been substituted for the particular purposes of individual states. Individual statesmen may have started the conflict, but neither they nor their opponents can stop it as they please. It has become a peoples' war, and peoples of all sorts and races, of every degree of power and variety of fortune, are involved in its sweeping processes of change and settlement. We came into it when its character had become fully defined and it was plain that no nation could stand apart or be indifferent to its outcome. Its challenge drove to the heart of everything we cared for and lived for. The voice of the war had become clear and gripped our hearts. Our brothers from many lands, as well as our own murdered dead under the sea, were calling to us, and we responded, fiercely and of course.

The air was clear about us. We saw things in their full, convincing proportions as they were; and we have seen them with steady eyes and unchanging comprehension ever since. We accepted the issues of the war as facts, not as any group of men either here or elsewhere had defined them, and we can accept no outcome which does not squarely meet and settle them. Those issues are these:

Shall the military power of any nation or group of nations be suffered to determine the fortunes of peoples over whom they have no right to rule except the right of force?

Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations and make them subject to their purpose and interest?

Shall peoples be ruled and dominated, even in their own internal affairs, by arbitrary and irresponsible force or by their own will and choice?

Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all peoples and nations or shall the strong do as they will and the weak suffer without redress?

Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance or shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights?

No man, no group of men, chose these to be the issues of the struggle. They *are* the issues of it; and they must be settled — by no arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests, but definitely and once for all and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest.

This is what we mean when we speak of a permanent peace, if we speak sincerely, intelligently, and with a real knowledge and comprehension of the matter we deal with.

We are all agreed that there can be no peace obtained by any kind of bargain or compromise with the Governments of the Central Empires, because we have dealt with them already and have seen them deal with other Governments that were parties to this struggle, at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. They have convinced us that they are without honor and do not intend justice. They observe no covenants, accept no principle but force and their own interest. We cannot "come to terms" with them. They have made it impossible. The German people must by this time be fully aware that we cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us. We do not think the same thoughts or speak the same language of agreement.

It is of capital importance that we should also be explicitly agreed that no peace shall be obtained by any kind of compromise or abatement of the principles we have avowed as the principles for which we are fighting. There should exist no doubt about that. I am, therefore, going to take the liberty of speaking with the utmost frankness about the practical implications that are involved in it.

If it be indeed and in truth the common object of the Governments associated against Germany and of the nations whom they govern, as I believe it to be, to achieve by the coming settlements a secure and lasting peace, it will be necessary that all who sit down at the peace table shall come ready and willing to pay the price, the only price, that will procure it; and ready and willing, also, to create in some virile fashion the only instrumentality by which it can be made certain that the agreements of the peace will be honored and fulfilled.

That price is impartial justice in every item of the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed; and not only impartial justice, but also the satisfaction of the several peoples whose fortunes are dealt with. That indispensable instrumentality is a League of Nations formed under covenants that will be efficacious. Without such an instrumentality, by which the peace of the world can be guaranteed, peace will rest in part upon the word of outlaws, and only upon that word. For Germany will have to redeem her character, not by what happens at the peace table but by what follows.

And, as I see it, the constitution of that League of Nations and the clear definition of its objects must be a part, is in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself. It cannot be formed now. If formed now, it would be merely a new alliance confined to the nations associated against a common enemy. It is not likely that it could be formed after the settlement. It is necessary to guarantee the peace; and the peace cannot be guaranteed as an afterthought. The reason, to speak in plain terms again, why it must be

guaranteed is that there will be parties to the peace whose promises have proved untrustworthy, and means must be found in connection with the peace settlement itself to remove that source of insecurity. It would be folly to leave the guarantee to the subsequent voluntary action of the Governments we have seen destroy Russia and deceive Rumania.

But these general terms do not disclose the whole matter. Some details are needed to make them sound less like a thesis and more like a practical program. These, then, are some of the particulars, and I state them with the greater confidence because I can state them authoritatively as representing this Government's interpretation of its own duty with regard to peace:

First. The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.

Second. No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all.

Third. There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations.

Fourth. And more specifically, there can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the league and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control.

Fifth. All international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.

Special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war. It would be an insincere as well as an insecure peace that did not exclude them in definite and binding terms.

The confidence with which I venture to speak for our people in these matters does not spring from our traditions merely and the well-known principles of international action which we have always professed and followed. In the same sentence in which I say that the United States will enter into no special arrangements or understandings with particular nations let me say also that the United States is prepared to assume its full share of responsibility for the maintenance of the common covenants and understandings upon which peace must henceforth rest. We still read Washington's immortal warning against "entangling alliances" with full comprehension and an answering purpose. But only special and limited alliances entangle; and we recognize and accept the duty of a new day in which we are permitted to hope for a general alliance which will avoid entanglements and clear the air of the world for common understandings and the maintenance of common rights.

I have made this analysis of the international situation which the war has created, not, of course, because I doubted whether the leaders of the great nations and peoples with whom we are associated were of the same mind and entertained a like purpose, but because the air every now and again gets darkened by mists and groundless doubtings and mischievous perversions of counsel and it is necessary once and again to sweep all the irresponsible talk about peace intrigues and weakening morale and doubtful purpose on the part of those in authority utterly, and if need be unceremoniously, aside and say things in the plainest words that can be found, even when it is only to say over again what has been said before, quite as plainly if in less unvarnished terms.

As I have said, neither I nor any other man in governmental authority created or gave form to the issues of this war. I have simply responded to them with such vision as I could command. But I have responded gladly and with a resolution that has grown warmer and more confident as the issues have grown clearer and clearer. It is now plain that

they are issues which no man can pervert unless it be willfully. I am bound to fight for them, and happy to fight for them as time and circumstance have revealed them to me as to all the world. Our enthusiasm for them grows more and more irresistible as they stand out in more and more vivid and unmistakable outline.

And the forces that fight for them draw into closer and closer array, organize their millions into more and more unconquerable might, as they become more and more distinct to the thought and purpose of the peoples engaged. It is the peculiarity of this great war that while statesmen have seemed to cast about for definitions of their purpose and have sometimes seemed to shift their ground and their point of view, the thought of the mass of men, whom statesmen are supposed to instruct and lead, has grown more and more unclouded, more and more certain of what it is that they are fighting for. National purposes have fallen more and more into the background and the common purpose of enlightened mankind has taken their place. The counsels of plain men have become on all hands more simple and straightforward and more unified than the counsels of sophisticated men of affairs, who still retain the impression that they are playing a game of power and playing for high stakes. That is why I have said that this is a peoples' war, not a statesmen's. Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought or be broken.

I take that to be the significance of the fact that assemblies and associations of many kinds made up of plain workaday people have demanded, almost every time they came together, and are still demanding, that the leaders of their Governments declare to them plainly what it is, exactly what it is, that they are seeking in this war, and what they think the items of the final settlement should be. They are not yet satisfied with what they have been told. They still seem to fear that they are getting what they ask for only in statesmen's terms, — only in the terms of territorial arrangements and divisions of power, and not in terms of broad-visioned

justice and mercy and peace and the satisfaction of those deep-seated longings of oppressed and distracted men and women and enslaved peoples that seem to them the only things worth fighting a war for that engulfs the world. Perhaps statesmen have not always recognized this changed aspect of the whole world of policy and action. Perhaps they have not always spoken in direct reply to the questions asked because they did not know how searching those questions were and what sort of answers they demanded.

But I, for one, am glad to attempt the answer again and again, in the hope that I may make it clearer and clearer that my one thought is to satisfy those who struggle in the ranks and are, perhaps above all others, entitled to a reply whose meaning no one can have any excuse for misunderstanding, if he understands the language in which it is spoken or can get some one to translate it correctly into his own. And I believe that the leaders of the Governments with which we are associated will speak, as they have occasion, as plainly as I have tried to speak. I hope that they will feel free to say whether they think that I am in any degree mistaken in my interpretation of the issues involved or in my purpose with regard to the means by which a satisfactory settlement of those issues may be obtained. Unity of purpose and of counsel are as imperatively necessary in this war as was unity of command in the battle field; and with perfect unity of purpose and counsel will come assurance of complete victory. It can be had in no other way. "Peace drives" can be effectively neutralized and silenced only by showing that every victory of the nations associated against Germany brings the nations nearer the sort of peace which will bring security and reassurance to all peoples and make the recurrence of another such struggle of pitiless force and bloodshed forever impossible, and that nothing else can. Germany is constantly intimating the "terms" she will accept; and always finds that the world does not want terms. It wishes the final triumph of justice and fair dealing.

VI

FEATURES OF AMERICAN LIFE AND CHARACTER

NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AS MOLDING PUBLIC OPINION[1]

JAMES BRYCE

[For another selection by the same author and a biographical sketch see page 160.]

As the public opinion of a people is even more directly than its political institutions the reflection and expression of its character, we may begin the analysis of opinion in America by noting some of those general features of national character which give tone and color to the people's thoughts and feelings on politics. There are, of course, varieties proper to different classes, and to different parts of the vast territory of the Union; but it is well to consider first such characteristics as belong to the nation as a whole, and afterwards to examine the various classes and districts of the country. And when I speak of the nation, I mean the native Americans. What follows is not applicable to the recent immigrants from Europe, and, of course, even less applicable to the Southern negroes.

The Americans are a good-natured people, kindly, helpful to one another, disposed to take a charitable view even of wrongdoers. Their anger sometimes flames up, but the fire is soon extinct. Nowhere is cruelty more abhorred. Even a mob lynching a horse thief in the West has consideration for the criminal, and will give him a good drink of whisky before he is strung up. Cruelty to slaves was unusual while slavery lasted, the best proof of which is the quietness of the slaves during the war when all the men and many of the boys of the South were serving in the Confederate armies. As

[1] From "The American Commonwealth," Chapter LXXX. Copyright, 1910, The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

everybody knows, juries are more lenient to offenses of all kinds but one, offenses against women, than they are anywhere in Europe. The Southern "rebels" were soon forgiven; and though civil wars are proverbially bitter, there have been few struggles in which the combatants did so many little friendly acts for one another, few in which even the vanquished have so quickly buried their resentments. It is true that newspapers and public speakers say hard things of their opponents; but this is a part of the game, and is besides a way of relieving their feelings: the bark is sometimes the louder in order that a bite may not follow. Vindictiveness shown by a public man excites general disapproval, and the maxim of letting bygones be bygones is pushed so far that an offender's misdeeds are often forgotten when they ought to be remembered against him.

All the world knows that they are a humorous people. They are as conspicuously the purveyors of humor to the nineteenth century as the French were the purveyors of wit to the eighteenth. Nor is this sense of the ludicrous side of things confined to a few brilliant writers. It is diffused among the whole people; it colors their ordinary life, and gives to their talk that distinctively new flavor which a European palate enjoys. Their capacity for enjoying a joke against themselves was oddly illustrated at the outset of the Civil War, a time of stern excitement, by the merriment which arose over the hasty retreat of the Federal troops at the battle of Bull Run. When William M. Tweed was ruling and robbing New York, and had set on the bench men who were openly prostituting justice, the citizens found the situation so amusing that they almost forgot to be angry. Much of President Lincoln's popularity, and much also of the gift he showed for restoring confidence to the North at the darkest moments of the war, was due to the humorous way he used to turn things, conveying the impression of not being himself uneasy, even when he was most so.

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The native Americans are an educated people, compared with the whole mass of the population in any European country except Switzerland, parts of Germany, Norway, Iceland, and Scotland; that is to say, the average of knowledge is higher, the habit of reading and thinking more generally diffused, than in any other country. They know the Constitution of their own country, they follow public affairs, they join in local government and learn from it how government must be carried on, and in particular how discussion must be conducted in meetings, and its results tested at elections. The Town Meeting was for New England the most perfect school of self-government in any modern country. In villages, men used to exercise their minds on theological questions, debating points of Christian doctrine with no small acuteness. Women, in particular, pick up at the public schools and from the popular magazines far more miscellaneous information than the women of any European country possess, and this naturally tells on the intelligence of the men. Almost everywhere one finds women's clubs in which literary, artistic, and social questions are discussed, and to which men of mark are brought to deliver lectures.

That the education of the masses is nevertheless a superficial education goes without saying. It is sufficient to enable them to think they know something about the great problems of politics; insufficient to show them how little they know. The public elementary school gives everybody the key to knowledge in making reading and writing familiar, but it has not time to teach him how to use the key, whose use is in fact, by the pressure of daily work, almost confined to the newspaper and the magazine. So we may say that if the political education of the average American voter be compared with that of the average voter in Europe, it stands high; but if it be compared with the functions which the theory of the American government lays on him, which its spirit implies, which the methods of its party organization assume, its inadequacy is manifest. This observation, however,

is not so much a reproach to the schools, which generally do what English schools omit — instruct the child in the principles of the Constitution — as a tribute to the height of the ideal which the American conception of popular rule sets up.

For the functions of the citizen are not, as has hitherto been the case in Europe, confined to the choosing of legislators, who are then left to settle issues of policy and select executive rulers. The American citizen is one of the governors of the Republic. Issues are decided and rulers selected by the direct popular vote. Elections are so frequent that to do his duty at them a citizen ought to be constantly watching public affairs with a full comprehension of the principles involved in them, and a judgment of the candidates derived from a criticism of their arguments as well as a recollection of their past careers. The instruction received in the common schools and from the newspapers, and supposed to be developed by the practice of primaries and conventions, while it makes the voter deem himself capable of governing, does not fit him to weigh the real merits of statesmen, to discern the true grounds on which questions ought to be decided, to note the drift of events and discover the direction in which parties are being carried. He is like the sailor who knows the spars and ropes of the ship and is expert in working her, but is ignorant of geography and navigation; who can perceive that some of the officers are smart and others dull, but cannot judge which of them is qualified to use the sextant or will best keep his head during a hurricane.

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Religion apart, they are an unreverential people. I do not mean irreverent, — far from it; nor do I mean that they have not a great capacity for hero-worship, as they have many a time shown. I mean that they are little disposed, especially in public questions — political, economical, or social — to defer to the opinions of those who are wiser or better instructed than themselves. Everything tends to

make the individual independent and self-reliant. He goes early into the world; he is left to make his way alone; he tries one occupation after another, if the first or second venture does not prosper; he gets to think that each man is his own best helper and adviser. Thus he is led, I will not say to form his own opinions, for few are those who do that, but to fancy that he has formed them, and to feel little need of aid from others towards correcting them. There is, therefore, less disposition than in Europe to expect light and leading on public affairs from speakers and writers. Oratory is not directed towards instruction, but towards stimulation. Special knowledge, which commands deference in applied science or in finance, does not command it in politics, because that is not deemed a special subject, but one within the comprehension of every practical man. Politics is, to be sure, a profession, and so far might seem to need professional aptitudes. But the professional politician is not the man who has studied statesmanship, but the man who has practiced the art of running conventions and winning elections.

Even that strong point of America, the completeness and highly popular character of local government, contributes to lower the standard of attainment expected in a public man, because the citizens judge of all politics by the politics they see first and know best, — those of their township or city, — and fancy that he who is fit to be selectman, or county commissioner, or alderman, is fit to sit in the great council of the nation. Like the shepherd in Virgil, they think the only difference between their town and Rome is in its size, and believe that what does for Lafayetteville will do well enough for Washington. Hence when a man of statesmanlike gifts appears, he has little encouragement to take a high and statesmanlike tone, for his words do not necessarily receive weight from his position. He fears to be instructive or hortatory, lest such an attitude should expose him to ridicule; and in America ridicule is a terrible power. Nothing escapes

it. Few have the courage to face it. In the indulgence of it even this humane race can be unfeeling.

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They are a commercial people, whose point of view is primarily that of persons accustomed to reckon profit and loss. Their impulse is to apply a direct practical test to men and measures, to assume that the men who have got on fastest are the smartest men, and that a scheme that seems to pay well deserves to be supported. Abstract reasonings they dislike, subtle reasonings they suspect; they accept nothing as practical which is not plain, downright, apprehensible by an ordinary understanding. Although open-minded, so far as willingness to listen goes, they are hard to convince, because they have really made up their minds on most subjects, having adopted the prevailing notions of their locality or party as truths due to their own reflection.

They are an unsettled people. In no State of the Union is the bulk of the population so fixed in its residence as everywhere in Europe; in some it is almost nomadic. Except in the more stagnant parts of the South, nobody feels rooted to the soil. Here to-day and gone to-morrow, he cannot readily contract habits of trustful dependence on his neighbors. Community of interest, or of belief in such a cause as temperance, or protection for native industry, unites him for a time with others similarly minded; but congenial spirits seldom live long enough together to form a school or type of local opinion which develops strength and becomes a proselytizing force. Perhaps this tends to prevent the growth of variety of opinion. When a man arises with some power of original thought in politics, he is feeble if isolated, and is depressed by his insignificance, whereas if he grows up in favorable soil with sympathetic minds around him, whom he can in prolonged intercourse permeate with his ideas, he learns with confidence and soars on the wings of his disciples. One who considers the variety of conditions under which men live

in America may certainly find ground for surprise that there should be so few independent schools of opinion.

But even while an unsettled, they are nevertheless an associative, because a sympathetic people. Although the atoms are in constant motion, they have a strong attraction for one another. Each man catches his neighbor's sentiment more quickly and easily than happens with the English. That sort of reserve and isolation, that tendency to repel rather than to invite confidence, which foreigners attribute to the Englishman, though it belongs rather to the upper and middle class than to the nation generally, is, though not absent, yet less marked in America. It seems to be one of the notes of difference between the two branches of the race. In the United States, since each man likes to feel that his ideas raise in other minds the same emotions as in his own, a sentiment or impulse is rapidly propagated and quickly conscious of its strength. Add to this the aptitude for organization which their history and institutions have educed, and one sees how the tendency to form and the talent to work combinations for a political or any other object has become one of the great features of the country. Hence, too, the immense strength of party. It rests not only on interest and habit and the sense of its value as a means of working the government, but also on the sympathetic element and instinct of combination ingrained in the national character.

They are a changeful people. Not fickle, for they are if anything too tenacious of ideas once adopted, too fast bound by party ties, too willing to pardon the errors of a cherished leader. But they have what chemists call low specific heat; they grow warm suddenly and cool as suddenly; they are liable to swift and vehement outbursts of feeling which rush like wildfire across the country, gaining glow, like the wheel of a railway car, by the accelerated motion. The very similarity of ideas and equality of conditions which makes them hard to convince at first makes a conviction once implanted run its course the more triumphantly. They seem all to take

flame at once, because what has told upon one, has told in the same way upon all the rest, and the obstructing and separating barriers which exist in Europe scarcely exist here. Nowhere is the saying so applicable that nothing succeeds like success. The native American or so-called Know-Nothing party had in two years from its foundation become a tremendous force, running, and seeming for a time likely to carry, its own presidential candidate. In three years more it was dead without hope of revival. Now and then, as for instance in the elections of 1874–1875, and again in those of 1890, there comes a rush of feeling so sudden and tremendous, that the name of Tidal Wave has been invented to describe it.

After this it may seem a paradox to add that the Americans are a conservative people. Yet any one who observes the power of habit among them, the tenacity with which old institutions and usages, legal and theological formulas, have been clung to, will admit the fact. Moreover, prosperity helps to make them conservative. They are satisfied with the world they live in, for they have found it a good world, in which they have grown rich and can sit under their own vine and fig tree, none making them afraid. They are proud of their history and of their Constitution, which has come out of the furnace of civil war with scarcely the smell of fire upon it. It is little to say that they do not seek change for the sake of change, because the nations that do this exist only in the fancy of alarmist philosophers. There are nations, however, whose impatience of existing evils, or whose proneness to be allured by visions of a brighter future, makes them underestimate the risk of change, nations that will pull up the plant to see whether it has begun to strike root. This is not the way of the Americans. They are no doubt ready to listen to suggestions from any quarter. They do not consider that an institution is justified by its existence, but admit everything to be matter for criticism. Their keenly competitive spirit and pride in their own ingenuity have made them

quicker than any other people to adopt and adapt inventions: telephones were in use in every little town over the West, while in the city of London men were just beginning to wonder whether they could be made to pay. The Americans have doubtless of late years become, especially in the West, an experimental people, so far as politics and social legislation are concerned. Yet there is also a sense in which they are at bottom a conservative people, in virtue both of the deep instincts of their race and of that practical shrewdness which recognizes the value of permanence and solidity in institutions. They are conservative in their fundamental beliefs, in the structure of their governments, in their social and domestic usages. They are like a tree whose pendulous shoots quiver and rustle with the lightest breeze, while its roots enfold the rock with a grip which storms cannot loosen.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE WEST TO AMERICAN DEMOCRACY[1]

FREDERICK J. TURNER

[Frederick J. Turner (1861–) was educated at the University of Wisconsin and at Johns Hopkins, and from 1889 to 1910 was connected with the former as instructor and professor of history. Since then he has been Professor of History in Harvard University. He is best known for his studies of Western history, among these being the present essay and "The Rise of the New West" (1906) in the *American Nation* series. Nowhere can a better presentation of the characteristic features of Western democracy and its various problems be found than in the essay from which the historical review below has been taken.]

. . . It is to changes in the economic and social life of a people that we must look for the forces that ultimately create and modify organs of political action. . . . In dealing with Western contributions to democracy, it is essential that the considerations which have just been mentioned should be kept in mind. Whatever these contributions may have been, we find ourselves at the present time in an era of such profound economic and social transformation as to raise the question of the effect of these changes upon the democratic institutions of the United States. Within a decade four marked changes have occurred in our National development: taken together they constitute a revolution.

First, there is the exhaustion of the supply of free land and the closing of the movement of Western advance as an effective factor in American development. . . . In the second place, contemporaneously with this there has been such a concentration of capital in the control of fundamental industries as to make a new epoch in the economic development

[1] From *Atlantic Monthly*, January, 1903. Reprinted by permission.

of the United States. . . . A third phenomenon . . . is the expansion of the United States politically and commercially into lands beyond the seas. . . . And fourth, the political parties of the United States now tend to divide on issues that involve the question of Socialism.

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Jefferson was the first prophet of American democracy, and when we analyze the essential features of his gospel, it is clear that the Western influence was the dominant element. Jefferson himself was born in the frontier region of Virginia, on the edge of the Blue Ridge, in the middle of the eighteenth century. His father was a pioneer. Jefferson's Notes on Virginia reveal clearly his conception that democracy should have an agricultural basis, and that manufacturing development and city life were dangerous to the purity of the body politic. Simplicity and economy in government, the right of revolution, the freedom of the individual, the belief that those who win the vacant lands are entitled to shape their own government in their own way, these are all parts of the platform of political principles to which he gave his adhesion, and they are all elements eminently characteristic of the Western democracy into which he was born. In the period of the Revolution he had brought in a series of measures which tended to throw the power of Virginia into the hands of the settlers in the interior rather than of the coastwise aristocracy. The repeal of the laws of entail and primogeniture would have destroyed the great estates on which the planting aristocracy based its power. The abolition of the established church would still further have diminished the influence of the coastwise party in favor of the dissenting sects of the interior. His scheme of general public education reflected the same tendency, and his demand for the abolition of slavery was characteristic of a representative of the West rather than of the old-time aristocracy of the coast. His sympathy with Western expansion culminated in the Louisiana Purchase. In a word,

the tendencies of Jefferson's legislation were to replace the dominance of the planting aristocracy by the dominance of the interior class, which had sought in vain to achieve its liberties in the period of Bacon's rebellion.

Nevertheless, Thomas Jefferson was the John the Baptist of democracy, not its Moses. Only with the slow setting of the tide of settlement farther and farther toward the interior did the democratic influence grow strong enough to take actual possession of the government. The period from 1800 to 1820 saw a steady increase in these tendencies. The established classes of New England and the South began to take alarm. Perhaps no better illustration of the apprehensions of the old-time Federal conservative can be given than these utterances of President Dwight, of Yale College, in the book of travels which he published in that period:

> The class of pioneers cannot live in regular society. They are too idle, too talkative, too passionate, too prodigal, and too shiftless to acquire either property or character. They are impatient of the restraints of law, religion, and morality, and grumble about the taxes by which the Rulers, Ministers, and Schoolmasters are supported.
>
> After exposing the injustice of the community in neglecting to invest persons of such superior merit in public offices, in many an eloquent harangue uttered by many a kitchen fire, in every blacksmith shop, in every corner of the streets, and finding all their efforts vain, they become at length discouraged, and under the pressure of poverty, the fear of the gaol, and consciousness of public contempt, leave their native places and betake themselves to the wilderness.

Such was a conservative's impression of that pioneer movement of New England colonists who had spread up the valley of the Connecticut into New Hampshire, Vermont, and western New York in the period of which he wrote, and who afterwards went on to possess the Northwest. New England Federalism looked with a shudder at the democratic ideas of those who refused to recognize the established order.

But in that period there came into the Union a sisterhood of frontier states — Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri — with provisions for the franchise that brought in complete democracy. Even the newly created states of the Southwest showed the same tendency. The wind of democracy blew so strongly from the West, that even in the older states of New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Virginia conventions were called, which liberalized their constitutions by strengthening the democratic basis of the state. In the same time the labor population of the cities began to assert its power and its determination to share in government. Of this frontier democracy which now took possession of the nation, Andrew Jackson was the very personification. He was born in the backwoods of the Carolinas in the midst of the turbulent democracy that preceded the Revolution, and he grew up in the frontier state of Tennessee. In the midst of this region of personal feuds and frontier ideals of law, he quickly rose to leadership. The appearance of this frontiersman on the floor of Congress was an omen full of significance. He reached Philadelphia at the close of Washington's administration, having ridden on horseback nearly eight hundred miles to his destination. Gallatin, himself a Western man, describes Jackson as he entered the halls of Congress: "A tall, lank, uncouth-looking personage, with long locks of hair hanging over his face and a cue down his back tied in an eel skin; his dress singular; his manners those of a rough backwoodsman." And Jefferson testified: "When I was president of the Senate he was a senator, and he could never speak on account of the rashness of his feelings. I have seen him attempt it repeatedly and as often choke with rage." At last the frontier in the person of its typical man had found a place in the government. This six-foot backwoodsman, with blue eyes that could blaze on occasion, this choleric, impetuous, self-willed Scotch-Irish leader of men, this expert duelist, and ready fighter, this embodiment of the tenacious, vehement, personal West, was in politics to stay. The frontier democracy of that time had

the instincts of the clansman in the days of Scotch border warfare. Vehement and tenacious as the democracy was, strenuously as each man contended with his neighbor for the spoils of the new country that opened before them, they all had respect for the man who best expressed their aspirations and their ideas. Every community had its hero. In the war of 1812 and the subsequent Indian fighting Jackson made good his claim, not only to the loyalty of the people of Tennessee, but of the whole West, and even of the nation. He had the essential traits of the Kentucky and Tennessee frontier. It was a frontier free from the influence of European ideas and institutions. The men of the "Western World" turned their backs upon the Atlantic Ocean, and with grim energy and self-reliance began to build up a society free from the dominance of ancient forms.

The Westerner defended himself and resented governmental restrictions. The duel and the blood-feud found congenial soil in Kentucky and Tennessee. The idea of the personality of law was often dominant over the organized machinery of justice. That method was best which was most direct and effective. The backwoodsman was intolerant of men who split hairs, or scrupled over the method of reaching the right. In a word, the unchecked development of the individual was the significant product of this frontier democracy. It sought rather to express itself by choosing a man of the people than by the formation of elaborate governmental institutions. It was because Andrew Jackson personified these essential Western traits that in his presidency he became the idol and the mouthpiece of the popular will. In his assaults upon the bank as an engine of aristocracy, and in his denunciation of nullification, he went directly to his object with the ruthless energy of a frontiersman. For formal law and the subtleties of state sovereignty he had the contempt of a backwoodsman. Nor is it without significance that this typical man of the new democracy will always be associated with the triumph of the

spoils system in national politics. To the new democracy of the West, office was an opportunity to exercise natural rights as an equal citizen of the community. Rotation in office served not simply to allow the successful man to punish his enemies and reward his friends, but it also furnished the training in the actual conduct of political affairs which every American claimed as his birthright. Only in a primitive democracy of the type of the United States in 1830 could such a system have existed without the ruin of the state. National government in that period was no complex and nicely adjusted machine, and the evils of the system were long in making themselves fully apparent.

The triumph of Andrew Jackson marked the end of the old era of trained statesmen for the presidency. With him began the era of the popular hero. Even Martin Van Buren, whom we think of in connection with the East, was born in a log house under conditions that were not unlike parts of the older West. Harrison was the hero of the Northwest, as Jackson had been of the Southwest. Polk was a typical Tennesseean, eager to expand the nation, and Zachary Taylor was what Webster called a "frontier colonel." During the period that followed Jackson power passed from the region of Kentucky and Tennessee to the border of the Mississippi. The natural democratic tendencies that had earlier shown themselves in the Gulf States were destroyed, however, by the spread of cotton culture and the development of great plantations in that region. What had been typical of the democracy of the Revolutionary frontier and of the frontier of Andrew Jackson was now to be seen in the states between the Ohio and the Mississippi. As Andrew Jackson is the typical democrat of the former region, so Abraham Lincoln is the very embodiment of the pioneer period of the old Northwest. Indeed, he is the embodiment of the democracy of the West. How can one speak of him except in the words of Lowell's great Commemoration Ode:

For him her Old-World molds aside she threw,
And, choosing sweet clay from the breast
Of the unexhausted West,
With stuff untainted shaped a hero new,
Wise, steadfast in the strength of God, and true.
. . . . . .
His was no lonely mountain-peak of mind,
Thrusting to thin air o'er our cloudy bars,
A sea-mark now, now lost in vapors blind;
Broad prairie rather, genial, level-lined,
Fruitful and friendly for all human kind,
Yet also nigh to heaven and loved of loftiest stars.
Nothing of Europe here,
. . . . . .
New birth of our new soil, the first American.

The pioneer life from which Lincoln came differed in important respects from the frontier democracy typified by Andrew Jackson. Jackson's democracy was contentious, individualistic, and it sought the ideal of local self-government and expansion. Lincoln represents rather the pioneer folk who entered the forest of the great Northwest to chop out a home, to build up their fortunes in the midst of a continually ascending industrial movement. In the democracy of the Southwest, industrial development and city life were only minor factors, but to the democracy of the Northwest they were its very life. To widen the area of the clearing, to contend with one another for the mastery of the industrial resources of the rich provinces, to struggle for a place in the ascending movement of society, to transmit to one's offspring the chance for education, for industrial betterment, for the rise in life which the hardships of the pioneer existence denied to the pioneer himself, these were some of the ideals of the region to which Lincoln came. The men were commonwealth builders, industry builders. Whereas the type of hero in the Southwest was militant, in the Northwest he was industrial. It was in the midst of these "plain people," as he loved to call them, that Lincoln grew

to manhood. As Emerson says: "He is the true history of the American people in his time." The years of his early life were the years when the democracy of the Northwest came into struggle with the institution of slavery that threatened to forbid the expansion of the democratic pioneer life in the West. In President Eliot's essay on Five American Contributions to Civilization he instances as one of the supreme tests of American democracy its attitude upon the question of slavery. But if democracy chose wisely and worked effectively toward the solution of this problem, it must be remembered that Western democracy took the lead. The rail-splitter himself became the nation's President in that fierce time of struggle, and the armies of the woodsmen and pioneer farmers recruited in the old Northwest, under the leadership of Sherman and of Grant, made free the Father of Waters, marched through Georgia, and helped to force the struggle to a conclusion at Appomattox. The free pioneer democracy struck down slave-holding aristocracy on its march to the West.

The last chapter in the development of Western democracy is the one that deals with its conquest over the vast spaces of the new West. At each new stage of Western development, the people have had to grapple with larger areas, with vaster combinations. The little colony of Massachusetts veterans that settled at Marietta received a land grant as large as the state of Rhode Island. The band of Connecticut pioneers that followed Moses Cleaveland to the Connecticut Reserve occupied a region as large as the parent state. The area which settlers of New England stock occupied on the prairies of northern Illinois surpassed the combined area of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Men who had been accustomed to the narrow valleys and the little towns of the East found themselves out on the boundless spaces of the West dealing with units of such magnitude as dwarfed their former experience. The Great Lakes, the prairies, the Great Plains, the Rocky Mountains, the Mississippi and the Missouri, furnished new standards of measurement for the achievement

of this industrial democracy. Individualism began to give way to coöperation and to governmental activity. Even in the earlier days of the democratic conquest of the wilderness, demands had been made upon the government for support in internal improvements, but this new West showed a growing tendency to call to its assistance the powerful arm of national authority. In the period since the Civil War, the vast public domain has been donated to the individual farmer, to states for education, to railroads for the construction of transportation lines. Moreover, with the advent of democracy in the last fifteen years upon the Great Plains, new physical conditions have presented themselves which have accelerated the social tendency of Western democracy. The pioneer farmer of the days of Lincoln could place his family on the flatboat, strike into the wilderness, cut out his clearing, and with little or no capital go on to the achievement of industrial independence. Even the homesteader on the Western prairies found it possible to work out a similar independent destiny, although the factor of transportation made a serious and increasing impediment to the free working out of his individual career. But when the arid lands and the mineral resources of the far West were reached, no conquest was possible by the old individual pioneer methods. Here expensive irrigation works must be constructed, coöperative activity was demanded in utilization of the water supply, capital beyond the reach of the small farmer was required. In a word, the physiographic province itself decreed that the destiny of this new frontier should be social rather than individual.

Magnitude of social achievement is the watchword of the democracy since the Civil War. From petty towns built in the marshes, cities arose whose greatness and industrial power are the wonder of our time. The conditions were ideal for the production of captains of industry. The old democratic admiration for the self-made man, its old deference to the rights of competitive individual development, together with the stupendous natural resources that opened to the conquest of the

keenest and the strongest, gave such conditions of mobility as enabled the development of the vast industries which in our own decade have marked the West.

Thus, in brief, have been outlined the larger phases of the development of Western democracy in the different areas which it has conquered. There has been a steady development of the industrial ideal, and a steady increase of the social tendency, in this later movement of Western democracy. While the individualism of the frontier, so prominent in the earliest days of Western advance, has been preserved as an ideal, more and more these individuals struggling each with the other, dealing with vaster and vaster areas, with larger and larger problems, have found it necessary to combine under the leadership of the strongest. This is the explanation of the rise of those preëminent captains of industry whose genius has concentrated capital to control the fundamental resources of the nation. If now, in the way of recapitulation, we try to pick out from the influences that have gone to the making of Western democracy the factors which constitute the net result of this movement, we shall have to mention at least the following:

Most important of all has been the fact that an area of free land has continually lain on the western border of the settled area of the United States. Whenever social conditions tended to crystallize in the East, whenever capital tended to press upon labor or political restraints to impede the freedom of the mass, there was this gate of escape to the free conditions of the frontier. These free lands promoted individualism, economic equality, freedom to rise, democracy. Men would not accept inferior wages and a permanent position of social subordination when this promised land of freedom and equality was theirs for the taking. Who would rest content under oppressive legislative conditions when with a slight effort he might reach a land wherein to become a co-worker in the building of free cities and free states on the lines of his own ideal? In a word, then, free lands meant free opportunities.

Their existence has differentiated the American democracy from the democracies which have preceded it, because ever as democracy in the East took the form of a highly specialized and complicated industrial society, in the West it kept in touch with primitive conditions, and by action and reaction these two forces have shaped our history.

In the next place, these free lands and this treasury of industrial resources have existed over such vast spaces that they have demanded of democracy increasing spaciousness of design and power of execution. Western democracy is contrasted with the democracy of all other times in the largeness of the tasks to which it has set its hand, and in the vast achievements which it has wrought out in the control of nature and of politics. Upon the region of the Middle West alone could be set down all of the great countries of Central Europe, — France, Germany, Italy, and Austro-Hungary, — and there would still be a liberal margin. It would be difficult to over-emphasize the importance of this training upon democracy. Never before in the history of the world has a democracy existed on so vast an area and handled things in the gross with such success, with such largeness of design, and such grasp upon the means of execution. In short, democracy has learned in the West of the United States how to deal with the problem of magnitude. The old historic democracies were but little states with primitive economic conditions.

But the very task of dealing with vast resources, over vast areas, under the conditions of free competition furnished by the West, has produced the rise of those captains of industry whose success in consolidating economic power now raises the question as to whether democracy under such conditions can survive. For the old military type of Western leaders like George Rogers Clark, Andrew Jackson, and William Henry Harrison have been substituted such industrial leaders as James Hill, John D. Rockefeller, and Andrew Carnegie.

The question is imperative, then, What ideals persist from

this democratic experience of the West; and have they acquired sufficient momentum to sustain themselves under conditions so radically unlike those in the days of their origin? In other words, the question put at the beginning of this discussion becomes pertinent. Under the forms of the American democracy is there in reality evolving such a concentration of economic and social power in the hands of a comparatively few men as may make political democracy an appearance rather than a reality? The free lands are gone. The material forces that gave vitality to Western democracy are passing away. It is to the realm of the spirit, to the domain of ideals and legislation, that we must look for Western influence upon democracy in our own days.

Western democracy has been from the time of its birth idealistic. The very fact of the wilderness appealed to men as a fair, blank page on which to write a new chapter in the story of man's struggle for a higher type of society. The Western wilds, from the Alleghanies to the Pacific, constituted the richest free gift that was ever spread out before civilized man. To the peasant and artisan of the Old World, bound by the chains of social class, as old as custom and as inevitable as fate, the West offered an exit into a free life and greater well-being among the bounties of nature, into the midst of resources that demanded manly exertion, and that gave in return the chance for indefinite ascent in the scale of social advance. "To each she offered gifts after his will." Never again can such an opportunity come to the sons of men. It was unique, and the thing is so near us, so much a part of our lives, that we do not even yet comprehend its vast significance. The existence of this land of opportunity has made America the goal of idealists from the days of the Pilgrim Fathers. With all the materialism of the pioneer movements, this idealistic conception of the vacant lands as an opportunity for a new order of things is unmistakably present. Kipling's "Song of the English" has given it expression:

We were dreamers, dreaming greatly, in the man-stifled town;
We yearned beyond the sky-line where the strange roads go down.
Came the Whisper, came the Vision, came the Power with the Need,
Till the Soul that is not man's soul was lent us to lead.

As the deer breaks — as the steer breaks — from the herd where they graze,
In the faith of little children we went on our ways.
Then the wood failed — then the food failed — then the last water dried —
In the faith of little children we lay down and died.

On the sand-drift — on the veldt-side — in the fern-scrub we lay,
That our sons might follow after by the bones on the way.
Follow after — follow after! We have watered the root,
And the bud has come to blossom that ripens for fruit!
Follow after — we are waiting by the trails that we lost
For the sound of many footsteps, for the tread of a host.

Follow after — follow after — for the harvest is sown:
By the bones about the wayside ye shall come to your own!

This was the vision that called to Roger Williams, — that "prophetic soul ravished of truth disembodied," "unable to enter into treaty with its environment," and forced to seek the wilderness. "Oh, how sweet," wrote William Penn, from his forest refuge, "is the quiet of these parts, freed from the troubles and perplexities of woeful Europe." And here he projected what he called his "Holy Experiment in Government."

If the later West offers few such striking illustrations of the relation of the wilderness to idealistic schemes, and if some of the designs were fantastic and abortive, none the less the influence is a fact. Hardly a Western state but has been the Mecca of some sect or band of social reformers, anxious to put into practice their ideals, in vacant land, far removed from the checks of a settled form of social organization. Consider the Dunkards, the Icarians, the Fourierists, the Mormons, and similar idealists who sought our Western wilds. But the

idealistic influence is not limited to the dreamers' conception of a new state. It gave to the pioneer farmer and city builder a restless energy, a quick capacity for judgment and action, a belief in liberty, freedom of opportunity, and a resistance to the domination of class which infused a vitality and power into the individual atoms of this democratic mass. Even as he dwelt among the stumps of his newly cut clearing, the pioneer had the creative vision of a new order of society. In imagination he pushed back the forest boundary to the confines of a mighty commonwealth; he willed that log cabins should become the lofty buildings of great cities. He decreed that his children should enter into a heritage of education, comfort, and social welfare, and for this ideal he bore the scars of the wilderness. Possessed with this idea he ennobled his task and laid deep foundations for a democratic state. Nor was this idealism by any means limited to the American pioneer.

To the old native democratic stock has been added a vast army of recruits from the Old World. There are in the Middle West alone four million persons of German parentage out of a total of seven millions in the country. Over a million persons of Scandinavian parentage live in the same region. This immigration culminated in the early eighties, and although there have been fluctuations since, it long continued a most extraordinary phenomenon. The democracy of the newer West is deeply affected by the ideals brought by these immigrants from the Old World. To them America was not simply a new home; it was a land of opportunity, of freedom, of democracy. It meant to them, as to the American pioneer that preceded them, the opportunity to destroy the bonds of social caste that bound them in their older home, to hew out for themselves in a new country a destiny proportioned to the powers that God had given them, a chance to place their families under better conditions and to win a larger life than the life that they had left behind. He who believes that even the hordes of recent immigrants from southern Italy are drawn to these shores by nothing more than a dull and blind

materialism has not penetrated into the heart of the problem. The idealism and expectation of these children of the Old World, the hopes which they have formed for a newer and a freer life across the seas, are almost pathetic when one considers how far they are from the possibility of fruition. He who would take stock of American democracy must not forget the accumulation of human purposes and ideals which immigration has added to the American populace.

In this connection it must also be remembered that these democratic ideals have existed at each stage of the advance of the frontier, and have left behind them deep and enduring effects on the thinking of the whole country. Long after the frontier period of a particular region of the United States has passed away, the conception of society, the ideals and aspirations which it produced, persists in the minds of the people. So recent has been the transition of the greater portion of the United States from frontier conditions to conditions of settled life, that we are, over the larger portion of the United States, hardly a generation removed from the primitive conditions of the West. If, indeed, we ourselves were not pioneers, our fathers were, and the inherited ways of looking at things, the fundamental assumptions of the American people, have all been shaped by this experience of democracy on its westward march. This experience has been wrought into the very warp and woof of American thought. Even those masters of industry and capital who have risen to power by the conquest of Western resources came from the midst of this society and still profess its principles. John D. Rockefeller was born on a New York farm, and began his career as a young business man in St. Louis. Marcus Hanna was a Cleveland grocer's clerk at the age of twenty. Claus Spreckles, the sugar king, came from Germany as a steerage passenger to the United States in 1848. Marshall Field was a farmer boy in Conway, Massachusetts, until he left to grow up with the young Chicago. Andrew Carnegie came as a ten year old boy from Scotland to Pittsburg, then a distinctively Western town. He built up his

fortunes through successive grades until he became the dominating factor in the great iron industries, and paved the way for that colossal achievement, the steel trust. Whatever may be the tendencies of this corporation, there can be little doubt of the democratic ideals of Mr. Carnegie himself. With lavish hand he has strewn millions through the United States for the promotion of libraries. The effect of this library movement in perpetuating the democracy that comes from an intelligent and self-respecting people can hardly be measured. In his "Triumphant Democracy," published in 1886, Mr. Carnegie, the iron master, said, in reference to the mineral wealth of the United States: "Thank God, these treasures are in the hands of an intelligent people, the Democracy, to be used for the general good of the masses, and not made the spoils of monarchs, courts, and aristocracy, to be turned to the base and selfish ends of a privileged hereditary class." It would be hard to find a more rigorous assertion of democratic doctrine than the celebrated utterance attributed to the same man, that he should feel it a disgrace to die rich.

In enumerating the services of American democracy, President Eliot includes the corporation as one of its achievements, declaring that "freedom of incorporation, though no longer exclusively a democratic agency, has given a strong support to democratic institutions." In one sense this is doubtless true, since the corporation has been one of the means by which small properties can be aggregated into an effective working body. Socialistic writers have long been fond of pointing out also that these various concentrations pave the way for and make possible social control. From this point of view it is possible that the masters of industry may prove to be not so much an incipient aristocracy as the pathfinders for democracy in reducing the industrial world to systematic consolidation suited to democratic control. The great geniuses that have built up the modern industrial concentration were trained in the midst of democratic society. They were the product of these democratic conditions. Freedom to rise was the very

condition of their existence. Whether they will be followed by successors who will adopt the policy of exploitation of the masses, and who will be capable of retaining under efficient control these vast resources, is one of the questions which we shall have to face.

This, at least, is clear: American democracy is fundamentally the outcome of the experiences of the American people in dealing with the West. Western democracy through the whole of its earlier period tended to the production of a society of which the most distinctive fact was the freedom of the individual to rise under conditions of social mobility, and whose ambition was the liberty and well-being of the masses. This conception has vitalized all American democracy, and has brought it into sharp contrast with the democracies of history, and with those modern efforts of Europe to create an artificial democratic order by legislation. The problem of the United States is not to create democracy, but to conserve democratic institutions and ideals. In the later period of its development, Western democracy has been gaining experience in the problem of social control. It has steadily enlarged the sphere of its action and the instruments for its perpetuation. By its system of public schools, from the grades to the graduate work of the great universities, the West has created a larger single body of intelligent plain people than can be found elsewhere in the world. Its educational forces are more democratic than those of the East, and counting the common schools and colleges together, the Middle West alone has twice as many students as New England and the Middle States combined. Its political tendencies, whether we consider Democracy, Populism, or Republicanism, are distinctly in the direction of greater social control and the conservation of the old democratic ideals. To these ideals the West as a whole adheres with even a passionate determination. If, in working out its mastery of the resources of the interior, it has produced a type of industrial leader so powerful as to be the wonder of the world, nevertheless it is still to be determined

whether these men constitute a menace to democratic institutions, or the most efficient factor for adjusting democratic control to the new conditions.

Whatever shall be the outcome of the rush of this huge industrial modern United States to its place among the nations of the earth, the formation of its Western democracy will always remain one of the wonderful chapters in the history of the human race. Into this vast shaggy continent of ours poured the first feeble tide of European settlement. European men, institutions, and ideas were lodged in the American wilderness, and this great American West took them to her bosom, taught them a new way of looking upon the destiny of the common man, trained them in adaptation to the conditions of the New World, to the creation of new institutions to meet new needs, and ever as society on her eastern border grew to resemble the Old World in its social forms and its industry, ever, as it began to lose its faith in the ideals of democracy, she opened new provinces, and dowered new democracies in her most distant domains with her material treasures and with the ennobling influence that the fierce love of freedom, the strength that came from hewing out a home, making a school and a church, and creating a higher future for his family, furnished to the pioneer. She gave to the world such types as the farmer Thomas Jefferson, with his Declaration of Independence, his statute for religious toleration, and his purchase of Louisiana. She gave us Andrew Jackson, that fierce Tennessee spirit who broke down the traditions of conservative rule, swept away the privacies and privileges of officialdom, and, like a Gothic leader, opened the temple of the nation to the populace. She gave us Abraham Lincoln, whose gaunt frontier form and gnarled, massive hand told of the conflict with the forest, whose grasp on the ax handle of the pioneer was no firmer than his grasp of the helm of the ship of state as it breasted the seas of civil war. She gave us the tragedy of the pioneer farmer as he marched daringly on to the conquest of the arid lands, and met his first defeat by forces too strong to

be dealt with under the old conditions. She has furnished to this new democracy her stores of mineral wealth, that dwarf those of the Old World, and her provinces that in themselves are vaster and more productive than most of the nations of Europe. Out of her bounty has come a nation whose industrial competition alarms the Old World, and the masters of whose resources wield wealth and power vaster than the wealth and power of kings. Best of all, the West gave, not only to the American, but to the unhappy and oppressed of all lands, a vision of hope, an assurance that the world held a place where were to be found high faith in man and the will and power to furnish him the opportunity to grow to the full measure of his own capacity. Great and powerful as are the new sons of her loins, the Republic is greater than they. The paths of the pioneer have widened into broad highways. The forest clearing has expanded into affluent commonwealths. Let us see to it that the ideals of the pioneer in his log cabin shall enlarge into the spiritual life of a democracy where civic power shall dominate and utilize individual achievement for the common good.

THE SPIRIT OF THE PACIFIC COAST[1]

JOSIAH ROYCE

[Josiah Royce (1855–1916), one of the greatest American philosophers, was born in California and educated at the University of California and at Johns Hopkins. From 1882 to his death he taught philosophy at Harvard. He wrote, besides a large number of other works, a history of California, "The Philosophy of Loyalty" (1908), and "William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life" (1911). His brilliant defense of idealism entitled "Loyalty and Insight" in the last-mentioned volume is perhaps the best popular example of his philosophical teaching. The analysis below is part of an address entitled "The Pacific Coast: A Psychological Study of the Relations of Climate and Civilization," prepared for a meeting of the National Geographic Society in 1898 and first printed in the *International Monthly* for November, 1900. Its luminous discussion of the distinctive temperament of the inhabitant of the Pacific Coast is a valuable contribution to any survey of American character.]

I have been asked to describe some of the principal physical aspects of California, and to indicate the way in which they have been related to the life and civilization of the region. The task is at once, in its main outlines, comparatively simple, and in its most interesting details hopelessly complex. The topography of the Pacific slope, now well known to most travelers, is in certain of its principal features extremely easy to characterize. The broad landscapes, revealing very frequently at a glance the structure of wide regions, give one an impression that the meaning of the whole can easily be comprehended. Closer study shows how difficult it is to understand the relation of precisely such features to the life that has grown up in this region. The principal interest of the task lies in the fact that it is our American character and

[1] From "Race Questions, Provincialism, and Other American Problems." Copyright, 1908, by The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

civilization which have been already molded in new ways by these novel aspects of the far western regions. But we stand at the beginning of a process which must continue for long ages. Any one interested in the unity of our national life, and in the guiding of our destinies by broad ideals, desires to conceive in some fashion how the physical features of the Pacific Coast may be expected to mold our national type. Yet thus far we have, as it were, only the most general indications of what the result must be.

In endeavoring to distinguish between what has already resulted from physical conditions and what has been due to personal character, to deliberate choice, or to the general national temperament, or to what we may have to call pure accident, one is dealing with a task for which the data are not yet sufficient. We can but make a beginning.

One may say that the main feature of the whole climate, apart from its mildness, is the relatively predictable character of the year's weather. In the drier regions of the south, wherever irrigation is possible and has been developed, the agriculturist often feels a superiority to weather conditions which makes him rejoice in the very drought that might otherwise be regarded as so formidable. In central California one is sure, in advance, of the weather that will steadily prevail during all the summer months. Agricultural operations are thus rendered definite by the knowledge of when the drought is coming, and by the freedom from all fear of sudden storms during the harvest season.

That this climate is delightful to those who are used to its routine will be well known to most readers. That it is not without its disagreeable features is equally manifest to every tourist. Nor can one say that this far western country is free from decided variations in the fortunes of different years. Where irrigation is not developed, great anxiety is frequently felt with regard to the sufficiency of the annual rain supply of the rainy season. Years of relative flood and of relative drought are as well known here as elsewhere. Nor is one wholly free within

any one season, from unexpected and sometimes disagreeably long-continued periods of unseasonable temperature. A high barometer over the region north and east of California occasionally brings to pass the well-known California "northers." These have, in the rainy season, a character that in some respects reminds one of the familiar cold-wave phenomena of the east, although the effect is very much more moderate. Frosts may then extend throughout northern California, may beset the central Coast Range, and may on occasion extend far into the southern part of California itself. But when the "northers" come during the dry season, they are frequently intensely hot winds, whose drought, associated with hill or forest fires, may give rise to very memorable experiences. But these are the inevitable and minor vicissitudes of a climate which is, on the whole, remarkably steady, and which is never as trying as are the well-known variations of our own northeastern climate. The generally good effect upon the health of such a climate is modified in certain cases by the possibly over-stimulating character of the coast summer, which, as for instance at San Francisco, permits one to work without thought of holidays all the year round. In my own boyhood it used often to be said that there were busy men in San Francisco who had reached that place in 1849, and who had become prominent in mercantile or other city life, and who had never taken vacations, and never left San Francisco, even to cross the bay, from the hour of their coming until that moment. Of course, such men can be found in almost any busy community, but these men seemed rather characteristic of the early California days and suggested the way in which a favorable climate may on occasion be misused by an ambitious man to add to the strains otherwise incident to the life of a new country.

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If one attempts to describe in what way the civilization either of the golden days or of the later agricultural period

has been affected by the geographical conditions, a student of my own habits and prejudices feels at once disposed to pass directly to the inner life of the Californian and to ask himself what influence the nature and climate of such a region seem to have upon the life of the individual mind and body, and, indirectly, upon the social order.

The most familiar account of the California climate in literature is Bret Harte's characterization of the seasonal changes in his poem, "Concepcion Argüello." The scene is here at the Presidio at San Francisco, close by the Golden Gate, where the heroine waited for her lover during the long years that the poem describes.

Day by day on wall and bastion beat the hollow empty breeze —
Day by day the sunlight glittered on the vacant, smiling seas;
Week by week the near hills whitened in their dusty leather cloaks —
Week by week the far hills darkened from the fringing plain of oaks;
Till the rains came, and far-breaking, on the fierce southwester tost,
Dashed the whole long coast with color, and then vanished and were lost.
So each year the seasons shifted, wet and warm and drear and dry;
Half a year of clouds and flowers — half a year of dust and sky.

Now what all this poetry in general psychologically means, quite apart from special moods, is that the Californian, of necessity, gains a kind of sensitiveness to nature which is different in type from the sensitiveness that a severer climate would inevitably involve, and different too in type from that belonging to climates mild but moist and more variable. In the first place, as you see, such a climate permits one to be a great deal out of doors in the midst of nature. It permits wide views, where the outlines are vast and in general clear. As, when you are on a steamer it is a matter of some skill to understand what are the actual conditions of wind and sea, while, when you are on a sailing vessel, you constantly feel both the wind and the sea with a close intimacy that needs no

technical knowledge to make it at least appreciated, so, in the case of such a climate as the one of California, your relations with nature are essentially intimate, whether you are a student of nature or not. Your dependence upon nature you feel in one sense more, and in another sense less, — more, because you are more constantly in touch with the natural changes of the moment; less, because you know that nature is less to be feared than under severer conditions. And this intimacy with nature means a certain change in your relations to your fellow men. You get a sense of power from these wide views, a habit of personal independence from the contemplation of a world that the eye seems to own. Especially in country life the individual Californian consequently tends toward a certain kind of independence which I find in a strong and subtle contrast to the sort of independence that, for instance, the New England farmer cultivates. The New England farmer must fortify himself in his stronghold against the seasons. He must be ready to adapt himself to a year that permits him to prosper only upon decidedly hard terms. But the California country proprietor can have, during the drought, more leisure, unless, indeed, his ambition for wealth too much engrosses him. His horses are plenty and cheap. His fruit crops thrive easily. He is able to supply his table with fewer purchases, with less commercial dependence. His position is, therefore, less that of the knight in his castle and more that of the free dweller in the summer cottage, who is indeed not at leisure, but can easily determine how he shall be busy. It is of little importance to him who his next neighbor is. At pleasure he can ride or drive a good way to find his friends; can choose, like the southern planter of former days, his own range of hospitality; can devote himself, if a man of cultivation, to reading during a good many hours at his own choice, or, if a man of sport, can find during a great part of the year easy opportunities for hunting or for camping both for himself and for the young people of his family. In the dry season he knows beforehand what engagements can be made,

without regard to the state of the weather, since the state of the weather is predetermined.

The free life and interchange of hospitality, so often described in the accounts of early California, has left its traces in the country life of California at the present day. Very readily, if you have moderate means, you can create your own quiet estate at a convenient distance from the nearest town. You may cover your house with a bower of roses, surround yourself with an orchard, quickly grow eucalyptus as a shade tree, and with nearly equal facility multiply other shade trees. You become, on easy terms, a proprietor, with estate and home of your own. Now all this holds, in a sense, of any mild climate. But in California the more regular routine of wet and dry seasons modifies and renders more stable the general psychological consequences. All this is encouraging to a kind of harmonious individuality that already tends in the best instances toward a somewhat Hellenic type.

A colleague of my own, a New Englander of the strictest persuasion, who visited California for a short time when he was himself past middle life, returned enthusiastic with the report that the California countrymen seemed to him to resemble the ancient, yes, even the Homeric, Greeks of the Odyssey. The Californians had their independence of judgment; their carelessness of what a barbarian might think, so long as he came from beyond the border; their apparent freedom in choosing what manner of men they should be; their ready and confident speech. All these things my friend at once noticed as characteristic. Thus different in type are these country proprietors from the equally individual, the secretively independent, the silently conscientious New England villagers. They are also quite different from the typical southern proprietors. From the latter they differ in having less tendency to respect traditions, and in laying much less stress upon formal courtesies. The Californian, like the westerner in general, is likely to be somewhat abrupt in speech, and his recent coming to the land has made him on

the whole quite indifferent to family tradition. I myself, for instance, reached twenty years of age without ever becoming clearly conscious of what was meant by judging a man by his antecedents, a judgment that in an older and less isolated community is natural and inevitable, and that, I think, in most of our western communities, grows up more rapidly than it has grown up in California, where the geographical isolation is added to the absence of tradition. To my own mind, in childhood, every human being was, with a few exceptions, whatever he happened to be. Hereditary distinctions I appreciated only in case of four types of humanity. There were the Chinamen, there were the Irishmen, there were the Mexicans, and there were the rest of us. Within each of these types, every man, to my youthful mind, was precisely what God and himself had made him, and it was distinctly a new point of view to attach a man to the antecedents that either his family or his other social relationships had determined for him. Now, I say, this type of individuality, known more or less in our western communities, but developed in peculiarly high degree in California, seems to me due not merely to the newness of the community, and not merely to that other factor of geographical isolation that I just mentioned, but to the relation with nature of which we have already spoken. It is a free and on the whole an emotionally exciting, and also, as we have said, an engrossing and intimate relation.

In New England, if you are moody, you may wish to take a long walk out-of-doors, but that is not possible at all or even at most seasons. Nature may not be permitted to comfort you. In California, unless you are afraid of the rain, nature welcomes you at almost any time. The union of the man and the visible universe is free, is entirely unchecked by any hostility on the part of nature, and is such as easily fills one's mind with wealth of warm experience. Our poet just quoted has laid stress upon the directly or symbolically painful aspects of the scene. But these are sorrows of a sort that mean precisely that relation with nature which I am trying

to characterize, not the relation of hostility but of closeness. And this is the sort of closeness determined not merely by mild weather, but by long drought and by the relative steadiness of all the climatic conditions.

Now, I must feel that such tendencies are of vast importance, not merely to-day but for all time. They are tendencies whose moral significance in the life of California is of course both good and evil, since man's relations with nature are, in general, a neutral material upon which ethical relations may be based. If you are industrious, this intimacy with nature means constant coöperation, a coöperation never interrupted by frozen ground and deep snow. If you tend to idleness, nature's kindliness may make you all the more indolent, and indolence is a possible enough vice with the dwellers in all mild climates. If you are morally careless, nature encourages your freedom, and tends in so far to develop a kind of morale frequently characteristic of the dwellers in gentle climates. Yet the nature of California is not enervating. The nights are cool, even in hot weather; owing to the drought the mildness of the air is not necessarily harmful. Moreover, the nature that is so uniform also suggests in a very dignified way a regularity of existence, a definite reward for a definitely planned deed. Climate and weather are at their best always capricious, and, as we have seen, the variations of the California seasons have involved the farmers in much anxiety, and in many cases have given the farming business, as carried on in certain California communities, the same sort of gambling tendency that originally vitiated the social value of the mining industry. But on the other hand, as the conditions grew more stable, as agriculture developed, vast irrigation enterprises introduced once more a conservative tendency. Here again for the definite deed nature secures a definite return. In regions subject to irrigation, man controls the weather as he cannot elsewhere. He is independent of the current season. And this tendency to organization — a tendency similar to the one that was obviously so potent in the

vast ancient civilization of Egypt — is present under Californian conditions, and will make itself felt.

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It remains necessary to characterize more fully the way in which the consequences of the early days, joined to the geographical factors upon which we have already laid stress, have influenced the problems of California life and society. From the very outset, climate and geographical position, and the sort of life in which men were engaged, have encouraged types of individuality whose subtle distinction from those elsewhere to be found we have already attempted in a very inadequate fashion to suggest. Accordingly, from the first period down to the present time, the California community has been a notable theater for the display of political and financial, and, on occasion, of intellectual individuality of decidedly extraordinary types.

It would be wholly wrong to conceive California individuality as at all fairly represented by a border type such as Terry's. Yet when one looks about in California society and politics, one finds even at the present day picturesque personalities preserving their picturesqueness amidst various grades of nobility and baseness, in a fashion more characteristic, I think, than is customary in most of our newer communities. The nobler sort of picturesque personality may be the public benefactor, like Lick or Sutro. He may be the social reformer of vast ideals, like Henry George. Or again the baser individual may be the ignorant demagogue of the grade of Dennis Kearney. Your California hero may be the chief of the Vigilance Committee of 1856, or some other typical and admired pioneer, growing old in the glory of remembered early deeds. He may be the railway magnate, building a transcontinental line under all sorts of discouragements, winning a great fortune, and dying just as he founds a university. But in all these phases he remains the strong individual type of man that in a great democracy is always necessary. It is just this

type that, as some of us fear, the conditions of our larger democracy in more eastern regions tend far too much to eliminate. In California, such individuality is by no means yet eliminated.

The individuality that we have described quickly revolts against its false prophets. In party politics, California proves to be an extremely doubtful state. Party ties are not close. The vote changes from election to election. The independent voter is well in place. Finally, through all these tendencies, there runs a certain idealism, often more or less unconscious. This idealism is partly due to the memory of the romance due to the unique marvels of the early days. It is also sustained by precisely that intimacy with nature which renders the younger Californians so sensitive. I think that perhaps Edward Rowland Sill, whose poems are nowadays so widely appreciated, has given the most representative expression to the resulting spirit of California, to that tension between individualism and loyalty, between shrewd conservatism and bold radicalism, which marks this community.

TRANS-NATIONAL AMERICA[1]

RANDOLPH S. BOURNE

[Randolph S. Bourne (1886–) was educated at Columbia University and has traveled and studied in Europe. He is one of the most important of the younger contributors to American magazines on social and political movements and on education. His most important books are "Youth and Life" (1913) and "Education and Living" (1917). The pages below are part of a stimulating discussion on the assimilation of the immigrant into American life which has come to be referred to as "the melting pot."]

No reverberatory effect of the great war has caused American public opinion more solicitude than the failure of the "melting pot." The discovery of diverse nationalistic feelings among our great alien population has come to most people as an intense shock. It has brought out the unpleasant inconsistencies of our traditional beliefs. We have had to watch hard-hearted old Brahmins virtuously indignant at the spectacle of the immigrant refusing to be melted, while they jeer at patriots like Mary Antin who write about "our forefathers." We have had to listen to publicists who express themselves as stunned by the evidence of vigorous nationalistic and cultural movements in this country among Germans, Scandinavians, Bohemians, and Poles, while in the same breath they insist that the alien shall be forcibly assimilated to that Anglo-Saxon tradition which they unquestioningly label "American."

As the unpleasant truth has come upon us that assimilation in this country was proceeding on lines very different from those we had marked out for it, we found ourselves inclined to blame those who were thwarting our prophecies. The

[1] From *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1916. Reprinted by permission.

truth became culpable. We blamed the war, we blamed the Germans. And then we discovered with a moral shock that these movements had been making great headway before the war even began. We found that the tendency, reprehensible and paradoxical as it might be, has been for the national clusters of immigrants, as they became more and more firmly established and more and more prosperous, to cultivate more and more assiduously the literatures and cultural traditions of their homelands. Assimilation, in other words, instead of washing out the memories of Europe, made them more and more intensely real. Just as these clusters became more and more objectively American did they become more and more German or Scandinavian or Bohemian or Polish.

To face the fact that our aliens are already strong enough to take a share in the direction of their own destiny, and that the strong cultural movements represented by the foreign press, schools, and colonies are a challenge to our facile attempts, is not, however, to admit the failure of Americanization. It is not to fear the failure of democracy. It is rather to urge us to an investigation of what Americanism may rightly mean. It is to ask ourselves whether our ideal has been broad or narrow — whether perhaps the time has not come to assert a higher ideal than the "melting pot." Surely we cannot be certain of our spiritual democracy when, claiming to melt the nations within us to a comprehension of our free and democratic institutions, we fly into panic at the first sign of their own will and tendency. We act as if we wanted Americanization to take place only on our own terms, and not by the consent of the governed. All our elaborate machinery of settlement and school and union, of social and political naturalization, however, will move with friction just in so far as it neglects to take into account this strong and virile insistence that America shall be what the immigrant will have a hand in making it, and not what a ruling class, descendant of those British stocks which were the first permanent immigrants, decide that America shall be made. This is the condition

which confronts us, and which demands a clear and general readjustment of our attitude and our ideal.

Mary Antin is right when she looks upon our foreign-born as the people who missed the *Mayflower* and came over on the first boat they could find. We are all foreign-born or the descendants of foreign-born, and if distinctions are to be made between us, they should rightly be on some other ground than indigenousness. The early colonists came over with motives no less colonial than the later. They did not come to be assimilated in an American melting pot. They did not come to adopt the culture of the American Indian. They had not the smallest intention of "giving themselves without reservation" to the new country. They came to get freedom to live as they wanted to. They came to escape from the stifling air and chaos of the Old World; they came to make their fortune in a new land. They invented no new social framework. Rather they brought over bodily the old ways to which they had been accustomed. Tightly concentrated on a hostile frontier, they were conservative beyond belief. Their pioneer daring was reserved for the objective conquest of material resources. In their folkways, in their social and political institutions, they were, like every colonial people, slavishly imitative of the mother-country. So that, in spite of the "Revolution," our whole legal and political system remained more English than the English, petrified and unchanging, while in England law developed to meet the needs of the changing times.

It is just this English-American conservatism that has been our chief obstacle to social advance. We have needed the new peoples — the order of the German and Scandinavian, the turbulence of the Slav and Hun — to save us from our own stagnation. I do not mean that the illiterate Slav is now the equal of the New Englander of pure descent. He is raw material to be educated, not into a New Englander, but into a socialized American along such lines as those thirty

nationalities are being educated in the amazing schools of Gary. I do not believe that this process is to be one of decades of evolution. The spectacle of Japan's sudden jump from medievalism to post-modernism should have destroyed that superstition. We are not dealing with individuals who are to "evolve." We are dealing with their children, who, with that education we are about to have, will start level with all of us. Let us cease to think of ideals like democracy as magical qualities inherent in certain peoples. Let us speak, not of inferior races, but of inferior civilizations. We are all to educate and to be educated. These peoples in America are in a common enterprise. It is not what we are now that concerns us, but what this plastic next generation may become in the light of a new cosmopolitan ideal.

If we come to find this point of view plausible, we shall have to give up the search for our native "American" culture. With the exception of the South and that New England which, like the Red Indian, seems to be passing into solemn oblivion, there is no distinctively American culture. It is apparently our lot rather to be a federation of cultures. This we have been for half a century and the war has made it ever more evident that this is what we are destined to remain. This will not mean, however, that there are not expressions of indigenous genius that could not have sprung from any other soil. Music, poetry, philosophy, have been singularly fertile and new. Strangely enough, American genius has flared forth just in those directions which are least understanded of the people. If the American note is bigness, action, the objective as contrasted with the reflective life, where is the epic expression of this spirit? Our drama and our fiction, the peculiar fields for the expression of action and objectivity, are somehow exactly the fields of the spirit which remain poor and mediocre. American materialism is in some way inhibited from getting into impressive artistic form its own energy with which it bursts. Nor is it any better in

architecture, the least romantic and subjective of all the arts. We are inarticulate of the very values which we profess to idealize. But in the finer forms — music, verse, the essay, philosophy — the American genius puts forth work equal to any of its contemporaries. Just in so far as our American genius has expressed the pioneer spirit, the adventurous, forward-looking drive of a colonial empire, is it representative of that whole America of the many races and peoples, and not of any partial or traditional enthusiasm. And only as that pioneer note is sounded can we really speak of the American culture. As long as we thought of Americanism in terms of the "melting pot," our American cultural tradition lay in the past. It was something to which the new Americans were to be molded. In the light of our changing ideal of Americanism, we must perpetrate the paradox that our American cultural tradition lies in the future. It will be what we all together make out of this incomparable opportunity of attacking the future with a new key.

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The failure of the melting pot, far from closing the great American democratic experiment, means that it has only just begun. Whatever American nationalism turns out to be, we see already that it will have a color richer and more exciting than our ideal has hitherto encompassed. In a world which has dreamed of internationalism, we find that we have all unawares been building up the first international nation. The voices which have cried for a tight and jealous nationalism of the European pattern are failing. From that ideal, however valiantly and disinterestedly it has been set for us, time and tendency have moved us further and further away. What we have achieved has been rather a cosmopolitan federation of national colonies, of foreign cultures, from whom the sting of devastating competition has been removed. America is already the world-federation in miniature, the continent where for the first time in history has been achieved that

miracle of hope, the peaceful living side by side, with character substantially preserved, of the most heterogeneous peoples under the sun. Nowhere else has such contiguity been anything but the breeder of misery. Here, notwithstanding our tragic failures of adjustment, the outlines are already too clear not to give us a new vision and a new orientation of the American mind in the world.

It is for the American of the younger generation to accept this cosmopolitanism, and carry it along with self-conscious and fruitful purpose. In his colleges, he is already getting, with the study of modern history and politics, the modern literatures, economic geography, the privilege of a cosmopolitan outlook such as the people of no other nation of to-day in Europe can possibly secure. If he is still a colonial, he is no longer the colonial of one partial culture, but of many. He is a colonial of the world. Colonialism has grown into cosmopolitanism, and his motherland is no one nation, but all who have anything life-enhancing to offer to the spirit. That vague sympathy which the France of ten years ago was feeling for the world — a sympathy which was drowned in the terrible reality of war — may be the modern American's, and that in a positive and aggressive sense. If the American is parochial, it is in sheer wantonness or cowardice. His provincialism is the measure of his fear of bogies or the defect of his imagination.

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Only America, by reason of the unique liberty of opportunity and traditional isolation for which she seems to stand, can lead in this cosmopolitan enterprise. Only the American — and in this category I include the migratory alien who has lived with us and caught the pioneer spirit and a sense of new social vistas — has the chance to become that citizen of the world. America is coming to be, not a nationality but a trans-nationality, a weaving back and forth, with the other lands, of many threads of all sizes and colors. Any movement

which attempts to thwart this weaving, or to dye the fabric any one color, or disentangle the threads of the strands, is false to this cosmopolitan vision. I do not mean that we shall necessarily glut ourselves with the raw product of humanity. It would be folly to absorb the nations faster than we could weave them. We have no duty either to admit or reject. It is purely a question of expediency. What concerns us is the fact that the strands are here. We must have a policy and an ideal for an actual situation. Our question is, What shall we do with our America? How are we likely to get the more creative America — by confining our imaginations to the ideal of the melting pot, or broadening them to some such cosmopolitan conception as I have been vaguely sketching?

The war has shown America to be unable, though isolated geographically and politically from a European world-situation, to remain aloof and irresponsible. She is a wandering star in a sky dominated by two colossal constellations of states. Can she not work out some position of her own, some life of being in, yet not quite of, this seething and embroiled European world? This is her only hope and promise. A trans-nationality of all the nations, it is spiritually impossible for her to pass into the orbit of any one. It will be folly to hurry herself into a premature and sentimental nationalism, or to emulate Europe and play fast and loose with the forces that drag into war. No Americanization will fulfill this vision which does not recognize the uniqueness of this trans-nationalism of ours. The Anglo-Saxon attempt to fuse will only create enmity and distrust. The crusade against "hyphenates" will only inflame the partial patriotism of trans-nationals, and cause them to assert their European traditions in strident and unwholesome ways. But the attempt to weave a wholly novel international nation out of our chaotic America will liberate and harmonize the creative power of all these peoples and give them the new spiritual citizenship, as so many individuals have already been given, of a world.

Is it a wild hope that the undertow of opposition to metaphysics in international relations, opposition to militarism, is less a cowardly provincialism than a groping for this higher cosmopolitan ideal? One can understand the irritated restlessness with which our proud pro-British colonists contemplate a heroic conflict across the seas in which they have no part. It was inevitable that our necessary inaction should evolve in their minds into the bogey of national shame and dishonor. But let us be careful about accepting their sensitiveness as final arbiter. Let us look at our reluctance rather as the first crude beginnings of assertion on the part of certain strands in our nationality that they have a right to a voice in the construction of the American ideal. Let us face realistically the America we have around us. Let us work with the forces that are at work. Let us make something of this trans-national spirit instead of outlawing it. Already we are living this cosmopolitan America. What we need is everywhere a vivid consciousness of the new ideal. Deliberate headway must be made against the survivals of the melting-pot ideal for the promise of American life.

We cannot Americanize America worthily by sentimentalizing and moralizing history. When the best schools are expressly renouncing the questionable duty of teaching patriotism by means of history, it is not the time to force shibboleth upon the immigrant. This form of Americanization has been heard because it appealed to the vestiges of our old sentimentalized and moralized patriotism. This has so far held the field as the expression of the new American's new devotion. The inflections of other voices have been drowned. They must be heard. We must see if the lesson of the war has not been for hundreds of these later Americans a vivid realization of their trans-nationality, a new consciousness of what America meant to them as a citizenship in the world. It is the vague historic idealisms which have provided the fuel for the European flame. Our American ideal can make no progress until we do away with this romantic gilding of the past.

All our idealisms must be those of future social goals in which all can participate, the good life of personality lived in the environment of the Beloved Community. No mere doubtful triumphs of the past, which redound to the glory of only one of our trans-nationalities, can satisfy us. It must be a future America, on which all can unite, which pulls us irresistibly toward it, as we understand each other more warmly.

To make real this striving amid dangers and apathies is work for a younger *intelligentsia* of America. Here is an enterprise of integration into which we can all pour ourselves, of a spiritual welding which should make us, if the final menace ever came, not weaker, but infinitely strong.

DEMOCRACY IN INDUSTRY[1]

LYMAN ABBOTT

[Lyman Abbott (1835–) was educated at New York University and has been editor of *The Outlook* since 1893. He is a frequent writer and speaker on social and religious topics. This popular and friendly discussion is one of a series entitled "Democracy around the World," and covers clearly but succinctly the chief developments of industrial democracy.]

The other day I noticed a motto on a teamster's cart in our village: "There's no fun like work." The cart belongs to an original neighbor of mine who thinks himself and sets other people a-thinking; and his motto set me a-thinking. Is it true?

True to my experience, yes. My work has always been my best fun. There is no game that begins to interest me as does my work. I began to wonder whether that was temperamental. Or is it universal? If not, can it be made universal? I reflected that almost every kind of workaday activity is also employed in a more or less modified form as a recreation. I recalled the saying attributed to Phillips Brooks, "It is great fun preaching." I remembered what a very successful and very hard-working business man once said to me, "It is more fun to make money than to have it or to spend it." I recalled the pride and pleasure I had seen all sorts of workmen take in their work: the seamstress in her stitch, the cook in her dishes, the teacher in his pupil, the lawyer in his brief. Surgery would be impossible for me. But I remembered how often I had heard that surgeons speak of "a beautiful operation."

I hope that my readers will not lay down this article at this point under the impression that I am trying to prove that

[1] From *The Outlook*, August 17, 1912. Reprinted by permission.

there is no difference between work and play. *Not at all.* NOT AT ALL. What I am trying to show is that nearly every activity of mind and body employed in useful work may be made to minister to the pleasure of the worker. The toil of the farmer, of the carpenter, of the railway engineer, of the teamster, of the lawyer, of the teacher, of the surgeon, of the preacher, and whatever other toil there is, may be, and often is, a joy. My epigrammatic friend is right: "There's no fun like work."

In this article I am trying to give my readers a vision of what industry might be and ought to be, but is not — the vision as one sees it who believes in democracy in industry. Raphael says that "we paint nature not as she is, but as she ought to be." I am trying to depict industry not as it is, but as it ought to be.

All natural, normal, healthful activity, whether of mind or body, is pleasurable. This is not equivalent to saying that it is all pleasant. It is not saying that it is not accompanied by discomfort, and sometimes very great discomfort. But if it is natural, normal, healthful, it is pleasurable — that is, able to give pleasure. If it fails to do so, the failure is probably due to artificial conditions which we have created. It is at least well for us to consider whether we cannot change those conditions which we have created, and give back to the activity the pleasure-giving qualities of which we have robbed it.

There are five conditions which the industrial democrat desires to see established in industry in order to restore to it the pleasurable qualities of which our artificially established conditions have deprived it. There may be more; there are at least these five:

I. We needlessly work overtime.

Every activity of mind or body uses up some physical tissue which must be removed from the body and replaced by a new tissue in order that the activity may be healthfully continued. The dead tissue must be removed. Living tissue must take its place. When the worker works overtime, he becomes, as

we say, exhausted; that is, he is drained or emptied. And this is literally true. He is exhausted when the vital tissue employed has been drained and he is left with too small a supply to furnish adequate energy for pleasurable activity. Of course the more monotonous the industry, the more the same class of tissues are employed, and the greater is the drain or exhaustion. The mere fact that the worker can enter upon some other form of activity is no indication that he is not exhausted. That the men of a factory in a noon hour engage in a game of ball does not indicate that they are not exhausted. The ball game calls a new set of muscles into play and leaves the others to rest. So when one's eyes are tired with reading, he may converse. He rests his exhausted eyes and uses his unexhausted throat. But rest is indispensable to pleasurable work; re-creation is indispensable to pleasurable creation.

In America most of us work overtime. We glorify the strenuous life. To be always doing something is our ambition. Robert Louis Stevenson's essay in praise of idleness gets scant attention. We begrudge the time necessary to wind up the mainspring; and it takes more time to wind up the mainspring of a man than the mainspring of a watch. We cut our nights short; stay up as late as our fellow-mortals in Europe, but are not willing to sleep as late in the morning. We have adopted European habits of retiring, and try to keep up Puritan habits of rising. We pare off our Sundays at both ends; work late Saturday night because we can lie abed Sunday morning, and go to bed earlier Sunday night in order to arise earlier Monday morning, and use Sunday as a day of travel to get from one business appointment to another.

The industrial democrat believes in an eight-hour day for all organized employments. It is true that eight hours is a purely artificial standard. In some vocations the hours of labor should be fewer; it is doubtful whether in any organized industry they should be more. In employments in which the labor is monotonous, as in most factories, the hours of labor should be fewer than in employments which allow for great

variety of activity and therefore less exhaustion of particular tissues, as in most household work. But we all work overtime. And it is inconceivable that a man should work, as some steel workers do, twelve hours in the day and seven days in the week and retain that physical and mental energy which is essential to pleasure in work. If my friend were to run his motor car for seven days in succession, eight hours a day, he would probably be as tired of motoring as the railway engineer is of driving his engine; and if the preacher were to preach a sermon eight hours long, he would be almost as exhausted as his congregation. Different persons doubtless have different powers of endurance. For myself three hours spent at my desk in creative work is as much as I can usually give with profit in any one day. The remainder of the day is not given to rest, but it is given to a changed occupation.

This working overtime is wholly unnecessary. One individual cannot step out of the mill; but the owner of the mill — that is, society — can order the work stopped. This incessant grinding is not required in order to give us food. The statisticians tell us that with our improved machinery seven men can feed a thousand. Why, then, go on driving the mill as though hunger demanded it? The invention of machinery has made possible the lessening of toil and largely the elimination of drudgery. Says Emerson

> The farmer had much ill temper, laziness, and shirking to endure from his hand sawyers, until one day he bethought him to put his sawmill on the edge of a waterfall; and the river never tires of turning his wheel; the river is good-natured and never hints an objection. . . . The forces of steam, gravity, galvanism, light, magnets, wind, fire, serve us day by day and cost us nothing.

And yet, fired by this passion for work, we go on working as though our lives depended on it. In fact, our lives depend as much on our resting as on our working. Social students in England have demonstrated, by actual experiment, that in many industries men will produce, not only better products,

but actually more products, in nine hours than in ten, and better men if not both better products and more products in eight hours than in nine.

It is said that the average life of a stoker on an ocean steamer is nine years. James Ford Rhodes tells us in his "History of the United States" that the average industrial life of a plantation slave on the sugar plantations of Louisiana was seven years. The industrial democrat desires to see industry so organized that it shall prolong human life, not shorten it, and enhance the joy of life, not rob it of its joy. He wishes to see industry so organized that it shall be a pleasurable activity. A first condition is a reasonable limitation for every worker in the hours of his work — a limitation that shall give him daily adequate time in the repair shop — that is, adequate time for rest and for that change of activity which is re-creation.

II. Only second in importance to limited hours of labor are the conditions in which the labor is performed. All that science and art can do should be done to make them both sanitary and comfortable. There is something preposterous in the prevailing fashion of making luxurious the rooms wherein we spend the fewest hours of life and taking any kind of room for our working-room. The kitchen, the nursery, and the living-room ought to be the best rooms in the house — the sunniest in winter, the airiest in summer, the most commodious and comfortable in all seasons. The kitchen is the working-room of the housekeeper and her assistants; the nursery is the training-room of the children; and the living-room is the gathering-place of the family. In the old New England days the parlor was intended to be, what it was courteously called, the "best room," and was open only on state occasions or perhaps on Sundays. We have inherited this folly from the past, and are not yet entirely emancipated from it.

The same curious disregard of comfort and convenience in the rooms in which our work is done and the major part of our life is spent has in the past characterized our industrial life. We are slowly, but far too slowly, realizing that bad

conditions produce bad workingmen and bad work. We are providing machinery to expel from our mines the air that once poisoned the miners. We are providing our factories with windows that furnish adequate sunlight, and in summer approximately adequate ventilation. We are requiring cleanliness, not only in floor and wall and ceiling, but in the atmosphere. We are abolishing the conditions which made the head heavy and the heart sick, which begot discomfort and bred discontent. Law has done something, public sentiment has done even more. There are an increasing number of employers who really care more for the health and comfort of the men and women in their factories than for the health and comfort of the horses in their barns. Only a real though gradual revolution has brought this about — a revolution bitterly resisted by some of our "best citizens" both in England and America: and much still remains to be done. Read Charles Dickens's description of Coketon:

It was a town of red brick, or of brick that would have been red if the smoke and ashes had allowed it; but as matters stood it was a town of unnatural red and black, like the painted face of a savage. It was a town of machinery and tall chimneys, out of which interminable serpents of smoke trailed themselves for ever and ever, and never got uncoiled. It had a black canal in it, and a river that ran purple with ill-smelling dye, and vast piles of buildings full of windows where there was a rattling and a trembling all day long, and where the piston of the steam-engine worked monotonously up and down, like the head of an elephant in a state of melancholy madness. It contained several large streets, all very like one another, and many small streets still more like one another, inhabited by people equally like one another, who all went in and out at the same hours, with the same sound upon the same pavements, to do the same work, and to whom every day was the same as yesterday and to-morrow, and every year the counterpart of the last and the next.[1]

How can work in such conditions be fun?

[1] "Hard Times," Chapter V.

III. Not less important than making useful work enjoyable to the worker by a limitation in the hours of his labor and an improvement in the conditions under which it is performed is it that his right to some share in the finished product should be recognized.

The demand for profit-sharing is not the same as a demand for increased wages. It is not merely a demand for better compensation. It is a demand for a better and more human relationship between the employer and the employed, the recognition of the fact that the two are working together, and that the product of their common industry belongs to them both, and should be shared between them upon some just and equitable basis.

It is a common charge made against the modern workingman that he takes no interest in his job. Why should he? It is not *his* job. It is his master's job. If he slights his work, the loss falls on the master. If he does peculiarly excellent work, the profit goes to his master, and to his master the honor is given. The workingman is not interested in the product because it is not his product when it is finished, and he has no share in it. He is not working to produce anything; he is working for a wage. And I do not find that any one complains that he is not interested in his wage.

Let me by a single illustration make clear what I mean by profit-sharing.

A few years ago I went into a little local shoemaker's shop, where my shoes had been repaired, and ordered a pair made for me. They cost about the same that equally well made shoes would have cost in one of the great shoe stores, and they fitted me a little better. But I was interested to see the shoemaker's interest in his work and his pride in the fit when the shoes were done. His interest was not merely in the price that was paid for them, it was in the product itself, because it was his product, and the profit and the honor were his. For that reason he unmistakably had fun in his work.

About the same time I heard Mr. George W. Perkins, at a public dinner in New York, give an account of the profit-sharing scheme which has been introduced into the Steel Corporation. I pass here no judgment upon the method pursued. What interested me then, and what illustrates the point I am making here, was Mr. Perkins's statement that the result of the profit-sharing introduction has been to make the men engaged in the industry interested in the industry. The corporation had not, he said, introduced profit-sharing as a philanthropy. But, as it paid thousands of dollars every year to keep the material machinery in the best condition, so it thought it worth while to pay thousands of dollars to make the men who operate that machinery contented with their position and interested in their work. Mr. Filene, who has built up from small beginnings one of the most successful department stores in Boston, and gives to his employees both a share in the profits of the business and a participation in its administration, has found the same results to follow: an almost entire elimination of perfunctory service, and a contented and interested body of co-workers in every department.

IV. If the worker is to find any fun in his work, he must have not only some share in the product, but also some share in determining under what conditions it shall be carried on. This principle seems to me eminently just; though there are some employers, apparently, who think that it is entirely impracticable to apply it in our modern industrial system.

The Golden Rule has always seemed to me to afford, not only an excellent ideal, but an eminently practicable rule of conduct. To determine what is just toward any man I ask myself, If I were in his place, what should I think I had a right to demand? If I were a railway engineer and not only my comfort but my life depended on the fireman who traveled with me, I should want to have something to say as to the conditions upon which men should be appointed as firemen. If I were a miner, I should, for the same reason, want to have

something to say as to the conditions on which other miners working with me should be appointed. If I were to work in a factory, I should want to have something to say as to hours of labor and the sanitary conditions of the room in which I was to spend my working hours.

We read much in the daily papers of the "recognition of the union"; and sometimes of strikes maintained with great obstinacy, not for higher wages or shorter hours, but for this "recognition of the union." Such strikes are generally condemned unsparingly by the daily papers. I suppose that the phrase "recognition of the union" has different meanings at different times and in different localities. But when it means that the laborers are insisting, not merely that they shall have better wages or shorter hours, but also that they shall have some share in determining what the hours and conditions of their labor shall be, I sympathize with their demand, though I may not with their methods. The adjustment of this new and growing demand of the workingman to have some share in the control of the organized industries of the world presents many difficult problems. Certainly the direction cannot be transferred by any instantaneous process from the autocracy which has controlled the industry in the past to the democracy which will perhaps control it, at least in part, in the future. But the history of industry in the past in all civilized countries makes it equally clear that it cannot, with safety to the workingmen or to the community, be left in the unlimited control of an irresponsible autocracy. The administration of our great businesses has not been so uniformly just, humane, and public-spirited, or even so economically efficient and so beneficent to the community, that its advocates are justified in insisting that no change can be made for the better.

V. There is one other condition necessary in order to make modern work carried on by organizations of workers fun to the individual worker. This it is difficult to state, because it is a condition of the spirit in which the work must be carried on, and it is always difficult to define anything so subtle as spirit of life.

It is evident that the man in the shoe factory who simply puts the eyelets in the shoe cannot have the kind of pride in the finished shoe that the individual shoemaker can have who by his individual labor makes the entire shoe from start to finish. The pride of the latter in his work is an individual pride; the modern laborer's pride in his work must be a social pride; a pride in the organization to which he belongs and in the work of his fellows no less than in his own.

A simple illustration of this pride in one's coöperative work is furnished by the soldier in the army. His personal contribution may seem insignificant. He believes in his commander, whether he be General Lee or General Grant, and in his cause, whether it be States' rights or Nationalism, and to that cause and to that commander he has given himself with absolute devotion. Whether he is in front as a sharpshooter, or in the rear guarding a baggage train, or in camp cleaning his gun, he is a member of a great army, devoted to a great cause, and sharer in a great service; and when the war is over, his country will rear a soldiers' monument to his memory and to the memory of all his brave comrades. The service is a common service, the achievement will be a common achievement, the honor will be a common honor.

To reach the highest joy in work this consciousness of cooperation in industry is necessary. It is necessary for us to realize that we are all engaged in coöperative industry; that life is an exchange of services; that the least and humblest of us is contributing to a great achievement which is possible only as a combined achievement; that no man is more essential than another; that the least work is a great work because it is a necessary part of a great work, as the day laborer with his spade at Panama is necessary to the completion of the great world waterway between two oceans. Inspired by this sense of a great fellowship, any work may become joyful. "If," says a friend of mine, "I cannot do what I like, I like what I do." "If," says Professor Josiah Royce, " I am to be loyal, my cause must from moment to moment fascinate me,

awaken my muscular vigor, stir me with some eagerness for work, even if this be painful work."

I am an industrial democrat. I am also an optimist. And I look forward with hope to the time when, even more than now, machinery will do the world's drudgery and man will cease to be a drudge; when his hours of labor will be so limited that his life will not be exhausted, but will be enriched and developed by his labors; when the conditions of his labor will be always sanitary and generally comfortable; when he will share in the profits of his labor, and so realize the value to himself of good work; when he will have a voice, and an influential voice, in determining how the organized labor in which he takes a part shall be carried on; when commerce will be seen to be what the word imports, an interchange of services; when there will be none so rich that they will have no incentive to work, and none so poor that they can get no work to do; and when the now perilous class consciousness will grow into a social consciousness, and we shall all, employer and employed, recognize the truth that an injury to one is an injury to all, and a benefit to one is a benefit to all.

Impossible ideal? No! No true ideal is ever impossible. Toward its realization society is slowly, very slowly, tending. And the great democratic movement throughout the world is one of the signs of its coming.

THE AMERICAN NOVEL[1]

ROBERT HERRICK

[Robert Herrick (1868–), one of the best-known of present-day American novelists, was educated at Harvard and is now Professor of English in the University of Chicago. Among his most noteworthy novels may be mentioned "The Common Lot" (1904) and "The Healer" (1911). This trenchant criticism of contemporary American literature, with special reference to the novel of to-day, followed an article in the January number of the *Yale Review* entitled "The Background of the American Novel."]

One hears much of the romantic quality of American life, which when analyzed is found to consist for the most part of our dazzling performances in conquering wealth and the frequently bizarre conduct of the successful rich. The feeling, still widespread, that opportunities for similar individual achievements exist more abundantly here than elsewhere continues this romantic note even in the face of sobering economic facts. In harmony with the rest of the world, American literature is less flamboyantly romantic than it was a scant decade ago, but it vaunts at all times a robust optimism that verges upon the romantic. We are also told that ours is a fertile soil artistically, ripe for a creative period of self-expression. How does it happen then, one is likely to ask, that the most significant imaginative work of the day still comes to us from the other side of the ocean — the best plays from Austria and Germany, the best novels from the much-worked English field? Why is it that Wells, Bennett, and Galsworthy — not to mention half a dozen others almost as distinguished as these three — are writing in England at the present time, while in America one would have to strain

[1] From *Yale Review*, April, 1914. Reprinted by permission.

patriotism to the point of absurdity to name any novelist of similar performance? In answering this pertinent question we shall have to consider incidentally the quality of our imaginative life to-day and thus continue the theme of my paper in the January number of this magazine.

We have had a literature in America — not an American literature, to be sure, — but a good sort of literature in America. The best of it came from the New England group of writers — the purest, the most authentic expression we have yet had. When Emerson, Hawthorne, Longfellow, and Lowell were writing, New England may have been but one province of a greater country, but it was intellectually a dominant and fairly homogeneous province. Mr. Howells has garnered admirably the last sheaves from that soil. Puritan America found its ultimate expression in "Silas Lapham," "A Modern Instance," and "The Hazard of New Fortunes." Mrs. Freeman and others have gleaned faithfully the last stalks. Some of their disciples are still trying to revive the cold ashes on the hearth.

Meanwhile, following the more robust inspiration of Bret Harte and Mark Twain, a large number of writers have risen to take possession of local fields — Cable in the South, Miss Murfree in the mountain districts of Tennessee, Owen Wister and many others in the varied localities of the great West, to name but a few of these fruitful writers. Already that period of local literature is passing, and the reason for its swift passing is obvious. It was in no sense national, and was largely sentimental in its appeal — pretty and picturesque. The people, the country as a whole, was never reflected therein. It offered nothing, so to speak, to go on: it opened no new vistas for the younger generation. There is, of course, nothing incompatible with greatness in the use of purely local material. Hauptmann in his "Weavers" has shown that a great modern labor play can be written with a Silesian background of the Forties. More recently, Gustav Frenssen has written an important German novel with a

Hamburg lad as the hero and a narrow North German background. It is the spirit always that counts. The spirit of our American local literature has been generally, to be quite frank, merely provincial — always seeking the picturesque, the sensational, the so-called romantic. And those are the elements of any civilization that are most surely discarded, swept aside in the flow of national life. Wister's cowboys were already romantic memories when he drew them. Social settlements, railroads, and hook-worm commissions are eradicating the picturesque conditions that provided Miss Murfree and Mr. John Fox with their material. The Panama Canal will abolish the last vestiges of Cable's New Orleans, as general prosperity has already effaced the sentimental South of Mr. Thomas Nelson Page and Mr. Hopkinson Smith. The swift current of our national life has swept into all these backwater places and stripped them of the peculiar aspects that charmed the story-tellers.

While these local fields were still being enthusiastically worked, we had our romantic historical revival of the Nineties. Janice Merediths and Richard Carvels were circulated by the ton, not to mention the purely imitative output of machine-made American historical novels. They were our recognition of the pseudo-romantic wave started by Stevenson. The preceding generation of school children got their history from the storybooks. Then suddenly as we turned into the new century, the demand for this sort of imaginative solace stopped. Authors who had sold hundreds of thousands of these candied products could not sell fifty thousand. Why was this? The distressed publishers have never been able to account satisfactorily for the sudden cessation in the demand for such books and have been seeking hither and yon for "a new line of goods" that shall have the same popular appeal. What happened to the American reading public? Had they become sufficiently educated to go direct to the history books for their history, and to "foreign-made literature" for imaginative realization? It would surely seem so, if we consider

the steady increase in the number and the sales of so-called serious books, and the broadening demand for the novels and plays and poems of contemporary European writers.

To understand the situation intelligently, we must first realize a great social phenomenon that has appeared, one might almost say, since the time of the New England writers, — and that is journalism. I mean not merely daily and weekly and monthly journalism, but journalistic drama and journalistic books. In short, the thing done for the immediate moment, whatever form it may take, — that is what I mean by journalism. It is not my affair to account for the tidal wave of journalism that has swept around the earth in our day and reached its height in this country, nor to judge it socially or æsthetically. For the moment it seems to have crowded serious literature quite out of public attention — I mean the ordered, leisurely, imaginative product. And this other sort of thing, which I call perforce literature, if it is to emerge once more, must absorb journalism and transcend it. I am not interested in the moral or æsthetic or educational value of journalism. I see merely the facts as they apply to that other sort of product in which I am fervently interested: I see that journalism because it pays tremendously well has drawn into its ranks the more vital writers of our day; that it has insensibly affected the form as well as the content of literature; lastly that it has fed a huge reading public with the raw meat of imagination, on which it gorges until it has no appetite for more refined dishes. To be quite specific, why should we read picaresque novels when we can follow the McNamara case day by day? What detective story can compete with Burns and the San Francisco "grafters," or with the snaky involutions and pollutions of the Lorimer scandal? Is "Robert Elsmere" any more profoundly human and ethical than Judge Lindsey's story of his struggle to save the souls of Denver children? The point can be indefinitely illustrated by a thousand instances

drawn from our newspapers and magazines. And these journalistic "stories" are true — or supposed to be — and the persons described are real people — or pretend to be. How, then, can literature contend in interest with these revelations of the actual social life going on around us?

For one thing, it can feebly reproduce them, as has been the case with our commercial fiction, for example, in the "big business" stories, conveniently shaped to the requirements of the magazines. Especially in the short story — a product that our magazines have made almost their own — incidents and types familiar to us through the newspaper are reproduced again and again. The short story of commerce and the magazined novel have done more, I believe, to debauch our literary situation than any other one thing. They enervate both writers and readers.

But all who think on such matters know that neither journalism nor commercialized fiction is an adequate medium for interpreting life deeply — for realizing ourselves and our country. We know that these are not literature and never can become such by any perversion of terms. Life is a flowing stream, and to mirror that stream with its multiform drama we must have some large, organic form — something epic in size and in purpose. Every race has had its epics, in prose or verse, — its famous deeds, its heroes and its villains, its own peculiar themes. Ours cannot be the exception. In the modern socialized world these epics must take the form of prose fiction. The large, loose form of the novel, so thoroughly developed yet not exhausted in the last two hundred years, resembles the stream of life in its volume, and is the only literary form known to us that is adequate to the task of interpreting and realizing the complex life of our day. To say that it is dead, that the play, or the newspaper, or the magazine, has come to take its place, is as absurd as to hold that men will no longer rear families and build homes for them because they have taken to flats. And as a matter of easily verifiable fact, the novel has never shown

more vitality, developed in more promising spontaneity, than during the last decade, when all the noise has been about the play.

We as a people have not had our due share in this renaissance of the prose epic. Since that boom in the fiction market, to which I have referred, when quarter-million sales of favorite novels were not uncommon, there have been comparatively few successful novels from the publisher's exact viewpoint. Nor has there been much consideration given to the American novel by that minority of the reading public that is supposed to be superior to the publishers' viewpoint. For the moment, we seem to have a distaste for our own fiction product and are going abroad for imaginative wares. Witness the success with us, among the intelligent, and one suspects among the less intelligent also, of De Morgan, Locke, Galsworthy, Wells, and more recently of Arnold Bennett and Leonard Merrick, — not to mention such journalistic stuff as "The Rosary" and "The Broad Highway," both being "English-made." Is it possible that we have outgrown the American novel such as we have had, that we realize it does not truly represent us, does not satisfy our aspirations for self-realization? Do we feel the artificiality and the thinness of the pictures it gives us of American life? It seems so. It would be hardly gracious for me to enter into personalities and to examine in detail the work of contemporary craftsmen. I prefer to give four general reasons for the inferiority that I find in the American novel, four ways in which it is inadequate and not to be considered in the same class with the best foreign work of the day. And I am thinking only of the more representative and serious novels, not of that machine-made product which the weekly and monthly magazines provide by the million words. For that is a commercial, not an artistic product, and has nothing to do with the question, although in passing I may point out that America without the aid of protection leads the world in this sort of manufacture — machine-made fiction. I am

concerned with the sincere efforts for vital self-expression in the novel form, not with commerce.

In the first place, our novels are weakly sentimental. As a people we have always been excessively sentimental beneath our practical surface. Among the great mass, sentimentality is one of our blind spots, and "the mass" here does not imply poverty or ignorance. "The Rosary," which might justly be described as the most sirupy concoction of current years, found its immense market among American women. But we are no longer as sentimental as the novelists think us to be: at least, our more intelligent readers are fast losing the vice. The tone of public discussion, the note of the newspaper world, no longer has the sickly sentimentality that has characterized it largely since the Civil War. Our charities no longer dare to put forward the sentimental plea. The vice conditions of our cities are not only being exposed with sensational candor, but are being met with unsentimental efforts at reform. When we consider the verdict of the press and of the people upon the McNamara case, we cannot be accused of the maudlin, sentimental squint that has often made our criminal procedure a farce. But with all the evidence of a growing appetite for healthy fact, sentimentalism persists in our novels. We sentimentalize in them success and business warfare; above all we sentimentalize our women — both the amorous relation of the sexes and the home. One of the benefits we may expect from the present woman movement is that American women will rise in resentment and kick over the false pedestal of chivalrous sentimentality on which (in our novels) American men have posed them inanely for so long.

But sentimentalism dies hard. It is an insidious disease inherited through romance from the miasmatic mysticism of the Middle Ages. It has proved peculiarly corrupting to art in all forms, because it is the easy means of gaining an immediate popular appeal. Therefore sentimentalism should be fought hard wherever it makes an appearance.

Until we as a people are able and willing to look all the facts of our civilization in the face and recognize the unpleasant as well as the "pleasant," until we demand in our literature the same strong tonic of clear-sighted truth that we get from science, we shall remain morally flabby — soft. What can we expect of a young man or woman who accepts the prevailing type of serialized novel in our magazines as a true or desirable picture of life? As a people, we are far more mature than our novelists assume: we have a clearer vision and a sterner temper. Publishers say that our novels are no longer read by adult persons. The commercial product, at any rate, is manifestly designed for the consumption of the young person. That is a great pity, for a virile literature must represent both a man's world and a woman's world — with the interests and the values of maturity.

Again, our novels are weak religiously. For the most part, they avoid altogether the religious side of life, perhaps as unfit for the tired reader in his hour of relaxation; and at the best they represent a conventionally or negatively religious social world. In a few cases, survivals of the New England tradition, they iterate the old Puritan themes of sin, self-sacrifice, and regeneration. The Puritan tradition is dead, however: for good or for bad it no longer expresses the spiritual life of the people. Yet there is abundant religious feeling in America. We have always had a strain of transcendental mysticism, cropping out in the least expected spots, developing latterly into Christian Science and other healing cults. The ancient creed of Catholicism still has a vital hold, especially in the cities, and the older Protestant creeds have some influence in the smaller towns. It is perhaps not surprising that these formal religions have not shown their influence in our literature. For as a people, our attitude towards the whole subject of religion has fundamentally changed. We demand increasingly an effective religion — a religion that shall have its *point d'appui* on this terrestrial abode. Moreover, American life is becoming peculiarly

paganized, yet without renouncing a vital religious interest. It is not a sensual or self-indulgent paganism, but a vital, active, effective paganism, with a popular creed that might read like this: "Life is good! I desire to make it better. For me life is here and now, and what I can do to make it better must be done here and now, and done not by prayer and fasting but by strong deeds." All our interest in social betterment, which is literally immense, is permeated with this spirit at once scientific, pagan, and mystic. But very little of this spirit gets into our novels. A lot of it gets into the novels of Mr. Wells and Mr. Galsworthy. In these writers are felt always the stirrings of a new social and religious world. Even when — as in "Ann Veronica" — the medium is one of gentle ridicule or irony, the new spirit is found just the same. As for Mr. Galsworthy, his work is saturated with social and religious speculation of the kind I am describing: his characters move always in an atmosphere of awakened social consciousness that is the special contribution of the creator. Our novelists still cling to the old individualistic string, — the story of the triumphant industrial pirate and his adventures with the stock market and incidentally womankind. Socialism, for instance, which in many of its protean manifestations is surely religious, is scarcely tolerated in the American novel. Our imaginative writers in ignoring it display the same ignorance of its meaning as have our two ex-presidents in their published utterances.

In the third place, there is our prudery in the sex realm. Nobody denies that sex is of profound importance in life. Probably more than half of the larger issues of living are affected in one way or another by the sex impulse — at least are colored by it. One can't persistently ignore half life, or give a sentimentally false interpretation to its phenomena with any hope of creating a human literature of enduring significance. It is easy to be misunderstood in this delicate ground, for we have somehow tied up four fifths of our morality in sex prohibitions, and any statement in opposition to

the conventional beliefs about sex at once arouses suspicion of gross immorality. No serious writer believes in encouraging "boudoir literature," which is unhealthy, nor in the deliberate exploitation of sex "problems" for the sensation that may be found in them. But he should not be forced by a prudish and fearful public opinion, which is not the opinion of the public, into dodging the sex side of life when it comes inevitably into the picture as I believe it must. There is, of course, the "young person." But the young man, if he reads at all, should read what his elders do, and as for the young woman, she will get less harm from "Madame Bovary" than from perusing one of our sentimental boy-and-girl serial stories. Unless she were neurotic and degenerate, she would get from Flaubert's masterpiece a truthful picture of sex relations that should give her a profound horror of emotional indulgence. From the American book she might get an entirely false conception of the healthy relations of the sexes, from which some day she must awake, possibly with a rude shock of experience. And in either case, man or woman, the young person must face the facts of life, no matter how much we sterilize the reading. All we need is more honesty in this matter, and that it seems to me we are fast learning, to the advantage of our novels and also of our essential morality.

Lastly, for a democratic people, as we call ourselves, we have a singularly unreal and aristocratic literature. The preoccupation of our popular novelists with the lives and the possessions of the rich, who perforce are our aristocrats, is something amazing. Even that much-read novel "The House of Mirth," which came near being the woman's epic of our day, betrays this unbalanced absorption in the lives of the privileged, with little or no shading of the commoner experience. American women must be held responsible for this aristocratic taste. They are still by far the chief reading public, and they prefer books about rich and luxurious people. Their favorite epic still remains the old barbaric one of the triumphant male who conquers the riches and the powers of

this earth, only to lay them at the feet of his loved one, chivalrously surrounding her with all the glories of his conquest, and rewarded by her with faithfulness and love. Another less childish epic is already emerging into sight — that of woman making her struggle for life and accomplishment, conquering in an honorably equal strife with her male comrades. Why does not some woman write that epic for us? The fact that our novels are written largely by women and for the entertainment of women, is in itself a weakening element in our literature. It would be idle to champion a male literature as opposed to a feminine one, but our literature should represent both sexes and interest both sexes. The man's conception of life ought to interest women, and what the woman feels about it ought to interest men — if true and not merely sentimental.

To return for a moment to the aristocratic aspect of our novels, wealth has been the great American fact for the past generation — the making, the conquest, the control, the disposal of money. The figures that have fascinated the imagination of our people have been the forceful men who have taken, often ruthlessly, what they wanted out of life, who have directed the economic energies of the race. The capitalist has been both our buccaneer and our epic hero. So we had for a time a great many business novels that described commercial struggles and money conquests. But this rich material of the pioneer days of capitalism was largely wasted: it never gave us one great epic figure, enduring, illustrative for all time of our predatory period. The future American will have to go to the magazine biographies of Gould, Rockefeller, Harriman, or Morgan to get the epic, not to our novels. The pity of it! For it was the one big theme of the past twenty years — the story of the money-maker, his inner meaning and his self-explanation. We are already passing out of that period of towering industrial creators: we have come to the era of luxury and trusteeship — the family life of wealth in the second and third generations.

And what we get of them in our novels is a profusion of motors, country houses, — Palm Beach and Fifth Avenue. We do not get the stories of the little people, and they make up the living of most of our ninety millions. As I have said in my previous article, our writers belong to the old stock; perhaps they too have been easily prosperous. The little people — not necessarily the submerged elements of society — have got themselves abundantly into modern English novels. It is often said that the experiences of the ordinary citizen are tame and his soul commonplace. The test of real imagination is the power to find the significant beneath the commonplace. At any rate, a literature to be truly national must concern itself with more than the prosperous classes — especially in a democratic society!

On these four grounds, then, among others, I find the American novel to-day lacking in importance, not really representative of our richest and most significant life. I find it thin and impermanent — and not a little shoddy. Naturally, in dealing with such a subject in this broad and generalized fashion, I am aware that I have ignored certain instances of genuine worth — signs, let us hope, of a fuller, richer development for our imaginative literature. It is a matter of private judgment with all of us as to how far I may be correct in estimating the trend of the current, as to how significant the scattered instances of serious effort to create less superficially may be. Unfortunately in America it must always be an affair of private judgment. For we have no criticism of literature worth the name. Criticism along with much else has been handed over to the daily newspaper. Our few journals professedly devoted to literary criticism have slight vogue and practically no weight in the utterance of their opinions. We have had no critic of recognized reputation since Lowell and seem in no haste to produce one. Our literary criticism remains a haphazard affair of personal taste, enormously laudatory, cocksure, and ignorant of all but the season's grist of books. Just how far this state of things may be

another ground for our inadequate creative performance it would be hard to say. Under the circumstances, the wisest course for the imaginative writer to pursue is to ignore all so-called criticism and do his best in his own way, untroubled by journalistic chatter.

Thus far I have been obliged to dwell rather insistently upon the negative side of the situation; and before concluding, it would be well to glance at the other side and try to see what there is of hope for us in getting a more vital, a more representative presentation of ourselves as a people in the imaginative record. There is, of course, much to be said on this side. Our reading public has expanded enormously of recent years, in spite of the motor car, and has become more discriminating and more intelligent as well as better educated. If it were not true that we are gaining in intelligence and discrimination, it would be depressing for us to go on pouring out of our colleges each year tens of thousands of young men and women, who presumably have made some acquaintance with ideas and formed some standards of judgment. The fact that the reading public tends to split up into many different circles, each one demanding its own kind of imaginative food, is another healthy sign of progress, although it has undoubtedly cut down the huge sales of a few popular books. The demand for the works of the more advanced foreign authors, which is now quite considerable in this country, is also an encouraging sign, because an appetite for mature and virile literature once formed cannot be satisfied with froth and frivol. To-day in all our bookstores are found the plays and novels of writers that a few years ago had to be imported specially from Europe. More broadly suggestive than these signs is the evidence of general improvement in the intellectual grasp of our people: they are thinking on tough political and economic problems, trying to realize themselves in this twentieth-century life, and the longer they do that the more insistently will they demand that life as they perceive it be portrayed in the fiction offered them. If

it cannot be said that in general the tone of our amusements has become more elevated, it is certainly possible to satisfy occasionally a more exacting taste at our theaters than ever before. Nothing moves by itself in modern society. Every interest helps in some way every other interest. To make a literature intelligent and virile, there must first be an intelligent and open-minded public, and somehow one feels that we are getting that faster than we are getting the literature. For we await the writer or writers keen enough to perceive the opportunity, powerful enough to interest the public in what it has been unwilling to heed, and of course endowed with sufficient insight to comprehend our big new world.

The material in that world is crying for expression — as rich human material as the creative artist has ever had. In place of the narrow individualistic epic of the "captain of industry," we have the social struggle. That struggle is already expressing itself confusedly in our political life, and from it must emerge picturesque and powerful types suggestive to the novelist. Hitherto our novels have scarcely dabbled in politics because for the most part we as a people have merely dabbled in politics. We are beginning now to understand that modern social life must be largely political, that each and all, including women, must take a hand in politics if we are to make our destiny something nearer the ideal than our fathers have made theirs. Already our political life is putting upon the screen certain enticing figures for artistic interpretation — not great heroes, perhaps, but Americans spotted with the weaknesses of our civilization and terribly human. Their types should not be lost in the ephemeral columns of the newspapers. As our less favored classes become more expressive, we may hope to hear from them and have imaginative pictures of those who have lived all their lives in the treadmill of American industrialism. Certain magazine studies of men and women in factory life are the harbingers of a more epic treatment of the labor

subject. Our literature will not continue to ignore for another twenty years the daily lives and spiritual experiences of four fifths of the people, nor of all those of stranger blood whom fate has placed in our social system. In this way, I foresee our novels coming to include the larger interests which occupy the thoughts of many of us. It will not be necessarily a "problem" or "thesis" literature: the imaginative writer ought never to make a propaganda of his social beliefs. But he should represent men and women as they are in the struggle of modern life, actuated by the serious ideas and ideals of their time, not solely as sentimental puppets preoccupied with getting married.

. . . . . .

As has been said before, we have the richest background in a purely human way that the story-teller ever had offered him. It abounds with new notes of character, of situation, of theme, of human drama. It is religious and pagan, selfish and generous, adventurous and mean, sordid and splendid, — at one and the same time. Our novels should reveal all that. They should reflect not merely the lives of the successful, the predatory, the indulgent, but also the lives of the small, the struggling, the obscure. They should give us not simply the sensual atmosphere of prodigal spenders, but the strong religious impulses moving in new ways to sanctify our lives. I say our novels — not *the* American novel, which is a figment of the newspaper critic's imagination. The newspaper critic seems distressed because he cannot find one book that displays all these powers and riches. He complacently discovers *the* American novel each season — the one that most nearly pleased him of the last consignment. Every year a number of these discoveries are proclaimed to be *the* American novel — the epic masterpiece of our civilization. But they quickly fall back into the ranks.

The truth is that we are not yet ready for the masterpiece, if we ever shall be, — if, indeed, one epic, no matter how

splendid, will ever serve for the complete record. Before that appears we must have developed a truly national spirit: our society must have a greater solidarity. We must be clearer about what we want to do, what we think about momentous matters, where we stand as a people. We must lose that excessive consciousness of our individualism that characterizes us now, and become more conscious of our nationalism. When in spirit and in purpose we are truly national, we shall doubtless create a national literature. The local and the individual will be merged in the broader type of the nation. Then we may speak of the American novel.

THE PURPOSE AND SPIRIT OF THE UNIVERSITY[1]

GEORGE E. VINCENT

[George Edgar Vincent (1864–) was educated at Yale and has had much to do with the administration of the Chautauqua Institution founded by his father, Bishop John H. Vincent. While serving as professor of sociology in the University of Chicago, he was in 1911 elected president of the University of Minnesota. Since 1917 he has been president of the Rockefeller Foundation. Though the Commencement address which follows is substantially that which was delivered at the University of Wisconsin in 1911, its characterization of the social aims of modern higher education, and its ringing challenge to youth for service to the commonwealth, make it peculiarly appropriate for study to-day.]

Modern students of human nature have changed the old saying, "Many men, many minds," into the new dictum, "One man, many selves." There is much talk of multiple personality. Our complex modern life reflects itself in a composite person. A man is said to have as many selves as there are social groups of which he feels himself a member. To maintain a business self which can look a moral self straight in the eye, to have a theological self on good terms with a scientific self, to keep the peace between a party self and a patriotic self, to preserve in right relations a church self and a club self — such are the present problems of many a man or woman. One way to escape embarrassment is to invite at a given time only congenial and harmonious selves, and to banish from the company the selves that are discordant and disconcerting. The strong soul is he who can summon all his selves into loyal team play. Personality is the name men give to this unity of the self, and purpose is the organizing principle. Only as many groups of thought and feeling are schooled

[1] From *Science*, June 30, 1911. Reprinted by permission.

into coöperation by a well-considered, steadfast aim can a man be master of a single self. To be sure, unity of a sort can be achieved by one who has a meager company of selves. Narrowness, provincialism, bigotry, describe a personality in which unity of purpose is won at a sacrifice of breadth, outlook, and sympathy. The highest type of personality grows out of many far-reaching selves which have been selected and organized into unity by a dominant purpose. It is no easy task to unify often divergent and conflicting impulses, habits, memories, and ideals into a harmonious hierarchy of aims. But such singleness of ideal and effort creates power. The man of purpose is not to be resisted. Every instinct and habit, every picture of the mind, every effort of the will, every emotion, fits into his scheme of things. He never wanders from the path which leads toward the end he has set up. He turns every opportunity to account. He foresees problems and is prepared to meet them. He confronts difficulties undaunted. He is master of a company ever devoted and responsive to command. The world submits to great men of single aim.

In many ways a human group, a family, a community, an institution, a nation, is like a personality. Hobbes saw the state as a vast Leviathan. Comte conceived humanity as an on-going continuous life which sweeps through the centuries. Bluntschli endows political society with the characteristics of a person. Contemporary philosophers attribute to society the mental and moral traits of a vast super-man. The analogy is not wholly fanciful. Just as purpose unifies the individual, so a common aim gives the human group a sense of solidarity. Social consciousness is the well-worn term for this thrill of comradeship. The sense of team play that makes the eleven or the nine an efficient unit gives us the type. Each individual sees the group as a whole, is aware of his own relation to it, knows that his fellows share his feeling, and counts upon them to act promptly for a common end. A group which cannot control its members and rally them in loyalty to a single aim lacks solidarity and effectiveness.

If the university, as an organ of society, is to gain strength of purpose, it must have a consciousness of its function and duty. Only by such sense of team play can individuals, departments, schools, colleges, faculties, classes, student groups, be fused into genuine unity and rallied to a common loyalty. In general, the university ideal is changing from the thought of personal privilege to the conception of social service, from a preaching of personal culture to a democracy of studies, or in another phrase, from culture to efficiency. This does not mean that colleges and universities have not always had some sense of social obligation. But too generally the privileges of higher education were for the favored few who by virtue of their special opportunities were set off from the masses of men. The growth of democracy has made new demands, has widened opportunity, has broken down the barriers of class. Even in the old world, and notably in the new, democracy has created schools, colleges, and universities, and has chartered them to serve the common welfare. The university has become, therefore, especially in this mid-western region, "the people's organized instrument of research," or as President Van Hise puts it, "the scientific adviser of the state." On every hand we hear variations of this central theme of social service. College presidents and men in political life, each group from its own point of view, insist upon this conception of higher education. In this view the university appeals to the imagination, it becomes an organ of the higher life of the community and the state, it connects itself at every point with the industry, commerce, social conditions, educational interests, ideal purposes of the commonwealth.

The university as a social agent is intrusted with certain standards of the community, standards of scientific method and of truth, standards of technical efficiency, standards of cultural attainment, standards of personal character and of civic duty. It is only through the creation, the guarding, the elevation of these standards that material and spiritual progress is possible. The university becomes a trustee of ideas and

ideals, a custodian of standards. In the administration of these standards the university cannot sacrifice the common welfare to individual need or desire. It must exclude those who fail to meet the standards of attainment and character which the university administers. Favoritism, faltering, compromise, cowardice mean betrayal of a social trust. Nor may the standards of the university be provincial and temporary. In the words of President Hadley, "the university must be judged by the standards which have held for all time rather than those of a single generation, or of a single profession." The imagination kindles at this thought of a university exalting the tests of truth and character by which society slowly gropes toward higher levels.

When the mind is possessed by this vision of the university, all the careers for which it provides training take on the dignity of social worth. Vocations which have been thought of as individual widen into literal calls to be servants of the common life. The office of the teacher, the function of the physician, the work of the engineer, get their higher meaning from their value to the community. The profession of the law, so often thought of as a field for personal exploitation, is in its true significance a social service. "We lawyers," declares Woodrow Wilson, "are servants of society, officers of the courts of justice . . . guardians of the public peace, . . . bond servants of the people." The scientific farmer is in one view seeking personal gain, but in a much deeper sense he is diffusing knowledge and skill and is raising into higher esteem fundamental industry which makes modern society possible. The college graduate who has received the training men are fond of calling liberal may no longer regard himself merely as a member of a privileged class. In the new spirit of *noblesse oblige* he must recognize his obligation to his fellows and to the community; must remember that "life is not a cup to be drained, but a measure to be filled." Such is the ideal purpose which summons the modern university to unity and comradeship in the service of the common life. When this vision fills the minds of all,

when it controls their conduct, when it stirs their emotions and carries them steadily forward to loyal achievement, then the university gains an irresistible power and becomes a true expression of the higher purposes of the state, the nation, and mankind.

The university fails of its purpose if its students do not catch the inspiration of the common ideal. To generous-minded young men and women this thought of the university must make appeal. It is the duty of the institution to fix this image of the university in the imaginations of its students. From the day they enter to the day they leave, this dominant purpose, this persuasive spirit should grow ever more potent and fascinating. It would be well if students could begin their college life with formal ceremony, so that at the very outset they might feel more keenly the social obligations they are assuming. Admission to the university should seem to them initiation into a high calling. It is a pity that they should begin for the most part thoughtlessly or with minds fixed solely upon personal aims and plans. The state is calling them to her service. She has a right to insist that only those who are in earnest, who have at least a dawning sense of social duty, should seek admission to the public training which can be justified only by its service to the state. It should be made clear that no one has the right to demand admission as a personal privilege. Conformity with technicalities of entrance must not blind us to the moral obligations involved. Out of the common fund to which all citizens contribute, the state erects and maintains not for personal advantage but for public good this West Point of science, the arts, and the professions. Every matriculant, therefore, by virtue of admission is honor bound to meet the state halfway in her desire to prepare soldiers of science for the battles of peace. The university must unhesitatingly rid itself of individuals who are indifferent to intellectual work or hostile to it. After fair test, those who fail to show their sense of the university's purpose must be dismissed. This is necessary not only in justice to the state,

but in fairness to those who show due appreciation of their opportunities and duties.

The dominant university purpose gives a proper setting to the activities of student life and to the standards and conduct of the groups into which the student community naturally falls. The contacts of daily association and searching tests of comradeship, the discovery and development of leadership, the give and take of social intercourse, the healthy recreation of undergraduate life — all constitute an environment which may afford admirable discipline. There is large truth in the assertion that the university is the world in miniature and that it offers a social training which will be turned to account in the wider life of the community. But all these activities must be tested by the dominant purpose of the university. The question must always be, Is this or that out of harmony with the ideal of the university as an organ of the common life? Does this student demonstration or that rollicking festivity create in the public mind the feeling that the university is living for itself and not for the community; does it foster the belief that the university is not dominated by the motive of service; does it create the suspicion that students ignore or forget their duty to the state which is making their self-preparation possible? This is a vital question. So with the student groups that play so large a part in academic communities. Are these groups working loyally for the common welfare, have they due regard for the fundamental things of university life, are they actuated by a sense of responsibility for their members, do they cultivate tolerance, justice, and good will? These are questions which individuals and groups must constantly put to themselves and answer frankly and honestly. The good name of the university is safe only when its members feel an obligation to further the common purpose to make the university a true organ of the whole people.

So long as this spirit prevails, no sense of arrogance, of exclusiveness, of privilege or caste will enter the minds of its members. The old distinction of "town" and "gown," the

traditional attitude of superiority toward those outside the walls of the academic cloister, these things have no place in an institution dominated by the spirit of social service. Every man and woman of the commonwealth becomes in this view a supporter and patron of the university, and may expect from it good will and loyal service. If to say that the university belongs to the state is anything more than phrase-making, every member who has imagination, the power to see the institution in its real relationships, must feel the genuine humility of one who would faithfully serve his fellows.

If the university is to fulfill its function, it must carry conviction to the people of the commonwealth. It must impress them with its purpose, make them see it as a faithful agency of the people. The men and women of the state must not think of the university as an institution which, because it has public support, should lower its standards to admit the weak, indifferent, or incompetent, or to graduate those who have failed to reach the minimum of attainment. People must not think of the university as a place in which personal influences can secure special privilege. Rather they must regard it as fearlessly loyal to the common welfare, true to high standards of scholarship, truth, efficiency, character, and judgment. They must not ask or expect special favors from this servant of the whole democracy.

If the university purpose is to be achieved, the institution must seek special ability wherever this is to be found. It would be a calamity if only sons and daughters of the rich and well-to-do could gain access to higher training. Talent and genius ignore the distinctions of wealth and class. A way must be found by which young men and young women of great promise, however they may be hampered by poverty, may gain access to the social training of the university, and be freed in large part or wholly from the self-supporting work which makes the best scholarship impossible. We must believe that men and communities will catch this vision of the university and by providing scholarships see to it that no

exceptional ability shall be deprived of development for the service of the commonwealth. The university would lose its power and its ideals if it ever became a place of privilege for the well-to-do and not a training school for all who have talents and capacities for which the state has need. The controlling ideal, the mastering purpose of the university, therefore, is not a mere phrase or conceit; it is a guiding principle which finds application to every individual, to every group, to every activity of academic life, and organizes these into the strength and unity which only a common aim can confer.

Purpose steadily pursued creates a persuasive spirit, registers itself in institutional character. Open-mindedness must be a conspicuous trait of a true academic community. The very search for new knowledge, the effort to see the relations of things, presupposes an attitude of inquiry, a willingness to look at an idea or a fact from many different standpoints. Open-mindedness toward truth merges into tolerance and mutual respect as between the individuals and groups who make up the university. Narrowness or prejudice, a patronizing attitude of one group toward another, the discrediting of this calling as compared with that, the limiting of the conception of research to traditional fields of inquiry — these things have no place in an institution mastered by a sense of loyal duty to commonwealth and nation. Genuine culture consists largely in sympathy with many kinds of men and in insight into the widest ranges of human life. To live in a highly specialized community and to enter with appreciation into the activities of one's colleagues in many fields is in itself a liberalizing experience. There is place for generous rivalry in a great university, but this rivalry must be kept on a high level and not allowed to sink into unworthy conflict and discord. Open-mindedness, tolerance, high-minded rivalry cannot fail, under the guidance of a controlling ideal, to fuse the university into a genuine unity of comradeship and good will. When each man and each group can see, not only through its own eyes but through the eyes of other persons and groups,

the common problems of the institution, there must develop a keener sense of team play, a quickened loyalty, a more vivid corporate consciousness.

The university, a servant of the common life, exalting standards of efficiency and worth, summoning its members to a common task, must stand for the loftiest ideals. It must inspire enduring faith. It must exalt character above technical skill, mental alertness, refinement of feeling. It must lay hold of the fundamental motives. The university rightly aims at leadership, but in the words of Dr. Pritchett, it can win this

> only by inspiring the youth of the democracy with a true, vibrant living faith. . . . The American university is to-day the home of that faith. It is the faith of humanity in humanity . . . and the American university, which embodies the intellectual aspirations of a free people, is becoming day by day the representative of their spiritual aspirations as well.

The state university cannot fulfill its true function unless it rises to the higher level of spiritual idealism. It may not ally itself with any church or support any one theology, but it must draw its inspiration from an essentially religious view of life. As the Sir Thomas More's Utopians tolerated many theologies of widely varying kinds, but united in common worship of the divine energy back of all nature and human life, so the university welcomes men and women of many faiths and rallies them to a devoted loyalty to common ideals of duty, service, and reverent aspiration.

In the "Republic" Socrates, in talking of testing the young for leadership, declares,

> We must inquire who are the best guardians of their own conviction that the interest of the state is to be the rule of all their actions. We must watch them from their youth upwards and propose deeds for them to perform in which they are most likely to forget or be deceived, and he who remembers and is not deceived is to be selected and he who fails in the trial is to be rejected.

The gentle sage goes on to describe the tests of toil and pain, the tests of fear, the tests of seductive pleasures, and he tells us that

> He who at every age as boy and youth, and in mature life, has come out of the trial victorious and pure, shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the state. He shall be honored in life and death, and shall receive sepulcher and other memorials of honor, the greatest that we have to give.

The essentials of life and character have not changed since the days when Socrates talked of truth and justice in the groves of Academus. You graduates to-day go forth to be tested. You have in varying measure the vision of the university, the sense of obligation which your training lays upon you. You must hear, be it ever so faintly, the call to be servants of the commonwealth. Put to yourselves the question which comes down through the centuries, can you hold to this conviction that the interests of the community should be the rule of all your actions? You will face intellectual sophistry and beguiling fallacies. Have you the keenness of mind and the force of character to analyze these specious assertions and to hold steadfastly to things that are true and enduring? You will be tested by fear, fear of financial loss, fear of ridicule, fear it may be of social ostracism. Have you the courage and character to preserve your convictions of loyalty to the general good? You will be lured by pleasure, dazzled it may be by luxury and ostentation, tempted to self-indulgence and evanescent pleasures. Have you the fiber to resist these appeals and to remember that the social servant must be ever strong, clear eyed, and faithful to his work?

May you hold to the vision you have caught: may it with the passing years grow ever clearer, brighter, more commanding in your lives. The university sends you forth to-day with God speed, intrusts to you the good name of our widening community, summons you to loyalty, urges you to organize all your resources of mind and spirit into the unity of a high

aim, the firm resolve to realize in your own lives the masterful purpose of the university which is to be in ever fuller measure at once the standard bearer and the servant of the state.

Go to your work and be strong, halting not in a world of men,
Balking the end half won for an instant dole of praise.
Stand to your work and be wise — certain of sword and pen,
Who are neither children nor Gods, but men in a world of men.

MILITARY CHARACTER[1]

YATES STIRLING

[Captain Yates Stirling, United States Navy (1872–), was educated at the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis and has served in the navy since his graduation in 1892. He participated in the Spanish-American War, served in the Philippines during the insurrection, and in 1913 commanded the submarine flotilla of the Atlantic Fleet. He has written many technical articles on the navy and several books for boys ("A United States Midshipman in the Philippines," etc.). The present selection discusses those moral qualities which from a military and naval standpoint may be considered the chief aims of education not only at West Point and Annapolis but in any educational program of the present day.]

"A high moral courage capable of great resolutions. A physical courage which takes no account of danger. A man who is gallant, just, firm, upright, capable of esteeming merit in others without jealousy," — this is Jomini's definition of a leader of men.

The great leaders each possessed moral power and intellectual power to a high degree. Of the two, moral power is by far the more important. Moral power, or strength of character, is usually a product of heredity and early training.

For a military leader qualities of character that have the greatest weight are decision and good sense. He must have clearness in conception and energy in execution. History offers many examples to show that after decision one of the qualities of leadership which contributes the most to success is stubbornness.

Napoleon was fond of declaring to his less decisive commanders: "Before conceding the victory let us wait until

[1] From "Fundamentals of Naval Service." Copyright, 1917, by J. B. Lippincott Company. Reprinted by permission.

it is snatched from us. Before retiring let us wait until we are forced to do so."

John Paul Jones on board the sinking *Bon Homme Richard*, engaged in a death struggle with the *Serapis*, when asked if he had struck, stubbornly answered: "I have not yet begun to fight." Moral power won for him the victory.

General Grant betrayed this important characteristic of military character when he announced, "We will fight it out on this line if it takes us all summer."

A leader, to be able correctly to use his natural moral power, must be thoroughly versed in his profession, and thus obtain the necessary confidence in his ability to succeed in any undertaking. Knowledge alone is not enough; he must have frequently applied his knowledge to cases; in other words, solved and executed problems dealing with the elements and principles of his profession.

Napoleon, before his campaign in Italy, had thoroughly trained his mind for war, yet he had not acquired that supreme self-confidence which afterwards made him the boldest leader of history. This boldness came to him gradually through the practical experience of handling armies in the field. It was not until the great victory at the bridge of Lodi that he fully realized his great ability as a general, and gained a self-confidence that seemed impossible of resistance.

"The Articles for the Government of the Navy," popularly known as the "Articles of War," define the standard of character of a "Gentleman and a Naval Officer" in the following words:

"The Commanders of all fleets, squadrons, naval stations, and vessels belonging to the Navy are required to show in themselves a good example of *virtue*, *honor*, *patriotism* and *subordination*."

Possessing these four cardinal qualities of character will not assuredly produce a leader, yet they are necessary ingredients in leadership. No man can be a truly great leader without all of them.

VIRTUE signifies the quality of manliness, manly strength or valor, courage, bravery. Can any one doubt that Cæsar, Hannibal, Alexander, Nelson, Napoleon, St. Vincent, Farragut, John Paul Jones, Sampson, or Dewey lacked these?

"Add to your faith virtue and to your virtue knowledge" is an excellent receipt for military character. Also bear in mind that "The brave man is not he who feels no fear, but he whose noble mind its fears subdues."

A famous military leader when going into battle could not control his legs, which shivered so as to make him fear others would observe them and believe he was afraid. He is said to have been overheard saying: "Tremble, legs, but if you only knew where I am about to take you, you would give way under me."

Virtue demands strong spirit and precludes the weak and vicious; it produces the kind of men that command respect and attention everywhere and at all times. With virtue as a foundation *honor* erects a high sense of duty. It gives the possessor a subconscious understanding of what is right and just. From honor, loyalty, fair dealing, and faithfulness to trust naturally flow. Honor causes a person in the performance of a duty not to look for reward or punishment, but to scrupulously execute the task for the task's sake.

PATRIOTISM is the motive binding us all together in one great cause. It gives unity to action. The virtue in the civil administrators, the heroism and self-sacrifice of the soldiers and sailors, flow from a custom acquired by men of considering their nation as an entity. They delight to identify themselves with its fortunes, share in its triumphs, and mourn in its disasters; ever looking to a future when the nation's destiny will be fulfilled. This noble idea of "Country" represents a heritage of sentiments, of traditions, of thoughts, of common interests. Patriotism is fundamental. We must learn in our childhood to cherish and defend this most sacred of all national ideals.

A nation in whose citizens the virtue of patriotism is securely implanted is of consequence strong, vigorous, progressive.

Without this ideal, a nation will be weak and spineless — two traits of national character which inevitably lead to national death. Patriotism becomes a passion which burns undiminished. It exerts the strongest influence for unity; it is the moving force in war; it is the ideal for which sailors and soldiers cheerfully die, their beloved national anthem upon their lips.

All great leaders understood the power of patriotism and seldom missed an opportunity to arouse it in their followers. If an army or a fleet is blessed with a true leader, patriotism often centers around the personal magnetism of that leader. He becomes the embodiment of the ideal of patriotism. It is said that Napoleon's presence upon the battle field, in the effect it had upon the morale of his soldiers, was worth 30,000 men. Nelson was given the value of three ships of the line.

SUBORDINATION, the quality or habit of obedience, is indispensable in a military service. Subordination is an essential quality to regulate the relations of subordinates to their leaders. Without subordination in a community chaos will reign supreme.

Burke glorifies this attribute of good citizenship in words so stirring as to appeal to every patriot: "That generous loyalty to rank and sex; that proud submission; that dignified obedience; that subordination of the heart which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom."

Virtue, honor, patriotism, subordination, will, self-confidence, all go to make up military character. Yet there is another and most important attribute for leadership; it is the "willingness to take responsibility."

The courage of responsibility is a glorious and divine gift, which alone enables a high-placed general to achieve great results; for, if his experience and intelligence are not sufficient, he finds shrewd helpers to supply his deficiency. Courage of responsibility is born of a certain magnanimity which must be inherent in the general, and which ennobles his whole nature. It is a feeling of superiority which elevates without making presumptuous. It is moral

courage and strength of mind in high development, schooled to endure the severest trials without unsettlement of the power to reason clearly, and without swerving from the great end in view. Thorough knowledge enhances security, steels self-confidence, and so gives calmness under responsibility. Ignorance and uncertainty undermine it, destroying the power to act with decision under stress. — VON DER GOLTZ.

Every leader worthy of the name must be prepared to accept responsibility for the acts of his subordinates.

AMBITION, the soldier's virtue, is a valuable military attribute. It is the desire to excel, to be *first*, and with it there will be continuous and unflinching effort to succeed. "Great deeds are impossible without ambition."

Other contributing attributes to leadership are patience and resolution in order to "meet with triumph and disaster and treat those two impostors just the same."

IMAGINATION puts the crowning glory upon the head of a leader. It is the creative force. Napoleon attributed his inspirations to memories called up by his imagination.

Will, ambition, and a love of fame, blended with creative powers (a trained and imaginative mind), result in an irresistible activity.

Military history teaches that in nearly every battle, character, morale has been the determining factor. We accept the statement readily. But the remarkable fact is that in spite of the known determining value of superior morale, of superior military character, and especially of the value of superior military character in those who command, no systematic and continued effort has been made in our service to examine the ways of creating superior morale, of creating a high average of military character in the service.

We understand academically the several attributes which go to make a leader of men, but we seem to take for granted that these factors are innate and cannot be developed. That this is not true has been shown by many writers on military history.

Military character is a product developed by gradual and prolonged application. It does not shine forth except after profound studies and in its beginnings, like every creature that tries to walk, it is obliged to follow a guide on whom it leans. The true genius differs from other men in this, that he may soon dispense with his guide to become in his own turn a creator. Yet a genius never ceases work on his own mind. He constantly builds by the untiring effort of a will that has an end in view.

A study of the life of Napoleon shows that his genius was so developed. Education, the will to learn, the concentrated life-long effort, the clear perception of the mission, the application of the knowledge and experience gained, all joined in an individual of exceptional attainments, served to produce the greatest military genius of modern times.

If such a genius found such measures necessary, if he had to endure the labor of preparation to insure achievement, no man can be justified in believing he can succeed with lesser effort.

Education first of all must ever be considered the foundation for genius, the principles underlying cause and effect; a clear comprehension of past events. With these there must be a precise formulation of one's own ideas, and lastly exercise in application.

Military and naval operations require more than mere loyalty. In a large mixed force of battleships, cruisers, scouts, destroyers, submarines, and auxiliaries, going into action against an enemy's fleet, there is no time for the supreme leader to attend to every detail of the impending battle. Subordinates must appreciate the situation and act appropriately for themselves. It is therefore evident that in war the forces of mentality and character enter most frequently and are the dominating forces. Subordinate leaders must act to oppose the enemy at every point. To do this effectively they must act upon their own initiative. Not independently, but in coördinate effort. The quality required is called "trained

initiative." It must be based upon knowledge — knowledge of their profession and the plan of the supreme leader. Trained initiative implies loyalty, not a mere personal loyalty, but a loyalty to the plan, to the end to be accomplished.

"Whoever is loyal, whatever be his cause, is devoted, is active, controls himself, is in love with his cause, and believes in it."

Loyalty aims at unity. Full knowledge is a necessary essential for true loyalty. A subordinate leader with full knowledge of the plan of the supreme leader uses his trained initiative and loyally furthers the aims of his chief. The aim, the end to be reached, must ever be held before his mind's eye; an act which does not further that end is disloyal.

Loyalty to the supreme leader must be coupled with loyalty from that leader to all his subordinates.

Napoleon's "system" meant merely that his subordinate leaders thoroughly understood the plans, intentions, strategy, and tactics of their chief. They had been indoctrinated and taught by Napoleon himself; the workings of Napoleon's mind were plain to such soldiers as Davout, Bernadotte, Lannes, and Murat. They possessed the trained initiative coupled with loyalty to act for the furtherance of Napoleon's aims. "A word to the wise is sufficient." Each understood the "system," and they by united and continued effort, without restricting directions from their chief, won for him Austerlitz, Jena, Wagram. Napoleon was loyal to such captains. When he ceased to be loyal, when through mistrust in their loyalty and ability he failed to make known his plans, then his "system" broke down and battles were lost. Even the genius of Napoleon could not give directions at every point of a battle field, and subordinate leaders cannot act to further a plan whose end in view is not known nor understood. "They do not understand my system," Napoleon is quoted to have said. Why? Because he had not freely confided in his subordinates. No man can be fully loyal either to a cause or a plan without a full understanding of it. The desire to be loyal

is insufficient; it must be augmented with knowledge to guide loyal effort.

Loyalty naturally involves a surrender of a measure of individualism. Proper loyalty in the military sense should not lessen individual worth, but, on the contrary, should enhance it.

Self-assertive independence is suppressed, but individual judgment and initiative find themselves encouraged.

To be great within his own authority and prepare for being great in a higher area should be the true aim of loyalty.

To inspire his subordinates with loyalty, a leader must have their full confidence. He must instruct them thoroughly and carefully in his plans of action, feel sure that each one understands them clearly and that all know what results are desired, what end is in view. And in addition to this and equally as important, he must let his subordinates feel his confidence in them and fully realize the limits of their own authority in order that they can be prepared to act with promptness and decision.

The following is quoted from a paper written by a young lieutenant of the Fleet upon loyalty. It is particularly interesting in view of the intimate knowledge of conditions portrayed:

We have all seen unexpected failures of ships officered by capable men that could only be explained by a lack of team work. Conversely, in seeking the secret of some very successful ships manned by officers of only average abilities, we could only conclude that they had merged their efforts. Who has not seen the divisional officer who could not look beyond his own division? Who has not seen the chief engineer who, immersed in his own department, failed to consider the ship as a whole? A most vital tactical error is to send one's forces into action piecemeal; similarly, disjointed action in the everyday affairs of the ship will certainly ruin her.

A condition such as might exist on board ship through disjointed action of subordinates must be laid at the captain's

door. He has failed in his loyalty, either through sheer laziness or else through lack of confidence in his subordinates, in not making plain his plans and his aims and encouraging his subordinates to join him as subordinate partners in a common cause.

DECISION OF CHARACTER. — We have frequently heard it said of men in high places, "He lacks decision of character." What do we mean to convey by this expression? "Sway over others is before all else founded upon WILL. He who knows best how to give the most definite expression to his will leads." This is axiomatic and the description fits our expression "decision of character." Knowledge reënforced by practice, thoughtful consideration, a decision, and then *will* or stubbornness in execution, — that is decision of character, and he who possesses it will rise high in a military profession. In the navy there is no place for an indecisive man. He is a destroyer of unity, of confidence, and he fritters away valuable time. He dissipates his own energy and the energy of his subordinates through "resolutions adopted, rejected, resumed, suspended."

Who is there who cannot recall such indecisive characters — a man occupying a position of responsibility and trust who could not give a decided answer to the least important question where action was concerned? Instead he would hide behind such answers as "I'll think it over" or "I'll take it under consideration."

Decision of character is the habit of dealing with each situation as it arises with a prompt, clear, and firm reply as to what shall be done and the manner of doing it. It is a habit and requires cultivation by practice.

In the cultivation of this valuable habit, a habit most important for any man who is in a position of responsibility, no matter how unimportant the position may be, the first thing to consider is, "What is the task?"; then, "What are the obstacles in the way of its accomplishment?"; further, a knowledge of and a careful weighing of the means at hand for

overcoming the obstacles. The reasoning mind by a method of pure logic is then ready to give the reply. This process of reasoning is long and laborious to the novice, who has not the knowledge of either the obstacles or the means at hand of overcoming them. Knowledge and practice overcome these difficulties. A trained mind can "estimate a situation" with the speed of thought; his "decision" or reply comes so quickly after the question is put to him it would appear almost that he had rendered his reply without reasoning. But such is not the case; his mind "short circuits" from the recognition of the task to the decision as to the manner of its accomplishment merely because the mind is trained. The reasoning becomes subconscious and such reasoning has the speed of light itself.

"The man who seeks decision of character should decide knowingly if he can, ignorantly if he must, but in any case he should decide."

INITIATIVE is of two kinds: (1) The power to make starts. (2) To act upon one's own responsibility in order to help the cause of the Chief.

These two should not be confounded; it is the second which is of most importance in a military service. It is called *trained initiative* and has been casually discussed above. We are now going to elaborate more fully upon the fundamental attribute.

Thorough and systematic study, education, in other words, in order to be able to grasp the principles of the art of war, naval or military, must be the base rock foundation upon which this initiative can be built. Without a clear understanding of these principles, initiative must inevitably lead to a disorganizing independence.

We all know that a boy of eight or ten years cannot be given complete initiative; why? Because the moral and material principles of life have not yet been learned. If we could confine his experiments in initiative in reasonably shallow water, and near enough home, it would be the most salutary experience for him to let him take his own risks and get,

figuratively speaking, capsized. Thus he will learn the wind's treachery, the water's danger and discomfort, and his own poor judgment and insufficiency without losing his young life, or, what is worse, his developing character. He needs to buy as cheaply as possible the necessary experience of failure which will tone down his willfulness, develop his caution, cultivate his dexterity in handling his own craft (himself), practice his judgment and his quickness of decision, and give him thus a working knowledge of the world.

For the navy, and those who will join in time of war, this initiative must be acquired in time of peace through frequent practice.

It is a very old saying that "We learn from our failures, not our successes." No one should be ashamed of a failure that occurred through a lack of knowledge, which was through no fault of his. Yet do not depend upon learning the many lessons through the failures of yourself alone; profit by the failures of others. This was the method of all great leaders.

We have seen that as a base foundation for the development of military character we must obtain our knowledge of war from both historical study and experience during peace. In war, character comes to the front quickly, but in peace many officers having the qualities of great leaders lie fallow, awaiting only the call of opportunity.

VII

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

THE INTERNATIONAL MIND: HOW TO DEVELOP IT[1]

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER

[Nicholas Murray Butler (1862–) is one of the most prominent figures in American education. He was educated at Columbia University, served there as professor of philosophy and education, and has been its president since 1902. His writings embrace "The Meaning of Education" (1915) and "True and False Democracy" (1907). He is the editor of *The Educational Review*. The address below was delivered at the first session of the National Conference on the Foreign Relations of the United States at Long Beach, New York, on May 28, 1917. It was first published in the Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science for July, 1917.]

For two generations it has been a common complaint that the people of the United States took no adequate interest in foreign policy and were without any but cursory knowledge of international politics. This judgment has been expressed, often publicly, by successive secretaries of state, by those who have held important diplomatic posts, and by those who, in the Senate of the United States, have seen long service upon the Committee on Foreign Relations. A sort of national self-centeredness together with a feeling of geographic and political isolation have combined to bring about this unfortunate state of affairs. It has been unfortunate for two reasons: first, because it marked a serious break with our earlier national tradition; and second, because it has held back the people and the government of the United States from making the full measure of contribution of which they were capable to the better and closer international organization of the world.

[1] From "A World in Ferment." Copyright, 1918, by Charles Scribner's Sons. Reprinted by permission.

One need have but slight acquaintance with the writings and speeches of the Fathers and with the records of the early Congresses to know that, when the government of the United States was young, it was the eager ambition of those who most fully represented it to play a large part in the international life of the world, primarily with the view of advancing those ideas and those principles in which the people of the new American republic believed and to which they were committed. Benjamin Franklin was our first great internationalist. Alexander Hamilton, of whom Talleyrand said that he had divined Europe; Thomas Jefferson, whose public service in Europe was quite exceptional; as well as Chancellor Livingston, John Jay, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, John Quincy Adams, and Henry Clay not only knew western Europe, but were known by it. In making endeavor, therefore, to increase the interest of the American people in foreign relationships and in international policy we are but asking them to return to one of the finest and soundest of national traditions.

Our national self-absorption has held us back, too, from playing an adequate part in the development of that international organization which has long been under way and which the results of the present war will hasten and greatly advance. Despite these facts, and chiefly because of the high character and ability of those who represented the United States at the two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the American contributions to the deliberations and recommendations of those notable assemblies were most important. Indeed, when the record of history comes to be made up, it may be that those contributions will be judged to mark the beginning of a new epoch in the world's history.

The Conference which now assembles to consider and discuss the international relations and the international policies of the United States is a beginning and only a beginning of a campaign of education and enlightenment which is to continue until there has been developed among all parts and sections of our land what I ventured some years ago to describe

as the "international mind." The international mind is nothing else than that habit of thinking of foreign relations and business, and that habit of dealing with them, which regards the several nations of the civilized world as free and coöperating equals in aiding the progress of civilization, in developing commerce and industry, and in spreading enlightenment and culture throughout the world. It would be as inconsistent with the international mind to attempt to steal some other nation's territory or to do that nation an unprovoked injury or damage, as it would be inconsistent with the principles of ordinary morality to attempt to steal some other individual's purse or to commit an unprovoked assault upon him. The international mind requires that a nation and its government shall freely and gladly grant to every other nation and to every other government the rights and the privileges which it claims for itself. From this it follows that the international mind is not consonant with any theory of the state which regards the state as superior to the rules and restrictions of moral conduct or which admits the view that to some one state is committed the hegemony of the world's affairs for the world's good. When that doctrine prevails and takes hold of the conviction and the imagination of a great people, an issue is presented that cannot be settled by vote in conference, that cannot be arbitrated by the wisest statesmen, and that cannot be determined by the findings of any court. The authority and the value of each of these modes of procedure is challenged by the very issue itself. Therefore resort must be had to armed force in order to determine whether the international mind, shared by a score or more of independent and self-respecting nations, shall prevail or whether the arms of a non-moral, all-powerful, military imperialism shall be stretched out over the whole round world for its government and its protection. It is to determine this issue that the world is now at war.

Should the cause of imperialism, by any chance, win this war, the people of the United States would find it quite unnecessary for some time to come to concern themselves with

foreign relations and with foreign policy. Those matters would be taken care of for them, by a power that had shown itself strong enough to overcome and to suppress internationally minded men and nations. On the other hand, if, as we confidently hope and believe, the issue of this war is to be favorable to the free self-governing democracies of the world, then the people of the United States must address themselves with redoubled energy and with closest attention to those matters of legislation, of administration, and of general public policy which constitute and determine national conduct. The first task of this conference and of every similar conference that may be held hereafter is to drive this lesson home.

When this task is undertaken, it will speedily appear that our government is not well organized at the moment for the formulation and prosecution of effective international policies. The division of authority between the national government and governments of the several states raises one set of problems. Action under the treaty-making power of the national government raises another set of problems, particularly since there is not yet a substantial unanimity of opinion as to the scope and authority of the treaty-making power itself, or as to the proper and effective means which should be at the command of the government of the United States for enforcing among its own people adherence to a treaty obligation into which, through their government, they have solemnly entered. The difficulties with which we shall have to contend are, therefore, not alone difficulties arising from present lack of popular information and present lack of popular interest in international policies, but they are also those which arise from the structure and the operation of our own form of constitutional government.

That the old secrecy of diplomatic action has gone forever is a happy circumstance. This secrecy was well suited to the making of conventions between ruling monarchs or reigning dynasties, or between governments which represented only very select and highly privileged classes. It has no place,

however, in diplomatic intercourse between democratic peoples. The people themselves must understand and assent to international policies and contracts that are entered upon and executed in their name. Otherwise there can be no assurance that these policies will be executed and these contracts observed; for without foreknowledge on the part of the people of that to which they are committed there can be no successful moral appeal made to them to keep their word and their bond at a later time when an opposition may arise between principle and immediate self-interest.

We are assembled, then, to help begin a movement which must not cease until the entire American people are interested in their international relationships, their international position, and their international influence. When that shall have been even measurably accomplished, the people themselves will be quick to bring about such changes in the form of their governmental structure and in their administrative procedure as will enable them honorably and finely to maintain their place, not as a nation that lives to itself alone, but as a nation that shares with every other like-minded nation the desire and the purpose to improve the lot of mankind everywhere, and to carry into the uttermost parts of the earth those hopes, those principles, and those forms of governmental action that are best adapted to giving man the fullest opportunity to make himself free, and to be worthy of freedom.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY[1]

ALBERT SHAW

[Albert Shaw (1857–) was educated at Grinnell College (Iowa) and at Johns Hopkins. In 1891 he established the *American Review of Reviews* and has been its editor ever since. He has written books and articles on political science, economics, and municipal government. The article which follows was an address delivered at Long Beach, New York, on May 30, 1917, before the National Conference on the Foreign Relations of the United States and is valuable for calling attention to the "larger vision" of the Monroe Doctrine which has become merged in Pan-Americanism.]

The power and persistence of ideas lie at the base of all historical movements. Policies have a tendency to form themselves around doctrines and theories, and in due time precedents begin to support policies and to reflect credit upon doctrines. The Monroe Doctrine has run some such course, until now the tendency has been to glorify it as well as to accept it. In order that hope may not die within us and that pessimism may not paralyze our power to press forward, we are compelled to believe that the millennium is about to dawn, that the great war of nations will end in the near future, and that in the happiness of a world peace we shall somehow find solutions for all the problems hitherto unsettled. I like to indulge in these rosy, optimistic dreams, although I have observed too much and studied too widely to suppose that in plain reality a great war will have enlightened all understandings, chastened all spirits, and made everybody at once right-minded and true-visioned.

[1] From *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, July 1917. Reprinted by permission.

We shall continue to live in a world that is highly unequal in its stages of development. Some parts of the world will be much more unfinished than other parts. The future will have very difficult questions to deal with that are not involved in the present war. Nevertheless, if many great things that we deem righteous and just can be established at the end of this war, the future course of progress and civilization will be rendered accordingly less difficult. We shall have our western-hemisphere problems, but we shall also, I hope, have found improved ways of dealing with them.

I should like to say a few words upon the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to a far larger doctrine that had been earlier proclaimed and that persisted in the convictions of some of the men concerned with the Monroe Doctrine's formulation. The political teachers of the eighteenth century, who were the mentors and prophets of the revolutionary period, not only proclaimed their doctrines of the rights of man and of political and social democracy, but they also held firmly to the doctrine of world organization. Europe lost the great vision and entered upon a period of unrestrained nationalism after the collapse of the Holy Alliance. But the American leaders, notably Jefferson, kept alive both parts of the great conception of the revolutionary reformers. That is to say, the authors and defenders of the Declaration of Independence not only stood for democracy, but also believed in the confederation of democratic sovereignties and in the abolition of international conflict.

Thus our American union of states was consciously built upon both parts of the great conception of a reformed political life for the world. The first part was the democratic rule of communities, and the second part was the confederation of sovereign states. In both parts we have made a marvelous success of the practical demonstration. This success was based not merely upon the doctrines themselves, but also very greatly upon wisdom and generosity at moments of crisis. Two great steps stand out among others. Hamilton's leadership in

securing the assumption of the revolutionary debts of the states by the confederation as a whole was most admirable in its effects. Still more important was Jefferson's leadership in persuading Virginia to cede her western lands, with the result that the Northwestern Ordinance gave us a series of magnificent states while pointing the way toward creating the group of states south of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi. The conceptions embodied in the Northwestern Ordinance have been projected across the continent. They have given us forty-eight sovereign states, not by any means of equal size and importance, but sufficiently alike in their averages of population and resources to constitute a true and permanent sisterhood of commonwealths.

It was because of the persistence of this great conception of democratic self-government in the particular states with the common interests of them all merged in the higher structure of the confederation, and with a higher machinery of justice to deal with possible misunderstandings between them, that Jefferson could see no necessary limit to the extension of a system thus firmly based upon human equality and universal education. He expressed the opinion repeatedly that a confederation thus formed might expect in due time to comprise the whole of North America and ultimately to include Central and South America.

Canada has, indeed, had a different history thus far from that which both British and American statesmen had anticipated until a very recent period. Yet the course of things in the Dominion of Canada has not, upon the whole, been widely divergent from that which Jefferson and others had predicted. The great northwestern areas have been divided into states, in each of which — as in Manitoba and the rest — there is now to be found a thoroughly modern and strictly democratic government, with all the attributes of autonomy. The Canadian states, from the maritime communities of the east to British Columbia on the west, are united in a confederacy that is quite in harmony with the Jeffersonian conception. So

closely akin are the essential principles that control the individual states and the Canadian confederation with the principles that control our individual states and our union, that there is visible an increasing harmony between the two halves of the North American continent. There is practically little more danger that Michigan will quarrel with Ontario, or that Minnesota will quarrel with Manitoba, than that either Michigan or Minnesota will quarrel with Wisconsin. I hope and believe, however, that in case of a quarrel, as over a boundary line, there may in due time be an authoritative tribunal as between Alberta and Montana, so that the diplomatic methods of the past that dealt with the Maine boundary and the Alaska boundary may be superseded by an institution more analogous to our Supreme Court. Suffice it to say that North America has upon the whole worked out fairly well the eighteenth-century conception of the democratic autonomy of states and the confederation of neighboring commonwealths extending over continental areas.

Jefferson and the men of his time undoubtedly realized that democratic institutions could not be so easily developed where people were lacking in homogeneity or were made up of races lacking in education and unequal in economic development and position. Yet those statesmen of the revolutionary period had supreme faith in democracy, and they were not so contemptuous of the so-called inferior or backward races.

The Monroe Doctrine was inspired by two things: first, a large vision; and second, an exigency of statesmanship. I shall not, I am sure, be thought to touch upon matters of historical controversy when I ascribe the Monroe Doctrine to Jefferson in so far as the larger vision is concerned. His correspondence with Monroe affords all the evidence that one needs. For the statesmanship of John Quincy Adams I have the most unqualified regard, as also I have for the Pan-Americanism of Henry Clay and those of his school. The independence of Latin America was favored by our political leaders and thinkers in the United States as the great preliminary step.

There were also those in Latin America who cherished the earlier ideals of the French Revolution, and who believed both in democracy and in the federation of states for the preservation of peace. It was plain enough that even with admirable paper constitutions prescribing democracy, it would be a painful task to build up the intelligent and capable body of democratic citizens without which mere paper institutions cannot give freedom or security. But Jefferson, Adams, Monroe, and their contemporaries believed that Latin America would have a better future if it were free to go on in its own way creating through arduous experience the reality of a series of democratic republics, than if it were brought back under the yoke of European colonialism by the united military and naval efforts of the emperors of the Holy Alliance and the Spanish crown.

It is true that the nature and the motives of the Monroe Doctrine have been construed in different ways at different times by statesmen in Europe, in South America, and in North America. These different constructions have been due chiefly to practical problems involving the possible application of the doctrine. It can never be rightly or fully understood, however, unless one keeps in mind not only the historical circumstances but the political doctrines and the large visions under which it had its origin.

I repeat, then, that the conception of the American union of self-governing states was in no small measure the outgrowth of that still larger conception of world federation and perpetual peace that German and British thinkers, as well as French and American, were entertaining in the latter part of the eighteenth century. The Monroe Doctrine was intended to save the whole of the western hemisphere for the processes of democracy and interstate organization, for the abolition of war and the promotion of the concerns of the common civilization.

I have never had much respect for that view of the Monroe Doctrine which has made foreigners think of it as a sort of

Yankee jingoism. Doubtless at certain times and in certain aspects our own national interests have been involved in the assertion that Europe must not meddle in western-hemisphere affairs. We have desired to keep the western world from becoming militaristic, and in this sense we have helped to make the Monroe Doctrine a success. From the Straits of Magellan to Baffin's Bay and the Northwest Passage, there has been no state or community that has founded itself upon the doctrine of military power as against its neighbors. For a region so relatively undeveloped in natural resources, and so far from maturity in the creation of its bodies politic, South America in recent decades has been singularly free from the din of arms. Brazil, Argentina, and Chile have learned to be good neighbors; and there is little evidence anywhere in Latin America of the existence in any country of a party or a leadership that has in mind the securing of a dominant position as among neighbors by the militarizing of national resources on the European model.

It was precisely to prevent the growth of such military policies, and to encourage friendly and helpful inter-relationships among the American democracies, that the men of Monroe's time took their stand against the extension to the western hemisphere of the European system of exploited colonies. The survival of that system in Cuba remained as an awful example and a standing justification of the principles that Monroe and Adams enunciated and that Mr. Canning seems to have supported.

It is necessary, I think, to have this larger vision in mind in order to judge at times of the value of practical applications. It happens that the confederation of our forty-eight sovereign states becomes relatively less a confederacy of sovereigns, and relatively more a national union of subordinate parts, simply because of the great homogeneity of the older American stock and the wide distribution of our newer immigrant elements. But for these facts the states would be relatively more individual and the union would not absorb

power quite so easily. I am making this remark because of its relation to the future of entities that have distinct populations. Thus, Porto Rico can derive security and much economic and social progress from her place in our confederation while exercising democratic self-government according to the genius of her own people and with the enjoyment of her own language and customs. Cuba, in turn, can, for purposes of international policy, derive benefit from a limited connection with our confederacy while working out her own destiny as a self-governing people. I am of opinion that the two principles of democracy and confederation may also secure for all of the Central American states, and even for Mexico, some advantages from special or limited partnerships in our confederation, with full freedom of domestic evolution.

As respects the larger nations of South America, the Monroe Doctrine has become for them and us merely a family concern. As against European imperialistic assertions, we may indeed at times have been justified in declaring that ours was the place of leadership in the western hemisphere, and that we would make it our business to see that no small American state should be treated by any European empire as Serbia was treated in 1914 by the government at Vienna. But, as among ourselves in the western hemisphere, it was not the purpose of the Monroe Doctrine to create or set up a position of overlordship. Much less was it any part of our doctrine that Europe must find her spheres of interest and exploitation in Asia and Africa in order that we might have the western hemisphere as our sphere of commercial or political exploitation. So far as Brazil and the other larger and more stable republics are concerned, the Monroe Doctrine is to be interpreted as one of mutual help and good understanding. We seek increasing friendship with our South American neighbors and rejoice in their progress and welfare.

It is entirely in accord with the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine that the Pan-American Union has been established, and that

the various Pan-American conferences have been held from time to time. Our interests in the European struggle were identical with those which we asserted in the period of the Monroe Doctrine. We stand now, as then, for Democracy, Liberty, non-militarism, and friendly adjustments for all international differences. We have joined in the war against Germany, not to help one set of European powers obtain the advantage over another group of powers for selfish reasons of their own, but because the interests of all the American republics, as of democracies everywhere, were imperiled everywhere by the methods which Germany had adopted, and by the doctrines and policies that Germany and her allies were supporting with an organized application, such as the world had never seen, of science and skill to military ends.

The Monroe Doctrine was a part of that larger message of peace, democracy, and universal friendship that the best thinkers of modern times had delivered to Europe and America in the latter part of the eighteenth century. With many blemishes, but faithful in the main, North America and South America have gone forward trying to realize in practice those great dreams of Democracy and International Peace. Over against these high doctrines, announced in the eighteenth century by utilitarian philosophers and Christian moralists alike, we are now combating the destructive and hideous doctrine of the right to dominate in the affairs of the world by unrestrained force.

The object of the Monroe Doctrine was the peaceful evolution of Democracy in the western hemisphere. Our particular interest in the war against Germany is in strict fulfillment of the aims of the Monroe Doctrine. We are fighting for the rights of Democracy and the claims of International Peace. Fundamentally, the whole of the western hemisphere, South America no less than North America, had become imperiled by the doctrines and methods of Germany and her allies. The cause of the United States in this war, therefore, is also

the cause of Brazil and other South American republics. We are entitled to the moral support, if not to the physical aid, of all the members of the Pan-American Union. If in this crisis the western hemisphere shall see alike, it will be fortunate indeed for the future relations of the United States with the sister republics of South America, and the communities of the mainland and of the islands around the Caribbean.

OUR LATIN-AMERICAN POLICY[1]

RICHARD OLNEY

[Richard Olney (1835–1917) was educated at Brown and Harvard universities and was a member of President Cleveland's Cabinet from 1893 to 1897, first as Attorney-General and then as Secretary of State. The chief incident of his term of office was the Venezuela Affair, in which the United States by a rather tart note induced Great Britain to refer her boundary dispute with Venezuela to arbitration. The present discussion is valuable for showing clearly the chief recent development of the Monroe Doctrine since President Wilson took office.]

Twenty years ago a practical application of the Monroe Doctrine seemed to be called for and was made. Subsequent events have not weakened it, but rather enlarged its scope and increased the esteem in which our people hold it.

The relations between the United States and the countries of South and Central America — commonly spoken of collectively as Latin America — have as a rule been friendly, though not intimate. Those countries on the one hand have relied for their commercial and financial connections almost wholly upon Europe and treated their relations with the United States as mostly official and perfunctory. The United States, on the other hand, has viewed those relations in pretty much the same way, while until within a very short time our capitalists, producers, and manufacturers have failed to realize the advantages of trade and intercourse with the peoples of the South American continent. The one marked exception to this condition of things has been the Monroe Doctrine — a policy whereby the United States declares itself prepared to resist any aggression by a European state upon the independence or territorial integrity of any other American state.

[1] From *North American Review*, February, 1916. Reprinted by permission.

The policy simply means protection and security for any other American state, and, maintained and exercised in good faith, cannot easily be objected to by any other American state. In that view it is a policy directed against Europe only, and until recently it represented our entire Latin-American policy.

Within a short period, however, the United States has developed a distinctive rule of action in respect of Latin America, which in one sense certainly is in the interest of Europe and not against it, and whose only connection with the Monroe Doctrine is the desire and purpose of the United States to avoid any clash with Europe over the practical application of the Doctrine. Perhaps what has been done in the course of developing the new policy may be considered as a tacit acknowledgment and acceptance of the claims of European jurists and statesmen that if the United States assumes to protect the political independence and territorial integrity of other American states it must see to it that such states abide by and perform their international duties and obligations. At all events, that is what the United States has been doing and is doing with the acquiescence of European states in various well-known instances. Instead of standing by and looking on while a European state enforces its international rights as against a lawless or defaulting American state, the United States has intervened, has in effect warned the European state concerned off the premises, and has itself caused international justice to be done. It has undertaken the protection of the lives and property of Europeans when threatened by riots and revolutionary movements. It has exacted indemnities and penalties for injuries suffered by them, and has collected debts for European states and their citizens by occupying ports and collecting and applying customs revenues. In cases of this sort it has, in effect, charged itself with duties and trusts analogous to those devolving upon the receiver of a bankrupt corporation.

Consequently, whether the supplemental policy above sketched is or is not the logical and inevitable sequence of

the Monroe Doctrine, it is now no longer aimed at Europe only, but also trenches upon American states themselves. It is a policy, indeed, which as respects such states impairs their independence. It does not alter the case that the intervention of the United States in the manner described may be for the best good of such states. Such intervention is in clear conflict with the basic principle of international law, which asserts the absolute equality *inter sese* of all states, great and small.

But our Latin-American policy, hitherto practically limited to the Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries, has necessarily taken on a wholly new development by reason of our acquisition of the Panama Canal and the Panama Zone. The United States is now a South American power, with extensive territorial interests acquired at immense cost. It holds the Canal in double trust — on the one hand for the people of the United States, on whose behalf it is bound to make the operation of the Canal efficient and, if possible, fairly remunerative; on the other hand for the world at large, on whose behalf it is pledged to give to all nations the like facilities in the use of the Canal upon equal terms. In both relations it has assumed to protect the Canal against all assaults from every quarter, whether they come in the shape of military invasion or of economic competition. Hence, on the one hand the United States has fortified the Canal and will undoubtedly take all other measures necessary to protect it against military attack. Hence, on the other hand the United States has initiated measures looking to the preëmption of all other routes practicable for a rival canal.

It sufficiently appears from these premises that the Latin-American policy of the United States now has the following objects:

First. To secure every American state against loss of independence or territory at the hands of a European Power, as means to which end the United States will resist aggression by such Power by force of arms, if necessary, while, in

the case of the weak and backward states, removing any excuse for such aggression by itself seeing to the performance of their international duties;

Second. To secure its interest in the Panama Canal by whatever military measures may be appropriate or necessary; and

Third. To protect its interest in the Panama Canal and Zone by whatever measures may be appropriate and necessary to prevent unjust and ruinous competition.

These being the general objects aimed at by our present Latin-American policy, what is the best and most obvious course for the United States to pursue in order to insure their accomplishment? The efforts of the present Administration for the pacification of Mexico distinctly point the way to the course to be pursued. The striking feature of those efforts is the coöperation between the United States and South American states. That the coöperation has been highly beneficial to all interests concerned is unquestionable, and, should normal conditions in Mexico follow, as now seems probable, it must be largely credited with the result. Nevertheless, and however more or less valuable such coöperation in this particular instance, its chief value lies in its tendency to introduce into our Latin-American policy a new and important factor, which in all respects — ethical, political, and practical — should operate decidedly to the advantage of the United States and all American states.

Our Latin-American policy as represented by the Monroe Doctrine has always been woefully weak at one vital spot. The United States, the originator of it so far as America is concerned, failed to receive any substantial support for it from Great Britain except for a comparatively short period. Ever since, the United States has been the sole asserter and sponsor of the Doctrine. The other American states have been content to enjoy its advantages while in no way assuming any share of its burdens. Realizing that the United States assumes those burdens not from benevolence but from

considerations of self-interest, they have no special reason for gratitude, and as a rule exhibit none. On the contrary, the more they have gained in wealth and general importance, the more their pride seems to take offense at a doctrine which, in a degree at least, makes them stand to the United States in the relation of wards to a guardian. Further, the proceedings by which the United States has felt constrained to compel some of the smaller and less advanced American states to perform their international duties have unquestionably excited uneasiness in all. They feel those proceedings, however temporary or however beneficent in purpose and result, to be distinctly menacing and to indicate purposes and ambitions on our part quite inconsistent with their dignity and safety as independent states. This feeling has been greatly intensified by the lawless violence which robbed Colombia of its territory for the purpose of the Panama Canal enterprise. It thus comes about that, in its relations to Latin America and Europe respectively, the United States now figures as a self-appointed guardian of the independence of the one and the self-appointed guarantor of the rights of the other — both the guardianship and the guaranty being submitted to rather than desired, and neither gaining for the United States any special consideration or reward — while our glaring invasion of Colombia's sovereignty makes us "suspect" in the eyes of all Latin America. A futile attempt to remove or lessen the suspicion led to the ex-President's suggested qualification of the Monroe Doctrine already noted. This situation is obviously anomalous and unnatural and cannot be expected to last. The best practical solution of its difficulties as already intimated would seem to be indicated by the course of the present Administration in its handling of the Mexican situation. For the rôle of sole dictator of affairs on the American continent as now undertaken by the United States, there should be substituted cooperation between the United States and the other principal American states for the promotion and protection of their

common American interests. In short, what is to be desired in place of the present unsatisfactory status is a Concert of American states, with powers, objects, and means of accomplishing them defined with all practicable precision. The detailed provisions of any plan for such Concert it is unnecessary now to consider. But certain of the great objects to be attained have already been indicated. The Concert would put all American states behind the Monroe Doctrine, so enlarged as to mean the protection of every American state not only against European aggression but against foreign aggression from whatever quarter. The discretion of the Concert would decide when in the common interest it was necessary and proper to so far invade the independence of any particular state as to compel it to recognize and perform its international duties, and would also determine by what state or states the decision of the Concert should be enforced. And, the United States having become an important South American as well as North American Power by virtue of its construction and ownership of the Panama Canal — a purely American enterprise world-wide in its significance and consequences, and which the United States proposes to carry on not merely for its own account, but as trustee for all nations and peoples — the Concert would unquestionably make appropriate and adequate provision for its security and defense against all dangers, whether military or economic.

The advantages of the Concert for the accomplishment of these several ends are apparent. In place of being a self-constituted agency, the Concert would hold credentials from a practically "United America" as represented by the states the most populous, the most powerful in material resources and military strength, and the most advanced in all the constituents of modern civilization. It would wield an authority well-nigh irresistible, not merely because of its superiority in physical forces, but because the diverse interests, policies, and rivalries of the many states concurring in a result would be a practical guaranty that the end in view

was the general interest of the whole Concert, and not the special interest of any particular state. It would follow that as a rule, and except in extraordinary cases, a mandate of the Concert might be expected to be self-executing and not dependent upon the use of physical force for its effectiveness.

Still another important advantage of such an American Congress remains to be stated. The Monroe Doctrine is without recognition in international law. It exists as a policy of the United States, firmly settled at this moment, but subject to change at pleasure. But an established Concert of American states on the lines and for the purposes already outlined might well challenge recognition as coming within the purview and entitled to the sanction of international law. A Federation of the World — a Parliament of Man — may be a dream. But if it ever becomes a reality, it will be by a process of gradual approach and as the result of a merger in a world-wide unification of many groups of nations which, through geographical proximity, racial affinities, common institutions and modes of thought, have been led to form themselves into local federations for the attainment of certain common ends. In the last analysis, the true basis of international law is the usages and practices of the great civilized states of the world. As those usages and practices necessarily change with the advent of new conditions, international law, which is a progressive science, also changes in order to meet the new conditions. It cannot be doubted, for example, that the conception of the absolute equality of states and the unconditional independence of each is now displaced by the conception that every state is perforce a member of an International Society of States and by virtue of that relation both acquires rights and assumes obligations. The whole International Society is in theory at least the common superior by which the rights and obligations of each member should be determined and enforced. In point of fact, of course, and while the logical status is perfect, there has been no world-wide organization of civilized states and no action

by them as a whole. On the other hand, international controversies often arise which are local and limited in their nature and in which only a group of states has a substantial interest.

In such cases, long-established international practice seems to justify the conclusion that the particular group concerned may legitimately settle such controversies even if the settlement involves overriding the resistance of a particular state. The principle applied in every such case is of course the general welfare — the greater good of the greater number — the common interests of all the members of the group rather than the special interests of one or a few members. The many instances in which groups of European states have thus settled controversies between their members, always on the plea of acting for the good of the whole group, are too well known to need citation. That their decisions have often been criticized and sometimes with only too much justice may be admitted. Yet on the whole the operation of the various European concerts has been considered to be beneficent especially in their tendency to prevent wars between the members of a group. For that reason and on the grounds already stated, and because there can be no useful and effective coöperation between states for common objects unless each can be made to subordinate its special interest to the general interest, international law must be regarded as acquiescing in the authority of a group of states to control the actions of its members whenever there is a real exigency calling for such control and provided always that the authority is exercised in good faith, by the use of reasonable and appropriate means and with all practicable regard to the rights, interests, sentiments, and traditions of the several peoples concerned. Tried by such a test, an American Concert established for the objects and with the purposes already stated, and providing for their accomplishment through strictly necessary and appropriate agencies, might confidently contend that principle as well as

the usages and practices of civilized nations amply justify its existence and purposes. Obviously no rule of international law can be violated by an American Concert undertaking to protect every American state against European or other foreign aggression. So it is difficult to contend that such a Concert's intervention in the affairs of an American state with no other aim and no other result than to bring about the performance of international duties is not calculated to strengthen the ascendancy of international law rather than to weaken it. And it is yet more difficult to believe that an American Concert for the maintenance and security of the Panama Canal should not be recognized as a fit subject for the protection of international law — on the contrary, as a neutralized canal inuring to the benefit of humanity at large, the Panama Canal might well be held as matter of international law to be under the guardianship of each and all of the civilized states of the world. Modern writers on international law concur in the principle which is thus stated by one of them — "Canals which connect great bodies of water and are international in character, modify the course of the commerce of the world, and their status is therefore a matter of international concern."

If opinions may differ as to the merit of any or all of the foregoing suggestions, there surely can be no difference as to the necessity of determining with the least delay practicable what our future Latin-American policy is to be. "Preparedness" for defensive war is demanded by the country notwithstanding the immense burdens it entails. It involves many besides strictly military problems, and among them one of the most serious is for what contingencies we are to prepare and for what causes we are to be ready to fight. Shall we preserve unchanged our traditional attitude as the champion of every American state against foreign aggression without regard to its consent or request or its preference to take care of itself or to seek some other ally than the United States, and without regard to the surely

incurred hostility of the aggressive foreign Power? It has often been claimed and sometimes effectively asserted that the United States in its own interest and for its own welfare must firmly resist any surrender of independence or cession of territory by an American state to a foreign Power even if the same be entirely voluntary. Suppose, for example, that an American state undertakes to permit an oversea Power to plant a colony on its soil, or to convey to it a port or a coaling station, is the United States to resort to war, if necessary, in order to defeat the scheme? These are only some of the inquiries which go to show the necessity of a speedy and comprehensive revision of our Latin-American policy. The replies to them involve possibilities which must be taken into account in any intelligent estimate of the kind and measure of military "preparedness" the United States ought to initiate. Obviously our "preparedness" means one thing with the coöperation of Latin America secured through the American Concert suggested, and a wholly different and much more difficult and burdensome thing without such coöperation. The difficulties of arranging such a coöperation are not to be underrated. Yet the exigencies of the situation are apparent and threaten not merely the United States but all American states. It is matter of self-preservation for each — and each should realize the vital interest it has in supporting a Concert which is formed on lines broad enough to cover all measures essential to the security of all, which is wholly defensive in nature, and which carefully abstains from any unnecessary impairment of the sovereignty of each.

THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS[1]

BAINBRIDGE COLBY

[Bainbridge Colby (1869–) was educated at Williams College and practices law in New York City. He was one of the founders of the Progressive Party in 1912, and is now a member of the United States Shipping Board. The following is an address delivered in May, 1917, before the National Conference on the Foreign Relations of the United States. It is valuable for its emphasis on the importance of economic factors in international affairs, especially as illustrated by the policy of the "open door."]

The supreme concern of mankind is justice. This is the aspiration of democracy, not only in its internal but in its international relations. Justice not only demanded for ourselves but freely accorded to others.

This is the keynote of President Wilson's epoch-making appeal to the nations of the world. This immortal address constitutes not only a satisfactory declaration of the principles for which we entered the Great War, but it is the latest and most authentic expression of the spirit of democracy. The inviolability of treaties, respect for nationality, the right of development along self-evolved and national lines, obedience to the promptings of humanity, in other words, international justice — these are the salients of his definition of democracy's aims and of the democratic ideal in international relations.

But nations are animated not only by theories but by conditions. And it is well for us to remember that a nobly defined ideal does not necessarily meet or vanquish a robust and persistent condition. The issue of the Great War is familiarly

[1] From *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, July, 1917. Reprinted by permission.

defined as between autocracy or militarism on the one hand, and democracy on the other. But militarism or even autocracy, odious as they are, are only different lines of approach to, or treatment of, underlying conditions in the world.

I think it may fairly be said that the ailment which afflicts the world is economic and not exclusively political. The trouble with the highly industrialized nations of the temperate zone is that they cannot produce what they need to consume, and they cannot consume what they need to produce. The populations of the industrial nations are steadily growing. The nations of western Europe in a century have doubled their population. Germany is adding a million per annum to her population, and the United States even more. The nations of western Europe cannot produce the means required for their subsistence. They have not the agricultural basis which yields them their requirements in food and raw materials. These indispensables of national life must be obtained beyond their borders. They must, in other words, be purchased, and the means necessary to the purchase are manufactured products, which must greatly exceed in amount what the domestic market of the producing nation can absorb. From this universal need of nations, *i.e.* food and raw materials on the one hand, and a market for products on the other, arises the value of colonial possessions, particularly in the unexploited and highly productive regions in the tropics and the Orient.

These regions are in large part peopled by nations whose titles to the lands they hold are unassailable, yet the people are lacking either in industry or ambition, and the productive possibilities of their lands are incapable of realization unless the popular energies are marshaled and directed and even supplemented by the more progressive and colonizing nations. The world needs their produce, the life of Europe demands their raw materials, and mere rights of nations can with difficulty make a stand against necessities that are so imperious. There has thus arisen an economic imperialism, of which, strange to say, the most democratic of nations are the most

conspicuous examples. England throughout the world, France in Africa and the East, are deeply conscious of the relation to their industrial vigor of colonial expansion.

Economic advantage seems to follow in the wake of political control. It is the mother country which builds the railroads in the colonies, controls port privileges, fixes tariffs, and secures to her nationals the out-distancing advantages which make alien competition impossible. Theoretically this may not be true, but in practice it is uniformly true. Of Algeria's exportations seventy-nine per cent are to France, and eighty-five per cent of her imports come from France.

As the industrial nation grows in population, the pressure upon her means of sustenance increases, her need of raw materials grows greater, and she turns a ranging eye throughout the world for the means of satisfying this internal pressure.

Here is the motive of wars, here is the menace to world peace. And it is with reference to this condition, prevalent throughout the world, that we must determine the attitude of democracy in its international relations.

This economic pressure is but beginning to be felt in the United States, but its premonitory symptoms are already seen. It is only a question of time when our complacent sense of security will give way to a realization that our vast agricultural basis is not vast enough to sustain our even vaster industrial development. We shall then feel, if not so acutely as sister nations in the east, at least as truly, the need of expanding markets and enlarged sources of raw materials, if not of food.

The spiritual aims of democracy, so perfectly defined by the President, will have to encounter the imperious economic necessities which drive all nations, which cannot be stayed, and which refuse to be silenced. The freedom of the seas, respect for international boundaries, observance of treaties, obedience to international law, recognition of the dictates of humanity — in short, all the aims which animate America and her allies in this great war, do not in and of themselves contain the promise of a complete tranquilization of the world. To end

wars requires that the sources of international friction should be reached. The repression of barbarism, the punishment of ruthlessness, constitute a sufficient but only an immediate objective of the world's struggle. It is, of course, the primary undertaking of civilization, and once achieved, our thought and our effort must go forward in aims that are more far reaching. Our goal must be the destruction of the economic root of war — in other words, to establish an economic, not only a political, internationalism, a community of interests, even if qualified and incomplete, among great nations. The American policy of the open door in colonial administration must find acceptance in the world if mankind is to emerge from the perennial menace of war.

TUTORING THE PHILIPPINES[1]

CHARLES H. BRENT

[Charles H. Brent (1862–) was born in Canada and educated at Trinity College, Toronto. From 1901 to 1917 he was the bishop of the Episcopal Church for the Philippine Islands and was closely identified with the progress made by the Filipinos after the American occupation. In 1911 he was president of the International Opium Conference at the Hague. Since the entrance of the United States into the World War he has been appointed a major in the United States Army and put in charge of all Protestant Chaplains of the American Army in France. This candid article is especially valuable for its clear exposition of the application of American democratic ideas to our dependencies.]

In the course of a recent discussion of the Philippine problem, I was asked by one of our most eminent educators of the senior generation, whether any instance in history could be cited where one nation had successfully tutored another in self-government. My answer took the form of a counter-question — Can an instance be adduced where the full experiment has been tried, except so far as our own nation has done so during the last two decades? No reply was made.

By tutoring in self-government was understood the effort of a country to develop to the uttermost the latent capacity of a backward dependency, with a view to bringing it to nationhood and launching it with all the responsibilities and prerogatives of a new unit of government in the world of men. I believe that this can be successfully done and that the result of our labors in the Philippines testifies to the fact.

Great Britain, whatever her deficiencies, has been the most just friend of weak and backward people that history has known. The part she has played in their development and

[1] From *Yale Review*, July, 1917. Reprinted by permission.

protection has been replete with noble elements, especially during the last half-century. She has consistently put her dependencies and colonies to school, carrying them from the kindergarten to the higher grades, but she has always stopped short of graduating them into independent statehood. In every instance, her frankly declared objective has been not their independence but their continued and, in a sense, increased dependence. Her whole viewpoint has been imperial: her first concern has been the well-being of the empire, and her second, the individual aspirations and desires of the dependency. Of course, her statesmen would claim that what was good for the empire was good for the dependencies, and that it was more profitable all the way round to develop a strong dependency within the empire than a weak nation outside of it. That, however, is not to the point. Even if it be true that the British Empire came into existence through a fit of absent-mindedness, it represents, with its famous *pax Britannica* and its network of colonies all over the world, one of the noble monuments of history, quite capable of justifying its principles and its main methods. But the question at stake is not whether Great Britain is a structure of magnificent proportions and beneficent influence. It is whether she or any other European power has ever set as the goal of a dependency ultimate self-government and used all her wisdom and resources to compass that end. I am aware of no such instance.

The outstanding example of the British government's educational and philanthropic ventures among alien peoples is its administration, for more than a quarter of a century, of Egyptian affairs. It was doubtless for Egypt's sake that the country was occupied, but it was still more for the benefit of the empire. An effete and bankrupt nation, under Great Britain's firm discipline and beneficent schooling, renewed its youth and credit in a remarkably short period. But the moment Egyptian nationalism reared its head, it was, to use mild language, discouraged. That is to say, the educational

terminus ad quem came short of the ideal of independence, and the child was kept in the schoolroom. The late Lord Cromer, Egypt's greatest friend and servant, a man whom history cannot fail to place high on the roll of statesmen and administrators, was of the opinion that there was lack of capacity among the Egyptians to come up to the requirements of a modern independent state. In 1905 in reply to my categorical question — Will Egypt ever be able to govern herself? — he gave an unqualified negative. Recently Great Britain has found it necessary to denude Egypt of even the semblance of independence.

. . . . . .

In the case of Cuba, America's occupation was too brief to be immediately effective. Nevertheless, however short it was, it represented a period of administrative education without which Cuba could not have so soon become a tolerable neighbor. Between the moment when the American flag went up on Morro Castle, and the Cuban flag took its place, a period of four years, America was tutoring Cuba in self-government. Popular education was begun, departments of government planned, and standards of political integrity set. Cuba, because of her history, her proximity to the American continent, her comparative freedom from heterogeneous elements of population, her territorial compactness, was at once put into an advanced class and given her degree of independent statehood early. A short post-graduate course was administered later. Now the new republic seems to have settled down to sober business and bears perpetual witness to America's purpose to promote the interests of small or weak nations and her aptitude as a teacher in self-government. Her case stands alone in history.

The Philippines presented a vastly different proposition. Situated ten thousand miles away; composed of the broken territory of an archipelago; with a diversified population widely scattered excepting in an occasional congested district

such as Cebu; with no common language, save among a small percentage where there is a babel of dialects; devoid of a native literature; disturbed by internal troubles; with a stubborn fragment of the people wild and unorganized, and a Mohammedan *tertium quid* traditionally hostile to the Christian population, — with all this to face, the problem presented by the pupil to the teacher was baffling.

Even before the process of restoring public order was well under way, the symbol of democracy, the schoolhouse, made its appearance. In 1901, the year in which civil government was established, a veritable army of American schoolteachers was drafted into the Philippine service. The training of Filipino teachers was begun at the earliest possible moment. In 1913, there were in the Department of Public Instruction some 9500 teachers, of whom 658 were American, the balance, of course, being Filipino. This is noteworthy, for it indicates that the purpose of the United States was sincere. There can be no successful experiment in democracy where free education for all does not prevail. And the converse is true — where there is a strong public school system, democracy will surely take root. The progress of education marks the progress of democratic ideals and principles, that is to say, of self-government. There never yet was a republic in more than name that had not an instructed commonalty, either in Central or in South America. And where the franchise outruns the intelligence of the voters, you have bureaucracy among officeholders, manipulation of voters by corrupt and self-seeking politicians, and a debased governmental system from top to bottom. You cannot teach men how to vote merely by extending the franchise, as we know to our sorrow in our own country without looking further. It is not merely that efficient public schools promote literacy, valuable as the function is. The Philippine public school is the direct application of democracy to the life of the child. "Definite training for citizenship," says the Report of the Philippine Commission for 1914, "is given in the primary, intermediate, and secondary

courses. Various literary societies afford pupils practice in conducting meetings at which questions of interest to all citizens are discussed."

Admitting shortcomings in the Philippine Department of Public Instruction, which was organized in 1901, it represents the high-water mark of popular education in an Oriental dependency. To quote again from the Commission's Report:

> The intellectual awakening of the Philippines which followed the American occupation and the establishment of a modern school system is one of the most gratifying results of American control in the Islands. Everywhere there is the keenest desire for education. . . . It is because of this intellectual awakening and desire for growth and development that the American teachers have an opportunity of doing so important a work in introducing Western methods and ideals, and in keeping the schools in close touch with Western culture. Through the introduction of English, the people of the Philippine Islands have had access to a literature undreamed of by them, and, not only in the schools, but in the public libraries, works of history, travel, biography, and science are greatly sought, not only by the coming generation, but by many of the older generation who learned English because they found that their horizon was immeasurably widened through the reading of English prose and verse.

I attach supreme importance to the place of public education and the preservation of its standards in our school of Philippine self-government. Education outranks all else although its fruits ripen slowly. It is the mightiest engine of democracy; and where it is weak, citizenship is weak. In the case of Mexico, no group of men have more nearly analyzed her need, or intimated the solution of her problem, than the group of college professors who have been giving careful consideration to her educational poverty and how to remedy it.

In the Philippines, the great mass of the adult population is illiterate, and their horizon is more circumscribed than can be easily realized by those personally unfamiliar with the country at large. Though the terms for qualifying as a voter

were from the first set at the bottom notch, only some 200,000 out of a population of approximately 9,000,000 have up to this time claimed the franchise. Voters are now those comprised within one of the following classes: men who under existing law are legal voters and have exercised the right of suffrage; men who own real property to the value of five hundred pesos, or who annually pay thirty pesos or more of the established taxes; men who are able to read and write Spanish, English, or a native language. It was the Jones Bill which added the ability to read and write a native language as an alternative. The provision is theoretically just. Unfortunately, however, it is premature, as it will not only increase the present number of poorly informed voters but also tend to check the bilingual movement which is going to be so valuable an asset in the unifying of the Archipelago and in the international relations of the Philippines of the future. It would be the part of wisdom, even at the cost of hurting the feelings of the adult generation of the day, to restrict the electorate until the present school children shall have reached their majority. In advocating this, I am only applying to the Philippines a principle which I should like to see operative in the United States, where the emphasis is rather on the extension of democratic privilege than on the exactions of democratic responsibility and the preservation of its purity.

Next in importance to the Philippine Department of Public Instruction, I would place the coöperative method of actual government which has characterized our procedure in the Philippines. With a consistency that has been more rapid than opportune, we have "moved from a government of Americans aided by Filipinos to a government of Filipinos aided by Americans." From the beginning, an honest effort was made to fill every possible office with Filipinos as they manifested ability. A minority of the first Commission were Filipinos; likewise the chief justice, an increasing number of the associate justices, and so on through every department and bureau of government to the personnel of the most obscure

municipality. There can be no possible objection to this course provided the appointees are chosen with strict regard for fitness and training, which has not always been the case. Men have been taught to govern by being given a share in government. The response through a decade has been eminently satisfactory, and a carefully organized civil service, controlling both Americans and Filipinos, has promoted a purity of motive and an efficiency of service that is admirable. Every step in the direction of Filipinization — this awkward but expressive word is current coin — has been logical. Government by commission gave place in the course of time to government by commission and popular assembly. A majority of American commissioners gave place to a majority of Filipino commissioners, and in provincial administration similar changes were made. Now within a few months, government by commission and popular assembly has been superseded by government by a legislature of two chambers — a Senate and a House of Representatives.

The Jones Bill, after three years of consideration, emerged as a tolerably creditable product. Its defects, in my judgment, are three. The preamble is marred by the insincerity of intentional ambiguity — it is "the deliberate purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence *as soon as stable government can be established therein.*" The room for controversy over the italicized section of this clause is so patent as to call for no comment. In the second place, it is dangerous and provocative of conflict for the young Senate to be immediately clothed with authority to checkmate at will the chief executive in his appointments. Lastly, an increase of the electorate at this stage is unwise in the light of our experience in America.

It was to the credit of the House of Representatives in Washington that they negatived in emphatic manner the Clarke Amendment to the Jones Bill, which provided for complete Philippine independence in not more than four

years. It was unintelligent in conception, cowardly in motive, and unjust to the Philippines in substance. Loyalty, not opposition, to the true principles of Philippine freedom prompts this criticism. I write as one who, without prospect or thought of reward, has given the best years of his life to the Philippine cause in its more difficult and obscure phases. Democracy I hold to be a sacred trust. It is governed, as history clearly shows, by inflexible laws. Opportunism which scouts these laws may bring momentary satisfaction, but later on retribution will inflict its scorpion sting. Other governmental systems may flourish without regard to the condition of each individual citizen. Democracy, never. Democracy is as dependent for its purity and effectiveness, its wisdom and integrity, upon the purity and effectiveness, the wisdom and integrity of each citizen small or great, as the babe is upon its mother's milk. In the Philippines, America is for the moment the steward of democracy in a university of government of her own creation. She must exercise her stewardship with due regard for the nature of the treasure she is dispensing, as well as with consideration for the desires and aspirations of the people she is educating.

Mention should be made of the thorough training that is being given our wards in scientific research through the agency of the Bureau of Science, which is by long odds the most efficient institution of the sort in the Orient. They are also being trained in the treatment of criminals under the Bureau of Prisons, which, in the Gwahig Penal Colony where there is neither weapon, bolt, nor bar, and in San Rameon Farm among the Moros, has in operation among one thousand five hundred prisoners the most advanced and humane principles of penology. The Filipinos are being educated in road building, in the development of irrigation and artesian water, in architecture and construction, by the Bureau of Public Works; in matters pertaining to exports and imports, to the preservation of public order, to hygiene and sanitation, by their respective Bureaus; and, last but not least, in religious

magnanimity, which I believe to be greater than in any other Latin-trained country, by the separation of church and state. I mention the foregoing not as exhaustive but as illustrative. Moreover, the instruction has all been given in our university of self-government without drawing upon the Treasury of the United States. Apart from the twenty million dollars agreed upon as a *douceur* to Spain by the Treaty of Paris, and the added expense connected with maintaining the army and navy in the Philippines, the affairs of our insular dependency have been so honestly and economically handled that the receipts of government meet all liabilities. The men who laid the foundations of this undertaking and bore the burden and heat of the day builded a fabric too strong and too deep to be easily shaken. All who come after will be able to do themselves and their task credit only in so far as they give honor to whom honor is due.

The future of the Philippines is difficult to forecast. It will depend in large part upon the way America executes the balance of her trust. But I would say in conclusion that this seems tolerably clear: the young or small or weak nation of to-morrow is going to have a harder time and a grander opportunity than ever before. It is true that nations like India and Egypt did govern themselves or, to speak more accurately, had independent statehood — the two expressions are not synonymous — in ancient days. But that was at a period when the ends of the earth did not rub shoulders. Such government as they had would not be tolerated in our modern world any more than an absolute monarchy would be tolerated in America. If internationalism and the federation of the world are anything more than empty verbiage, they imply that every nation is responsible for the purity and effectiveness of its government not only to itself but also to the whole family of nations, just as truly as the States of the Union are responsible to the federal center which symbolizes and cements the whole. Even we have not hesitated to call to account Spain and Santo Domingo and Haiti

and, forbearingly and ineffectively, Mexico, for financial incompetence or inability to preserve order. The small state of the future, if it has any self-respect, will not even desire to crawl behind the pseudo-protection of the discredited principle of neutralization. Every nation, great and small, will desire and be compelled to stand on its own merits and character, manfully shouldering its responsibility. It is not merely that neutralization fails to protect from attack from the outside. If a nation were really to trust in its guaranteed inviolability as, happily, Belgium did not, as Holland and Switzerland do not, neutrality would prevent growth from within, for it would emasculate and sterilize its victim. A nation cannot be a nation in more than name if it declines to accept full international responsibility.

Democracy to grow healthily must grow slowly; and, as I view it, it will be to the mutual advantage of both America and the Philippines to walk yet awhile in close organic relation. America has had no more sobering or enlightening experience than her direct responsibility for the well-being of a people like the Filipinos. It goes without saying that when once America's governmental authority in the Philippines has reached the vanishing point, the flag that has guaranteed and presided over an unprecedented period of peace, prosperity, and progress, will go down forever, leaving the Islands to their own self-protection as well as their own self-government. But I still cling to the hope that our school, so ably and hopefully established by American men and patriots, will not close its doors until the Philippines shall have honorably graduated into a liberty that will be as secure as it will be to the liking of its citizens and to the credit of democracy.

THE FAR-EASTERN PROBLEM[1]

J. O. P. BLAND

[J. O. P. Bland (1863–) is an English journalist and author who has spent most of his life in the Far East. He has been connected with the Chinese Customs Service, been the *London Times* correspondent at Shanghai, and was in Peking from 1907–1910. He has also traveled extensively in Japan since 1887, and during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 he assisted the Japanese secret service in China. His wife is an American. The present article, from which some paragraphs of temporary interest have been omitted, furnishes an interpretation of Japanese aims in the Far East, which, while not entirely unchallenged, is helpful in forming American opinion on this vexing question.]

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At the conclusion of the present struggle, the exhaustion of European nations must leave the United States and Japan relatively much stronger and richer than they were. Both powers will be deeply and directly interested in the arrangement of the conditions under which peace is eventually restored. Japan, as an ally of the Quadruple Entente, and America, possibly as a mediator, must have a voice in the international conference which will define the future frontiers of Europe and many subsidiary questions. Among these, the rights and interests of the powers in China, and the future of that country as an independent state, present problems which, unless carefully studied in advance, may well create great difficulties and even new *casus belli* for the powers whose territories border on the Pacific Ocean. The shadow of the Far-Eastern question has frequently been darkly cast between the United States and Japan in recent years, and never more ominously than when the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1911) relieved England of the duty of assisting

[1] From *Century Magazine*, January, 1916. Reprinted by permission.

Japan against any nation with which Great Britain might have concluded a treaty of arbitration. But much of the trouble has been due to ignorance: a closer study of the question should serve to reassure public opinion in the United States and to put an end to the suspicious uneasiness which finds expression in the unbalanced writings of a Homer Lea or the diplomatic vagaries of a Philander Knox.

Japanese statecraft, whether displayed in Manchuria, in Magdalena Bay, or in the Marshall Islands, points to a perfectly consistent and legitimate policy, which has only to be rightly appreciated in order to remove all immediate prospect of serious friction between Nippon and Anglo-Saxon peoples. The Japanese, who would not hesitate for a moment to exclude from their country Chinese or other cheap labor, are fully alive to the economic necessity which has compelled America, Canada, and Australia to frame their Asiatic exclusion acts. Beyond all question they recognize the legitimate protective purpose of these acts; what they object to, and very properly, is the implied assumption of the racial and moral superiority of the white races. They are well aware that the objection to Chinese laborers in the Pacific States and to Japanese children in the Californian schools is just as directly due to economic causes as the anti-Semitic movement in Russia. They know that the Asiatic is excluded not because he would contaminate, but simply because he would devour, the white man in open-labor competition. England, which professes to believe in free trade and unrestricted immigration, can hardly meet the Japanese on this question in the spirit of "frank and full consultation" for which the text of the alliance provides. Frankness must stultify either the British Government or the acts of the dominions overseas. Similarly, with its Monroe Doctrine for America and its open door for Asia, with its professed belief in the right of every human being freely to change his nationality and domicile, the United States is not in a position to discuss the exclusion acts with Japanese statesmen

on its accustomed lofty ground of political morality. The Anglo-Saxon's ultimate argument, conceal it as we may, lies in the stern law of self-preservation, backed by force.

Now, if there is one fact which stands out more prominently than any other in the history of the last ten years, — that is, since the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, — it is that Japanese statesmen are prepared to recognize and accept these self-protective activities of the Anglo-Saxon races, provided only that Japan also is allowed to follow her own national instincts of self-preservation on the lines of geographical gravitation dictated by her economic necessities; that is to say, by expansion into China's thinly peopled dependencies of Manchuria and Mongolia. Even a cursory study of the recent history of the Far East points clearly to this conclusion. Japan is not prepared to accept the Monroe Doctrine and the Asiatic exclusion acts and at the same time to acquiesce in the traditional policy of the commercial powers, which insists on maintenance of the status quo in China.

It is true that by the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty and other conventions Japan pledged herself to abstain from any encroachments on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China; but her diplomacy, trained in the best European traditions, is unsurpassed in the gentle art of treaty-making and treaty-breaking. It has learned to a nicety the time and place for "extra-textual interpretations" and the conclusive value of the *fait accompli*. As far as China is concerned, the protective clauses of the Portsmouth Treaty, greeted with intense satisfaction in America, were never likely to be effective in Manchuria even had Russia and Japan remained on guard against each other in their respective spheres. Those who hoped and believed that China, in accordance with that treaty, would be allowed to develop the resources of this fertile region without interference and for her own benefit knew little of the imperative necessity which had compelled Japan to fight Russia for Port Arthur. The same necessity led her, immediately after the conclusion of the Portsmouth

Treaty, to come to terms with Russia for a division of the spoil under conditions which virtually insured the benevolent acquiescence of England and France. Upon the conclusion of this pact of spoliation, diplomatically known as an *entente*, the Portsmouth Treaty became a dead letter; it had never been more than a time-and-face-saving device.

The results were many and important. Not only was China not permitted to develop her commerce in Manchuria by the extension of her northern railways, not only did Russia and Japan separately and jointly veto the construction by English and American capitalists of the Chinchou-Aigun trunk-line; but they went much further, asserting and extending their special rights and interests over China's loosely held dependency of Mongolia, forbidding its colonization by Chinese subjects, and establishing their usual trading and mining monopolies. By the end of 1910, China's sovereignty throughout all the region north of the Great Wall was evidently doomed. Mr. Secretary Knox, under the direction of American financiers, made spasmodic, but futile, attempts to prevent the inevitable, by his scheme for the neutralization of Manchurian railways, by forlorn excursions into dollar diplomacy, and by earnest appeals to the open-door pledges of all concerned; their only result was to draw Russia and Japan more closely together in the bonds of a most profitable pact. In 1910, Korea, whose independence had been solemnly guaranteed by Japan and by all the powers, was "persuaded" to sign away the remnants of her sovereignty and become an integral part of the Japanese Empire. The scraps of paper, which were consigned to oblivion by the European and American chancelleries at this passing of the Hermit Kingdom, had ceased to represent either actualities or vital interests. This being so, the forces of geographical gravitation met with no resistance, and the disappearance of an economically unprofitable nation evoked only perfunctory valedictory articles in the press.

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In view of the probability that the Far-Eastern question, with many others, will eventually have to be settled at a post-bellum international conference, it is evidently desirable that public opinion in England and America should be formed upon accurate knowledge of the main facts of the actual situation. So long as the censorship continues to function as at present, this knowledge will not be generally available in England; this makes it the more necessary that all possible publicity should be brought to bear on the subject in America. In view of the misunderstandings and mutual suspicions which have been created between Tokio and Washington on more than one occasion by the reckless sensationalism of yellow-press writers on the one hand and, on the other, by the American public's indifference to foreign affairs, it is a matter of no little importance to the future of the world's peace that the Far-Eastern question should be carefully studied and widely discussed by leading publicists in the United States. The creation of an enlightened public opinion, based on accurate knowledge, is essential to the conclusion of a general agreement between the powers interested in the future of China and the trade routes of the Pacific.

In the formation and education of such a body of opinion certain venerable shibboleths of diplomacy and catchwords long current will need to be gently, but firmly, relegated to the limbo of creeds outworn. All the political ideas underlying the open-door conventions and the international guarantees for the maintenance of China's territorial integrity must be frankly recognized as obsolete, for the simple reason that they have been abrogated by Russia and Japan with the tacit consent of all concerned. The resultant grouping of rival forces and interests at Peking, both before and after the Russo-Japanese War, conferred on China the protective benefits of a period of equilibrium; but this period came to an end with the definite conclusion of the Russo-Japanese *entente*. Optimistic belief in the possibility of China's effectively setting her own house in order must also be abandoned.

It is a belief that gained many sentimental adherents in America as the result of Young China's so-called Republicanism in 1911, but the prospect of organizing honesty and efficiency out of any class of officialdom in China is just as remote to-day as it was under the Manchus. Eloquent platform enthusiasm for representative government, and the profession of high moral ideas by political adventurers and place-seekers, can no more make for good government in China than in Mexico. The men and machinery are completely lacking for the production of honest administration and military efficiency from the official corruption and ignorance of China's rulers. All our instincts of justice and respect for the rights of nations, all our sympathy for the misfortunes of the Chinese people, patient victims of misgovernment from time immemorial, are powerless to avert from them the destiny which sooner or later overtakes a passive, non-resisting race menaced by the necessities of earth-hungry neighbors in arms.

Deeply as we may sympathize with the Chinese, we should not hastily criticize or condemn the expansionist policy of Japan. In considering the causes and possible results of that expansion, certain fundamental truths are often overlooked by writers who approach the Far-Eastern question from a sentimental point of view. In the first place, it must be borne in mind that the Japanese nation differs radically from the typically passive Oriental races of India and China. It is, in the words of John Stuart Mill, an "active, self-helping" people, a people inspired not only by ideals of imperialism, but possessed of strong martial instincts. When in India or China the pressure of population upon food supplies becomes acute, the patient toiling millions accept death with fatalistic resignation. By thousands and tens of thousands, almost uncomplaining, they go to their graves as to beds, accepting plague, pestilence, and famine as part of the inevitable burden of humanity. Only in the southern maritime provinces the more virile inhabitants in China have endeavored to lessen this burden by emigration, by seeking work and wealth

overseas; but individually and collectively the race is lacking in the "self-helping" instinct which solves such problems of expansion by warfare and the survival of the fittest.

In the second place, it must be remembered that Japan's vital need of wider frontiers, new sources of food supply, and new markets for her industries has been in very great measure forced upon her by the policies and example of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. In self-defense they have learned from us the organization of machine labor in cities; following our example, they have passed swiftly from the condition of an agricultural to that of an industrial nation. With these economic changes came the modern science of sanitation, the immediate result being an increase of population far greater than that which had taken place when the country lived by and for agriculture. In 1875, before industrialism had set in, the population of Japan's 150,000 square miles was thirty-four millions; last year it was fifty-four millions, and the average annual excess of births over deaths is roughly seven hundred thousand. The Elder Statesmen of Japan anticipated long ago, as all their unswerving policy has proved, the consequences to their country of the ever-increasing fierceness of industrial competition. They realized that, as the number of countries that depend for their very existence upon the exchange of manufactured goods for foodstuffs and raw materials increases, and as the countries with surplus food supplies become fewer and fewer, Japan must face the alternative either of emigration on a large scale or of finding in territorial expansion new sources of supply and an outlet for her surplus population. The Anglo-Saxon peoples, by their Asiatic exclusion acts, have shut the door on emigration to those parts of the world where Japanese labor might have reaped a rich harvest. Small wonder, then, that the eyes of Japan's wise rulers became fixed upon Korea and the fertile, unpeopled regions of Manchuria and Mongolia, that the possession of these lands became the be-all and end-all of Japanese policy, the goal toward which all the hopes and energies of the nation

have been unswervingly directed. "Eastern Asia," said Count Komura in the Diet three years ago, "is the only safe field for Japanese emigration." Like Prince Ito and other makers of modern Japan, Count Okuma has never had any illusions on this subject. If at times the Japanese have seemed to be desirous of testing the resistant strength of the Monroe Doctrine in California and in Mexico; if they have displayed activity in Vancouver and Honolulu, and cast their eyes toward island outposts in the southern seas, these have been political side issues, deliberately planned and pursued in order to create opportunities for application of the principle of *do ut des*.

Long before the Russian invasion had been swept back from the shores of the Yellow Sea, while still the Japanese people were working patiently and with undivided patriotism to master the mechanical and military sciences of the Western world, the whole nation knew that its destinies depended upon the struggle for Korea and the Manchurian *hinterland*. Eastern Asia could not become a safe field for Japanese immigration so long as Russia remained undefeated and in possession of Port Arthur, but it was always the only possible field in sight. Every page of Japanese history since the Treaty of Shimonoseki reveals the conscious purpose of the nation's rulers to make that field both safe and fruitful at the earliest possible moment. Their policy of expansion, unlike that of Russia, has been from first to last dictated by recognition of the supreme law of self-preservation. We may deplore the fact that Japanese emigration to eastern Asia can be carried out only by inflicting grave injustice and suffering upon millions of defenseless Chinese. We may assume that debarred from colonizing Mongolia, gradually reduced in Manchuria to the position of a subject race, prevented from developing the resources of their country for their own profit by the vested rights and monopolies of the predominant power, the Chinese must find the struggle for life greatly intensified. Nevertheless, the Anglo-Saxon, whose whole

history has been one of expansion in anticipation of the actual and future needs of the race, can assume no moral grounds for criticizing or condemning the policy of the Japanese. The law of self-preservation, as applied between nations, recognizes no scope for altruism; red men, and yellow and brown, being unfit to survive in the struggle for places in the sun, have been eliminated by the European. To oppose Japan's actions and intentions on grounds of self-interest, as by treaties and conventions has been done in the past, may be justifiable; but to oppose them on high moral grounds is hypocritical and futile. British interests in this Far-Eastern question are partly commercial, partly political; Japan's are national and vital.

In taking advantage of the present situation in Europe to exact from China concessions and privileges far greater than she could ever have hoped to obtain at Peking under normal conditions of diplomatic procedure, the Japanese Government has ignored certain of its obligations recorded in the treaty of alliance with Great Britain, but the attitude and official statements of the British Foreign Office for the last four years have been of a nature to suggest that, so long as existing trading rights and railway concessions are not seriously menaced, Japan has a free hand. As far as the special rights and interests claimed in Manchuria and Mongolia are concerned, this vast region was definitely recognized as coming under Japanese influence four years ago; in other words, the open door is there closed, and the principle of equal opportunities abandoned. As for the "contingent" demands of the Japanese protocol, it would be unwise to speculate too closely as to their real intentions. Allowance must be made for Count Okuma's vote-catching program at election-time, and the prudence of the Elder Statesmen may be relied upon to look carefully before they leap into an untenable position in central or southern China. Even though neither England, France, Germany, nor the United States is at present likely to oppose Japanese infringement of treaty rights in China

by anything more than diplomatic protests, there are obviously many powerful obstacles, financial and political, to limit the ambitions and check the activities of the military party and the jingoes in Tokio. It is to be expected that for some time to come these activities will be concentrated on the colonizing of Manchuria and on the development of *points d'appui* in Shantung and Fu-kien.

Assuming the Japanese to be capable of organizing and enforcing good government in China, the cause of civilization and the welfare of the Chinese people would alike have much to gain from the establishment of a Japanese protectorate over the eighteen provinces. History proves clearly that the Chinese are prepared to accept alien rulers so long as they rule with wisdom and justice. It is certain that China's *intelligentsia* is utterly incapable of ruling wisely, and that the people are unfit for self-government; it is equally certain that no European power or group of powers could now undertake the stupendous work of reorganization and education which the country requires. Realizing this fact, millions of Japanese undoubtedly believe in the possibility of a great Asiatic empire under the flag of the rising sun, but there is no evidence that the sober sense of their responsible statesmen entertains any such ambitions. If they did, it would remain to be demonstrated that the ruling class in Japan possesses the moral qualities and administrative genius requisite to secure the loyalty and good will of the Chinese people.

To sum up, recent events at Peking mark clearly the beginning of a period in the history of the Far East in which Japanese predominance will be the central factor, and I have endeavored to show that the expansion of Japan into Manchuria and Mongolia, obviously preliminary to formal annexation, is the result of urgent economic necessity, the inevitable response to instincts of self-preservation. I have assumed that neither on political nor high moral grounds can exception rightly be taken to this expansion into the unpopulous regions north of the Great Wall; on the contrary,

that it should advance the cause of civilization by developing great sources of wealth which Chinese and Mongolian inefficiency have allowed to lie fallow.

But a clear line should be drawn between this justifiable expansion into thinly peopled fertile lands and the contingent claims to assert special rights of a semi-administrative character in China proper. Except with the clear consent of the Chinese, and for their ultimate benefit, any such political ascendancy might prove to be destructive of the world's peace and a cause of fresh calamities to the Chinese people. On the other hand, unless the present chaos and corruption in China can be checked internally and anarchy prevented, something will have to be done by agreement of the powers to impose upon the elements of disorder some form of forceful authority.

The problem is a vast one and intricate: upon its solution depend the peace and prosperity of countless millions. Upon it also must depend the future balance of power in the region of the Pacific, a matter of no small concern to the United States. Clearly the first thing needful is that the leaders and exponents of public opinion in England and America should carefully study and discuss the problem in all its bearings, so that when, with the restoration of peace, the time comes for consideration of the facts accomplished at Peking, that opinion may be clear visioned and firmly rooted in accurate knowledge.

NOTES AND REFERENCES FOR COLLATERAL READING

A WAR FOR DEMOCRACY (WILSON)

For full notes on the address see *Pamphlet No. 101*, "The War Message and the Facts behind It," distributed free by the Committee on Public Information, 10 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.; also for special parts of the address the following pamphlets from the same source: *No. 4*, "The President's Flag Day Address, with Evidence of Germany's Plans"; *Nos. 6 and 8*, "German War Practices"; *No. 10*, "German Plots and Intrigues in the United States."

THE INVASION OF BELGIUM (BETHMANN-HOLLWEG)

PAGE 80. **France stood ready**: The statement that France was ready to invade Belgium is disproved by the fact that the French armies at the beginning of the war were concentrated on the boundary of Alsace-Lorraine and were transferred with great difficulty to the Belgian border when the French found the Germans in Belgium. For the complete address of the German Chancellor and for Prime Minister Asquith's address to the House of Commons on August 6, 1914, see *International Conciliation* for November, 1914.

PRINCIPLES AT WAR (DWIGHT)

PAGE 88. **obscure London schoolman**: Hakluyt began to publish his "Voyages" in 1598.

For other articles on the issues of the War and its causes, see "The War: by a Historian" (F. J. Mather) in the *Unpopular Review* for November, 1914; "The War: by an Economist" (A. S. Johnson) in the *Unpopular Review* for November, 1914; "Headquarters Nights" by Vernon Kellogg in the *Atlantic Monthly* for August, 1917; and the address of President of the Council Viviani to the French Senate, August 4, 1914, in *International Conciliation* for December, 1914.

RÔLE OF THE INFANTRY IN MODERN WARFARE (MALLETERRE)

PAGE 58. **very recent offensive**: capture of Messines Ridge on June 7, 1917. For another technical exposition vividly phrased, see "The 75's" by "Odysseus" in *Blackwood's Magazine* for January, 1916.

THE FRENCH ON THE SOMME ("ODYSSEUS")

PAGE 59. **Lesbœufs**: between Peronne and Bapaume.

PAGE 61. ***gros obus***: French for "a heavy shell."

PAGE 62. **emerged into the daylight**: a short section in the original which describes the underground headquarters of an officer is here omitted.

PAGE 65. **Mr. Bass**: John Foster Bass; see "Who's Who in America" for all living Americans and the similar volume for Englishmen.

For a similar picture of the British soldier see "The Non-Combatant" by Ian Hay in *Blackwood's Magazine* for April, 1917.

DINANT LA MORTE (DAVID)

For confirmatory accounts of happenings in Dinant see the Bryce Report on Belgian Atrocities, The German White Book (accounts of Lieutenant von Rochow and Staff-Surgeon Dr. Petrentz).

A FIGHT WITH GERMAN AIRPLANES (BOTT)

PAGE 78. **Push**: slang term for an offensive movement, in this case the battle of the Somme, July 1, 1916, the first appearance of the armored tractors known as "tanks."

PAGE 80. **Archie**: anti-aircraft guns and batteries. — ***Vesti da Guibba:*** an aria in the opera "Pagliacci." — **Mossy-Face**: the places mentioned are all between Albert and Bapaume.

PAGE 81. **bus**: slang term for an airplane.

PAGE 83. **immediate action**: firing by pressing the trigger directly with the finger instead of firing automatically.

PAGE 86. **joystick**: slang term for the apparatus which causes the airplane to dive.

PAGE 88. **H. E.**: heavy explosive.

SIMS'S CIRCUS (WHITAKER)

PAGE 92. **unfortunate vessel**: the American destroyer *Jacob Jones*, sunk on December 6, 1917, off the Scilly Isles.

PAGE 93. The report of the commanding officer of the U. S. S. *Fanning*, which is the ship which made the capture, assisted by the destroyer *Nicholson*, can be found in "Composition for Naval Officers" by Stevens and Alden. This shows that the date was November 17, 1917; the location of the engagement is, however, still kept secret.

PAGE 94. ***Belgian Prince:*** crew taken on deck of submarine and then thrown into the water and drowned by the submarine's submerging.

For other descriptions of fighting see "From Bapaume to Passchendaale" (1918) by Philip Gibbs. For naval actions see "Sea Warfare" by Rudyard Kipling; "The Pirate" by Mayne Lindsay in *Living Age* for December 30, 1916; "The Gunlayer," *Blackwood's Magazine* for November, 1917; and "Sunk" by R. N. V. in *Blackwood's Magazine* for October, 1916.

THE SPIRIT OF FRENCH YOUTH (BARRÈS)

PAGE 109. **Charleroi**: battle of August 22, 1914. — ***piou-piou:*** a nickname for the French infantry.

For other articles by Barrès see "Young Soldiers of France" in the *Atlantic Monthly* for July, 1917. See also "The Frenchman as a Soldier" by James Milne in the *Living Age* for September 2, 1917.

DIAGNOSIS OF THE ENGLISHMAN (GALSWORTHY)

See also Mr. Britling's letter to the parents of the young German tutor in his family, in "Mr. Britling Sees It Through," by H. G. Wells.

SOUL AND STONES OF VENICE (D'ANNUNZIO)

PAGE 127. **Ca' d'Oro**: the House of Gold, one of the most elegant of the fifteenth century Gothic palaces on the Grand Canal. — **Guidecca**: an island opposite St. Mark's, also the broad canal between the two.

PAGE 129. **Santa Chiara**: a church in Assisi, the home of St. Francis, which contains the tomb of St. Clara, an enthusiastic admirer of St. Francis and founder of the Clarissime Order.

PAGE 130. **Aquilego or Grado**: places near Trieste on the Austro-Italian boundary.

See also "Italy's Duty" by G. Ferrero in the *Atlantic Monthly* for April, 1915, and "Venice in War Time" in *Blackwood's Magazine* for December, 1916.

THE AMERICAN FLAG (VIVIANI)

PAGE 133. **Mr. Long**: Third Assistant Secretary of State, a native of St. Louis and American representative with the Mission.

AMERICA OFFERS HER TROOPS (PERSHING)

For a vivid picture of the actual arrival of American troops in the trenches see "The American Relief Has Come" by Wythe Williams in *Collier's Weekly* for March 23, 1918.

THE DECISION TO MAKE WAR (BERNHARDI)

For other articles on the spirit of Germany and its attitude toward war see "The German Spirit" by Havelock Ellis in the *Atlantic Monthly* for April, 1915; "A Prussian Guardsman" by "Leander" in the *Contemporary Review* for September, 1917; and the chapter "Pretexts for War" in "Conquest and Kultur" issued by the Committee on Public Information. For the best evidence that Germany planned the World War see Henry Morgenthau on the Potsdam Conference in *World's Work* for May and June, 1918, and "Memorandum and Letters of Dr. Muehlon" in *International Conciliation* for September, 1918. For a discussion of Bismarck's ideas of the relations of diplomacy and force see "If Germany" by Munroe Smith in the *North American Review* for November, 1915.

ESSENTIALS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (ROOT)

PAGE 148. **Professor Sohm** : (1841–) German writer on political science.

THE STRENGTH OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (BRYCE)

PAGE 167. **12th of July** : anniversary of the battle of the Boyne, 1690, when William of Orange defeated James II. Celebrated as a Protestant victory. — **Orangemen** : an anti-Catholic society which originated in the North of Ireland.

See also "The Working of American Democracy" by C. W. Eliot in his "American Contributions to Civilization" (1888) and Balfour's Speech at Ottawa on May 28, 1917, relating to democratic efficiency in war — to be found in "Balfour, Viviani, and Joffre," for which see page 132 of this volume.

ATTITUDE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN A DEMOCRACY (HUGHES)

See also "Duties of a Citizen as a Member of a Political Party" by Elihu Root in "Addresses on Citizenship and Government."

THE PALE SHADE (MURRAY)

PAGE 184. **King's "Civil List"** : a grant by Parliament for the support of the King and the Royal Family in lieu of the income of lands formerly owned by the King in his own right. From it the King grants various pensions and annuities to men of literary and artistic importance.

PAGE 195. **Sir William Robertson** : Chief of the General Staff of the British Army in France in 1915–1916. He rose from very humble circumstances, his father having been a stable-keeper.

See also "The Social Revolution in England" by Arthur Gleason in the *Century Magazine* for February, 1917; "Democratic England" (1918) by Percy Alden; and compare "On a Certain Condescension in Foreigners" by James Russell Lowell.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS (SMUTS)

PAGE 204. **Lord Curzon** : (1859–) Viceroy of India 1899–1905.

See also "The Problem of the Commonwealth" by J. A. R. Marriott in *Nineteenth Century* for January, 1917, and "British Imperial Federation after the War" by G. B. Adams in the *Yale Review* for July, 1916.

IDEA OF LIBERTY IN FRANCE (BOUTROUX)

PAGE 209. **blind man of Mœonie** : Homer.

See also "Strength and Weakness of French Republic" by A. V. Dicey in *Nineteenth Century* for August, 1910, and "The Republic and Democracy" by Barrett Wendell in "France of To-Day."

A CLUE TO RUSSIA (BRAILSFORD)

PAGE 215. **Maximalists** : the Majority party, a translation of *Bolsheviki*.

PAGE 216. **Rasputin** : a Russian monk who wielded great influence over the Czar and his family : assassinated in 1916.

See also " The Psychology of the Russian " by Havelock Ellis in *The New Statesman* for May 22, 1915.

GERMAN IDEAL OF THE STATE (TREITSCHKE)

PAGE 224. **real Christian civilization** : so called apparently by the author because Christianity implies self-sacrifice. So, the Prussian theory of the subordination of the individual to the State is Christian !

For Treitschke see A. T. Hadley in the *Yale Review* for 1915, page 235 ; " The Political Philosophy of Treitschke " in the *London Quarterly Review* for July, 1916; " German Autocracy " by Kuno Francke in the *Yale Review*, Vol. V, p. 775 ; " The Political Future of Germany " by Kuno Francke and James M. Beck in *Fortnightly Review* for September, 1917. Read also " National Efficiency Best Developed under Free Governments " by C. W. Eliot in the *Atlantic Monthly* for April, 1915.

THE ARMY AND NATIONAL UNITY (TREITSCHKE)

PAGE 228. **freer and more rational than the French** ; means that Prussia was less bound by traditions, and more rational because looking at matters in a more practical way, being less susceptible to idealism and sentiment. — **sacrifice of nationalities for one another**: nationalities means citizens, and their sacrifice of themselves for the good of the State.

PAGE 229. **third epoch** : written 1872–1896; the years since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 are the third epoch.

See also " The German Theory of Warfare " by Munroe Smith in the *North American Review* for September, 1917.

An excellent discussion of the German philosopher *Nietzsche* will be found in the *Yale Review* for October, 1915, by Prof. C. M. Bakewell, and entitled : " A Modern Stoic."

GAINS FROM THE WAR (ELIOT)

PAGE 237. **Turcos** : troops from the North African colonies of France. — **Gurkhas** : from Nepal — regarded as the best troops in India.

PAGE 245. **Victor Chapman** ; young American aviator killed at Verdun in 1916.

NATIONALITY AND THE NEW EUROPE (COOLIDGE)

PAGE 251. **Livorno** : Italian for Leghorn.

PAGE 252. ***Plattdeutsch:*** Low German such as is spoken in northern Germany.

PAGE 254. **Wends in Lausitz** : the Wends are Slavic remnants in Lusatia in central Germany; they still speak a Slavic dialect.

See also " Nationality and the War " by A. J. Toynbee ; " Italy and the Adriatic " by G. Ferrero in the *Atlantic Monthly* for July, 1917; " The Destiny of the Turkish Straits " by Noël Buxton in the *Contemporary Review* for June, 1917.

FORCE AND PEACE (LODGE)

See also " Nobel Peace Prize Address " by Elihu Root in " Addresses on International Subjects " ; " Carnals and Celestials " by E. S. Martin in *Life* for March 23, 1916, also in his " Diary of a Nation."

A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE (LOWELL)

See also " A League to Enforce Peace " by William H. Taft and William J. Bryan in *International Conciliation* for September, 1916 ; " The United States and the League of Peace " by H. N. Brailsford in the *Atlantic Monthly* for April, 1917 ; " An International Court of Justice " by J. B. Scott in Proceedings of the Lake Mohonk Conference for International Arbitration, 1916.

AMERICA'S TERMS OF PEACE (WILSON)

PAGE 287. **Brest-Livotsk** : the Bolshevik Government finally accepted all the conditions imposed by Germany.

PAGE 288. **resolution of German Reichstag** : the Reichstag adopted a peace resolution proposed by the Socialists, Radicals, and the Catholic Party, expressing a desire for peace without forced acquisition of territory.

Compare with President Wilson's Senate Speech of January 22, 1917, Mount Vernon Address of July 4, 1918, and New York Address of September 27, 1918. Compare also with " British Labor's War Aims " of December 28, 1917, and " Great Britain's War Aims " by David Lloyd George of January 5, 1918, both in *International Conciliation* for February, 1918.

For the special terms see : (Open Diplomacy) " The Causation of the European War " by Perris in *Contemporary Review* for April, 1916, and " Democratic Control of Foreign Policy " by G. Lowes Dickinson in *Atlantic Monthly* for August, 1916 ; (Freedom of the Seas) " The Freedom of the Seas " by H. Sidebotham in *Atlantic Monthly* for August, 1916 ; (Equality of Trade) " The Open Door " by J. A. Hobson in " Towards a Lasting Settlement " and the article by Bainbridge Colby in this volume ; (Disarmament) " Imperial Defense after the War " by A. G. Gardner in *Contemporary Review* for January, 1917 ; (Territorial Adjustment) " Nationality and the War " by A. J. Toynbee ; " Italy and the Adriatic " by G. Ferrero in *Atlantic Monthly* for July, 1917 ; " Future of Turkey and the Balkan States " by Sir Edwin Pears in *Atlantic Monthly* for July, 1915 ; " The Return of Alsace-Lorraine " by Dimnet in *Nineteenth Century* for September, 1917.

CONDITIONS OF PERMANENT PEACE (WILSON)

See references under other addresses of President Wilson and articles by Lloyd George, Root, Dwight, Treitschke, Eliot, Coolidge, and Lodge.

NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AS MOULDING PUBLIC OPINION (BRYCE)

PAGE 809. **Lafayetteville** : any small town.

See also " The Divine Average " by G. Lowes Dickinson in his " Appearances," Part IV, Chap. I ; and " Culture : European and American " by G. Ferrero in his " Europe's Fateful Hour " (1918). For the Press see " The Growth and Expression of Public Opinion " by E. L. Godkin in his " Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy."

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE WEST TO AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (TURNER)

PAGE 826. **Icarians, Fourierists** : communistic experiments, Brook Farm being of the latter kind.

See also " Ideals of America " by Woodrow Wilson in *Atlantic Monthly* for December, 1902 ; " Conflict between Individualism and Collectivism in a Democracy " by C. W. Eliot ; " The Democrat Reflects " by Grant Showerman in the *Unpopular Review*, 1914, p. 34.

THE SPIRIT OF THE PACIFIC COAST (ROYCE)

PAGE 841. **Terry** : a chief justice and politician in California who opposed attempts to introduce law and order in the 1850's by means of the extra legal vigilance committees. — **Kearney** : a labor agitator who became a political leader and stirred up great excitement. See " Kearneyism in California " in Bryce's " American Commonwealth."

For other pictures and discussions of California character, see Frank Norris's novel " The Octopus " and B. I. Wheeler in the *Outlook* for September 23, 1911.

TRANS-NATIONAL AMERICA (BOURNE)

PAGE 843. **Mary Antin** : author of " The Promised Land " (1912), a record of her experiences in Russia and later immigration to the United States and education here.

DEMOCRACY IN INDUSTRY (ABBOTT)

PAGE 854. **Stevenson's essay** : " An Apology for Idlers."

PAGE 859. **Perkins, Filene**, etc. : see " Who's Who in America."

See also " Democracy as a Factor in Industrial Efficiency " by H. B. Drury in the Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science, May, 1916 ; " The Economic Necessity of Trade Unionism " by John Mitchell in the *Atlantic Monthly* for February, 1914 : " Labor and Capital Partners " by John D. Rockefeller, Jr., in *Atlantic Monthly* for January, 1916 ; " Organized Labor and Democracy " by W. G. Merritt in *Unpopular Review* for April, 1916.

THE AMERICAN NOVEL (HERRICK)

PAGE 365. **Janice Meredith** : historical novel by Paul L. Ford in 1899.

PAGE 366. **McNamara case** : blowing up of the printing plant of the *Los Angeles Times* in 1910 during labor troubles. See International Year Book, 1911, p. 138.

See also for other views, the articles in *Atlantic Monthly* for December, 1914, June, 1915, and December, 1915, by E. Garnett, Owen Wister, and H. S. Harrison, respectively.

PURPOSE AND SPIRIT OF THE UNIVERSITY (VINCENT)

PAGE 380. **Bluntschli** : German political scientist and statesman (1808–1881).

For other discussions of education see " Five Evidences of an Education " (1901) by Nicholas Murray Butler in " The Meaning of Education " ; " What Can a University Do to Provide Intellectual Pleasures in Later Life " (1907) by James Bryce in his " University and Historical Addresses " ; " The New Definition of the Cultivated Man " by C. W. Eliot ; " What Is a College For" by Woodrow Wilson in *Scribner's Magazine* for November, 1909; " Democracy in Education " by Nicholas Murray Butler in his " True and False Democracy " (1907).

MILITARY CHARACTER (STIRLING)

See also " Military Character " by Admiral W. S. Sims in Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute for March, 1917 ; " Leadership and Freedom " by W. B. Norris in Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute for January, 1916; " Liberty and Discipline " by A. L. Lowell in the *Yale Review*, Vol. V, pp. 741–53; and, for an admirable comparison of Nelson and Farragut as commanders, the last chapter of " Admiral Farragut " by Admiral A. T. Mahan.

THE INTERNATIONAL MIND (BUTLER)

See also " World Liberalism " by Lincoln Colcord in Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science for July, 1917 ; " Thinking Internationally " by Lord Cromer in *Nineteenth Century* for July, 1916 ; " Socialism and Internationalism " by John Spargo in *Atlantic Monthly* for September, 1917.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY (SHAW)

See also Address of Secretary Lansing at Madison Barracks on July 29, 1917, issued by Bureau of Pan-American Republics.

OUR LATIN-AMERICAN POLICY (OLNEY)

See also President Wilson's Speech at Mobile, November, 1913 ; " Differences between Anglo-Saxon and Latin America " by F. A. Pezet in Report of Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, 1914 ; " President

Wilson's Mexican Policy" by L. Ames Brown in *Atlantic Monthly* for June, 1916; "The Real Monroe Doctrine" by Elihu Root in his "Addresses on International Subjects."

421. ex-President's suggested qualification: that the Monroe Doctrine be held not to apply to the more stable and powerful South American governments. The previous mention of this has been omitted.

DEMOCRATIC IDEAL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS (COLBY)

See also "The Open Door" by J. A. Hobson in "Towards a Lasting Settlement."

TUTORING THE PHILIPPINES (BRENT)

PAGE 436. **Jones Bill**: a bill introduced into Congress in 1913 which provided for greater self-government for the Philippines and promised ultimate independence as soon as a stable government was established.

See also "Colonial Policy of the United States" by Theodore Roosevelt in the *Outlook*, Vol. 95, p. 345; "Ideals of America" by Woodrow Wilson in *Atlantic Monthly* for December, 1902.

THE FAR-EASTERN PROBLEM (BLAND)

PAGE 442. **Homer Lea**: author of "The Valor of Ignorance," an early book on "preparedness."

PAGE 443. **Treaty of Portsmouth**: (1905) closed Russo-Japanese War and made Japan predominant in Manchuria.

PAGE 444. **Chinchu-Aigun trunk line**: a railroad that was to run from Chinchu (Changchau) in South China to Aigun in northern Manchuria. It was projected in 1909 by British, American, and Chinese interests, but was objected to by Japan and Russia and never built. See "Contemporary Politics in the Far-East" by Stanley Hornbeck, page 162 and *passim*.

PAGE 447. **Elder Statesmen**: a group of aristocrats in Japan who advise the Mikado and have exercised a predominant influence in the government.

PAGE 448. **Diet**: the two Houses of the Japanese Parliament.

See also "Action and Reaction in the Far East" by E. B. Mitford in *Fortnightly Review* for January, 1916; Hornbeck, as above; and "Japan and Righteousness" by Barrett Wendell in *Scribner's Magazine* for July, 1918.

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
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